University of Alberta

Political Leadership and New Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy - Assessing Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis.

by

Nicholas Gammer ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled: **Political Leadership and New Directions in Canada's Foreign Policy-Assessing Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis** submitted by **Nicholas Gammer** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

Professor T. Keating (Supervisor)

Associate Professor J. Lejnieks

Associate Professor L.Trimble

David R Marples
Professor D. Marples, Dept. of History

Judson for L. Cohen
Professor L. Cohen (External Examiner)
Political Science, Simon Fraser University

Fred Judson
Associate Professor F. Judson
(Chair)

June 21, 1996
Date

Dedication

This study is dedicated to my former student, Jimmy Laing, and to my father Alexej Gammer. Jimmy was an exceptionally bright and talented young man of great promise. His memory and his potential for achievement have inspired me in my work. To my father, a survivor of two civil wars, two emigrations, and a concentration camp, I am most deeply indebted for being my bastion of courage and strength. Finally, I am most grateful to Dr. Tom Keating for his encouragement and boundless patience in guiding me through this project.

Abstract

This study is set against the backdrop of post World War II Canada-Yugoslav relations, the disintegration of the former Yugoslav state, rising ethno-nationalist conflicts and the demise of superpower bipolarity. The importance of the debates surrounding state sovereignty and particularly humanitarian intervention are integrated into this examination of Canada's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis. An examination of Canada's role in Yugoslavia reveals a significant shift in Canada's foreign policy in terms of humanitarian intervention. Evidence is presented of Canada's role in initiating and leading a number of bold actions that further advanced the cause of an interventionist approach to conflict resolution. By presenting a detailed account and examination of Canada's foreign policy involvements in the former Yugoslavia the case is made that the doctrine of non-intervention was rejected by the Canadian government. The rejection of the doctrine of non-intervention was made possible by the interplay of three determinants of foreign policy - *domestic*, *international* and *governmental* - which are analyzed in considerable detail. Highlighted in this study is the part played by the Canadian government in advancing the role of multilateral institutions - especially the UN, NATO and the CSCE - as key mechanisms of humanitarian intervention. Most important of all in this study is the emergence of the dominant role played by Canada's political leadership in reshaping foreign policy. Ultimately, it is Prime Ministerial power that is behind a new foreign policy which challenged the supremacy of state sovereignty and abandoned the doctrine of non-intervention in Canada's foreign policy approach to civil conflicts and humanitarian intervention.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

This study is inspired by the view that the recent disintegration of the former Yugoslav state has very serious political, strategic and economic implications for international relations. The peace and security of an important part of the world are very much at stake as Eastern Europe attempts the transition to political pluralism and market economies. Events in the former Yugoslavia have the potential of seriously undermining European security and attenuating East-West relations. Ethno-nationalist conflicts such as those that have erupted in the former Soviet republics and elsewhere indicate that what is taking place in Yugoslavia should not be viewed in isolation. Certainly, developments in Eastern Europe, specifically in the former Yugoslavia, have left our policy-making and scholarly establishments with the formidable task of responding prudently to rapid and unpredictable changes. The level of carnage, devastation and human suffering produced by the civil war has shocked the civilized world and has shown that the international community is uncertain and often ill-prepared to respond to the crisis.

In addition to addressing a number of issues of broader international significance this study has also been inspired by the unique story of Canada's involvement in the Yugoslav tragedy. That story is exciting because of the boldness of Canadian actions and revealing because of how Canadian foreign policy has been redefined. In reviewing and analyzing Canadian foreign policy towards the former Yugoslavia this study provides a detailed analysis of Canadian foreign policy and developments there. Canada's involvement in the Yugoslav conflict constitutes a very important issue for Canadians and Canadian foreign policy. It is also an issue that has not yet been addressed in its broader scope by the academic community. Canada's involvement in the former Yugoslavia constitutes more than unbroken ground in the study of Canadian foreign policy. By reviewing and analyzing Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia, this study also presents the opportunity to identify an important metamorphosis in Canadian foreign policy under the Mulroney government and to outline the role that political authority can play as an influence over foreign policy.

There is some compelling evidence that Canada, through her diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts in Yugoslavia, has advanced the cause for a more interventionist approach to conflict resolution. Policy statements by senior officials, our peacekeeping contributions, and our advocacy role in promoting much stronger interventionary mechanisms, attest to a change in Canadian foreign policy. Political leaders, as well as members of Canada's foreign policy community, contended that in a world of growing interdependence, freed from Cold War divisions, *peace-keeping* is not enough - *peacemaking* is also required. In clear and precise terms Canada's minister of external affairs, Barbara McDougall, signalled in 1992 that Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's government was launching a profound change in Canada's foreign policy when she announced: "In the area of human rights, Canada has rejected the doctrine of non-intervention and insisted on international oversight in the United Nations and the CSCE."[1] In doing so Canada's foreign policymakers were seeking to contribute "to a lasting framework for international cooperation" in the vacuum created by the demise of the Cold War and super power bipolarity[2]. That vacuum has neither lessened the dangers of conflict nor the necessity for Canada to play a part in striving to develop more effective and relevant means of addressing and ameliorating conflict and the destabilizing dangers associated with it. Furthermore, conditions of global interdependence are bringing to the fore a number of factors that are challenging former assumptions that assert the autonomy of the nation-state. It is also contended that Canada, working with bilateral and multilateral instruments in its role in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, has been playing a prominent role in instigating and redefining new cooperative security arrangements in her efforts to promote a more responsive and fruitful approach to conflict resolution, especially where human rights are concerned. The implications of Barbara McDougall's statement of 1992 are far-reaching. The Minister's statement represents a challenge to the international political consensus that has been sustained by the theoretical primacy of status quo assumptions upon which the system of states has interacted for at least the past three centuries. The Minister's statement suggests also a profound shift in Canada's approach to humanitarian intervention. In short, the evidence suggests a profound shift in Canadian foreign policy in terms of humanitarian intervention.

The central objectives of this study are three. First, it will present a detailed account and analysis of Canada's policy towards the former

Yugoslavia. Second, the dissertation will test the assertion made by the Minister of External Affairs that Canada has rejected the doctrine of non-intervention in accepting a more interventionist policy towards conflict resolution. Third, this study will also argue that the rejection of the doctrine of non-intervention and the corresponding shift in Canadian foreign policy have been instigated and directed by political leaders, especially the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. With these objectives in mind the dissertation is designed to explain Canada's policy towards the former Yugoslavia, the changes in policy in the early 1990's and shed light on the process by which foreign policy is made in Canada.

Canada and Yugoslavia

Recent events in the former Yugoslavia are worthy of examination both because of the threat they pose to European stability and international security and for what they tell us about Canadian foreign policy. While not of the highest priority, Yugoslavia has been an important factor in Canadian foreign policy since WWII. Few Canadians may be aware of the significance of evolving post-war Canada-Yugoslav relations. These relations are important not only in terms of tangible evidence of the importance of Canada's earlier presence in East Europe but also in terms of what they show us about how Canadian foreign policy was made. Canada's earlier role as a significant player in East European affairs and the factors that influenced the evolution of Canadian policy towards Yugoslavia are made salient through an exploration of a series of issues and events spanning the period from the birth and recognition of a new Yugoslavia in the forties to the fracturing and eventual demise of the Yugoslav federation that was becoming apparent by the late eighties. Besides matters of sovereignty and intervention, these issues and events revolved around Canada's middle power interests in international affairs during the Cold War period. They reveal both political differences between Canada and Yugoslavia and at the same time, the extent to which the two countries shared common international objectives. More specifically they had much to do with Canada's interest in managing conflict through the multilateral mechanisms of the United Nations, NATO and the CSCE, while finding a balance between human rights concerns and the geostrategic imperatives of the times.

The post-war review of Canadian foreign policy toward Yugoslavia presented in the second chapter of this dissertation, like a review of Canada's position on human rights in general, depicts, until the nineties, a foreign policy constrained in its ability to more effectively safe-guard human rights in other states. Canadian foreign policy had long emphasized human rights domestically and internationally. By the late seventies human rights had achieved greater prominence on the foreign policy agendas of many Western governments, especially the United States under President Jimmy Carter. The case has been made that while successive Canadian governments have appeared to take a more prominent stance in expressing their indignation and shock at human rights violations associated with foreign governments, this rhetorical commitment has not been fulfilled in practice. Margaret Doxey has described this as the "rhetoric gap" in Canada's human rights position.[3] Throughout Canada's post-war relations with Yugoslavia the Canadian government had been concerned about human rights violations taking place within Yugoslav borders. During that period Canada's human rights initiatives in its relations with Belgrade were played out in the shadow of strategic concerns related to supporting the integrity of the Yugoslav state.

Other valuable inferences can be drawn from a historical examination of Canadian-Yugoslav relations. Some are related to certain determinants of Canadian foreign policy that were particularly influential in molding Canadian foreign policy during the earlier period of relations between the two states. Most important, the historic review of relations between Canada and Yugoslavia provides a contextual reference point against which we are able to plot the shift in Canadian foreign policy which followed.

Sovereignty and Non-intervention

The shift in Canadian foreign policy has been attended by a debate in Canada and elsewhere concerning the concepts of sovereignty, intervention, self-determination, secession and, most importantly, a revived debate on human rights. In broader terms it will be argued that the Mulroney government's views on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are central to an assessment of Canada's role in advocating humanitarian intervention as an effective means of resolving the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. This study is also predicated on examining, largely within the context of human rights, the extent to which Canada's and the international community's views of those principles have changed. These changes have been driven by the assumption that the traditional rules that have managed and maintained order within the international system may no longer be appropriate. As a result, the old rules are increasingly the subject of debate. A changing environment normally requires the complementary adaptation of rules and norms to comply with those perceived changes. If an appropriate adaptation is not realized there arises a dangerous disjunction between the realities of international events and the rules by which actors attempt to cope with them. In terms of humanitarian intervention this disjunction may be located between the principles, policies and mechanisms of intervention at the international level and the current realities of civil war at the domestic/state level. The failure by the member states of the world community to recognize and correct this disjunction can pose dangers to international stability, peace and security.

A review of the recent evolution of discourse about sovereignty highlights the problem of the conflicting principles of non-intervention and humanitarian assistance as they apply to the current debate within Canada. The principles of non-intervention are well established, but threatened in the contemporary international community where principles in support of humanitarian assistance - based on the recognition and protection of human rights - are promoted and upheld. Conceptual debates on sovereignty, self-determination and secession, as well as the current debate on human rights in Canadian foreign policy, not surprisingly, inform much of this study.

Certainly the concept of sovereignty has been among the most controversial in international law and political science. On one pole it has been associated with the idea of indivisible and uncompromising political authority and has in that sense been regarded as a critical attribute of statehood. This notion of sovereignty also played a positive role where state and national boundaries agreed and were clearly definable. However, many writers on the subject such as Ruth Lapidoth, Nathaniel Berman and Alexis Heraclides have become more sensitive to the growing manifestations of post Cold War nationalism and ethnic awareness, and as such, promote a more subtle and flexible understanding of sovereignty.[4] According to these writers the pre-eminence of sovereignty is undergoing serious challenge and considerable deterioration. Some scholars point to the rise of democracy and federalism as contributing to the loosening of the notion of sovereignty. Concepts such as *dual sovereignty*, *divided sovereignty*, *residual* or *de jure sovereignty*, *de facto sovereignty*, *functional sovereignty*, *pluralistic sovereignty* and even *sovereignty-association*, Lapidoth illustrates, have re-surfaced as a part of the international system's vocabulary.[5] These writers represent that body of opinion that advances the view that sovereignty has undergone erosion as a consequence of contemporary technology and economics. They argue that due to the many facts of modernization the state no longer enjoys the kind of full and absolute authority it once did. National borders - in the face of free trade arrangements, transnational monetary, trade, and communication flows and the like - are no longer under genuine state control. State sovereignty has also been weakened by developments in constitutional and international law which have seen the adoption of new normative rules which place further prohibitions on the use of force, in part, to safeguard human rights. The increased participation of states in international organizations with considerable power is also seen to reduce the power of sovereignty. There has been, as Horst Drier has put it, "a loosening of monolithic sovereignty."[6] According to this view the doctrine of sovereignty requires redefinition as within certain parameters sovereignty is divisible and relative. Berman argues, for instance, that although sovereignty is safeguarded by international law in normal times, during abnormal periods of change sovereignty may be quite simply superseded by self-determination - as in the case of the birth of the Finnish state after World War One.[7] In other words, Berman's position complements the perspective of those who maintain that sovereignty may be in abeyance and that it is, in fact, divisible. Many of these writers argue that the concept of sovereignty becomes increasingly troublesome where a variety of national or ethnic groups share the same state, particularly when these subgroups aspire to self-determination, or at the very least self-rule. On that point Lapidoth writes:

> The ethnic revival [of the nineties] is another severe challenge to the old notion of sovereignty. Since several thousand peoples or ethnic communities exist, and the globe is too small to provide them full sovereignty over a piece of land, a compromise must be found to satisfy at least partially the aspirations of the various groups.[8]

It appears that members of the international community no longer consider sovereignty a sacrosanct principle. For instance **An Agenda for Peace** issued by the Secretary General of the United Nations declares the end of "absolute and exclusive sovereignty."[9] The report suggests that the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other in the period ahead."[12] Within the context of establishing a balance between those principles and ideals, a less rigid understanding of the concept of sovereignty is being sought. In addition, the conventional parameters of the principle of non-intervention will likely undergo even stronger challenges. If international norms have been changing and our own views changing in the same way, something very significant has been taking place on a global level, something that has had a profound influence on Canadian foreign policy.

The perception of the decline of sovereignty is also understood to have normative sources. Many rules linked to sovereignty have been abolished. First there has been a rigid restriction of the traditional right of a sovereign state to wage war. There has been an incremental decline in the permissible use of force. Force is now usually limited to individual and collective security through the United Nations in response to a threat to or breach of the peace as established by Article 2(4) of the Charter. Second, the case is made that the concept of "sovereign equality," while still lodged in the Charter, has, within the context of the complex interdependence of states, become transparent and meaningless. In short, the traditional prohibition against intervention in matters of internal state jurisdiction inherent in the concept of sovereignty has come under intense pressure and may have already been punctured. A large and perhaps growing number of authors, like Alexis Heraclides, have drawn the conclusion that "the traditional concept of sovereignty no longer fits the necessities of modern international law. The idea that sovereignty can be neither limited nor divided is contrary to modern developments in international society."[11] The example of aid to the Kurds of Northern Iraq has been cited as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. The agreement to intervene was received by an Iraqi government under tremendous international pressure and the Iraqi government had little choice but to agree. That intervention exposed the tension between the pressure to intervene and continuing support for sovereignty. In sum, it can be argued that the paramountcy of sovereignty has been reduced and the indivisibility of sovereignty seriously challenged. This is illustrated by the debate on self-determination and secession.

The principle of self-determination is plagued as well by controversies and ambiguities and is undergoing pressures of redefinition, even though the principle of the right of peoples to self-determine has been generally accepted and acclaimed as an important norm in the legitimization of the state. The right is externally motivated - the right to create a state or choose one to which to belong - and internally motivated - namely, the right to freely choose the government of one's choice. It is commonly accepted that under those circumstances where the state's population is homogeneous the right to self-determination strengthens the state and its sovereignty, whereas in the case of heterogeneous states, the right of self-determination is more likely to threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. Alexis Heraclides notes that before the Yugoslav secessionist crisis, "it was generally accepted that there were no 'cracks' in the existing self-determination regime," apart from the unique case of Bangladesh.[12] Opposition to secessionism is rooted partially in the constitutional norms of the majority of states, Heraclides notes. It is worth noting that the Yugoslav constitution appeared to provide for secession. However, Heraclides explains:

> The preamble to the Yugoslav constitution ... granted the right to break away from the center, though this right was undermined in the operative part: Territorial revisions were made possible solely with the consent of all six republics and

> the autonomous provinces. Hence change could come about by way of partition only, not through secession.[13]

As a corollary of self-determination and a focal point of our attention due to events in the former Yugoslavia and the recent rise of intra-state and ethnic tensions, the concept of secession has taken on added significance.

Not long ago there was a common view that secession is as an anachronism, or as Alexis Heraclides phrased it, "an oddity fit for the museum of historical movements.[14] This assessment is being rethought. With very little in the literature of leading political philosophers that provides us with guidance regarding the subject, secessionism has been moved forward on the domestic and international stage in good measure because of the startling events we are witnessing in a number of regions such as the Baltic, the former Soviet Union and the Balkans. Not surprisingly perceptions of secession have undergone what some might consider profound reassessment to the point where, as Heraclides suggests, "one can detect a weakening in the existing taboo against secession, indeed the signs of an emerging paradigm shift whereby secession will no longer be treated as unthinkable by the international system."[15] She suggests, for example, that "we should attempt to devise a qualified right to secessionist self-determination whereby only some claims to self-rule could be candidates for some form of separation or devolution, including independence."[16] Although one could well disagree with the extent of change perceived by Heraclides' assertion, one cannot escape the fact that a reemergence of secessionism is in evidence in many parts of the world. This evidence, at the very least, challenges many of our conventional assumptions associated with sovereignty and self-determination. The present international climate and the violent events that are shaking those areas where secessionist demands are being enacted, shows the importance of the reaction of the international community, particularly in terms of the potential for third-party involvement. The United Nations or any other regional intergovernmental organization is in the difficult position of, on the one hand, advocating the territorial integrity of states via the doctrine of non-intervention, and on the other, showing sensitivity to what might be considered the legitimate aspirations of peoples to self-determination and secession.

The dilemmas posed by the potentially conflicting principles of self-determination and secessionism becomes particularly problematic where humanitarian intervention is concerned. "Any humanitarian intervention," Michael Akehurst has argued, "however limited, constitutes a temporary violation of the target state's political independence and territorial integrity if it is carried out against that state's wishes."[17] While one can quote Article 1 of the Charter as promoting human rights, the same article begins by advocating the maintenance of "international peace and security."[18] There are other tensions in the Charter, for instance between those provisions that recognize the legal standing of human rights (as well as those rare exceptions under which intervention is possible) and the state's exclusive rights over matters of domestic jurisdiction. In similar terms the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference contains, on the one hand, a strong statement in favour of the doctrine of non-intervention under Principle VI, and on the other, an equally strong argument promoting the urgency of human rights as a matter of universal concern under Principle VII. Likewise, in the context of the UN Charter, Chapter VI requests that the Security Council call upon contesting parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means whereas Chapter VII (Article 39) allows the Security Council to take appropriate action "in respect of a threat to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression."[19] In short, there is a reasonably strong body of opinion that argues that the while the framers of the Charter were concerned about protecting the sanctity of state, they also wanted the Charter to be flexible enough to respond to changing conditions in the world.

In conclusion, the debates surrounding the concepts of intervention, self-determination, secession and the preeminence of sovereignty suggest that their monolithic and rigid interpretations are open to further question and challenge in the context of the emerging global order. In terms of Canada's approach to the international system, emerging global realities provide opportunity for Canada's political leadership to undertake a foreign policy agenda which can more actively advance human rights at the expense of considerations of sovereignty. The human rights debate in Canada further accentuates the need to reconsider the limits of state sovereignty.

Sovereignty and Human Rights in Canadian Policy

The shift in Canadian foreign policy, illustrated by Canada's response to events in Yugoslavia, is linked with the more general issue of human rights. A review of Canada's track record of human rights prior to the shift in Canadian foreign policy indicates that while human rights occupied a very important position in foreign policy, there were fundamental impediments and restraints associated with the issue that prevented Canada from pursuing a more active and intrusive foreign policy where human rights were concerned. An examination of some of the international and domestic roots of Canada's earlier reticence to pursue a more aggressive human rights agenda in its foreign affairs reveals at its center the concept of sovereignty.

The international roots of Canadian reticency can be detected in the dynamics of multilateral institutions upon which Canadian foreign policy is highly reliant. The popular view has asserted that Canada's attachment to multilateralism has allowed it, as a middle power, considerably greater influence in world affairs. By being at the forefront of multilateral involvements through institutions such as the UN in particular, Canada was able to play a more prominent role in fostering global cooperation. At the same time, it should be recognized that Canada's influence in multilateral fora, should not be exaggerated - particularly where human rights were concerned. It has been argued by Kim Richard Nossal, for instance, that Canada's multilateral involvements affected our human rights policies by reigning in their potential effectiveness, thereby muting any challenge to the international status quo dominated by the more powerful member states. In reviewing the pre-nineties period of Canada's human rights policies Nossal noted:

> Leaders of coalitions tend to have conceptions of interests that they wish pursued or maintained, conceptions that they typically impose, by transference on the group. Junior members are not obligated to identify with, or share, these conceptions but are forced to work within the boundaries, or parameters, set by the leaders if they wish to remain members in good standing. Junior members who differ on an issue may try to alter, by private discussion, the leaders' definition of the

> groups interest. If such attempts fail, however, they must weigh the importance of taking action that will more properly reflect their definition of interest but will conflict with the leaders'. Independent action on an issue important to the leaders may be costly.[20]

Nossal's point underscores the perspective that an important impediment preventing Canada from advancing more interventionist human rights policies through multilateral institutions were the constraints imposed on them by the dynamics of the political and security environment of the Cold War. In reflecting on Canadian policy toward Yugoslavia prior to its break up, this thesis documents how Canadian foreign policy operated largely within the conventional parameters (guarded by the more dominant members) of the United Nations, NATO and the CSCE. Certainly Canada had been pressing, at least on a rhetorical level, for the elevation of human rights in these multilateral forums. For the most part, however, it is not until the passing of the Cold War which coincided soon after with the break up of the former Yugoslavia, that Canadian initiatives are transformed into independent and forceful policies that indicate an important shift in Canadian foreign policy which seriously challenge the doctrine of the sovereignty of the state or undermine its position in multilateral associations. Canada's Cold War inhibitions pertaining to human rights were likewise carried over into Canada's stance on humanitarian intervention.

Prior to the 1990's governments took the view that humanitarian intervention is not permissible had been the position taken by successive governments. In his survey of Canadian human rights policy, Nossal came to the conclusion that "while Canada's position on sovereignty has not been entirely consistent, and while the interpretation of domestic jurisdiction in human rights has shifted since the late 1970's, Ottawa's continuing commitment to state sovereignty inhibits forceful action on human rights."[21] Nossal's conclusion is supported by Canada's history of avoiding humanitarian intervention. Prime Minister Trudeau's often quoted "Where's Biafra?" in response to a question in 1968 about the possibility that Canada might intervene in the Nigerian civil war symbolized what the Canadian government considered the inappropriateness of promoting humanitarian intervention in the affairs of another federal state. In 1971 when Prime Minister Trudeau visited the Soviet Union and was urged to raise human rights issues, Trudeau refused to do so on grounds of national sovereignty. Some time later another Trudeau government expressed it opposition to the view that the military intervention into Kampuchea by an invading Vietnamese army was an appropriate means of stemming gross violations perpetrated by the Pol Pot regime.

Canada's policy-making community has exhibited an enduring commitment to the doctrine of the sovereignty. Its adherence to the doctrine of state sovereignty has been described by some as a part of a "prevailing pattern from the Prime Minister on down ... of timidity and often appalling indifference ."[22] In similar terms the Department of External Affairs has been criticized for its "lackluster approach" and lack of appropriate attentiveness to human rights.[23] While increasingly acknowledging the importance of human rights, governments, policy-makers and analysts have typically viewed Canada's involvements in human rights-related issues as being particularly intractable, often in contradiction to our national and strategic interests, as well as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of foreign states.

Analysts and critics have also directed their attention to the nature of the decision-making process where human rights in Canadian foreign policy are concerned. It has been the nature of the decision making process, some argue, to avoid seriously engaging in a bolder and more substantive attack on human rights as more integral aspect of Canadian foreign policy. In their 1988 study "Human Rights and Foreign Policy-Making" Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney noted that "despite the slight change in 'atmosphere' - encouraging verbal support for human rights - in practice, human rights considerations are largely isolated and marginal in policy-making and in the day-to-day minutiae of implementation."[24] More importantly perhaps, they characterize decision-making in Canadian foreign policy as operating "on the assumption that international relations should be left to officials; they do what is best, quietly and behind closed doors ..."[25] In other words, foreign policy is best left to the professional bureaucrats that form and lead Ottawa's foreign policy making community. The views of the public in the domestic domain generally either assume a secondary role in policy-making or, regardless of the growing evidence of the "domestication" of foreign policy, the foreign policy bureaucracy is quite capable of remaining impervious to domestic preferences or the preferences of their political masters. The Department of External Affairs acts, of course, as the central institution in which Canadian foreign policy is developed and administered. "Ministers and their civil servants," Nossal has observed," are left to concentrate on the day-to-day problems of Canadian diplomacy - 'policy' at its lowest level."[26] As summarized by Berry and McChesney: "Broad or lofty principles have a rough time working their way through the bureaucracy to or from the minister. The Minister depends on the department's information and organizational wisdom; bureaucrats weigh the many steps in implementing a particular idea against a wide range of competing ideas and departmental activities."[27]

Canada's early post-war involvements in Yugoslav affairs show case the domination of the Department of External Affairs where lofty humanitarian principles become lost behind the "realities" of making and conducting foreign policy. Furthermore, Berry and McChesney call into question "the profile and importance" given to human rights within the Department of External Affairs where human rights are described as being vaguely defined and integrated into overall policy, where most officials have traditionally lacked "formal expertise" in human rights, where human rights considerations are all too often viewed as an impediment to the "normal give and take of diplomacy," all of which suggests to critics "an inadequate and underdeveloped understanding of what might be involved in giving fuller consideration to human rights."[28] It is not surprising, therefore, that within this large risk-avoiding bureaucracy, the Secretary of State for External Affairs is among the few actors who possess the capability to further the role of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. There have been a host of Secretary of States, especially since the 1970's, who have spoken passionately and earnestly about the relevance of human rights. They have been unable or unwilling to seriously challenge the preeminence of state sovereignty in the making and conduct of foreign policy. The post-war history of Canada's international relations, and particularly those that concern Yugoslavia, indicates that is not until the nineties that the conditions are right for there to emerge the political leadership willing to grasp an historical opportunity to empower itself to take the lead in seriously challenging conventional norms in international relations.

The shift in Canadian foreign policy has also been accompanied by a resurgent debate on the role of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. This debate has managed to produce both competing and complementary views on Canadian foreign policy as it relates to the issue of humanitarian intervention. To begin with, the debate has a uniquely Canadian history that can be traced to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed more than forty years ago. There have been a multitude of international treaties and other international documents on human rights that have been promoted and signed by Canada since 1945. Due in part to the gradually transforming international setting and persistent Canadian initiatives promoting human rights, the belief has arisen in some quarters that international standards concerning human rights have come to be set. Of relevance to this study of foreign policy is Canada's role and level of success in encouraging, for instance, other states to adopt as well as, in some cases, to elevate those standards.

As noted, the Canadian government's response to human rights violations, in the past certainly, has been cast in the pessimistic terms of the complexity of the problem, the inhospitability of the international environment, and Canada's weakness, to name a few. As will become evident in the next chapter, these considerations were certainly evident in Canada's policy towards Yugoslavia prior to 1990. This "doom and gloom" position, accompanied by what has often been referred to as the "rhetoric gap", can be contrasted with a position which emphasizes and espouses the possibilities of human rights activism on the part of Canadian foreign policy. These views were sparked, in large measure, by meetings of academics and activists in Toronto in 1984 and 1985 that were followed by a two day conference on human rights and Canadian foreign policy in June of 1985 soon after the Mulroney government came to power.[29] Work by Robert O. Matthews, Cranford Pratt, Victoria Berry, Allan McChesney, and Kathleen Mahoney and others, have contributed to the current policy debate and the presentation of competing arguments for and against a more interventionist policy. In his analysis of Canada's position on human rights Nossal has contributed to the debate through his explanations of the reasons Canadian governments have fallen short of meeting their rhetorical commitments to human rights in Canadian foreign policy. He argues that the commitment to the doctrine of sovereignty continues to overshadow whatever interests policy-makers have in implementing a more activistic human rights policy. Furthermore, he makes the argument, as already noted, that Canada's multilateral involvements serve to constrain rather than embolden any inclination on the part of governments to initiate stronger human rights policies.[30] Berry and McChesney's analysis, in a similar vein to Nossal's, presents the case that there are pockets of support within the government and foreign policy bureaucracy for elevating the importance of human rights in foreign policy, but that this support is limited due to the more powerful competing interests associated with economic and geo-strategic concerns that are "firmly rooted and reflected in governmental decision-making and administrative structures."[31]

Particularly relevant to the perspective adopted by this study is their observation that policy-makers in the government and bureaucracy are capable of shifting their priorities when there is a demand by the public to do so. In this way they suggest that the door is open for a more interventionist policy. In exploring the foreign policy-making process within the human rights context Berry and McChesney clearly part company with Nossal by offering some foreign policy-making prescriptions. These prescriptions employ a more systematic approach which "would require clearly defined responsibilities, carefully formulated consultative procedures within and between departments, and mechanisms for systematically gathering, receiving, vetting and acting on human rights data."[32] The Canadian debate also extends into the realm of international forums where Canada is capable of playing an even stronger and more intrusive role in encouraging stronger adherence to human rights standards by the international community. A political activist, Renate Pratt, for instance, laments the fact that Canadian governments have done little to promote human rights through international financial institutions.[33] In reviewing Canadian policy toward the Human Rights Committee of the UN, Cathal Nolan has argued that Canada's "record of openness to international review enhances its credibility when it speaks on violations elsewhere." [34] T.A. Keenleyside argues for incorporation of a flexible "framework of action" in Canadian foreign policy within the context of development assistance while criticizing government for being inconsistent and selective as well as far from its goals in offering assistance.[35] Frances Arbour, a human rights activist, in assessing Canada's human rights policy in Central

America, offers a series of recommendations that call for Canada to lend greater institutional support for human rights and justice.[36]

Exemplifying the pro-interventionist camp is the work of Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt. On the basis of *interfering* on behalf of human rights, Matthews and Pratt are able to present foreign policy prescriptions that could be considered by any government that is concerned about flagrant and chronic violations of basic human rights. These human rights policy prescriptions, while distinguishable from policies of intervention, nevertheless open the door to the consideration that protecting human rights abroad is an acceptable prerequisite for interventionary government policies. Matthews and Pratt substantiate their approach by adding that there are also exceptions when, to quote Waltzer, *intervention*, "is a response with reasonable expectations of success to acts that shock the conscience of the world."[37] Matthews and Pratt argue that:

> An intervention can legitimately include military assistance to those resisting an oppressive regime when these five conditions are met: first, an active organized resistance already exists; second, the regime nevertheless is itself able to command resources which will overwhelm those which this resistance is able to assemble; third; there seems no likelihood of meaningful change in other and less violent ways; fourth, there is near universal acceptance that the denial of human rights is particularly severe; and, fifth, there is reasonable likelihood that the armed resistance, if assisted, can succeed either in overthrowing the regime or in winning major reforms.[38]

Furthermore they argue that:

> Direct armed intervention is justified in those rare circumstances where either the oppression is so severe or the breakdown of order so complete that it is widely recognized that immediate humanitarian objectives justify an intervention. In these circumstances it is much preferable that intervention be accomplished by an international [emphasis mine] force.[39]

Proponents of this view are also careful to reiterate that intervention in rare and exceptional cases should not be seen to be undermining the principle of non-intervention "unless the humanitarian considerations seeming to require intervention are incontrovertible."[40] In examining the ethics of humanitarian intervention Jack Donnelly is among those academics who lend credence to the position that in spite of considerations of sovereignty, there are definable situations in which intervention should be legitimized. He writes:

> Where the state is guilty of gross and persistent systematic human rights violations, the consent of the governed can no longer be presumed. In fact, we must presume the opposite. Non-intervention is therefore no longer morally required. Likewise, the innocent victims of humanitarian crises cannot be imagined to have chosen or consented to their fate. In other words, whether the state is merely temporarily incapable of protecting individual rights or an active violator, it has lost the moral authority to demand that external actors remain uninvolved.[41]

In recognizing the impact of human rights-related principles on policy Kathleen Mahoney's "Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy," offers a comprehensive view of the recent debate surrounding the role of human rights in Canadian foreign policy which she describes as being "in evolution and transition."[42] Although uncertain about the "depth of the Canadian commitment to human rights" Mahoney strikes a note of optimism in describing evidence of the rise of human rights to a place of prominence in the government's foreign policy program.[43] "The emphasis," she concludes in 1992, "has shifted from self-centered, short-term economic considerations to a more holistic approach, presented in terms of human rights, democracy and security."[44]

There are a number of reasons why the current Canadian debate on human rights in Canadian foreign policy are relevant to this study. First of all, through the debate there has emerged a greater sense of order and clarity in terms of the issues explored and analyzed. The debate has allowed a clearer review of options to surface. The contemporary policy debate not only highlights the saliency of the human rights issue per se, but also its place in relation to other foreign policy interests and concerns. In other words, the debate has not only been about the hesitancy of Canadian officials to emphasis human rights in foreign policy because of definitional/legal propriety and interests of sovereignty. Human rights, as an integral aspect of our humanitarian concerns, also has had to compete with strategic/political and economic interests of Canadian foreign policy - within both a bilateral and multilateral context. At the same time, the debate suggests that while traditional foreign policy matters of national security and economic well-being limit or deter human rights goals, those matters are not immune to modification and change.

As noted a particularly salient feature of the debate is the advocacy by a number of the participants of fundamental guidelines and prescriptions in the making and conduct of foreign policy. There is also a growing recognition by many of those contributing to the contemporary debate that there are definable "basic rights" as prescribed by Matthews and Pratt which Canada should strive to achieve in its bilateral and multilateral relations. They are: "(1) the right to basic subsistence and related needs required for sustaining life; (2) freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention without trial; (3) freedom from torture; and (4) freedom from extrajudicial execution."[45] Finally the debate is also carried by those voices who call for greater accountability of ministers to Parliament for Canada's human rights policies. This call for greater accountability on the part of Canada's political executive, they suggest, would reduce criticism about the frequently ambiguous and evasive nature of the government's human rights policies and contribute to a better public understanding of human rights related issues promoted by Canada internationally.

From the perspective of the current policy debate a consistent argument has been made that human rights "have been elevated to a prominent and vital element of Canada's foreign policy alongside collective security, national unity, and prosperity."[46] Whereas in the early 1980's and before Canada's human rights policies were considered to be on the periphery of Canada's foreign affairs, they are now considered, by many, to be approaching parity with strategic/political and economic features of our foreign affairs. In short, the contributors to the debate have gone a long way towards drawing some clearer parameters for the legitimation of intervention on the basis of human rights violations and concerns. Prominent sectors of that debate have attempted to underscore and distinguish the basis for legitimate state intervention in the internal affairs of another from the illegitimate, in order to safeguard human rights as well as the principle of sovereignty.

Methodology and the Yugoslav Case Study

This paper's principal methodology is to examine the policies of the Canadian government in response to developments in the former Yugoslavia. Among the primary objectives the dissertation is to examine the role played by Canada's political leadership in the making of a policy which rejected the doctrine of non-intervention and heralded the arrival of a new doctrine which defied the norm of the sovereignty of the state. In examining Yugoslavia as the case study this paper has not attempted to apply a specific theory of foreign policy behaviour. A review of government policies and statements serves as the basis for demonstrating that a foreign policy shift to intervene on behalf of the promotion and recognition of human rights in the affairs of other states has taken place. Canada's foreign policy efforts in the former Yugoslavia acts as the case study which tests the strength and viability of that commitment as espoused by Prime Minister Mulroney, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, and others. Whether or not, or to what extent, Canadian foreign policy behaviour during the contemporary crisis in the former Yugoslavia was truly representative of Canadian foreign policy practice has not been analyzed in any depth. It has, however, been assumed that the Yugoslav case is sufficiently representative of Canadian policy behaviour to warrant this analysis in addition to the intrinsic importance and the highly serious and dangerous implications this civil war has had on European and world affairs and domestic affairs of other states. A cursory examination of Canada's other foreign policy involvements would indicate manifestations of foreign policy behaviors that are similar to those exhibited by the Mulroney government towards the Yugoslav situation - Canada's foreign policy engagements in Somalia and Haiti, being two primary examples. For example, evidence suggests that Prime Minister Mulroney was a key initiator of the multilateral response to the overthrow of the Aristide government of Haiti in February 1992 and the Canadian government's support of the Security Council's humanitarian intervention in Somalia in December of the same year was reinforced with a commitment of Canadian forces to that operation.

The case study of Canada's involvements with the former Yugoslavia is undertaken essentially on two levels - bilateral and multilateral. The bilateral level of the case study will address Canada's bilateral relations with the former Yugoslavia and the now independent states of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly, Croatia. Bilateral activities such as: diplomacy; cancelling or encouraging official visits; reducing or increasing diplomatic representation; reducing or increasing educational/cultural/scientific exchanges; assisting in the establishment of rights-related activities; reducing or increasing economic assistance; and assisting in training of police or armed forces, are but a part of an array of bilateral activities that indicate the level of importance attributed to Canadian initiatives in the Balkans. An analysis of bilateral relations is also useful under circumstances where governments undertake unilateral initiatives to further particular goals whether they be humanitarian, strategic/political or economic. Certain aspects of Ottawa's relations with Zagreb, Belgrade or Sarajevo were more effectively accomplished within a bilateral context - particularly where those bilateral instruments could be employed in conjunction with multilateral initiatives. Conversely, the host governments representing the secessionist states of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the rump state of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia, chose to undertake or respond to foreign initiatives outside of the context of United Nations or European Community involvement when dealing with Canadian officials and diplomats. In short, the use by Canada of bilateral instruments to influence especially the domestic behaviour of other states has a bearing on this study.

The multilateral dimension in the Balkans will focus specifically on Canada's role in the three multilateral institutions that have played a prominent role in the conflict in the Balkans, namely, the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In this context, Canada's part in a number and variety of multilateral initiatives in the pursuit of a resolution of the conflict through interventionary means will be studied. They would include our role in encouraging wider participation in the application of existing international instruments, the promotion of the development of novel instruments of conflict resolution, supporting or proposing calls for multilateral agencies and/or bodies to investigate grave situations, supporting or calling for diplomatic, economic and military sanctions by international bodies, stimulating the promotion of human rights by all governments and groups involved in the conflict, encouraging and participating in the co-ordinated gathering of information pertinent to the resolution of the conflict and the promotion of codes of conduct among adversaries and combatants. It is acknowledged that international organizations have had some success in setting standards and promoting human rights. A vital question in so far as Canadian foreign policy is concerned will be how successful international organizations have been in implementing human rights standards in the Yugoslav conflict. In examining the dynamics of relations between the Canadian government and the multilateral institutions noted - the UN, CSCE, and NATO - conclusions will be drawn as to the effectiveness of Canada's part in advancing the cause of multilateral intervention as a means of resolving conflict and defending human rights.

The acceptance of an interventionist foreign policy in response to civil conflict would mark a very significant change in the course and conduct of Canadian foreign policy, as well as the course and conduct of an individual state in the world system of states. This thesis offers explanations as to why and to what extent, there has been a change in the substance and direction of Canadian foreign policy. Evidence of change, and more specifically what influenced this change, will be examined within three spheres of our political environment - *domestic*, *international* and *governmental*. For the purposes of this study the determinants and sources of Canadian foreign policy are to be found in the three spheres.

In considering the *domestic* sphere or setting of Canadian foreign policy a number of explanatory variables will be considered. Prominent among those will be the impact of public opinion, ethnic groups, the media, and other interested groups. This paper accepts the theoretical premise that domestic factors cannot be ignored or underplayed in the making of Canadian foreign policy. Individuals and groups in society, frequently referred to as "societal actors" play a part in shaping Canadian foreign policy. The range, depth and shape of interests displayed by "societal actors" varies somewhat over time and according to circumstance. [47] It is frequently suggested that in the past Canadians were not particularly interested in their country's international affairs and that their influence on foreign policy was largely marginal. Furthermore, in reference to the early post-war era it has been noted by Tom Keating that "it was marked by a widespread popular consensus on the objectives and means of Canadian foreign policy."[48] These conditions offered policy-makers in the governmental sphere greater opportunity to influence foreign policy. The view of Canadians as largely disinterested spectators of Canada's external relations no longer prevails. As Joe Clark wrote recently: "The real change in Canadian foreign policy in the last fifty years is that it has become everybody's business - a central factor in national policy rather than something more marginal."[49] A range of public opinion polls taken over the last decade document a growth of public interest in, and closer identification with, Canada's foreign affairs. The reaction of contemporary governments to public opinion can be witnessed in their concern that foreign policy initiatives have the support of the public. Increased deference by government to societal actors, public opinion or interests groups should not lead us to over-emphasize the impact of societal forces on the making of foreign policy. Much of the literature suggests that societal forces do not dominate the process of making foreign policy, but rather as Nossal and others have suggested, define those boundaries within which policy should be made - *parameter setting*, in short. In terms of ethnic groups, this thesis examines the part played by the Croatian, Slovenian, and Serb ethnic lobby in attempting to influence policy-makers. Canada's ethnic history indicates that immigrants have adopted diverse interests. Sometimes the interests of these ethnic groups have been to see Canada maintain good relations with their homeland, and sometimes their interests have led them to attempt to influence Canadian foreign policy to adopt a belligerent foreign policy towards their native land whose rulers they often view as being oppressors or violators of human rights.

Human rights groups especially are very much in the vanguard of attempts to influence the shape of Canada's foreign policy. As representative of the symbolic interests of domestic groups in Canadian society, human rights issues have played a part in the empathy Canadians have historically shown to the plight of those whose human rights have been denied. In contemporary times, as in the past, the interest of Canadians in human rights has been episodic. At the same time, however, it can be perceived that human rights from the perspective of the public has gained greater political legitimacy in the minds of Canadians in general. Human rights groups have been credited with maintaining constant pressure on the policy making circles of government. The prevailing view is that these groups have become more vocal and have taken on a more prominent profile in human rights issues as they pertain to Canadian foreign policy. The extent to which governments appear responsive to pressures from human rights organizations and publicly identified themselves with the concerns and frustrations brought forward by these organizations becomes an important indicator of their influence on foreign policy. The role of the media in reporting the horrors of the war, identifying itself with its innocent victims, analyzing its repercussions, and offering policy prescriptions that called for intervention on a humanitarian basis, has become a significant influence on the government and a part of the larger domestic human rights debate. There are among analysts varying views as to the influence of media on foreign policy. This study accepts the perspective that the media adopts an important role in providing issues with shape, structure and a sense of importance. While the influence of media should not be linked directly to the making of foreign policy, it does have, as Denis Stairs has pointed out, " a very significant impact on the day-to-day activities of the men who make it."[50]

Finally, while not a focal point of this study, one must not lose sight of the domestic impact that the potential threat of Quebec separation and the politics of federalism generally may have had on the conduct and formulation of Canadian foreign policy towards a rapidly disintegrating federal Yugoslav state. Where in the past provincial governments have been absent from the formulation and management of foreign policy, the contemporary period sees their emergence as important players in Canadian foreign policy - especially where Quebec is concerned. Paradoxically, Quebec, as the object of grave domestic concern that evokes issues of sovereignty, has at the same time become a domestic force in the conduct of a Canadian foreign policy which is frequently called on to address international issues related to sovereignty and human rights.[51] Understandably, therefore, the Canadian government's sensitivity to the position of central governments in federal states is an important consideration, along with the other domestic factors related to the roles of public opinion, ethnic groups and the media in the making of Canadian foreign policy.

The *international* sphere or setting is a second important source of our foreign policy that this study isolates and examines. All states are subject to the constraints of the international environment and sovereign states occupying it in terms of achieving their objectives. Within this setting it is helpful to make a distinction between the environment in which Canada must function and the location Canada establishes for itself in the international environment. In terms of the environment in which Canada must operate, a number of variables are recognized. They include, in broad terms, the nature of the present international order, the degree of cooperation and institutionalization within the system and the viability and strength of international institutions as they affect Canadian policy where it concerns Canada's role in the Yugoslavia conflict. The global environment in which Canada must operate is of significance to this study as much of this study brackets the transition in the nature of the international order from one that was characterized as being bipolar to one that may be described as multipolar - with the US remaining as the one superpower. The transformation of the international order can have a bearing on the nature and degree of international collaboration between states as well as on the foreign policy orientation of a particular state within the system. The transformation of the international order will impact also on the power of international institutions. As Nossal points out, "the degree and strength of international institutions will have a comparable impact, for strong institutionalization is likely to offer greater opportunities for active diplomacy aimed at strengthening international order."[52]

In terms of location, understood in a broader political context, this study will take into account Canada's place in the international hierarchy, as well as our alignments within the UN, NATO and CSCE, where the "dynamics of compulsion" are present, on the one hand, and Canada's capacity for independent action, on the other.[53] To be considered as well are Canada's capability and power in terms of the resources available to Canada in its efforts to influence the resolution of civil conflict by means of intervention. Although Canada's land mass is huge and richly endowed with natural resources, its small population, limited industrial capacity, and small armed forces have been regarded as limitations on the scope of action Canadian foreign policy is capable of pursuing. As to how we define Canada's capabilities in terms of its power, this paper adopts the conventional "middle power" image. The "middle power" image does not imply that Canada is unable to play a distinctive and important interventionist role in the international hierarchy. On the contrary, Canada's middle power status can encourage a foreign policy capability that can make a difference internationally through the innovative development of strategies and the entrepreneurial use of international institutions. Furthermore, Canada's status as a middle power should not deny the surprising extent of Canada's international reach. Canada's post-war middle power initiatives were, for example, very much concerned with constraining regional conflicts. Canada's participation in institutionalizing conflict resolution mechanisms was also rooted in to Canada's bond to the United Nations and its peacekeeping activities as institutional instruments in support of general systemic peace. What is particularly significant about the breakdown of superpower bipolarity - as reflective of a change in the international system - is the extent to which that breakdown affected the direction of Canadian foreign policy. In other words, has the end of the Cold war era and subsequent changes associated with it, offered Canadian foreign policy-makers a window of opportunity to pursue a new foreign policy doctrine more appropriate to meet the challenges of the future?

Domestic and international factors contribute to the setting of general policy boundaries for the *governmental* sphere. For the purposes of this study, and borrowing from Nossal, the governmental sphere has been narrowed down to incorporate three arenas: the House of Commons , the Department of External Affairs or Canada's foreign policy bureaucracy, and the Prime Minister and the minister of foreign affairs or the political executive. The governmental sphere cannot be depicted as unitary or monolithic. Critical to developing an understanding of the impact of the governmental sphere on the shaping of foreign policy is the distribution of power and authority within the state apparatus. "A country's foreign policy," Nossal has observed, "will be affected if the state apparatus is highly institutionalized and bureaucratized, for the higher the degree of institutionalization, the less latitude political leaders have for dominating the process of decision."[54] Within the governmental sphere - elected and bureaucratic - there were competing interests and contending viewpoints on the course to be followed in Yugoslavia. As the center of the bureaucratic complex charged with managing Canadian foreign affairs, the Department of External Affairs has been a dominating institutional presence in the governmental sphere. Nossal makes the important point of distinguishing between the *power* that bureaucrats may have in advancing their own policy preferences as opposed to the *influence* they may have on their political masters. While the power of the bureaucrats may be limited, their influence on foreign policy is likely greater. The domination of the Department of External Affairs has been challenged and undercut by other forces, political and bureaucratic, in the governmental sphere. An assessment of the significance of the bureaucratic challenge emerging from two strengthened governmental support agencies: the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO) is required. The foreign policy bureaucracy has grown considerably since, for example, the days when it provided ministers of the crown advice on the foreign policy course to follow with regard to the emergence of the new Yugoslav state in the aftermath of WW11.

Parliamentary debates and the positions adopted by the parties on the Yugoslavian situation also had an impact on policy. While parliament acts as a forum for public debate, political parties, Robert Jackson has noted, "mobilize public opinion, coordinate political activity and function as intermediate instruments of political activity for those not elected to office."[55] As a consequence of convention and practice Canada's federal legislature has been relegated a smaller role in the development of foreign policy. As an institution the House of Commons is not empowered to make or shape foreign policy decisions, except for members of the House who have been appointed to cabinet. As an institution, though, the House of Commons is an important forum prevailing over a number of political functions described by Nossal and others as *legitimation*, *representation*, *education*, and *policy*.[56] The parliamentary debates concerning the Yugoslav crisis constitute a very important element in this study. It was through the House and the emotional and thought-provoking debates surrounding issues related to humanitarian intervention and the recognition of the secessionist aspirations of peoples of the former Yugoslavia that members were able to formalize and legitimize Canada's response. During the debates members sought to translate the urgent interests and demands of their constituents into policy. Opposition members were particularly forceful in representing the views of their constituents most often in terms of advocating a more intrusive role for Canada in the Balkans. Government members frequently attempt to exert their influence on the policy making executive through less visible, informal channels in order to avoid giving the impression of governmental disunity. The educational function of the debates on the Yugoslav crisis and how it affected the direction of Canada's foreign policy is also worth considering. A knowledgeable public is one that is more willing and likely to have its voice influence Canadian foreign policy.

The dominance over foreign policy by the political executive, at the expense of parliament, has generally prevailed in Canada. Parliament, therefore, can be considered, to use Denis Stairs' term, "an input mechanism" through which pressure may be brought to bear on the policy making process.[57] In broader terms Parliament and the political parties channel the often multifarious pressures generated by the domestic community onto the policy making process. It is generally assumed that the impact of opposition parties and outside groups on the foreign policy process is constrained by the powers of the government. However, if the demands of the domestic society, in conjunction with Parliament and the parties, are "explicitly articulated," the domestic environment can create a permissive environment within which the policy-making community and ultimately the Prime Minister can exercise more energetically acceptable courses of action.[58] Of special interest to this study is the part played by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs located at the apex of power. While the Prime Minister's power is constrained by constitutional provisions and convention, most Prime Ministers have established their dominance and have left their mark on matters of foreign policy. The Prime Minister is also capable of putting his/her own stamp on the decision-making process and ultimately is capable of dominating the foreign policy decision-making process. Besides asserting formal authority, through the power of appointment among other things, the Prime Minister is able to project personal enthusiasm and commitment on to certain policy initiatives and issues. "Their personal qualities and idiosyncrasies, their moods and emotions, cannot be dismissed as unimportant," Nossal reminds us, "for in diplomacy, where words are actions, such traits invariably bear on policy outcomes."[59] In an earlier analysis of leadership in Canada's external affairs Bruce Thordarson noted that an assessment of Prime

Ministerial influence on Canada's foreign affairs requires an appraisal of the Prime Minister both as a person and as an office holder constrained and influenced by larger structural forces. More than bold declarations are required for a Prime Minister to successfully initiate a change in foreign policy of considerable magnitude, scope and duration. As John Kirton has noted: "Basic alterations in the process by which that policy was produced would be needed. And if they [the Prime Minister and his colleagues] were serious in their intent they would not hesitate to challenge the entrenched perspectives and standard procedures of the thousands of officials who helped to make foreign policy within the executive branch of government."[60]

In presenting his views on Prime Ministerial capabilities Thordarson comments on the relationship between the Prime Minister and Canada's foreign minister:

> As important as the personal traits that a prime minister brings with him to office is the approach he adopts towards other institutions and structures such as cabinet, the civil service, and parliament. The extent to which they are allowed to play a major policy role will usually depend on the latitude they are allowed by the prime minister, who is at least in theory in a position of unequalled power and influence. The most important 'structural' relationship is undoubtedly that of the prime minister with his secretary of state for external affairs.[61]

The nature of the relationship between the Prime Minister and his foreign minister are important factors in assessing Prime Ministerial impact on foreign policy. The relationship between the Prime Minister, as the head of government, and a minister of foreign affairs, charged with authority over Canada's external affairs, is a difficult one largely due to the degree to which their roles overlap. When the relationship is problematic the management of foreign policy shows signs of ineffectiveness and divisiveness. "Indeed, there can be no doubt," wrote Nossal recently, "that no other cabinet portfolio is more likely to produce conflict with the head of government than that of foreign minister."[62] On the other hand, the relationship can be potentially advantageous and can facilitate harmony and strengthened purpose in the making of foreign policy. In describing the uniqueness of the relationship, Nossal points out "that in no other policy field does participating in the development and implementation of policy provide the head of government with the symbolic benefits of prestige (that invariably rebounds to the concrete political benefit of the leader back home). This is because foreign policy, to a far greater extent than any other policy field, can impose on the Prime Minister the necessity to take on a active and intimate role in developing foreign policy."[63] The degree to which the Prime Minister wishes to accept that imposition can depend on the Prime Minister's personal disposition as well as on the nature of the issue at hand. Of course the foreign affairs minister is also called upon to participate personally in the formulation and management of foreign policy.

The relationship between the Prime Minister and the foreign minister and its consequent impact on foreign policy is determined not only by structural explanations but by their personalities as well. James Eayers noted of the relationship between the two: "Whether they contrive a mutually profitable division of labour, or whether their energies are dissipated in rivalry, will depend mainly upon their temperaments; especially will it depend upon the temperament of the Prime Minister."[64] For the purposes of this study the Prime Minister's relationship with Joe Clark and later Barbara McDougall will be examined. In considering the relationship between the minister of foreign affairs and the Prime Minister it is also important to consider the predispositions the Minister of Foreign Affairs brings with the office. In other words, this examination must consider the extent to which the minister is committed to making policy as opposed to allowing himself/herself to be subsumed by the weight of the bureaucracy. The role played by the minister in relation to the "balance of power" between the Prime Minister and the foreign policy bureaucracy is particularly significant. Also significant is the extent to which the head of Canada's foreign policy establishment is prepared to change the "ministerial style" in the Department of External Affairs.[65] Change in ministerial style can imply the desire of a minister to have, as David Cox notes, "stronger political input on issues which the bureaucratic hierarchy would normally have considered to be their terrain" and improved access "to the real decision-making process within the department."[66] In threatening to undermine already-existing or conventional departmental procedures thereby challenging the authority of senior bureaucrats, the Minister is signalling a change in the *modus operandi* of decision-making.

It has been assumed that ministers of external affairs are to rely on their departmental functionaries for advice. By expanding and politicizing the Minister's office to include high-ranking personal aides and advisors the Minister strengthens the hold over his/her office to the detriment of the role of the under-secretary of state and his/her officials. By further politicizing the making of foreign policy, through formalizing the use of outside advisors who may be more receptive to interest/domestic group input, the Minister has likely enhanced his/her control of foreign policy. When a Minister's strong and personal commitment to an issue, such as human rights, reflects or coincides with domestic or public interest groups' sentiment on the issue, the Minister's ability to challenge convention and change foreign policy is greatly enhanced.

These three sets of factors will help illuminate the determinants of Canadian foreign policy towards the former Yugoslavia, as well as shifts in Canadian foreign policy generally. They will also allow us to examine more clearly evidence of change within the context of the past practise of Canadian foreign policy. The historical context incorporated in this study provides a detailed account of Canada's relations with Yugoslavia that sheds some light as well on the making of foreign policy during that period. In identifying factors influencing foreign policy one must not neglect the effects of specific events on Canadian foreign policy. Whether these events are traumatic or subtle, they may stimulate change. Finally, the role of political leadership in policy design, implementation and, ultimately, change will be examined and shown to be a critical explanation of change. An examination of both domestic and international conditions - in conjunction with the role of political leadership - will be completed to assess the extent to which a new set of systemic conditions in the international system, and a new mix of domestic interests have allowed Canada to pursue a new kind of foreign policy. In more significant and precise terms, I will argue that domestic and international factors supported the emergence of political leadership as the dominant determinant of change in Canada's foreign policy.

This study is comprised of six additional chapters. Chapter 2 provides a history of Canadian-Yugoslav relations and Canadian involvement in and reaction to events leading to the disintegration of the former Yugoslav state. Chapter 3 focuses on the specific issue of the recognition of the breakaway republics and what it suggests about the changing direction of Canadian foreign policy. Specific attention is drawn to the case of Croatia and Canada's evolving bilateral relations with that newly emerging state. Chapter 4 focuses on Canada's multilateral involvements in the former Yugoslavia via the UN. This chapter presents evidence that Canada's multilateral involvement in Yugoslavia through the UN shows that there has been a change in the making and conduct of Canadian foreign policy. The change in Canadian foreign policy is attributed to an interplay of domestic, international and governmental factors. Chapter 5 undertakes a similar endeavor, except here Canada's NATO and CSCE involvements in the Yugoslav crisis are explored. The attempt by the government to develop concrete institutional connections between the CSCE, NATO and the UN, as well as to institutionalize multilateral intervention, are examined and brought into focus within the context of domestic, international and governmental factors which have influenced that policy. International law, and especially Canada's part in making it a more effective instrument in the promotion of a more interventionary human rights policy, constitutes the subject of Chapter 6. In more specific terms Chapter 6 explores and highlights Canada's contribution to the creation of the international war crimes tribunal designed to prosecute human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia. Chapter 6 also examines Canadian efforts to establish a permanent international criminal court to bring to justice those failing to abide by fundamental, humanitarian standards of law. The final chapter summarizes evidence that a change in Canadian foreign policy has occurred. Prime Ministerial power and influence over foreign policy emerges as the most important determinant behind a new Canadian foreign policy doctrine which challenged the supremacy of the principle of sovereignty and abandoned the doctrine of non-intervention in Canada's approach to other states, civil conflicts and humanitarian intervention.

Endnotes

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3. Margaret Doxey, "Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy," *Behind the Headlines*, 37, June 1979, p.10.

4. See, for example, Ruth Lapidoth, "Sovereignty in Transition," *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter, 1992, 45, No. 2; Nathanial Berman, "Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law," *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, 7 (1988); Alexis Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention: In Quest of a Normative Symbiosis," *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 1992, 45, No. 2. Other contributors to this body of opinion include George P. Schultz, " On Sovereignty," Lecture on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the National Academy of Engineering (Washington, D.C.), October 4, 1989; Thomas Fliener-Gester and Michael A. Meyer, New Developments in Humanitarian Law: A Challenge to the Concept of Sovereignty," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 34 (1985); Luzius Wildhaber, "Sovereignty and International Law," in R.St.J. MacDonald and Douglas M. Johnston, eds., **The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory**, (Dordecht, Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1986.

5. Ruth Lapidoth, "Sovereignty in Transition," *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter, 1992,45, no.2, p.332.

6. Horst Drier, "Souveranitat," *Staatslexikon*, 4 (1988),p.408, cited in Ruth Lapidoth, "Sovereignty in Transition," p. 345.

7. Nathanial Berman, "Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law," cited in Ruth Lapidoth, "Sovereignty in Transition," p.333.

8. Ruth Lapidoth, "Sovereignty in Transition," *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter, 1992, 45, No. 2, p.345.

9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, **An Agenda for Peace**, (United Nations, New York, 1992), p.9.

10. Ibid., p.9.

11. Alexis Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention: In Quest of a Normative Symbiosis," *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 1992, 45, no.2, p.399.

12. Ibid., p.405.

13. Ibid., p.407.

14. Ibid. , p.399. "Secession," as defined by Heraclides, "is a unilateral act for independence by a region comprising territory in a sovereign, independent state undertaken in opposition to the metropole."

15. Ibid., p.399.

16. Ibid., p.408.

17. Michael Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention," **Intervention in World Politics,** H. Bull ed., (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), p.105.

18. Min-Chuan Ku, ed., **A Comprehensive Handbook of the UNITED NATIONS**, Volume 1, p.108.

19. Ibid., p.115.

20. Kim Richard Nossal, "Cabin'd, Cribb'd, Confin'd?: Canada's Interests in Human Rights," **Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy**, Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds, (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1988), p.53.

21. Ibid., p.53.

22. Sheldon E. Gordon, " The Canadian Government and Human Rights Abroad," *International Perspectives*, November/December 1983, p.9.

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24. Victoria Berry and Allen Mchesney, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy-Making," Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds., (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1988), p.59-60.

25. Ibid., p.62.

26. Kim Richard Nossal, **The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy**, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985), p.150.

27. Ibid., p.150.

28. Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy-Making," **Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy**, Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds, (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), p.66.

29. Kim Richard Nossal, "Cabin'd, Cribb'd, Confin'd?: Canada's Interest in Human Rights," **Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy**, R.O. Matthews and C. Pratt, eds., (McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 1988), p.47.

29. One of the products of the meetings and subsequent conference was the publication in 1988 was a thorough and comprehensive study of Canada's foreign policy role in human rights entitled **Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy** edited by Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, members of the University of Toronto's Department of Political Science.

30. Nossal outlines this line of argument in his contribution to **Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy** , Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds.

31. Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy-Making," **Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy,** Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds., (McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston and Montreal,1988), p.75.

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39. Ibid., p.171.

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41. Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention," *International Journal*, XLV111, Autumn 1993, p.615-616.

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47. "Interests" as defined by Nossal can be *concrete* or *symbolic*. A worker at Bombardier helping to build water bombers for export to Yugoslavia may have a *concrete* interest in arresting the violence in

Yugoslavia so that orders can continue to be filled, while at the same time he may demonstrate a *symbolic* interest in having Canadian peacekeepers halt the "ethnic cleansing" and bloodshed in that country because they offend his human values. Nossal, Kim Richard, **The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy**, Prentice Hall Canada Inc., Scarborough, Ontario,1989, p.89.

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Chapter 2 - History of Canadian-Yugoslav Relations (1941-1990)

Introduction

It is a little known fact that well before the deaths of eleven Canadian soldiers during the current crisis in Yugoslavia an even greater number of Canadians had paid the ultimate price in earlier conflicts in Yugoslavia. On the morning of November 11, 1948 in a ceremony presided over by Canada's first Minister to Yugoslavia and the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia, a Commonwealth war graves plot was dedicated to the 497 graves of mostly Commonwealth airmen located in the Belgrade municipal cemetery. Twenty-five of those graves belonged to Canadians of the Royal Canadian Air Force who had been shot down over Yugoslavia while participating in the liberation of that country during WW11. Their sacrifice symbolizes a longstanding investment by Canadian foreign policy in Eastern Europe, especially the Balkans. That investment has been surprisingly active and direct. In focusing on the post-war origins of Canada's international relations with Yugoslavia, this chapter, in broad terms, will present a historical backdrop against which Canada's recent foreign policy engagements in the Yugoslav conflict can be better measured and understood.

Besides providing a historical context this chapter will draw attention to some of the origins of the change in Canadian foreign policy which were to follow in the early nineties. A review of Canadian foreign policy relations with Yugoslavia reveals elements of consistency and elements that would predispose Canadian foreign policy to change. Canada's foreign policy focus on Yugoslavia in both historical and contemporary terms has in common a series of issues that this chapter shall bring forward. These issues include the recognition of a "new" Yugoslav state as well as related questions on sovereignty and intervention; the place Yugoslavia assumes in a maturing Canadian foreign policy specifically and in international relations generally; Canada's interest, as a middle power, in managing international relations and conflict through multilateral institutions; and the role of human rights as opposed to geo-strategic imperatives.

Finally, this chapter will begin to bring to the forefront the saliency of those domestic/societal and international factors which played their part in shaping Canadian foreign policy relations towards Yugoslavia beginning with events of the forties that led to the birth of a new socialist Yugoslavia and ending with those that preceded its demise in the nineties. Of particular significance during this period is the role played by Canada's foreign policymaking bureaucracy as a dominant domestic determinant, and international pressure as the dominant non-domestic determinant of Canadian foreign policy during this period.

The Forties

Even before the Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires in Ottawa informed the Government of the Dominion of Canada and Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs on December 8, 1945 that the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly in Belgrade, at its inaugural meeting of November 29, 1945, had proclaimed his country the Federative Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia, the seeds of a growing and what was to be an evolving relationship between the two countries had taken root under difficult and sometimes tumultuous circumstances.

Recognizing the "New" Yugoslavia

The events leading to the eventual recognition by Canada of the newly-formed republic were tightly woven into the fabric of Allied and Soviet relations with the remnants of the Royal Yugoslav government and with what was to be the emergence of Josip Broz Tito as an important political force in his country. At the outset of developing Canadian-Yugoslav relations the Canadian government was faced with the problem of ascertaining in the early forties who should represent the country - the Royalist forces under the King of Yugoslavia, which maintained the seat of their government in England with representation in Canada and the United States or Tito's coalition of partisan forces waging a guerrilla campaign from the mountains of Yugoslavia. In early 1941 the Yugoslav government was anxious to open a Legation in Canada. Canada's response was tentative and cautious - due in good part to the automatically cautious stance adopted by the Canada's foreign policy bureaucracy on such diplomatic matters and the fact that Canada's political leaders were not able to discern which group in Yugoslavia should rightfully represent the Yugoslav state - in spite of urging by the British government to accommodate the Yugoslav request and the fact that the Yugoslavs did not seek reciprocal arrangements.[1] Of particular importance for the Yugoslavs was the favorable effect on the morale of the Yugoslav government that Canadian accommodation to its request would have. After careful consultation with Vincent Massey, the High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain and the Canadian Legation to the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom, the establishment of a legation in Canada was approved and the question of reciprocity was postponed.[2] On May 15, 1942 Dr. Isidor Cankar presented his credentials and became Minister of Yugoslavia in Canada. Soon after on May 7, 1943 General George P. Vanier, Head of the Canadian Legation to Allied governments in London, presented his credentials as Canadian Minister to the Yugoslav government in London. At this same time, the Canadian government was aware that the Yugoslav government in exile appeared to be deeply divided, weak, out of touch with the people and made up of many representatives who had become discredited for their hasty departure from their country following the German invasion.

On October 20, 1944 Belgrade fell to the Partisans with the assistance of the Red Army. Unable to support his government's policies Dr. Cankar, who had been in charge of the Yugoslav Legation, resigned in 1944. As reported by Mr. John Starnes, a representative with the Canadian Legation to the Allied governments in the United Kingdom, Dr. Cankar spoke highly of Canada's policy towards Yugoslavia and the importance of its place in East European affairs:

> Because of the greatly increased international prestige which Canada has achieved as a nation during the war, he [Cankar] said he hoped she would continue to assume the very great responsibilities which had fallen to her lot. Countries such as Yugoslavia would measure Canada's willingness to accept responsibility, in part at least, by her continued interest in

> European affairs and by the establishing of Canadian diplomatic missions in Europe.[3]

With the Royal Yugoslav Government still in exile in London, Tito had succeeded in establishing his National Committee of Liberation as the government of Yugoslavia. Despite strong efforts by the United Kingdom and the United States and support from Canada for the creation of a united government - combing members of the National Committee with members of the Government-in-Exile - Tito's forces within the "united" government were able to isolate and render powerless their liberal-democratic opponents.[4] By October 7, 1945 the resignation of Dr. Subasic - formerly designated as the Prime Minister of the Government-in-Exile and in the "united" government, Tito's foreign minister - effectively brought the Tito-Subasic Agreement and any pretense of power-sharing to an end. On August 8th King Peter disavowed the Regency and denounced Tito as a dictator. The assessment of the Canadian government, like those of its Western allies, was that it was not likely that Tito had intended to carry out in good faith his obligations under the Tito-Subasic Agreement. With the end of the war and the liberation of German-occupied Europe, the Canadian Legation to the Allied governments ceased its operations and the process of establishing Canadian missions in a number of Allied capitals was undertaken. In December of 1945 the Canadian government, following in the footsteps of the United Kingdom and the United States, recognized the new regime in Yugoslavia.

Accompanying Canadian recognition of the newly-declared Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia were a number of new issues to be faced by the Canadian foreign policy establishment in the molding of Canadian foreign policy in the Balkans. Some of these issues simply dealt with practicalities that connected with the growing demands on what were the limited resources of a small foreign service and foreign policy-making establishment, while others concerned themselves with accommodating the geo-political and ideological realities and international pressures emerging from a cold war between East and West. It was within this new international environment that Canada had to come to foreign policy terms with the newly-declared Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Domestic Lobby Reacts

The recognition by Canada of the new republic received mixed reaction from Canada's domestic constituency, particularly in so far as Canadians of Yugoslav descent were concerned. The census of 1941 showed about 21 thousand persons of Yugoslav descent living in Canada, of those about 12 thousand claimed Croatian heritage and about 6 thousand claimed Serbian. The Yugoslavs in Canada were represented by three main bodies: the Serbian National Shield Society, the Croatian Peasant Society, and the Council of Canadian South Slavs. The Serbian Shield Society, via its press organ *Glas Kanadskih Srba* (The Voice of Canadian Serbs), was patriotically Serbian, monarchist and strongly opposed to Tito and his Communist state. The Society did not act as a representative of about 2 thousand Serbian Canadians described by an External Affairs memorandum as having "Communist leanings."[5] The Croatian Peasant Society was made up of anti-communist groups. It opposed Tito's regime, labelling it as dictatorial and non-democratic. An External Affairs memo described 4 to 5 thousand Croats as supporters of the Croatian Peasant Society, with 4 to 5 thousand Croats being supporters of Tito and some 2 to 3 thousand being indifferent. The Council of Canadian South Slavs, formed in 1944, consisted of three organizations: The League of Canadian Croats, League of Canadian Serbs and League of Canadian Slovenes. The Council supported Tito's government and the Soviet Union and was identified by the Canadian government as an arm of the Yugoslav branch of the Communist Party in Canada. The Council was also known by the Canadian government to be maintaining close ties with the Yugoslav government. With an estimated membership of about 6 thousand the Council undertook its support of Tito's Yugoslavia through three news outlets: *Novosti* (News) for its Croatian followers, *Srpski Glasnik* (Serbian Herald) for its Serb followers and *Edinost*(Unity) for its Slovenian followers.[6]

In the case of the Serbian Shield Society of Canada Canada's recognition of Tito's government was a terrible mistake, one which the Society had lobbied the previous Prime Minister Mackenzie King against adopting. The Society described the new regime as dictatorial, terrorist, single-party, responsible for the suppression of all political liberties and rights, and unresponsive to "every decision and recommendation of the three allied leaders at Yalta - decisions concerning the liberated peoples of all Europe."[7] It described the scheduled elections of November 11, 1945 as farcical since opposition candidates were not be allowed to appear on ballots and any voters deemed to have been collaborators or affiliated with democratic organizations were denied the right to vote. The elections were simply stacked in order to ensure an electoral victory by Tito's forces. The Canadian government was indeed aware that the elections also served as a ploy by Tito in that "the results of the elections of November 11 released the Yalta powers from the obligations which they considered they had assumed towards the people of Yugoslavia."[8] The Serbian Shield Society, describing itself as "spokesmen and representatives of the largest organizations of Canadians of Serbian descent, whose members have fought in the Armed Services of Canada," in a letter to the Prime Minister urged Mr. King to express Canada's disapproval of the forthcoming elections and to withdraw Canada's recognition of the regime until "a new government be formed broadly representative of all democratic elements and to provide assistance "to the new disenfranchised majority of the Yugoslav peoples" so that they could make there own democratic choices.[9]

Similar pleas were made by the Serbian Shield Society when Louis St. Laurent became Prime Minister. The Society, in a telegram on September 9, 1949 to the Prime Minister, appealed to the Canadian government to do everything possible to "establish a just and democratic government in Yugoslavia."[10] The outcome of the general election and the single list of candidates of the National Front received 90 per cent of the vote. The Canadian government was well informed via its Belgrade Legation of the fact that the voting process fell far short of being free and democratic. It was also aware that the government formed by the National Front was controlled by Marshall Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY).

On the other hand, there were Yugoslav emigres and groups like the National Committee of the Council of Canadian South-Slavs who looked upon Tito's new regime in a positive light. In a letter to Mackenzie King the Committee declared that it was "the great desire of Canadian Yugoslavs throughout the Dominion to see the establishment of closer diplomatic and trade relations between Canada and Yugoslavia" in the interest of both states and world peace.[11] The National Committee of Canadian South Slavs and other like-minded Yugoslavs, in urging closer Canadian-Yugoslav relations, also lobbied for Canada to establish diplomatic representation in Yugoslavia at the earliest possible date. The Department of External Affairs acknowledged the validity of these requests but cautioned that as as result, in part, of limited resources "there will probably be an unavoidable delay before a Canadian diplomatic mission can be opened in Yugoslavia."[12]

Bureaucratic Mistrust and Strained Canada-Yugoslav Relations

Besides the issue of limited resources as expressed by the External Affairs bureaucracy, the issue of Canada establishing a diplomatic mission in Yugoslavia was also, governed by the general Canadian wariness and mistrust of the new regime in Yugoslavia. The break between Tito and Stalin had not yet taken place and the Canadian government initially tended to share the view as expressed by the US and Great Britain that Yugoslavia was simply part of the dangerous and belligerent Soviet monolith threatening western security. That perception played a significant part in early post-war diplomatic relations between Canada and Yugoslavia. Yugoslav foreign policy up to the late forties was characterized by the Department of External Affairs as being somewhat aggressive as noted in a memorandum prepared for signature by the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

> In their relations with the Western powers and at international conferences, the Yugoslavs have sought by word and action to create as many difficulties as possible. Violent incidents have occurred on Yugoslavia's frontiers with Austria, Trieste and Greece, and Yugoslavia has exhibited a marked truculence within the United Nations. This attitude has been partly due to the desire to serve the purposes of the U.S.S.R. and partly to the necessity to assuage popular discontent at home.[13]

In addition to Canadian concerns about the somewhat belligerent foreign policy stance and the totalitarian features adopted by the newly-formed Yugoslav government, a number of incidents also marred early relations between Canada and Yugoslavia. Claims, for example, in speeches by the Yugoslav Consul General in Montreal and Vancouver in 1947 that Yugoslavia enjoyed complete religious freedom and that a high ranking Yugoslav cleric - recently appointed a cardinal by the Vatican - was a Nazi collaborator, were depicted in some Canadian governmental and foreign policy circles as a flagrant breech of propriety and yet another example of aggressive and sometimes hostile foreign policy behavior that complemented some of the statements and rhetoric dealing with Western imperialistic designs and the unfair allocation of post-war Allied aid in Europe emanating periodically from members of Tito's government.[14]

Despite the diplomatic feathers ruffled by the actions of the Yugoslav Consul General, in the end, the Department of External Affairs and the government took the official position that Canada was a free country in which both sides of an issue could be expressed through a free press and that the incident would not upset the cordial relations established between Canada and Tito's regime - despite the strong inferences by Yugoslav officials of Western interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Canadian government continued to view the occasions whereupon official Yugoslav representatives in Canada had overstepped the line of diplomatic propriety with marked annoyance. The distrust of the foreign policy making bureaucracy in Yugoslav intentions was amplified in a number of External Affairs memoranda which expressed concern about the close relations established by Yugoslav representatives with the Labour Party of Canada and other leftist organizations - further evidence of Yugoslavia's interference in the domestic affairs of Canada.[15]

While appearances of cordiality were maintained, tensions and mistrust between the two governments continued to manifest themselves. The policy of the Yugoslav government, initiated in early 1946, to "lure" emigres back to Yugoslavia was also viewed with some suspicion by the Canadian government. The Canadian government had been informed by Yugoslav authorities of their aspiration that Canadians of Yugoslav descent would return to Yugoslavia to participate in that country's reconstruction. According to a document prepared by the Department of External Affairs "the campaign for Yugoslav repatriation has been and continues to be conducted by the pro-Communist 'Canadian Council of South Slavs,' by the Labour Progressive Party [Communist] and the leftist press in Canada generally, and by officials of the Yugoslav Legation in Ottawa."[16] By 1947 plans for a substantial emigration from Canada to Yugoslavia were undertaken with the departure, in May of the same year, of about 500 Canadian citizens of Yugoslav descent aboard the S.S."Radnik." Two more shiploads of Yugoslav Canadians were followed. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, before the House of Commons on May 23, 1947, expressed his government's concern over the emigration and the legal position regarding re-immigration to Canada of the repatriates as well as the potential loss of their Canadian citizenship.

One diplomatic incident in particular also characterized the nature of relations between Canada and Yugoslavia during this period. When in March of 1947 the Yugoslav government presented a request for the appointment of Mato Jaksic as Ambassador (Minister) to Canada it was soon discovered - after a careful screening of the nominee's background and in consultation with other allied intelligence services - that Mr. Jaksic was a prominent head of the Yugoslav secret police in Western Europe. The case of Mr. Jaksic put the Canadian government in a predicament. On the one hand, the nominee appeared to be an unacceptable candidate, and on the other, the rejection by the Canadian government of the nominee was unprecedented. On the basis of a recommendation by Lester B. Pearson to Canada's Minister of External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, the Canadian government adopted the strategy of offering the Yugoslavs an opportunity of withdrawing Jaksic's nomination and waiting out the Yugoslavs. While giving the Yugoslavs no reason for the position, the Canadian government stressed its willingness to receive a Yugoslav Ambassador (Minister) and to open a mission in Belgrade in the near future.[17] It appeared that the fundamental reason for rejecting Mr. Jaksic's nomination was concern over any embarrassing publicity a revelation of his background might entail. While the Prime Minister was initially opposed, he eventually granted approval for acceptance of the appointment.[18] It was understood, after all, that members of Communist legations would be expected to undertake intelligence activities and consequently there were advantages in knowing the backgrounds, however dubious, of diplomatic representatives from Communist states. On September 25, 1947 the Yugoslav Charge d'Affairs in Ottawa was informed that the Canadian government was granting the agreement and on July 8, 1948 Mr. Jaksic presented his credentials in Ottawa.

Domestic Media's Reaction

During the Jaksic affair, planning for the establishment of a Canadian mission in Belgrade was underway. In fact, well before this period when Tito's regime had managed to consolidate itself in Yugoslavia the Yugoslavs had been pressing Canada hard to establish a more significant presence in Belgrade. The establishment of a mission in Yugoslav was surrounded by a considerable degree of controversy. In August of 1947 the Canadian government had requested agreement for Emile Vaillancourt but it was not granted until the end of October 1947 - prompting the suggestion that the Yugoslavs were not adverse to retaliating diplomatically for the Jaksic affair. On the domestic level the January 2, 1948 announcement of the appointment of Mr. Vaillancourt as Canadian Minister in Yugoslavia received considerable adverse reaction in the media against which the government was forced to defend itself. An editorial in the *Montreal Gazette* "Why a Legation in Yugoslavia?" served to spark some of the debate.[19] The editorial suggested, in part, that:

> ...Yugoslavia is a nation in which Canada's need for representation is far from self-evident and would appear to be slight. Yugoslavia is well on its way to being a satellite nation, not in free control of its own affairs. Our trade there is not great, and in the future would be clouded by the uncertainties of totalitarian dealings.[20]

The editorial went on to refer to instances of Yugoslav propagandizing in Canada and the recruitment of Canadian immigrants of Yugoslav extraction to return to their former homes as an indication that the Yugoslav attitude and actions toward Canada had not only been less than friendly but "were acts of a totalitarian mentality."[21] The *Gazette* editorial was soon followed on January 5, 1948 by an equally provocative editorial in the *Ottawa Journal*. A January 8, 1948 editorial by the *Ottawa Citizen* entered into the fray by offering its support of Ottawa's decision to send a diplomatic representative to Marshall Tito's Yugoslavia by stating that those opposed to the decision:

> ... are ignorant of what is happening in Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia is undergoing profound economic and social changes. It is creating an industrialized state, beginning with heavy industry. It needs machinery and technical supplies of the kind Canada is well equipped to provide.[22]

Ottawa defended its position by explaining that Canada was merely following up on the appointment in 1942 of (General) George P. Vanier as Minister to Yugoslavia to the exiled government in London as well as implementing a policy of maintaining contact with East European states, Canadian legations having already been established in Poland and Czechoslovakia. At this point in Canadian-Yugoslav relations human rights concerns played a secondary role in the formulation of Canada's foreign policy toward the socialist state. Canada was to be the twenty-seventh country to establish a diplomatic mission in Belgrade. With the exception of Greece the Canadian Mission in Belgrade was the first one established by Canada in the Balkans.[23] Furthermore, as conventionally expressed by the Canadian government at that time, a diplomatic presence - besides being tasked to follow developments in Eastern Europe and the Balkans - would foster better knowledge of Canadian institutions, attitudes and values in that part of the world.

International Pressures: Canada Finds a New Role in the Balkans

As expressed by an External Affairs memo in response to the publicity surrounding the Canadian Government's decision to extend diplomatic representation to Yugoslavia, it was noted that:

> It is necessary also to take into account Canada's growing responsibilities in international affairs, and the part which Canada must play in the United Nations and its affiliated agencies. If Canada is to discharge its responsibilities wisely, its representatives in the United Nations must be kept abreast

> of developments in all parts of the world. Especially in order to discharge Canada's obligations as a member of the Security Council, the Canadian Government needs up to date information from countries such as Yugoslavia on which to base considered and independent judgments.[24]

Within foreign policy-making circles there appeared to be few illusions about the newly-established regime in Yugoslavia. This view stemmed from the broader perspective that the government adopted in devising a role for itself with the advent of the Cold War. In a statement in the House of Commons on April 29, 1948 Louis S. St. Laurent, Secretary of State for External Affairs, expounded on Canada's broadening role in Europe specifically and in international relations in general:

> It is now, I believe, an accepted fact that practically everything of importance that happens in the international sphere is of interest to Canada - often of direct and immediate interest. For us there is no escape, even if we wished to seek one, in isolation or indifference. Recent events have brought home to all of us the increasing threat to our democratic national existence of the rising tide of totalitarian communism. We know that Canada's boundaries against such a threat extend far beyond her physical frontiers. We know also that a line is being drawn which runs through the hearts of free men everywhere, and that on our side of the line are all those in every country who fight to preserve the freedom and dignity of the individual against reactionary dictatorship, whether communist or fascist.[25]

Canadian foreign policy in the immediate post-war period mirrored the belief held by the West that the "aggressive" and "imperialistic" policies and actions of international communism, led by the Soviet Union, represented a major international threat to peace and security. In promoting an active international role for Canada in Eastern Europe and elsewhere Mr. St Laurent was reflecting the influence of international pressures on the formulation of Canadian foreign policy - most specifically in terms of the viability of employing international institutions such as the UN and NATO as a vital means of ensuring peace and security. St. Laurent reiterated that point when he stated, "collective security through the operations of an effective international organization is the primary objective in the foreign policy of this country."[26] Even though , as he acknowledged, the effectiveness of the UN was being undermined by the divisions within Europe,the Canadian position reflected a strong determination to make the UN work as an important arbitrator of tension between the West and eastern Europe. At the same time, and no doubt in reference to what was soon to be the establishment of NATO, it was in Canada's interests, as well as in the interest of establishing international peace, to form a "closer association for collective self-defence"[27] under article 51 of the UN charter based on a foreign policy that recognizes "the fact that totalitarian communist aggression, endangers freedom and peace of every democratic country, including Canada."[28]

In spite of the threat and accompanying paranoia posed by the Soviet Union and possibly its East European satellites, there were the signs of an early recognition by Canadian foreign policy-makers - especially those at External Affairs - of the unique role Yugoslavia, like Canada, could play in East-West relations. This point is highlighted in an internal 1948 External Affairs memorandum which reads:

> It must be an important object of Canadian and other Western policy that Yugoslavia, which through centuries of political, cultural, and religious history had been a part, although perhaps on the fringe, of Western civilization, should not now cease to be in community with us. The maintenance and development of effective community between the Yugoslav people and the rest of us is not only desirable in itself, but if achieved, may also constitute an important step towards the eventual re-establishment of true community between the peoples of the Soviet Union and those of Canada and the rest of the world.[29]

In the final analysis as well, a careful assessment by officials at External indicated that although there was considerable evidence of the totalitarian nature of Tito's regime, for the time being at least, there was little likelihood of an alternative to Tito and so it would be prudent to attempt to facilitate a rapprochement with Tito's Yugoslavia as Mr. Vaillancourt settled into his new position after presenting his credentials in Belgrade on February 26, 1948.[30]

The task of facilitating a rapprochement was not to be an easy one given Canadian and Allied uncertainties about Yugoslav intentions and the manifestations of insecurity exhibited by the new socialist regime in Yugoslavia. One of the more immediate tasks of the Canadian Legation in Belgrade was to assess the strength and popularity of Tito's newly-founded regime. While it was ascertained that the Communist party was the "greatest reservoir of enthusiasm for the regime," according to Mr. Vaillancourt the strength of the armed forces and loyalty of the peasantry was uncertain.[31] Manifestations of nationalist discontent were detected - particularly in Croatia - "caused," in Mr. Vaillancourt's words, "by the centralization of authority and administration in Belgrade to just as great a degree as under the Karadjordjevic monarchy , in spite of the new federative constitution and the lip service paid to provincial autonomy."[32] While operating in close consultation with the British and Americans in Belgrade, the Canadian approach to the problems faced by the new regime appeared, at the same time, to be more conciliatory - with the United States taking a harder line in terms of providing some assistance to Tito's government. With occasional reservations, the Canadian policy, early in the relations between the West and Yugoslavia, began to place greater faith in the perception that the Yugoslav's could be a unique case in the East European camp of socialist states - certainly in so far that Yugoslavia's leadership enjoyed a far greater degree of popular support than the leadership of the other socialist regimes of Eastern Europe. Moreover, an early assessment by Mr. Vaillancourt, in response to Western predictions of the loss of Yugoslavia to the East , reflects what was to be a belief adopted more broadly among Canadian foreign policy-makers that Yugoslavia could be nurtured back to the West and its socio-political traditions.[33] In short, the task of monitoring the new regime's internal policy and external relations reflected the Canadian government's growing appreciation of Yugoslavia's place within the Soviet orbit. The Soviet-led expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June of 1948 provided an ideal opportunity for Canada to further exercise and develop a foreign policy towards Yugoslavia that was unique from the Western Allies and somewhat unique as far as Canadian foreign policy towards the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was concerned.

Stalin-Tito Split: A Turning Point in Canadian Foreign Policy

At the outset of the Stalin-Tito split the Canadian foreign policy community became particularly focused on using Belgrade as an important monitoring station for Soviet Bloc intentions. Yugoslavia was uniquely situated in geo-strategic and political terms and Canadian foreign policy used Yugoslavia as an important back door of opportunity to Eastern Europe and specifically the Soviet Union. In order to ensure that that door remained open, it was becoming obvious to the Canadian government that its foreign policy must be directed towards fostering the independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as a counter against Soviet hegemony. A statement by then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, in the House of Commons on November 16, 1949 addressed the issue of Canadian policy towards Eastern Europe and the significance of Yugoslavia. Pearson noted that:

> In Yugoslavia, for instance, it has been made quite clear by recent exchanges of notes between that government and the government of the U.S.S.R. that the U.S.S.R. is exerting every effort, short of actual war, to bring the government of Yugoslavia to heel, and to extract from it the kind of unquestioning and slavish obedience that the Kremlin demands.[34]

Soviet attempts to complete the subjugation of Eastern Europe, Pearson reminded the Commons, not only involved the installation of "completely servile governments" but also an insidious "trespass on the sanctity of human rights."[35] While Canadian diplomats in Belgrade could lament, as Mr. Pearson did in the Commons, the human rights abuses - well documented in diplomatic correspondence from the Canadian Legation in Belgrade - taking place under Tito's rule, the strategic necessity of backing the Yugoslav government became the primary criterion governing Canadian policy towards Yugoslavia.

Generally speaking, by 1949 relations between Canada and Yugoslavia had become more cordial. The Yugoslav press had begun to depict Canada and its involvement in Yugoslavia in a favorable light. Some minor irritants between the two countries were still unresolved as in the case of a $226,000 (US) debt Yugoslavia owed Canada for military relief and the issue involving approximately 2 thousand naturalized and Canadian-born Canadians of Yugoslav origin who had returned since the war to participate in the reconstruction of the *new* Yugoslavia. As there was no treaty between the two countries recognizing dual nationality, a problem arose when a great number of these people wished to return to Canada but were prevented from doing so by Yugoslav authorities.[37] There was also the matter of progress being made in releasing Yugoslav assets -totalling some $300,000 - blocked in Canada. It is interesting to note that the issue of compensation for Canadian property nationalized by Tito's government in 1946 as well as other war damages was being handled and negotiated, at Canada's request, by the British government on behalf of the Canadian government. It was appreciated by the Department of External Affairs that the potential release of Yugoslav assets would provide the Canadian government with "some bargaining power in its negotiations concerning Canadian claims."[38]

In terms of growing Soviet-Yugoslav tensions the Secretary of State for External Affairs was from the beginning of the dispute not only kept abreast by his department of efforts by Cominform states to weaken Tito's regime but also Cominform efforts to undermine Yugoslavia's position vis-a-vis Canada. In one case an article, entitled "Tito's Agents Unmasked in Canada" appeared on October 2, 1949 in *Slowo Polskie* , a Polish newspaper. The article alleged that agents of Tito - some of whom with links to Anglo-American intelligence - were arming themselves in Toronto to disrupt the activities of "progressive" organizations by means of anti-democratic and pro-Titoist propaganda. The Canadian government was not taken in by the often transparent attempts of Cominform states to undermine Yugoslavia's improving relations with the West and her growing interest in employing the United Nations to further the building of a new Yugoslav foreign policy of non-interference and co-existence.[39]

Yugoslavia's interest in the United Nations, the Canadian government was aware, had not been without its own ideological content and perspective. A *Borba* article which appeared on December 30, 1948 outlined the substance of views of the Yugoslav Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, M. Kardelj on the United Nations within the context of an ideological struggle between reactionary imperialism and progressive socialism. Essentially Kardelj was communicating the hard-line position that Yugoslavia, in spite of differences with the Cominform, would remain part of a united front against "enemies of peace, against imperialist expansion and against the attacks of the enemies of socialism."[40] The Yugoslav position was also that the UN should not be allowed to become another instrument of superpower manipulation. Kardelj's call for international adherence to the principle of the sovereignty of the state over its domestic affairs typified Yugoslavia's position that the UN honor the doctrine of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. Kardelj's views also exemplified Yugoslavia's foreign policy dilemma between strengthening the United Nations on the one hand and re-establishing closer relations with Communist countries on the other. The Yugoslav move towards strengthening the former was monitored and cautiously encouraged by Canada.

Canada Supports Yugoslav Seat on Security Council

In 1949 the Canadian government followed closely Yugoslavia's interest in seeking a seat on the Security Council. There was some difference of opinion in the Canadian government and among Western powers on the question of supporting a seat for Yugoslavia on the Security Council. There was the belief in some quarters that because of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute Yugoslavia's presence on the Security Council could bedevil the Council's deliberations, particularly since Yugoslavia was a party to a dispute which could come before the Security Council. In the final analysis Canada supported Yugoslavia's candidacy for a seat on the Council. Canada's policy was based on the belief that greater international interest in Yugoslavia could help to deter a Soviet/Cominform armed intervention. It was also based on the belief that Western support could have the effect of promoting the further evolution of a Yugoslav anti-Cominform policy - hitherto limited to nationalist and ideological considerations to a more coherent and broad policy of political opposition to the Cominform. This point was connected to the basis of Canadian thinking perhaps best expressed in a memorandum of September 22, 1949 from the Canadian delegation to the United Nations to the Department of External Affairs which notes in part:

> A main criterion [for supporting a Yugoslav seat on the Security Council] will be the effect on the encouragement of the desired peaceful disintegration of the Soviet empire. Anything that helps the survival of a regime defaulting from the Cominform is likely to be important for this purpose. Presumably Tito, whose judgement in this matter must carry weight, thinks election to the Security Council would help.[41]

Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia was also sensitive to the view that a Western refusal to vote for Tito could weaken Tito's internal support and embolden a pro-cominformist hard-line alternative to his regime.

On December 23, 1949 Tito found occasion in a meeting with Canada's Minister to Belgrade, Mr. Vaillancourt, to personally express his appreciation to Canada's Minister in Belgrade for the good working relationship developed between the Canadian and Yugoslav delegations to the UN and Canada's decision to vote for a Yugoslav seat on the Security Council. A measure of friendliness established between Canadian diplomats and Tito's government following this meeting was the receipt by Canada's Minister in Belgrade, Emile Vaillancourt, of an autographed photograph from Marshall Tito - considered among the diplomatic community a gesture of considerable prestige.[42] The warming of relations between Canada and Yugoslavia provided Ottawa with greater room for maneuver in its foreign policy towards Yugoslavia in the early fifties. To some extent at least economic relations contributed to the warming of those relations as it played a part in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia.

Canada-Yugoslav Economic Relations

A review of economic relations between Canada and Yugoslavia during the 1940's reveals that trade between the two countries was not extensive.[43] Canadian exports increased notably to $12,030,003 during the immediate post-war period in 1946 while imports in 1946 fell to $1,819.

While trade during 1946-1947 revealed a significant improvement over the pre-war period, the increase in trade was not sustained into the later forties. During the 1940's Canadian foreign policy-makers attributed the difficulties of expanding trade with Yugoslavia to the political conditions in Yugoslavia, the fact that Yugoslav economy was heavily dependent on the USSR and the Soviet economic plan for its East European satellites and finally the fact that the Yugoslavs were attempting to emulate the centralized Soviet model of economic development. From the Canadian perspective long-term and centralized state planning by the new socialist Yugoslavia which was to dovetail with the economic plans of the USSR produced rigid eastward trading patterns rather effectively excluded western participation in East European trade and economic activity. Furthermore from the Yugoslav ideological perspective closer economic and trade relations with the capitalist west were subject to the inevitable economic depressions which Marxist theory maintains are an integral part of capitalism. More important still was what the Canadian government perceived to be a fear by the Yugoslav government of exposure to western political influence through economic dependence. Conversely, interest by Canadian companies in developing and investing in the Yugoslav market was severely constrained by fear of nationalization and undue state intervention in free enterprise. The first Yugoslav Five-Year Plan, intended to transform the basis of Yugoslavia's economy from agriculture to industry, was seen by the Yugoslav's as the best means of ensuring their economic and political independence from western capitalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Canadian government remained realistic about improving significantly trade relations between the two countries. This realism did not preclude attempts by the Canadian government to probe for potential opportunities, as reflected in a 1950 External Affairs memorandum:

> Yet, although the prospects of a great increase in trade with Yugoslavia are not encouraging, it would not be wise or desirable to neglect the opportunities which may be presented to enter into trade relations with Yugoslavia. Apart from the purely commercial advantages, trade with Yugoslavia is one of the factors which will serve to maintain that country's ties with the wider community of nations. By maintaining trade

> contacts, we make Yugoslavia, to a certain degree, less exclusively dependent on the Soviet Union, and thereby create an atmosphere where feelings of friendship for Canada and her institutions can take root.[44]

The Fifties

By the early fifties economic and political battle lines between East and West had become more clearly established. Canadian foreign policy, in so far as Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe concerned, was directed at monitoring closely Yugoslav intentions, and, to the extent it was possible, shielding Yugoslavia from Soviet/Cominform pressure and intimidation. As in the forties, Canadian foreign policy in the fifties required finding a balance between Canada's human rights concerns about Tito's regime and the geo-political imperatives of doing what was necessary to weaken Soviet influence over Eastern Europe and Third world states. With no alternative to Tito's regime in the fifties, Canadian foreign policy had to avoid giving the impression of approving totalitarianism in Yugoslavia while at the same time attempting to pull Yugoslavia back into the Western orbit and democracy. An internal memorandum drawn up by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1950 indicates the emergence of human rights-related considerations in Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia. In part, it states:

> The Canadian Government would welcome evidence of a trend towards the establishment in Yugoslavia of the fundamental basis and criterion of democracy, which is freedom of competition between differing political and social ideas.[45]

At the same time, the memorandum, in outlining the human rights principles of Canadian foreign policy in relation to Yugoslavia, emphasized that Yugoslavia was to be viewed as the effective point of penetrating Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Whereas in 1948 St. Laurent had lamented the loss of Czechoslovakia as a bridge between East and West, Canadian leaders by the early fifties had recognized Yugoslavia as the new bridge to the East. Although the strengthening of that bridge was reliant on both bilateral and multilateral initiatives, the period of the fifties shows the increasing importance of multilateral initiatives in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy.

There were a number of foreign policy issues of the fifties in which Canada played an important part. They included the poor relations between Yugoslavia and its neighbors, as well as relations between Yugoslavia and the US and UK; the elevation of diplomatic relations between Canada and Yugoslavia; trade and economic matters; and Yugoslavia's place in the international community. Canada's role in attempting to facilitate the resolution of tensions and conflicts between Yugoslavia and her immediate neighbors, as well as to facilitate an improvement in relations between Yugoslavia and the major Western powers also brought into sharper focus the impact of these issues on the principles of non-intervention and the sovereignty of the state as defined by Canadian foreign policy during that period.

The fact that the United States, and perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, the United Kingdom had incurred considerable hostility from the Yugoslavia government during the immediate post-war period provided the Canadian government with an ideal opportunity to advance its policies with Yugoslavia. American-Yugoslav relations had taken a marked turn for the worse after Yugoslav troops shot down two American transport plans in 1946. The Yugoslavs, in turn were upset with the United States for supplying aid to Greece while the United States had been angered by Yugoslav assistance to the Greek rebels. The United Kingdom and the United States were the object of Yugoslav resentment because Yugoslavia's territorial aspirations in Venezia Giula were blocked. The United States was also displeased with the fact that the large amounts of American material aid given to Yugoslavia through UNRRA was not recognized by the Yugoslav government which made the claim to its citizens that the United States had refused to provide assistance to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav government was particularly incensed with the United States for having frozen its assets - reportedly in excess of 65 million (US) - until satisfactory agreements on compensation for property belonging to American citizens, which was nationalized by the Yugoslav government, could be reached.[46] Canada was able to take advantage of poor American-

Yugoslav relations by beginning to establish an important foreign policy *niche* for itself in the Balkans.

Yugoslav relations were not only been poor with the United States and the UK, but as well with nearly all the countries with which it shared a border. Tensions between Greece and Yugoslavia over border violations and charges of armed intervention were still high. The Yugoslavs had strongly rejected the majority findings of the UN Border Commission which identified the Yugoslavs as having given assistance to Greek Communist forces. The Italian-Yugoslav dispute over Trieste only served to add to the antipathies between the two countries stemming in large part to the Italian occupation of Croatia. The normalization of relations between Austria and Yugoslavia appeared to be remote as differences over borders sparked by Yugoslav claims on parts of Austrian remained unresolved. In terms of Canada-Yugoslav bilateral relations, the part played by Canada was that of a moderating influence between the big powers and Yugoslavia. The roots of that approach can be found in the earlier application of a moderate Canadian foreign policy towards the new government.

Canada-Yugoslav Bilateral Relations

Bilateral relations between Canada and Yugoslavia - in spite of continuing reports of UDBA (Secret police) brutality and the persecution of political non-conformists from the Canadian Legation in Belgrade - improved considerably in the fifties. In reporting the continuation of arbitrary imprisonment and other totalitarian excesses of the regime there was an acknowledgement on the part of Canadian diplomats in Yugoslavia that human rights violations and other excesses perpetrated by the regime had subsided to some extent. At the same time, the fact that much of the state's coercive capabilities were re-directed and focused against pro-Cominformist elements in Yugoslavia did not seem to bother the Canadian government. The enormity of the problems facing Yugoslavia and the challenge that it posed to strengthening Canada-Yugoslav relations were illustrated by an unflattering assessment of the situation made by the soon-to-be-departing Head of Mission, Mr. Vaillancourt:

> The fact remains that Yugoslavia is at present a country scarcely unified, still torn by religious and racial prejudice, still recovering from the effects of a disastrous war; its people are primitive, ignorant, stubborn, ill-clothed, ill-fed and poor. Its rulers preach brotherhood and unity but the impact of their policies is so revolutionary that they can be said to divide as much as to rule. Besides the Army, the Ministry of the Interior and the police are the chief factors in keeping the country together. [47]

However bleak the situation appeared the Canadian government encouraged through diplomatic contact and communications the gradual decentralization of government in Yugoslavia. The behavior of Yugoslav diplomats in Canada had undergone, from the Canadian perspective, a marked improvement. The improved bilateral climate between the two countries brought with it calls for the elevation of formal diplomatic relations.

International Pressures and the Elevation of Diplomatic Relations

While calls for the elevation of the Canadian Legation to an Embassy and the appointment of an Ambassador to Belgrade could be heard from both sides, it was becoming increasingly evident that the Yugoslavs were pressing Canada to raise the official status of diplomatic relations between the two countries. There was some opposition to this move in Canadian circles. Domestic critics cited the totalitarian and oppressive nature of the Yugoslav government and the "anti- Communist attitude of Canadian public opinion", as evidence in opposition to elevating Canada's diplomatic status with Yugoslavia. Criticism of the proposed move also centered around alleged inconsistencies in Canada's policy of establishing Ambassadorial relations and the question of Canada's capability to perform at a raised diplomatic level; Canada's young and expanding diplomatic service should not be put in the position of bitting off, in the words of one member of Canada's diplomatic community, "more than we can - or want to - chew."[48] Moreover, there was concern that the move to elevating diplomatic relations would arouse Yugoslav expectations that Canada was committed to giving aid to Yugoslavia. It was evident that the Yugoslavs were placing a great deal of stock in elevating formal diplomatic relations with Canada. Mr. Crean, assuming the duties as Canada's Charge d'Affaires and highest ranking diplomat in Belgrade with the departure of Mr. Vaillancourt as Canada's Minister there in 1950, reported on sustained Yugoslav efforts to press Canada to appoint an Ambassador to Belgrade.

Quite transparent as well in the Yugoslav initiatives was the implication that the elevation of diplomatic relations between Canada and Yugoslavia should bring with it the possibility of trade agreements and aid from Canada.[49] Mindful of these concerns, early in 1951 the Canadian government, following the recommendation of the Department of External Affairs and with Mr. Pearson's approval, chose, nevertheless, to simultaneously ask the Yugoslav government for agreement on the appointment of Scott Macdonald as Canada's Ambassador and to raise Canada's Legation in Belgrade to an Embassy. Much to the delight of the Yugoslavs on July 2, 1951 the Canadian Legation in Belgrade became an Embassy and on October 23 J. Scott Macdonald presented his credentials as Canada's Ambassador to Yugoslavia. With the Canadian decision to elevate diplomatic relations between the two governments came Cabinet approval for the release of a $500,000 contribution to UNICEF of which $210,000 was designated for the purchase of Newfoundland codfish destined for Yugoslavia.[50] In providing this assistance to Belgrade the Canadian government also indicated to the Yugoslavs its hope that the Yugoslav government would take steps to release Archbishop Stepanic, Primate of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, who had been imprisoned for his collaboration with the war-time Ustahi regime of Croatia and his promotion of an independent Croatian state. The release of Stepanic, the Canadian government suggested, would contribute to the further improvement of Canada-Yugoslav relations. The Canadian government was certainly aware that the Yugoslavs placed considerable importance on the improvement of relations with Canada for both political and economic reasons and that, therefore, some pressure could be brought to bear on the Yugoslavs to release an important political prisoner. Nevertheless, the Canadian government was also cognizant of the sensitivity of the issue.[51] Not wishing to weaken Tito's regime in the face of Soviet pressure the

Canadian government was content to gently pressure the Yugoslavs that Stepanic's release would contribute to the betterment of Yugoslavia's relations with Canada, the Vatican and the West. The Canadian government was again forced to balance its commitments to human rights and the strategic necessity of not undermining Tito's leadership.

An External Affairs report prepared for the Governor-General perhaps best summarizes Canada's foreign policy towards Yugoslavia in the fifties where it stated:

> Canada has few political problems which must be taken up specifically with Yugoslavia, so that the state of our political relations is governed almost entirely by the international situation. The overriding consideration for the West at present is the strategic importance of ensuring the continuance of Yugoslavia's opposition to Cominform pressure.[52]

Strongly implied in the report too is the overriding influence of international pressures on the formulation of Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia. It is, therefore, not surprising that, in an effort to sustain the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet influence and interference, the Canadian government tended to follow a policy of approving economic and military assistance for Yugoslavia. Where Canadian foreign policy deviated from the policies of its Western Allies and revealed its independence was the Canadian tendency to advocate economic and military assistance usually without the attachment of the kind of political conditions called for especially by the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

Canadian Economic Assistance - Bilateral and Multilateral

With the elevation of diplomatic relations between Canada and Yugoslavia, the Canadian government found itself under some pressure from the Yugoslav government to stimulate greater interest in trade between the two countries. One of the fundamental problems deterring an improvement in trade, Canadian officials were reminding their Yugoslav counterparts, was the fact the in Canada trade was conducted by private enterprises and those enterprises could only be encouraged to do business in Yugoslavia by establishing an appropriate climate to do so. Some efforts had been made by the government to encourage Canadian businesses to participate in Yugoslav trade exhibits but they were seen as a conciliatory gesture to give the impression that the Canadian government was maintaining an interest in improving economic relations. The other deterrent was the Yugoslav government's policy of controlling its foreign trade through barter arrangements. It was the policy of the Canadian government not to enter into such agreements with other countries.

As expressed by Canada's Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade, Canada's hope of expanding its share of the Yugoslav market was hindered by the emergence in the latter fifties of a change in the trading pattern in East Europe attributed to the warming of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union combined with long-term U.S. credits for the purchase of their wheat seriously dampened the prospect of shorter term exports of Canadian wheat to Yugoslavia. In the longer term the Canadian Embassy was able to report that Canadian exports in general and wheat in particular could increase with the possible success Yugoslavia's industrialization programs.[53]

Although Canada faced limitations in terms of what it could do to affect greater trade and economic relations with Yugoslavia, the Canadian government, nevertheless, directed considerable diplomatic efforts in the international arena and particularly with its Western allies to facilitate the economic survivability of Yugoslavia. Particularly during the early 1950's extensive negotiations were taking place between the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western powers and Yugoslavia on ways and means by which to assist in Yugoslavia's economic recovery. On a multilateral level, the Canadian government quickly became a proponent of the necessity for the Western allies and international financial institutions to establish a more co-ordinated political and economic approach to the issue of providing economic assistance to the Yugoslav government. Canadian officials were troubled by the fact that considerable time and effort was expended by frictions between the Allies on how to come to the assistance of the Yugoslav's. The task was a formidable one given the differing funding and aid mechanisms that Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other Western states had at their disposal - not to speak of differences among the Western Allies as to their perspectives on Yugoslav intentions and the exact nature of the role an independent, non-aligned Yugoslavia could play in their geo-strategic considerations.The Canadian approach to providing economic assistance appeared more sensitive to the fact that conditions for a loan to Yugoslavia , for instance by the International Bank, were often viewed by the Yugoslavs as interference in their internal affairs and that as a consequence the Yugoslav leadership would favour riding out their economic storm rather than to submit to the Bank or any other state or international institution.

At this stage too Cabinet had decided that the government did not have the resources to come to the direct assistance of Yugoslavia. The decision not to provide direct bilateral assistance was also based, in part, on anticipated difficulties associated with extending aid to a Communist country. The advantages of multilateral approach to providing assistance to Yugoslavia was highlighted as early as 1950 in a dispatch from Canada's High Commissioner in London to Ottawa. The dispatch made the point that funding for Yugoslavia via international institutions would allow Yugoslavia to escape "the Cominform criticism of 'subservience' to the United States" while at the same time, modifying Yugoslavia's political and economic policies.[54] The rationale given by the Canadian government in support of indirect aid was also reinforced at a NATO Council of Deputies meeting in January of 1951, which concluded that NATO members should provide Yugoslavia whatever possible economic assistance available to them and that unilateral and direct aid to Yugoslavia could embarrass Tito's government by substantiating Soviet and Cominform propaganda directed against Yugoslavia.[55]

Besides supporting the use of international funding institutions to sustain the Yugoslav economy, the Canadian government also supported the use of Western technical assistance - particularly via the United Nations - to expose Yugoslavia to Western influences. Canada supported , for instance, the continuation of the UN Technical Assistance Program (UNTAP) which had been operating in Yugoslavia since the late forties. In Yugoslavia the program was involved in bringing into Yugoslavia a variety of experts, providing Yugoslavs with academic fellowships and facilitating the demonstration of modern technology for the Yugoslavs. In the realm of technical assistance as well the Canadian government was cognizant of Yugoslav concerns regarding interference into their internal affairs.[56]

Canada Promotes Multilateral Military Assistance

Besides the promotion of Western economic and technological assistance, the advancement of Western military assistance to Yugoslavia also constituted an important aspect of Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia during the fifties. Given the growing military strength of the satellite states bordering Yugoslavia, an increase in the number of "border incidents" between Yugoslavia and its Cominform neighbors, the potential for a concentrated Cominform military attack on Yugoslavia and the opinion of Allied intelligence services that the Yugoslav armed forces would no longer be capable of defending Yugoslavia against a combined Cominform invasion, it came as no surprise to Ottawa that Tito had indicated on numerous occasions in 1950 his desire to obtain Western military equipment. The realization of the importance of re-equipping Yugoslavia was confirmed by a NATO Deputies meeting in 1951 which concluded that every effort should be made to supply the Yugoslav army with its equipment requirements. The Canadian government concurred with the need to support the re-arming of Yugoslavia and it did what it could to facilitate the Western initiative.[57]

As in the case of providing economic assistance to Yugoslavia there were difficulties in establishing a coordinated tripartite (United States, United Kingdom and France) policy to supplying the Yugoslavs with military supplies and equipment, with the questions of financing, need assessment, and availability among the central issues to the problem. The French, quite willing to sell to the Yugoslavs, wanted the United States to provide the financing of sales to Yugoslavia. All these problems were played out against the backdrop of differing historical interests in the Balkans among the tripartite members as well as secret negotiations carried out between the representatives of the Tripartite Group and Yugoslav planners who were less than willing to be candid about the deployment and numbers of their forces. These meetings as reported by Canada's Ambassador to Belgrade, were often characterized by "a gap between the scale of aid the Yugoslav Government feels it is entitled to have and the amount the three Powers are willing to devote to their policy of 'keeping Tito afloat."[58] Negotiations with the Yugoslavs went beyond the armament requirements of Yugoslavia. Negotiations also explored plans to deploy Western armaments and military supplies within the borders of Yugoslavia and the extent to which Yugoslavia was willing to integrate her defences with those of the West. The Yugoslavs, for their part, expressed their willingness to integrate their forces on condition that it would not require adherence to formal pacts or agreements with the West. From the perspective of the Canadian government the secret negotiations between the Tripartite Group and Yugoslavia and other diplomatic manifestations, such as the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, indicated a significant Yugoslav tilt towards the West. [59] It is interesting to note that while members of Canada's foreign policy making establishment could appreciate the subtle nuances of Yugoslav foreign policy and geo-strategic significance of Yugoslavia in light of a potential Soviet threat, Canada's relations with Tito's government continued to evoke controversy at home.

There was in Canada some domestic opposition from anti-communist elements who were mistrustful of what they perceived to be any form of cozying up to the Soviet Union and its allies by the government. In 1953, for example, the Managing Editor of *The Granby Leader-Mail* in plain and "undiplomatic language" published an article that questioned "what position or independent opinion Canada had on the matter" and argued, as expressed in a letter to Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "that our Communist 'allies' should be told in plain language that we understand their game." In a letter to the editor Pearson responded by stating:

> There are undoubtedly many aspects of Yugoslav internal policy with which we do not and could not possibly agree and which we should oppose, but I do not think it can reasonably be argued (as the editorial does) that there is no real distinction to be made between the communist states which follow the dictates of Moscow, and Yugoslavia which does not.[60]

Recognizing the distinction between Yugoslavia and other Communist states had become an early distinguishing feature of Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia which proved largely resistant to challenge by domestic critics in Canada.

Domestic controversy aside, it is to be noted that the Tripartite Group requested that Canada provide military material that was in excess of Canadian requirements. Canada's actual military contribution to re-arming the Yugoslavs was minimal. In accordance with policies adopted by the United Kingdom and the United States, Canada also adopted a policy of allowing the export of reasonable quantities of strategic goods to Yugoslavia in an effort to support Yugoslavia from pressure from Moscow. While Canada's military aid to Yugoslavia was small, Canada's defence of Yugoslavia's independence and integrity within the realm of its United Nations involvements was more significant.

The UN and Mutual Foreign Policy Interests

Due in large part to Yugoslavia's isolation from the Cominform and the resultant pursuance of an independent foreign policy which was critical of "imperialistic" big power spheres of influence and interference in regional affairs as means of settling international problems - the most notable example being the Korean conflict - Yugoslav foreign policy placed considerable emphasis on collaboration with the United Nations. In a number of speeches Tito made it clear that Yugoslavia was committed to contributing as much as possible to the organization. The Canadian government did what it could to enhance and encourage that collaboration in its relations with Yugoslavia through the fifties by attempting to find common ground on a number of international issues and crisis.

Canada and Yugoslavia found in their developing relationship a middle power perspective and a commonality concerning the Cold war in general. Contact with Canada provided the Yugoslavs with the benefit of a more more moderate view of Western motivations and intentions which Canadian officials saw as an effective tool in influencing Yugoslavia's behavior, external and internal. For Canada a closer relationship between the two federal states provided Canada and the West with a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of East European affairs and Soviet intentions that could offset the conventional view of the monolithic threat of Soviet communism. Canadian diplomats in Belgrade monitored very closely the events and issues of the day as they transpired in Eastern Europe in an concerted effort to formulate a better understanding of the "threat" posed by Eastern Europe. Both Canada and Yugoslavia, as their diplomats and government officials were fond of reminding each other, lived in the shadow of a powerful neighbor. Both countries had been "colonized" and both were interested in developing their identity in a multilateral order which could serve as a counterbalance to the hegemony of the superpowers. In the case of Korea the Canadian government saw Belgrade as an important source of information regarding Soviet and Chinese intentions.[61] The Yugoslavs were concerned, for example, that a disproportionate allocation of UN forces in Korea could invite problems elsewhere, Europe in particular. The Yugoslav thesis was that the Soviets wanted to keep China weak and isolated from the West. The Yugoslav view, which closely approximated the Canadian, was that everything possible to maintain political and commercial contact with China should be done and that means of allowing China to save face and retreat with dignity in the Korean conflict should be advanced. The Yugoslav position that China should be admitted to the UN also received a sympathetic ear from Canada during diplomatic consultations.[62]

Through diplomatic contacts - bilateral and multilateral - Canada also attempted to ameliorate relations between Yugoslavia and Italy (the main focal point of tension being the Trieste issue), Austria and Greece by fostering open lines of communication and an attitude of compromise between all parties concerned. In improving relations with Yugoslavia the Canadian government had to be particularly sensitive to Italian and Greek sensitivities (as NATO members) concerning Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's concern over border violations by the satellites also caused the Canadian government some apprehension, Yugoslavia had become the focal point in Canada's endeavor to promote the improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and her neighbors and to establish stability in the Balkans. The Canadian government recognized the dilemma faced by the Yugoslav government in terms of potential UN involvement in the issue. Should the Yugoslavs raise a border-violation charge before the UN, limited UN action in the form of a dispatch of an Observer Commission to monitor their frontier would likely follow. It appeared that the Yugoslavs were prefering to wait for a serious violation which could then be brought before the UN as aggression.

The Canadian government actively supported the Yugoslav aim of institutionalizing its problems with its Cominform neighbors within the United Nations. In a statement to the House of Commons on March 25, 1952 Canada's Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs reported that "Yugoslavia's complaint of hostile activities by Cominform states was dealt with by a resolution [which Canada supported] calling on all parties to conduct their relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."[63] By bringing these problems before the United Nations and into the Security Council and General Assembly, the Yugoslavs could be afforded a measure of international recognition concerning their plight in Eastern Europe without having to be as closely reliant on super power influence alone. Through the UN the Yugoslavs would be able to modify the attitude of her neighbors in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and thereby legitimize their regime in the eyes of the international community.

Basing their foreign policy on the principle of non-intervention and seeing in themselves the embodiment of the "forces of progress," the Yugoslavs espoused the position that the world's problems could not be solved by exclusive agreements between the great powers at the expense of other less powerful countries. Moreover, according to the Yugoslavs, foreign policies based on spheres of influence were becoming out of date given the increased involvement and activity of smaller states. From the Yugoslav foreign policy perspective the achievement of peace and the resolution of conflict was very much dependent on agreement on a Great Power framework within the spirit of the UN Charter.[64] While the Canadian government was cognizant of and usually in disagreement with the Marxist framework in which much of Yugoslav foreign policy was cast, Canadian foreign policy was often supportive of the general tack taken by the Yugoslavs with regard to the UN, especially since it often reflected general Canadian views on super power relations and the UN.[65] Like Canada, Yugoslavia was often frustrated by the ability of the big powers to exclude the UN from important international issues and disputes, as in the case of Korea and Chinese representation in the UN.[66] The Canadian government recognized that Yugoslavia was performing a difficult and potentially dangerous balancing act in pursuing an independent foreign policy which was inspired by Marxist tenets but which depended on Western aid, military and economic, supposedly free of conditions either in regard to their internal socialist system or Yugoslavia's foreign policy. The Yugoslavs were more than willing to cooperate with the West and the East on condition that both sides adhere to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Yugoslav state and other states in general.

Canadian Foreign Policy: Unlocking the Door to Intervention

On April 15, 1952 L.B. Pearson, as Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, delivered a significant speech on national sovereignty and international organization which helped to clarify and define the direction Canadian foreign policy was taking. The speech, when applied to Canada's relations with Yugoslavia, revealed some interesting points of divergence and convergence between the two countries. It also reflected the nature and tone of relations between Canada and Yugoslavia, particularly where they concerned issues related to the sovereignty of the state in the post-war world.

Pearson noted with interest how "a wave of insurgent nationalism" as expressed in the desire of people to find self-government and independence coincided with "a time when long-established states are becoming increasingly aware of the disadvantages of a rigid adherence to the principle of national sovereignty in international relations."[67] The Minister was appreciative of the fact that "it is inevitable and right that nationalism must find expression in political freedom before its limitations are realized" and that, understandably, the "more developed and politically mature countries have, however, gradually been coming to realize as a result of their actual political, military and economic experiences, that their security, indeed their very existence, may require some modification of this doctrine of exclusive national sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction, which was once considered sacrosanct."[68] In his speech Pearson extolled the merits and potential of international institutions such as the United

Nation, which was based on the sovereign equality of its member states, and NATO, based on collective defence arrangements in the interest of enhancing collective security, and finally the emergence of the move towards European unity. Membership in these institutions and the promotion of European integration, Pearson argued, brought with it a measure of the yielding of sovereignty by members states in the interest of international peace and security. The movement towards European unity, for instance, was for Pearson the product "of a general dissatisfaction in Western Europe with the limitations and disadvantages of national sovereignty and an urge to a broader European basis for political organization."[69]

Particularly vexing for the Canadian government, Pearson pointed out, was the position taken by the Soviet Union and its satellites on the issues of sovereignty and international intervention:

> The Soviet Union has, in fact, an almost pathological concern for national sovereignty and the equality and independence of states, whenever any form of international action is proposed which would lay its own territory or its own domestic activities open to examination by others. On other occasions, when the action concerned means interference with 'capitalist' states, it takes, of course, the opposite view. Consistency in these, as in some other matters, is not a Communist virtue.[70]

Officially the Yugoslav position on the issues of sovereignty and intervention bore a close resemblance to the Soviet position - with the Yugoslavs being equally as vehement in arguing for and defending their sovereignty against intervention from the East or the West while maintaining that Western aid and assistance, along with "protection" from the UN, were vital in keeping the country afloat. At the same time the Yugoslavs denied that acceptance of Western support had compromised the internal and domestic integrity of the Yugoslav state. The Canadian government, while formally respecting and being particularly sympathetic to Yugoslav sensitivities concerning intervention into their domestic affairs, privately recognized that Western aid and UN support was an important instrument in influencing Yugoslav decision-making in the direction of becoming more sensitive to criticisms concerning human rights abuses taking place within its borders. Even more important at the time, the Canadian government believed that Western assistance could lead Yugoslavia to respond more favorably to Western initiatives and, therefore in geo-political terms, move closer to the Western camp. In his Princeton speech Pearson was careful to re-iterate the fact that the UN Charter contains an important provision that does not authorize the UN to intervene in essentially the domestic affairs of a state. At the same time, however, Pearson unlocked the door to intervention by stating:

> This [Charter position not allowing UN intervention in a state's domestic affairs] merely asserts another general principle, of course, and does not define what are essentially domestic matters. **The way is left open, therefore, for discussion and dispute regarding such a definition** [emphasis mine] - and the position taken in such discussion is often concerned more with political than legal considerations.[71]

It is essentially in this Pearsonian context that Canada's relations with Yugoslavia should be viewed. In his speech Pearson reminded his audience that:

> We should be reluctant, if not unwilling, to press others to make a greater abandonment of their sovereign rights than we are willing to make ourselves. We should also remember that small powers are often more sensitive about their rights than large ones. If they weren't they might not have any. If they are realistic, however, they must know - these smaller powers - that, by insisting on standing alone or in isolation or neutralism or whatever they may call it, they are not likely to get very far in determining their fate. Today it is only by working with others that smaller countries can exercise any influence on the big decisions by the big powers which determine their own fate. This should strengthen their belief in international co-operation and international organization.[72]

It was, therefore, the Canadian position that through international co-operation and international organization smaller states could regain their voice and greater control over their own futures. This view anchored Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia through the fifties and on into the sixties. This was the period as well that, from the Canadian perspective, foreign policy had begun to be viewed, as Pearson, in a statement before the House of Commons in 1952, called it "merely domestic policy with it hat on."[73]

The Sixties

Upon entering the sixties Canadian foreign policy makers focused on a variety of issues that were an integral part of Canadian-Yugoslav relations of that decade. While most of these issues represented a historical continuum, many were also reflective of a new decade of change in international relations, particularly between the super powers, and the steady evolution and democratization of the socialist system in Yugoslavia. Canadian foreign policy was particularly in tune with and responsive to the issue of economic reform taking place in Yugoslavia during the sixties. Related to the economic reform taking place in Yugoslavia was Canada's involvement in enhancing trade relations with Yugoslavia as well as persistent efforts by the government on the multilateral level to provide political support for Yugoslav efforts to secure and maintain the necessary international financial support to upgrade its economic system. As a vital listening post Canada's presence in Yugoslavia was very important in monitoring and occasionally encouraging an independent Yugoslav foreign policy as well as Yugoslavia's leading role in the non-aligned movement. Close relations with the Yugoslavs also provided Canada with important information on Soviet and Chinese intentions regarding the Vietnam war and revealed that the two countries shared many common views and interests in bring that war to an end and, in general, finding ways of limiting super-power hegemony. Canadian-Yugoslav relations of this period reveal that both states shared an interest in promoting the viability of multilateral institutions as a counter-balance to super-power dominance of world affairs. Two other issues drew the attention of Canadian foreign policy - the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the emerging power and influence of the republics - both of which posed a serious threat to the Yugoslav state and new challenges to Canadian foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Encourages Liberalization of Yugoslav Economy

Canadian foreign policy-makers were attuned to the fact that the breach within the communist bloc was followed in the fifties by fundamental changes in the economic policies of Yugoslavia which led to the abandonment of centralized planning of the economy and agricultural collectivization. These reforms were followed in the early sixties by a general reform designed to integrate Yugoslavia's economy into the world economy as well as a greater shift in emphasis from direct state control over pricing to market driven forces influencing price mechanisms. The Canadian government had urged this kind of economic reform and was somewhat encouraged by the prospect that there were joint-venture schemes which could be both economically profitable for Canadian companies and politically desirable for the government in that they would contribute to the westernization and democratization of Yugoslavia. As part of a memorandum to Cabinet in October of 1961 concerning an application for export financing for the sale and construction of a petroleum refinery at Pancevo, Yugoslavia, by Foster Wheeler Limited, an External Affairs report reflected this optimism when it concluded that:

> A peculiar brand of economy has thus been created in which public ownership of virtually all means of production exists side by side with relatively free trade, free formation of prices, autonomy of enterprise managed by workers' councils, and the existence of profits. The earnings of enterprises are now being applied in such a manner as to enable enterprises to invest for expansion. Significant also is the change in economic thinking that the economy has become strong enough to allow increased personal consumption and improvement in the standard of living without having to sacrifice the high rate of investment.[74]

The report also described as a success the Yugoslav five year plan of 1956-1961 for having surpassed the targets set by that plan. All sectors of the economy were reported to be moving forward, except for agriculture, which had been the victim of bad weather and crop failures. Of some significance as well was that trade with Canada from the mid-fifties to the first quarter of 1961 showed signs of improvement.[75]

While the report conveyed, in general, a more favorable view of economic and trade relations between Canada and Yugoslavia than had existed in the past, it was also very cautionary about Yugoslavia's ability to expand industrial exports to the West in the face stiff competition in Western markets and restrictions against her agricultural produce. Through the later fifties and into the early sixties imports continued to rise dramatically over exports due, as cited by the Canadian report, "to the persistent dependence on foreign resources for investment purposes."[76] In response to the rising trade deficit with her Western trading partners and growing foreign debt, the Yugoslav government was forced to look to the IMF, the United States and a number of European countries for loans and foreign aid.

While the Canadian government stated its inability to contribute directly to stabilizing Yugoslavia's trade and economic balance of payments difficulties, it continued to support the Yugoslav search for loans and aid from the United States and West European countries as well as from the IMF and other institutions. The Canadian government was cognizant of and did what it could to ameliorate the fact that credit insurers, as the report explained, normally took "a restrictive attitude towards Yugoslavia because of the implications of dealing with a communist country which has taken up a neutralist position."[77] From the perspective of the Canadian government the improvement in the Yugoslav economy was precarious. What was more significant from the political perspective of the Canadian government was that the Yugoslav government appeared to be willing to make many of the changes necessary for further integration of the Yugoslav economy into the West's. The approval of Cabinet in 1961 for export financing ($16.8 million) through the Export Credit Insurance Corporation of the Pancevo refinery project reflected the Canadian government's interest in maintaining its role as a player - albeit a smaller one - in Yugoslav affairs. The credibility of that role at least in terms of Canada's economic and trade relations with Yugoslavia sustained some damage, however, with the failure of the Vickers pulp and paper mill projects, and later, the Pancevo Foster Wheeler oil refinery project of the early sixties.[78]

Having involved itself quite deeply in the failed negotiations over the Pancevo and Vickers projects, the Canadian government was more careful to alert the private sector interested in doing business in Yugoslavia of the necessity of securing financing far in advance and understanding that the Communist Party, not the Yugoslav enterprises, very often had the final decision on foreign purchases. Very often as well there existed an uneasy relationship between the private sector, motivated primarily by economics, and the Canadian Government, empowered to make available long term export financing under Section 21A of the Export Credits Insurance Act and motivated very often primarily by political calculations. Past difficulties surrounding attempts to realize joint Canadian-Yugoslav ventures, for which the Yugoslavs acknowledged their responsibility, did not deter the Yugoslavs from attempting to initiate future ventures involving Canadian firms. While mindful of its power to induce future projects by making available export financing, (the final decision resting with Cabinet) and thereby enhancing its relations with Yugoslavia, the Canadian government was also aware that the Yugoslavs were clearly concerned about the dropping level of their exports to Canada that could lead to a decrease in future Yugoslav purchases in Canada. However, the government was cognizant that Canadian exports to Yugoslavia as reported by External Affairs, were quite miniscule in the context of Canada's total exports and that Yugoslav-Canadian economic relations served primarily a political purpose.[79] This view was substantiated by Ambassador Campbell's perceptive on the trade and economic aspect of Canada-Yugoslav relations of the time:

> It was difficult on the trade side because the two economies were not complementary. They were into this workers self-management system of semi-autonomous factories that were really not autonomous at all but were run by the Communist party and that was that. They made shoddy goods, nothing of that was of any interest whatsoever to Canada. I confess I came early to the conclusion that there was not alot you could do about the economic relations between Yugoslavia and us. It [our economic relations with Yugoslavia] was very much a political exercise and we were very much encouraging them in the direction in which they were moving as a country

> somewhere in between the West and the East and with a good foot in the non-aligned world.[80]

Conversely it was clearly understood by the Canadian government and diplomats in Belgrade that one of the primary reasons for the Yugoslav government's interest in maintaining friendly relations with Canada and the West was economic.

The Belgrade Listening Post

While economic relations played a secondary and yet supportive role in Canada's relations with Yugoslavia, political relations, which reflected in large measure Yugoslavia's role and significance in East European and in international affairs, clearly dominated the relations between the two countries in the sixties. As a vital listening post in Eastern Europe Canada's Embassy was very much preoccupied with ascertaining Yugoslavia's position and influence in the shifting and uncertain terrain of the international politics of the sixties. Canada's foreign policy community acknowledged with some unease a degree of rapprochement between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. A consensus seemed to gradually emerge among Canadian diplomats that the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement at least no longer posed the threat of Yugoslavia re-entering the Soviet bloc. What was of concern to the Canadian government, now that the rapprochement had been achieved, was the important question, of how Yugoslavia would use her influence with non-aligned countries. Moreover, the perception of Canada's new Ambassador to Belgrade reflected very much Canada's policy of improving relations with a gradually liberalizing Communist Yugoslavia in an effort to split the Soviet bloc while at the same time recognizing that those occupying the seats of power had not sacrificed much to their loyalty to communism as he observed in a dispatch to Ottawa:

> ... they [Yugoslav leaders] may be expected to push their extreme views to the point where they would feel it would interfere with their own future interests. If, for example, they thought they thought that by being too extreme in support of

> 'progressive forces' overseas they might lose out economically, I would expect them to appear more moderate at least on the surface. But I see no reason to treat them as other than what they are - Communists of longstanding who will remain so.[81]

Ottawa, while more moderate in its views on Yugoslavia than Washington, understood the dangers as well as the potential benefits of courting Yugoslavia in the international arena. Canada's acquiescence with an independent Yugoslavia foreign policy which was aimed at the same non-aligned world both coincided and conflicted with Canada's particular interests in the non-aligned world.

The Non-Aligned Movement and Canada-Yugoslav Relations

During the early 1960's the Canadian government began to scrutinize Yugoslavia's foreign policy which focused strongly on promoting "active peaceful coexistence" and the development of contacts and influence with Western and African-Asian non-Communist parties and movements. The considerable interest shown by Canada's Belgrade Embassy in Yugoslavia's "non-aligned" relations with other developing countries reflected the special interest and concern Canada had with the Yugoslav experiment and its world view within the context of the non-aligned movement. In commenting on the complimentary nature of Canadian-Yugoslav views on the conception of the non-aligned movement, Ross Campbell Canada's former Ambassador to Yugoslavia during most of the sixties recalled that:

> We recognized that Yugoslavia was one of the founding members of the non-aligned movement and we recognized that in the post-war world the non-aligned movement was going to be a major factor as all of the pre-war colonial empires dissolved. ... Canada recognized that a huge body of new countries were going to be important and there was a great deal of sympathy [in Canadian circles] We understood that because we had been through a colonial period ourselves. We could see, therefore, the Yugoslav point of view vis a vis

> Russia for example. We could see in Yugoslavia a prominent new leader in a new episode in history.[82]

Mr. Campbell recognized that there was here a kind of contradiction in Canadian foreign policy in that as loyal member of NATO, Canada, on the one hand, was willing to promote Yugoslavia's non-aligned initiatives as a counter to Soviet hegemony and yet, on the other, there were concerns in foreign policy circles and the government that those non-aligned initiatives could benefit the Soviet bloc more than the West.[83] In other words, the conundrum facing Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia at this stage of Canada-Yugoslav relations was whether or not, as concluded by Canada's Charge d'Affaires, "Yugoslavia's success for Communism in the non-aligned world out-weighs the value to the West of Yugoslavia's inevitably divisive influence within the Communist bloc" - a common theme that very much characterized the essence of Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia.[84] Canadian foreign policy had become sensitive to the fact that the meaning of "non-alignment" had evolved rather quickly into an affirmative concept designed, in part, as a challenge and alternative to cold war polarization. It was recognized by Canadian diplomats as well that "peaceful coexistence", regarded initially as a temporary expedient of communism, had come to be regarded by the Yugoslav leaders as the most effective means of spreading communism. Yugoslav foreign policy, for example, viewed the primary cause of war as stemming from inequality and its corollary "colonialism". In its attack against colonialism it was evident from the Canadian perspective that the foreign policy of Yugoslavia revealed a somewhat worrisome anti-Western bias.[85]

Shared Objectives

In the minds of many in the Canadian government there was the lingering fear that in supporting an independent Yugoslav foreign policy, Canadian foreign policy was, at least in the short term, in danger of lending support to a Yugoslav foreign policy which was doing more harm to the West than it was to the stability of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe. The Canadian government, in its relations with Yugoslavia through the sixties, appeared to be willing to take the shorter term risk with a view towards the longer term goal and benefit of hastening the evolution of Eastern Europe towards models of government with which the West could find more harmonious relations. While there were dangers associated with promoting the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet influence, there were potential benefits, particularly in areas where the two countries shared similar views and concerns, which Canadian foreign policy was willing to explore. The Vietnam war was one issue on which both countries shared similar view and one on which a great deal of reporting was done by the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade.

The Canadian government recognized at a very early stage in the Vietnam conflict, as Canada's former Ambassador to Yugoslavia during the sixties recalled, that "Yugoslavia had very special access to information because of her non-aligned connections."[86] The Yugoslav position, that a settlement of the conflict should be found on the basis of both sides admitting to the futility of a military solution, was shared by Canada. Also shared by Canada was the broader strategic Yugoslav concern expressed in a 1964 memorandum from the Far Eastern Division of External Affairs. The memo characterized the Yugoslav view by noting that:

> ... unless there is a change in Western policy in areas of acute friction, such as Vietnam, the philosophy of peaceful coexistence will lose out in its bid for support among the independent nations and a more militant approach, specifically that of the Chinese, will carry the day with Afro-Asian opinion; this in turn could lead to a full-scale confrontation on a racial basis.[87]

Besides sharing a fear that underdeveloped countries would look to more militant alternatives, both countries expended a great deal of diplomatic effort to finding a solution through the diplomatic channels to Hanoi that Belgrade was able to offer. For Canada Belgrade had become an unique and important listening post with regard to Chinese, North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front intentions which Canada was able to collect and share in her efforts to find a political solution to the war.[88] As was often the case, the Yugoslavs, while often critical of Hanoi's intransigence, would present Hanoi's position in a softer light, while Canada, in similar terms, would attempt to present a more moderate view of the US position and on that basis find common ground upon which to pursue new avenues in an attempt to stop the war that was having a negative effect on Canada's most important trading partner and neighbor - a negative effect that the Canadian government could see spilling over into Canada as well. Canada's information derived through its diplomatic channels and sources in Belgrade was, therefore , seen by the Canadian government to be a valuable asset that could assist in the search for a political/diplomatic solution to the conflict. In the words of Mr. Campbell:

> We had this interesting pipeline through me and the Yugoslavs back to Hanoi and Peking that was helpful to us. What our External Affairs did with it vis-a-vis the Americans I don't know but I cannot believe they were not using it for some purpose. I was encouraged very much to go on with this pipeline through to Hanoi and Peking.[89]

In bilateral terms Canada-Yugoslav relations continued to remain close, cordial and often quite intimate as reported by Ross Campbell, Canada's Ambassador in Belgrade, following a meeting with Tito in 1965:

> Tito began by inviting me to tell him something about changes in Canadian confederation of which he had been reading lately. I briefly explained the concept of cooperative federalism as evolution in confederation which was now resulting in greater autonomy for provincial governments stimulated in part by social revolution and national renaissance in Quebec. Because of Yugoslavia's own federal structure and complex nationalities problem, Tito showed great interest in Canada's experience and some surprise at the ethnic distribution of population in Canada, noting that Quebec's population was as large as Roumania's. He saw parallel to Yugoslavia's basic problem, commonly called nationalities question. It had, he said been a running sore throughout Yugoslavia's bitter history. It had been suspended in late stages of war when all Yugoslavs had been concentrating on struggle against Germany and had been quiescent during period of post-war reconstruction. Now however it was re-emerging as returning prosperity tended to underline gap between developed and underdeveloped regions, additional factor which he supposed

> did not RPT[repeat] not apply to Canada. I confessed that on contrary regional levels of development were problem in Canada too, with Maritimes chronically depressed in relation to rest and prairies periodically so, and I explained federal financial measures to lessen disparity in levels of prosperity in various parts of country. Tito noted that problem in Yugoslavia was exacerbated by coincidence of economic development with ethnic borders. To correct the imbalance without exacerbating the nationalities problem, government had decided on decentralization through enterprises rather than republic governments and had thus focused remedial measures on economic rather than political factors. 8th Congress had set pattern for further effort to remove regional rivalries.[90]

The Tito-Campbell meeting illustrated that both countries understood, and appreciated that they shared some common domestic problems associated with a federal form of government about which they could speak to each other rather candidly. In their meeting Tito further suggested that that Yugoslavia's nationalities problem had been been further irritated and complicated by the failure of Yugoslavia's neighbors to initially "deal with minority questions in enlightened way" and that, in fact, Yugoslavia's example of having ethnic groups form part of the national fabric had now encouraged other states in the region to follow Yugoslavia's example.[91]

In terms of Canada-Yugoslav relations Tito was able to make the observation that they were without friction and in some areas characterized by active cooperation. On the other hand, as reported by Mr. Campbell, Tito was far less reassured by the international situation, in particular the desperate straights in which the UN was finding itself. The UN, Tito reiterated, was the only forum capable maintaining international peace and promoting the well-being of the majority of states - a view shared in the most part by Canada. From Tito's perspective the financial difficulties faced by the UN were relatively negligible in comparison to the root of problem which had to do with great power interference, as a consequence of which a new approach, based on the equality of states, was needed in similar terms as expressed in a speech by Canada's External Affairs Minister, Mr. Martin to the UN.[92] Canada shared the view that the great powers stalemates and a shortage of funding were causing serious problems within the UN and in more specific terms could undermine, in Mr. Campbell's words to Tito, the "ability of UN to provide indispensable international services and assistance to under-developed states."[93] In terms of aid to developing countries Canada's Ambassador and Tito also reiterated their countries' preference that in most cases multilateral mechanisms were preferable to bilateral ones since in the case of multilateral aid it was more difficult to attach the kinds of political strings to which most states were adverse. Mr. Campbell's communication to Ottawa concluded with an observation held and nurtured by those involved in Canadian -Yugoslav relations:

> I had the impression that he [Tito] was more prepared to listen to Canadian views than he might be to similar views when expressed by our principal allies, and therein I think lay [the] usefulness of [our] talk from our point of view.[94]

Later in an interview in 1993 Mr. Campbell was equally as emphatic in his belief that the good relations between the countries drew from a common experience: "They saw a certain parallel [in Canadian thinking] to their own thinking. There is no question that they were much more open and forthcoming [with Canadians] than they were with alot of other people."[95]

Those involved in Canadian foreign policy were certainly aware that the crisis in the UN, the growing influence of China in socialist and non-aligned camps as well as the intensifying confrontation between the great powers over the Congo and Vietnam had provided Yugoslavia with an opportunity in the mid sixties, as Mr. Campbell put it, to bring about "a new balance of power in the world by welding the so-called non-aligned states into a broad, powerful anti-colonial, political alliance."[101] Besides Yugoslav initiatives concerning the non-aligned movement, the Canadian government also watched with some concern Yugoslavia's attempt to balance partial membership in COMECON against the special arrangements it sought to develop with GATT, EFTA and the EEC. Nevertheless, Canada continued to offer cautious support for Yugoslav membership in these multilateral institutions. Canada recognized the importance Yugoslavia placed on developing trade relations with western countries as well as Yugoslav efforts to overcome trade barriers erected by western European trade organizations. In general terms Canada was becoming recognized by

Yugoslavia in particular, and the international community in general, for taking the initiative towards improving relations between countries with different socio-political systems.

In 1967 Yugoslav foreign policy underwent a subtle but important shift which required a Canadian response. On January 6, 1967, the Yugoslav government made some interesting proposals - contained in a June 6, 1967 AIDE-MEMOIRE on the Promotion of Cooperation Among European States - that were aimed at enhancing European cooperation. The Canadian government found two points of interest in the Yugoslav proposal. First of all, Canada noted that the Yugoslav proposal sought to make extensive use of the existing United Nations, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), a caucus of European states and organizations such as the ILO, UNESCO, IAEA and the FAO in an effort to bring about an end to military blocs and the superpower hegemony of the US and USSR. The second point of interest was expressed in Ambassador Campbell's memorandum to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs on February 22, 1967 when the Ambassador suggested that the Yugoslav initiatives were "one more indication of Yugoslavia's 'return to Europe."[97] The Canadian response to Yugoslavia's "return to Europe" was open-minded but cautious. Canada's concerns about Yugoslavia's role in leading a non-aligned movement seemed to be somewhat alleviated as reported in a memorandum from the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa which, in part, stated:

> Tito's current peregrinations in the Third World strike the observer as a form of whistling loudly while passing by the graveyard of non-alignment. Yugoslavs dare not admit that the emperor known as non-alignment has no clothes until something is found to take the place of clothes - or the emperor.[98]

On the one hand, there were merits to the concept of a Europe that could serve as a counterbalance to the bilateral pulls exerted by the big powers.The Canadian government was after all sympathetic to Yugoslavia's continuing desire to preserve some maneuvering space for smaller independent nations in a world increasingly dominated by the super powers. Canada was also quite receptive to the concept that cooperation between European states could be promoted through an exchange of views through multilateral institutions and organizations such as NATO, the UN, the OECD, the ECE and the ILO. Although the Department of External Affairs was cognizant of the shortcomings associated with the Yugoslav initiatives towards Europe - especially as to their lack of detail - it was able to see in them a compatibility in terms, for example, of how Ottawa would view NATO's responses to the Yugoslav proposals.[99] The Canadian government also recognized that Belgrade was engaging in a more active European policy because it wished to take advantage of the climate of detente and did not want to find itself isolated from the Western or Eastern Bloc. Furthermore, Ottawa understood that domestic factors related to the expansion of Yugoslavia's economy and increased commercial contacts with the West were playing a part in the shift in Yugoslav foreign policy. Canada could , therefore, support Yugoslavia's "return to Europe" in so far as it could contribute, in a multilateral context, to European cooperation. On the other hand, the potential for enhancing European cooperation had to be weighed very carefully against the danger that it could bring with it the greater exclusion of Canada and the US from European affairs.[100]

Canada's response to Yugoslav proposals with regard to Europe illustrated again that the usefulness of Canada's support of and compatibility with Yugoslav foreign policy initiatives had its limitations. However, even within those limited parameters Canadian foreign policy found considerable success in pursuing and advancing its objectives vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. In encouraging the Yugoslavs to direct greater attention on Europe, the goal of Canadian foreign policy to return Yugoslavia to the West and to have Yugoslavia challenge and undermine Soviet hegemony and influence in the East, could be realized. While Yugoslavia's lessening involvement in the non-aligned movement and increasing involvement in Europe drew Ottawa's attention in the mid-sixties, by 1968 Yugoslavia's domestic arena took on growing importance in the eyes of Canadian observers. Yugoslavia's 'return to Europe' was not only a product of Western economic and political influence and the realization on the part of Yugoslav foreign policy of the limitations of playing a leading role in the non-aligned movement, it was also a product of the domestic dimension of

Yugoslav politics which dictated that the developed republics saw their future, as Ambassador Campbell noted, "in thoroughly 'European' rather than ideological terms."[101]

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 and its impact on the Western alliance in general, and Yugoslavia in particular and brought back into focus the importance of Canada's policy of promoting and defending the independence of Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership. The Canadian government was cognizant of Tito's position that developments in Czechoslovakia were an internal Czechoslovak affair. The Yugoslavs also feared that the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces would lead to a worsening of East-West relations and encourage the use of force in international relations. Canada, it was understood, in fact supported Yugoslav intentions to continue on in its economic and social reforms designed to create a freer society and greater competition in the world economy. Canadian foreign policy had also invested in the prospect that Czechoslovakia would become another Yugoslavia. In meetings between the Yugoslav Ambassador to Canada and Canada's Minister of External Affairs on the subject of the Warsaw Pact invasion Canada's Minister communicated to the Yugoslav Ambassador that Canada had made consistent efforts to improve relations with Czechoslovakia but in doing so was careful not give the impression that it was interfering in the internal affairs of that country. At the same time, the two were in agreement that there should be a rejection of any attempt to view the invasion of Czechoslovakia as an internal affair of the Communist bloc.[102]

Multilateralism and NATO: In Defence of Yugoslavia's Sovereignty

The Canadian government was also concerned with the military implications of the Warsaw Pact invasion, particularly NATO's involvement in the crisis.[103] While there was some disagreement in Ottawa as to whether or not NATO should make any commitments about the security of Yugoslavia, it seemed clear that the Yugoslavs, as expressed in a communication from Canada's Ambassador in Belgrade to Ottawa, were expecting some kind of military response from NATO: "I am inclined to think that senior and responsible Yugoslavs know full well that any attack on them by USSR would not go unchallenged by the West."[104] At the same time, on a formal level the suggestion that NATO would come to the assistance of Yugoslavia was dismissed by the Yugoslavs as unnecessary since they were confident in their own abilities to defend their sovereignty. From the perspective of the Canadian government there was a recognition that the pursuit of Yugoslavia's traditional middle way between East and West had served it well.[105] This balancing act did not preclude the Yugoslavs in private meetings with Canadian diplomats and officials from attempting to keep abreast of evolving NATO thinking on Soviet intentions. This sort of relationship raised, for Canadian diplomats and foreign policy, the issue of how far they could go in conversations with senior Yugoslav officials and diplomats. Canada's Ambassador in Belgrade made it clear that he was "in favour of relatively frank conversations between Yugoslavs and the representatives of of NATO countries." He, however, went on to add in his correspondence to Ottawa: "I have doubts however about any of us trying to give to the Yugoslavs information about NATO thinking as such unless the Council itself has decided what specific information should be conveyed and by whom and in what manner."[106]

Canadian foreign policy-makers were not about to forget that Canada also served to inform the Yugoslavs better of Superpower intentions. Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade persisted in obtaining a Canadian perspective on any given issue due to Canada's unique ties to the United States and Europe. This position of the Canadian government served to strengthen Canada's influence with regards to its relations with Yugoslavia. In turn, it was evident that the Department of External Affairs was very interested in closely monitoring power struggles within the Yugoslav leadership about the effect of Western policies on Yugoslavia or the placement of Yugoslav diplomats and senior officials on the basis of nationalism. Representation, for example, of all republics at the ambassadorial level was known to be an issue. An even more ominous issue, scrutinized by Canada, was the Yugoslav response to the rise of student unrest in the late sixties and early seventies. Canada like Yugoslavia, was aware that the Balkans remained the object of great power policies, often to its own detriment. It is, therefore, understandable that Canadian foreign policy reflected at least tacit support of those Yugoslav policies which encouraged mutual respect for sovereignty, independence and non-interference.

The Seventies

A review of Canadian-Yugoslav relations and the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia during the seventies reflect the continued importance that Canadian foreign policy placed on safeguarding Yugoslavia's political and territorial integrity. At the same time , however, this period reveals that there was growing concern among Canadian officials about the ever-growing emergence of the nationalities issue. The nationalities issue, from the Canadian perspective, not only posed a serious threat to the Yugoslav federation and the peace and stability of the region, it also began to raise questions about a Canadian foreign policy that had placed the human rights of Yugoslavia's nationalities behind Canada's geo-strategic concerns in the interests of maintaining an independent and cohesive Yugoslav state. This decade also reminded Canada that while Yugoslavia's role in the non-aligned movement may have lost much of its strength and vibrancy, Yugoslavia's place in that movement was still a force to be reckoned with. Canadian views on Yugoslavia's role in the non-aligned movement also reflected some interesting foreign policy commonalties between Canada and Yugoslavia which included the importance of middle powers playing a larger part in international relations.

The importance that each state saw in the other as significant players in the international arena was highlighted by Tito's 1971 visit to Canada which strengthened the good bilateral relations between the two states. On a multilateral level Canada and Yugoslavia shared common views (and some differences) in the early development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). By the end of the decade, however, the bilateral bonding that took place with Tito's visit, as well as cooperation in international affairs, was overshadowed by Canadian concerns about the survivability of the Yugoslav federation without Tito.

Nationalism on the Rise: The Croat Spring of 1971

As noted, the beginning of the seventies was marked by Canada's increased interest in the growth in the role of the republics in influencing the domestic and foreign policy of Yugoslavia. Along with the continuing trend towards the further decentralization of the economic system Canadian diplomats reported with great interest on the increasing participation of the republics in the foreign policy making process of Yugoslavia. There was considerable evidence by 1968 of a trend towards greater involvement of the republics and their institutions in the development of Yugoslav foreign policy.[108] Frequently the growing power of the republics was regarded in optimistic terms that were reflected, for example, in a statement by Yugoslavia's State Secretary for External Affairs, Marko Nikezic, in Yugoslavia's parliament:

> Yugoslavia's foreign policy expresses and represents the global interests of the community, depending on the active participation and cooperation of all the republics. The republics play an especially important role in the country's relations with her neighbors, in economic relations, in small-border traffic, tourism, and in the sphere of the national minorities questions, which, on the whole, also has important political aspects.[107]

Even in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only republic which did not share a common border with a foreign country, there was acknowledgment by federal authorities of the fact that the republic exported a large share of her products to foreign markets, and as a consequence, it should be allowed greater input in the foreign policy-making process of the country. Not surprisingly, because of the Canadian government's concern about the geo-strategic and political importance of an independent, socialist Yugoslavia and Ottawa's own preoccupation with questions of federalism, by the late sixties diplomatic correspondence between the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade and Ottawa increasingly concerned itself with the issue of Yugoslav federalism - with frequent parallels being drawn between the Yugoslav and Canadian experiences with federalism - and the ability of the Yugoslav federation to withstand the pressures of decentralization. At this point in Canada-Yugoslav relations, ideological differences did not carry the same weight, nor did they solicit the same paranoia among Canadian foreign policy-making circles as they once had in the earlier relations between the two countries.

In terms of Yugoslavia's foreign policy it was the assessment of the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade that at this point in its evolution consultations between the federation and the republics on foreign policy matters were still to a large extent a matter of chance, depending for instance, on whether responsible officials happened to meet each over certain periods of time. It was also understood by Canadian diplomats in Belgrade that the views of President Tito in the formation of foreign policy continued to carry considerable weight and indications were that while the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry was an important institution, nearly all the more important decisions were made by the "old boys network".[108] The threat posed to this "old boys network" and the cohesiveness of the federal system was exemplified when the Croatian government and Party responded favorably to the nationalistic manifestations of the so-called "Croatian Spring" of 1971. Calls by Croatian nationalists ranged from demands that Croatian be recognized as the official language of the Republic to demands for outright sovereignty and separate membership in the United Nations.[109] The consequent purge by Tito of the Croatian leadership and , soon after, leaders of Serbian nationalism, brought temporary stability to the situation in Yugoslavia and allowed constitutional revisions designed to transform Yugoslavia into an authentic and decentralized federation. A united and disciplined Party, the League of Communists (LCY), was to provide the necessary cohesiveness to the federal structure.

Canada's formal reaction to Tito's crackdown on Croat nationalism was low key and unobtrusive. In fact it would not be unfair to characterize Canada's response to the Croatian crisis as being primarily one of concern for the survivability of Yugoslav state. On a number of occasions the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade communicated its assessment to Ottawa of the dangers for the Yugoslav federation posed by nationalism, economic particularism, and political separatism, with particular stress and concern on the catalytic effect the Croat crises could have on the Yugoslav state. At this stage of Canadian-Yugoslav relations the maintenance of the integrity of the Yugoslav state as essential to the maintenance of stability in the region took priority over any nationalistic sentiments and human rights expressed by any "repressed" ethnic components of Yugoslavia. It is for this reason as well that, when reporting to Ottawa, Canadian diplomats in Yugoslavia may have tended to down-play the sometimes sensationalized versions of the response of federal authorities to the outbreak of Croat nationalism and separatism that was often found in the Western media.

The Canadian government also recognized, for example, that the Croatian crisis made dealings with the federal authorities more difficult. Moreover, Canadian authorities were concerned that the Croat crisis had undermined Yugoslav efforts to become a part of an expanding EEC. In the words of Canada's Ambassador, Bruce Williams: "... they [the Yugoslavs] were concerned that expanded EEC would become more like a bloc rather than a community and could pursue policies detrimental to Yugoslavia's economic and political interests."[110] Problems with nationalistic outbursts in Croatia and the resultant concern from the EEC, as well as references by the Western press to acts of police brutality and mass arrests, illustrated the extent to which the Yugoslav government felt exposed during the Croat crisis as well as the extent to which the Canadian government was sensitive to Yugoslavia's predicaments. The Canadian government recognized the extreme importance of the EEC to Yugoslavia: over 50 per cent of Yugoslav trade was with the EEC. Canada also recognized the uncompetitiveness of Yugoslav exports in East European markets and the heavy emphasis Yugoslavia placed on expanding its economic relations through various multilateral forums such as UNCTAD and GATT. The Canadian government was also worried that an expanding EC would leave Canada isolated from Europe and a fracturing Yugoslav federalism could undermine its foreign policy initiatives directed at challenging Soviet hegemony over the Communist world and maintaining a level of stability in the Balkans. From the Canadian foreign policy perspective to exclude Yugoslavia - although waning somewhat in its influence over the non-aligned movement - from the EC was to underestimate the important part Yugoslavia played in rallying middle power influence on a number of issues in international relations.[111]

Non-Interference and the Domestic Canadian Lobby

While the Yugoslav government did make public statements that hinted of outside Western interference in fomenting nationalist discontent in Croatia, the Canadian government was careful to remain as scrupulously uninvolved in the crisis as it could. There was after all the problem of those elements of the Croatian community in Canada linked to anti-Tito and anti-Yugoslav activism and possibly terrorism. In response to frequent Yugoslav concerns about the activities of emigre organizations in Canada, the Canadian government on a number of occasions disassociated itself from illegal and criminal acts committed against Yugoslav officials and property. At the same time, the Canadian position was that Yugoslavia could not be allowed to pass on responsibility for its problems to Canada. The root of the problem of anti-Yugoslav activities conducted by certain elements of the emigre community, Canadian authorities would often remind their Yugoslav counterparts, were to be found in Yugoslavia. In observing Canada's policy preference to interpret the Croat crisis more so as a threat to the stability of the region rather than a legitimate expression of the principle of self-determination one could conclude that Canada's domestic constituency - emigre or otherwise - had little influence in the formulation of Canada's foreign policy response to the crisis. It is interesting to note that the Canadian government was pleased with the Yugoslav reaction to international terrorism which tended to overshadow the usual Yugoslav support for revolutionary causes. The Canadian government was obviously cognizant of the Yugoslav fear that any support for the liberation of oppressed peoples by terrorist means could very well be turned against Yugoslavia. While problems with the activities of certain elements of the emigre community opposed to Tito remained a minor irritant, relations between the two countries continued to improve as highlighted by the visit to Canada of Tito and a high level entourage from November 2-7, 1971.

Tito Visits Canada: Common Views Re-Shared

Tito's visit to Canada reflected the good relations between Canada and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the importance each saw in the other in the field of international relations. The visit featured a state dinner in honor of President Tito hosted by Governor General Michener, the introduction of President Tito to Parliament, the presentation of a group of high level businessmen to Tito, visits to scientific, cultural, educational and industrial institutions, the presentation of an honorary degree from Dalhousie University to Tito, high level official talks in Ottawa and visits to Quebec city and Halifax. It is interesting to note in a joint Canadian-Yugoslav communique that there was not only "in a spirit of frankness, cordiality and mutual understanding" the usual exchange of views on a wide range of issues and views, there was in addition an exchange of ideas "on the current problems and future development of federal states."[112] This statement emphasized Canada's and Yugoslavia's common interests. The communique also summarized other areas were Canada and Yugoslavia shared common views:

> Both sides affirmed the attachment of Canada and Yugoslavia to the cause of international peace and security and the improvement of relations between States on the basis of the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, renunciation of the use or threat of force, mutual confidence, reciprocity and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. They also stated their conviction that peaceful relations between States are possible only in conditions of respect for sovereign equality, including the right of every State to freely choose and develop its political, social and economic systems, for independence and the territorial integrity of States and inviolability of frontiers.[113]

Further, the communique described economic relations between the two countries, as one would expect, in rather sanguine terms.[114] However optimistic and positive the tone concerning the economic relations between the two countries, the reality remained that trade relations did not constitute the essence of the relationship between Canada and Yugoslavia.

As in the sixties the 1971 communique could not escape noting the same imbalance in their modest trading relationship when in their joint communique the two countries "noted with satisfaction the recent increase in Canadian exports to Yugoslavia and agreed that a similar development of Yugoslav exports to Canada was desirable."[115] As in the fifties and sixties there were some political and economic advantages to be gained by both countries with Canadian economic initiatives via the Canadian Export Development Corporation.[116] However, even in the economic realm of joint ventures Canadian officials remained privately doubtful that the Yugoslavs had the necessary financial resources to successfully undertake enterprises such as joint-ventures. The private concerns of Canadian officials aside, Tito's visit to Canada produced negotiations for a civil aviation agreement designed to enhance tourist travel between the two countries, the reciprocal loosening of travel and immigration restrictions and the encouragement of further scientific and technological contacts and exchanges.

With respect to international relations the visit reiterated the middle power view of Canada and Yugoslavia that "smaller powers have an important role to play in international relations" particularly in terms of disarmament initiatives, the necessity of addressing development problems in the Third World and the easing of East-West tensions.[117] Both governments "expressed their satisfaction at the seating of the People's Republic of China as the sole representative of China in both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations." as well as their commitment to strengthening the United Nations and to "enhance its effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter."[118] Of particular import was the encouragement and support for a European Conference on Security and Cooperation that the visit was able to produce.

The CSCE and Canada-Yugoslav Relations

Canada worked quite closely with Yugoslavia on their positions concerning the development of the CSCE. As reported by Canada's Ambassador in Belgrade there seemed to be agreement between Canada and

Yugoslavia, for example, that "whatever docuordocus emerged from the CSCE should have as much legal weight as possible."[119] Canadian officials noted that Tito was enthusiastically supporting a conference on European security even though the Yugoslavs were a little concerned about the "free movement of peoples" concept which had become an important aspect of the proposed conference. There were some differences as well between the positions taken by the two countries on the development of the CSCE. Canada was not in agreement with Yugoslavia, for instance, on expanding CSCE membership to all Mediterranean countries. Canada was concerned that the Mid East crisis could be brought into the Helsinki talks, thereby weakening the chance of a successful conference. The Canadian government had recognized that at this early stage of the development of the CSCE the controversial nature of the minorities issue would likely preclude it being discussed. At the same time Canadian diplomats were able to report that the Yugoslavs remained optimistic about the future of the CSCE. In a speech in 1974 to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, Yugoslavia's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Milos Minic, made the following statements on the subject of Yugoslavia's view of the CSCE:

> We do not regard the Conference on European Security and Cooperation as the end but rather as the beginning of a continuing process of solving European problems which could make it possible to transcend bloc divisions in Europe, to assure equal security to and equitable cooperation among independent and sovereign European countries and enable Europe to make a greater contribution to safeguarding peace, security, equal cooperation and development in the world at large.[120]

Minic went on to outline Yugoslav proposals which called for the rights of national minorities to be guaranteed and the necessity that "the Conference should assume clear positions on national minorities which cannot be overlooked because they are a European reality and because this question has more than once in Europe's history served as the pretext and cause of crises and conflicts among European states."[121] Canada was particularly concerned about Greek-Yugoslav tensions concerning Macedonia, as well as the Austrian-Yugoslav and the Italian-Yugoslav tensions concerning their borders and ethnic minorities along their common borders. Canada regularly urged the Yugoslavs to apply moderation and compromise in their relations with Austria and Greece. The Canadian government was worried too about the effect of Yugoslav-Greek tensions on the NATO alliance and Greece, an important NATO ally of Canada in the Balkans. From the perspective of Canada's foreign policy, Yugoslavia's moderation and compromise could be even more effectively facilitated by Yugoslavia's active and institutionalized involvement in the CSCE.

Throughout the seventies the bilateral relations between Canada and Yugoslavia - re-energized by Tito's visit to Canada - remained good. As was the practise of Canadian diplomats in the fifties and sixties, through the seventies as well Canadian diplomats in Yugoslavia were constantly sounding out Yugoslav officials on their perception of Soviet intentions and in particular Soviet involvement in CSCE developments and NATO. With occasional unease Canada continued to watch Soviet attempts to influence Yugoslav foreign policy which nonetheless continued on an independent path. More ominous, however, was the growing fear among Canadian officials about what would happen to Yugoslavia after Tito - who by 1975 was eighty-three years of age - despite the fact that some assurances had been given that the necessary preparations for his succession had been made and that Yugoslavia's socio-political and economic system was strong enough for Yugoslavia to continue on its present course.

The Eighties

Throughout the eighties Canada's healthy and positive bilateral relations with Yugoslavia were tested by the rapidly disintegrating situation in Yugoslavia. The concept of a collective presidency designed to lead the country after Tito's departure was failing and Yugoslavia's economy - badly in need of international support - was floundering. Forces of decentralization were overtaking those forces that had once been able to hold the Yugoslav federation together. Internationally, super power bipolarity and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe were coming to an end.

The Suppression of Albanian Nationalism and Human Rights

One aspect of the disintegrating situation in Yugoslavia was exemplified by the upsurge of Albanian nationalism which led to demonstrations and violent riots in the autonomous province of Kosovo in April of 1981. Albanian nationalists were pressing for full republic status for Kosovo, an unacceptable prospect for most Serbs since it would imply the recognition of Kosovo as a "nation" within the Yugoslav federation and would constitute the first step in the separation of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. For the Serbs as well the potential secession of Kosovo ran contrary to their perception of Kosovo as the heartland of mediaeval Serbia. The Serbs felt it was necessary to protect the Serb minority there from the growing Albanian-Muslim population. In short, Kosovo's autonomy neither pleased the Serbs nor appeased the Albanians of Kosovo. More to the point, expressions of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo were forcefully and in some cases rather brutally suppressed by the security forces of the Federal government who were under the direction of a Serb, Aleksandar Rankovic. Up to this point, in the words of John Fraser, Canada's Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1983 to 1987, Yugoslavia had received "pretty good marks" on the human rights situation except for the rough handling of Kosovo situation by Yugoslav authorities.[122] Any concern expressed by Canadian authorities and diplomats over the treatment of Kosovan dissidents by the Federal security forces was generally muted as it appeared that the Canadian government was not prepared to make a big issue of human rights abuses in Kosovo.

Related as well to the nationalities problem was the growing fact that by the eighties the republics themselves had become increasingly influential in the foreign policy-making process within the Yugoslav federation. The constitutional revision of 1974 - in part a product of the "Croatian spring" of 1971 and other nationalist manifestations - had made Yugoslavia one of the most decentralized federations in the world. The constitution of 1974 was in part a reaction to the Croatian and subsequently Serbian nationalist enthusiasms of 1971 that coincided with the beliefs of Tito and Kardelj, Tito's chief ideologue, that the nationalist urges could be purged by giving the different republics a far greater degree of power and responsibility. Each of the republics had its ministry of foreign affairs with which the Canadian government and diplomats dealt with by way of consultations and visits. The Canadian government recognized that those republics did develop a more autonomous foreign policy with those states with which they shared a common border - such as in the case of Croatian-Hungarian and Slovenian-Austrian relations. Mr. Fraser's observed that:

> In terms of our own foreign policy operations for all sorts of things, particularly trade deals, you did have to go to the capitals of the republics because that was where the basic decisions were made. If we wanted to sell a nuclear reactor and we were in there trying to promote the virtues of CANDU when they were supposedly buying another nuclear reactor, you had to not only keep in touch with the federal authorities, but perhaps even more important, the Croatian and Slovenian authorities who were actually going to be, in the end, making the basic decisions on what to buy and running things. [123]

In terms of overall Yugoslav foreign policy-making per se, Canadian diplomats were cognizant of the growing debate in which the Slovenians in particular were very much promoting the idea that the whole foreign policy of Yugoslavia ought to be more directed towards Europe, in particular Western Europe and the EC, whereas the traditionalists in Belgrade still adhered to the belief in the viability of the non-aligned movement. This foreign policy debate within Yugoslavia implied that certain changes in Yugoslavia's domestic policy would have to be made in order for Yugoslavia's economy to be able to more compatible with the EC. Canada's response to these developments was one which encouraged Yugoslavia to adopt pro-Western pro-market policies which, ironically, represented an irritating complication for Canada in terms of its relations with Yugoslavia and its attempt to keep Yugoslavia together. "Economically speaking," Mr. Fraser recounted of this period, "the decentralization of Yugoslavia made it more difficult for all sorts of coherent economic policies at the national level to be applied."[124]

The establishment of Yugoslavia's collective presidency also caused some uneasiness in Canadian foreign policy circles. After having dealt for a number of years with a charismatic leader, the transition by the Canadian government to having to deal with less than memorable leaders required ascertaining where authority lie and where decisions were made in

Yugoslavia.[125] Of particular relevance to the Canadian government and the Belgrade Embassy was the concern that the collective leadership was incapable of formulating and implementing a coherent national policy necessary to deal with the continuing economic deterioration of Yugoslavia. Also the collective presidency was having difficulty in dealing with, for example, renewed manifestations of Serbian nationalism much of it related to Kosovo and epitomized by the October 1986 memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences which, in short, charged that Serbia had been getting a bad deal in the Yugoslav federation from its conception in 1945. In the meantime as well the Slovenians had become increasingly adventurous. The Slovenian authorities had allowed their youth newspaper to run extraordinary articles that were, for instance, very critical of the army. While the Canadian government understood that Slovenian nationalism was not in the grip of the sort found elsewhere in Yugoslavia - the primary concern of the Slovenians being that they be left alone to be efficient and prosperous - its net effect on the Yugoslav federation was to cause further fractures in the country's collective leadership.

Bailing Out Yugoslavia

By the late eighties Canada was very much involved in an attempted bail out of Yugoslavia. This point was confirmed by John Fraser, Canada's former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, who highlighted Canada's efforts to support Yugoslavia via varying international institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) which outlined and stipulated the conditions under which further assistance to Yugoslavia could be provided. Although Canada's role in preparing and negotiating these conditions was limited by the fact that Canada was a relatively minor creditor in the IMF, the Canadian government attempted to influence the IMF in the direction of assisting the Yugoslav's in getting their financial house in order. Ensuring the independence and integrity of the Yugoslav state - in the face of mounting political and economic divisions - continued, through the eighties, to be a predominant aspect of Canadian policy towards Yugoslavia. In recalling Canada's position at the time, Mr. Fraser stated:

"We were not inclined to let the inadequacies of Yugoslav policy towards Kosovo be a major impediment."[126] Throughout the turbulent economic and political crises endured by the Yugoslavs, bilateral relations between Canada and Yugoslavia remained on a good footing.

Those positive bilateral relations were symbolized by a visit to Canada in February of 1988 by Yugoslav Prime Minister Mikulic. An External Affairs report documented the success of the visit which:

> ... led to enhanced Yugoslav appreciation of Canada as political and economic entity in its own right, (B) advanced prospects for selling SPAR telecommunications satellite and challenger aircraft, (C) gave us substantial opportunity to influence nuclear debate in Yugoslavia and advance CANDU prospects, (D) increased prospects of Yugoslav agreement to negotiate Canadian claims settlement and (E) may have produced Yugoslav support for Canadian candidacy for UN Security Council.[127]

While it had been suggested that Mr. Mikulic knew little about Canada, the report indicated that Yugoslavia's Prime Minister was soon "impressed by the country's separate personality and dynamic economy" and that he was pleased with the official reception accorded to him by Prime Minister Mulroney, the Governor-General and other Canadian officials in spite of the fact that there was inadequate police protection in Toronto where anti -Yugoslav government demonstrators succeeded in throwing placards at the Prime Minister's car in which Mr. Mikulic was riding.[128] In meetings with Prime Minister Mulroney Mikulic emphasized Yugoslavia's desire to secure advanced technology from Canada, to participate in joint ventures, and to encourage greater investment by Canadians in tourism, automotive and aviation industries and the energy sector in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Prime Minister , as described by the report, "called for Canadian understanding in Yugoslavia's efforts to manage its debt."[129] Mulroney, in responding, stated that an improved commercial relationship was to be found in the private sector with the Canadian government playing a supporting role by facilitating contacts and occasionally providing credits. Although apprehensive about the mounting Yugoslav foreign debt, the Canadian government was supportive of Yugoslavia's efforts to negotiate an IMF stand-by agreement in June of 1988. Canada's Export Development Bank, Mulroney was aware, had recently concluded a bilateral rescheduling agreement with Yugoslavia and had continued to provide financing for exports of capital equipment and services in an effort to assist the Yugoslavs and hold open the prospects of improved economic relations.[130] In earlier meetings with Budimir Loncar, Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, had emphasized that Canada would continue to support Yugoslav efforts to reform its economy through multilateral financial institutions and the Paris Club. The Canadian government also looked with favour upon and encouraged the adoption by the Yugoslavs of a number of measures to further open their economy and to accept market-determined mechanisms.[131] In follow-up meetings with Clark, Mikulic received assurances that although Canada was a small creditor in the Paris Club, it was the intention of the Canadian government to take a "constructive attitude" with regard to Yugoslavia's debt problems. The Yugoslavs, no doubt, appreciated the position of the Canadian government, as expressed by Clark, that the Yugoslav problem was but a part of "broader problem of the debt of the developing world"[132] and that, therefore, it was in both countries' interests to adopt moderate stances on issues of debt and trade.

Besides sharing views on multilateral trade negotiations and the need for a solution to the problems of developing countries and other North-South issues, the two sides found some common ground on the issue of the possible sale of CANDU's to Yugoslavia.[133] In meetings with Premier Peterson of Ontario, Mikulic was encouraged to adopt the CANDU system which Mr. Peterson suggested was responsible for keeping Ontario competitive in the international market with power rates being substantially lower than those found in the United States. A visit to SPAR Aerospace Ltd by Federal Secretary of Foreign Trade Krekic produced considerable interest on the part of the Yugoslavs to have SPAR submit a proposal on the establishment of a communications satellite links for the Yugoslavs. In addition to the forthcoming sale of water bombers to the Yugoslavs, Mikulic's visit also produced interest in the Challenger by the Yugoslavs. Mikulic was also able to have meetings between the leaders of Canada's opposition parties, Mr. Broadbent and Mr. Turner which led to the expression of the view that contacts between Canadian and Yugoslav parliamentarians and political parties should be encouraged.[134]

In terms of Mulroney and Clark's request for Yugoslav support of Canada's candidacy for the Security Council, Mikulic indicated that as a consequence of the success of his visit to Canada Yugoslavia's support of Canada's candidacy was assured.[135] The fact that the Yugoslavs valued Canada's cooperation in the UN contributed to their inclination to support Canada's bid. In broader terms as well Canada continued to be interested in Yugoslavia's views on changes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the CSCE as well as arms control and disarmament. In addition to finding common ground on broader international issues, the Mikulic visit also led to some progress on an outstanding irritant to Canada-Yugoslav relations, namely, the issue of compensation for those Canadians whose property had been expropriated by the Yugoslav state.[136]

As could be expected, Yugoslav authorities continued to complain to Canadian authorities about the activities of emigre groups, particularly Croatian, in Canada. The Yugoslavs were were especially disturbed by links between some Canadian politicians and such groups. In meetings with the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Clark brought up the Croatian issue. The Croatian community in Canada tended to be supportive of an independent Croatian state as was the Slovenian community in Canada for an independent Slovene state. The Canadian response reiterated Canada's support of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Anyone conspiring to commit terrorism against Yugoslavia, its property or its personnel, the Yugoslavs were assured, would be subject to the full force of Canadian law. At the same time, the Yugoslavs were reminded that in an open democracy such as Canada's, individuals and groups, within certain limits, were free to express their views. The Canadian approach to this problem was made clear when, in meetings with the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Clark stated that while Canadians of Yugoslav origin had the freedom to express their views, in the words of the report, "the government tried to discourage support of such views from persons having official status."[137] At the same time, it should be noted that the Yugoslavs expressed their appreciation for the close cooperation between Canadian police and Yugoslav authorities in dealing with any terrorist threat at the 1984 Sarajevo winter Olympics and at the 1988

Calgary Olympics. There were, however, some limits to this cooperation. Yugoslavia's request, for information from Canadian police and security agencies on the emigre groups made prior to the Calgary Olympics to External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, was not complied with.

Yugoslav Fractures Deepen: Canadian Foreign Policy Approaches a Cross-Roads

Good relations and Canadian initiatives designed to promote and improve them notwithstanding, by the late eighties the political and economic situation in Yugoslavia had deteriorated at an alarming rate. Instead of providing the glue for the system, the Party as well had succumbed to the fracturing that was taking place along republic and ethnic lines. The political leadership of the federation was also fragmented and in disarray and in Canada serious questions were beginning to be raised about how Canadian foreign policy should react to the deepening crisis in the country. A 1988 report - appropriately entitled "Canada-Yugoslav Relations: An Act of Faith" prepared by the Belgrade Embassy for Ottawa captured the growing severity of the situation in Yugoslavia and the dilemma faced by Canadian foreign policy. In its summary Canada's new Ambassador, Terrance Bacon, wrote:

> The situation in Yugoslavia is much worse than it was at the end of 1987. The problems of inflation and nationalism have placed a severe strain on unity. Regional disparities, economic, ethnic and ideological have become more acute. **Harbouring confidence in the future of Yugoslavia is as much an act of faith as of social judgment**. [emphasis mine] In economic, if not political terms Canada does not have much at stake. Is faith alone an adequate basis for strengthening economic ties with this country? EDC (Export Development Corporation) does not think so ... Canadian investors in general have doubts, but Yugoslavia is a country of high potential, where the investment climate will eventually change and where doing business will lay the basis for a stronger and profitable relationship in the long term.[138]

The report also recognized the significance of the root of the disparities plaguing the rapidly failing federation where it explained:

> Regional disparities in this country are not just economic or ethnic; they are also ideological. Disciplined development under a Communist command system has been overtaken in Slovenia, where support for the Party has declined sharply (membership perhaps is as low as 100,000 at this time), but this is not case in the south. Staunch defenders of the system in Macedonia, Montenegro, even Bosnia and Hercegovina, resist any drift towards pluralism not really because of conviction, but rather to protect their privileges. For these republics, privilege based on prosperity based on development is still well out of reach. It would be too much of a risk to sacrifice party protection for a more competitive environment based on competency and productivity. The 'corruption' of party protection will persist in regions of the country and will continue to impede development and the creation of wealth. Instead, there will continue to be demands for a largely undeserved distribution of wealth and these demands will elicit at best a half-hearted response from those with the wherewithal.[139]

The report cites Germany as the primary example of a country with the foresight to continue its policy of strengthening its economic and political relations with Yugoslavia. It goes on to explore the feasibility of strengthening Canada's economic ties with Yugoslavia and in so doing revealed the beginning of the demise of a longstanding argument that justified attempts to strengthen economic ties with Yugoslavia as a viable means of ensuring an independent Yugoslav foreign policy:

> Obviously as much as other Western countries, Canada wants to discourage any eastward drift in Yugoslavia in political preferences. The risk of such a development is, however, minimal. ... Moreover, if they [Yugoslavs] ever to slog their way out of their economic swamp, they need the West and they know it. In the circumstances, strengthening Canada's economic ties with Yugoslavia as means of encouraging continuation of Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy is not a compelling argument upon which to base Canadian policy. Thus we are left only with an act of faith and with the hope

> that by investing now, despite the uncertainties, we are establishing the basis for a stronger, profitable economic relationship in the future while ensuring the continuation of a robust and constructive bilateral political relationship.[140]

The Export Development Corporation was making a strong case that, because of the growing crisis in Yugoslavia, the government should not risk extending or promoting new financial commitments to Yugoslavia. Interestingly enough, however, the EDC view was contradicted by Mr. Bacon's report as being unwise. Bacon felt that it would be short-sighted of Canada to withdraw from Yugoslavia during its time of crisis. "It was no time," to use the Ambassador's words,"to back out of the game."[141]

Canada did not withdraw from "the game." Canadian diplomats in Belgrade continued to monitor the situation in Yugoslavia very closely. Canadian policy maintained its course of providing whatever assistance and encouragement it could in supporting attempts by the federation to make the transition from a one-party state to a form of democratic pluralism as well as to transform the inefficiencies of the workers' self-management system to a market driven system. It was Canada's position that Yugoslavia's dependence on trade with the East could be lessened by imposing its capability to trade with the West. The Canadian government, as it had done in its past relations with Yugoslavia, took a lenient view of the Yugoslav position when participating in the renegotiation of the terms of Yugoslavia's foreign debt with multilateral institutions. [142]

With evergrowing concern Ottawa watched the final unravelling of what was once once considered to a model of successful federalism. By 1990 Canada had not withdraw itself from the crisis. Canada's historical involvement and experience in Yugoslavia up to the end of the eighties, if anything, had expanded and deepened. At the same time, Canadian diplomats in Belgrade were suggesting that Canada not abandon Yugoslavia and they were documenting and bringing to the attention of Ottawa the depth and severity of the nationalities problems threatening to destroy the Yugoslav federation. Officially the the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, assured his Yugoslav counterpart, Foreign Minister Loncar, of Canada's commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. [143] The Canadian government was concerned about the threats to the integrity of the Yugoslav state posed by the continuing economic crisis and especially the success of nationalist groups in capturing political power in the republics. For Canada the question of who or what entity represented the Yugoslav state was also beginning to loom forward as it had in the forties. Clark, in his meetings with Loncar, admitted that some Canadians were not sympathetic to Yugoslavia's problems. Clark reiterated, the position of the Canadian government which was to encourage the federation to stay together.[144]

Privately, from the perspective of the Canadian government the situation in Yugoslavia was less than encouraging. By November of 1990 the Canadian government was dealing with a Federal President, recognized by Canadian diplomats in Belgrade as a avowed proponent of Serbia's position on constitutional matters, and a Croat Prime Minister, without an electoral mandate, attempting to facilitate an economic reform program while under attack from the Serb leadership. The Canadian government would do what it could to slow Yugoslavia's worsening economic situation through Canada's involvement and influence in, for instance, the OECD and G-7. A long-term economic agreement between Canada and Yugoslavia had been negotiated and was ready for signature in Yugoslavia for some time in 1991. Pending as well was a long-planned official state visit to Yugoslavia by Mr. Mulroney and his wife.

Among the diplomatic community in Ottawa it was recognized that the Yugoslavs had enjoyed, according to a highly-placed Canadian diplomat, a privileged level of access to the Prime Minister and his wife that was envied by many diplomatic missions in Ottawa.[145] The Yugoslavs appeared very anxious to have a high-level visit by the Canadian government take place in order to provide international reassurance as to Yugoslav economic and political stability. As noted by Canadian diplomats in Belgrade there was by 1990 markedly fewer visits by world leaders to Yugoslavia due to to the volatility of the situation in Yugoslavia and the pitfalls attendant with having to maintain a neutral position between federal and republic sensitivities and interests. From the Canadian perspective in particular there was the difficulty of having to endure the often inaccurate parallels between Canada's problems and Yugoslavia's problems drawn by Yugoslav authorities .

The difficulties of maintaining "neutrality" by the Canadian government proved to be difficult enough even in Ottawa where domestic pressure may have played a part in facilitating "private" visits by representatives of some of Yugoslavia's republics. The private visit to Ottawa, for instance, by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, in September of 1990 provided the Canadian government with some awkward moments. The Canadian government limited its involvement to courtesy calls by Dr. Tudjman on the Speaker of the Senate (set up by the Department of External Affairs) and on Canada's Deputy Prime Minister, Don Mazankowski (which was organized by MP Don Blenkarn). There was also the recognition of the Speaker of the House of the presence of President Tudjman and the Speaker of the Assembly of Croatia in the House of Commons on September 26, 1990. The displeasure of Yugoslavia's Ambassador to Canada with his governments non-involvement in the Tudjman visit was expressed by his letter to both Speakers of Parliament. To other diplomatic missions in Ottawa, Ambassador Kapetanovic sent a letter in which he reminded them of the fact Croatia was but a part of Yugoslavia. Besides attempting to avoid diplomatic minefields in Ottawa and among Canada's domestic constituency that were related to the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia, the Canadian government continued to monitor ever more closely the uncompromising battles between sectoral interests that were threatening economic and political reform in Yugoslavia and the attendant prospect of civil war. Of particular and growing significance Canadian diplomats in Belgrade were also bringing to the attention of Canadian foreign policy makers what had always been in the past bilateral relationship between the two countries a more minor irritant - namely the issue of human rights as they apply, in particular, to the principle of self-determination of peoples.

Clark, as early as 1989, in expressing Canada's sensitivity to the difficulty and complexity of the situation in Yugoslavia, had cautioned the Yugoslav Foreign Minister that any worsening of the human rights situation in Yugoslavia could impede bilateral relations between the two countries.[146] In large measure the growing significance of human rights stemmed, Canadian diplomats in Belgrade understood, from the conflicting aspirations of republics, the worsening state of the country's economy and the fact that there was little chance that Yugoslavia would drift into what, at this point , was becoming a rapidly weakening Soviet sphere of influence.

The renewed persecution of Albanians in Kosovo in 1990 was clear evidence to the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade of the volatility of the situation in Yugoslavia. Efforts on the part of the Republic of Serbia to limit the powers of the autonomous province of Kosovo, as well as to reassume control over law and order and the courts, contributed to an outbreak of strikes, riots and general civil unrest.The response of the federal authorities to Albanian unrest - described by many as a "reign of terror" - was swift and brutal and a clear signal to the other republics and ethnic minorities not to pursue a secessionist path to independence. The Canadian government was aware that from the perspective of the Croats and Slovenians the "reign of terror" had been deliberately instigated by the Communist leadership of Serbia and as a consequence became an important factor in the decision by the republics of Slovenia and Croatia to seek early and prompt international recognition. Vesa Pusic, among other Yugoslavs, wrote about the significance of the conflict in Kosovo as a preamble to the federal onslaught against Slovenia, Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international human rights focus it brought with it:

> Indeed, the events at Kosovo and those to follow, placed human rights at the centre of public attention and concern [making] the question of human rights a legitimate political issue of the first order. It was clear that it did not come after but before, all ideological disputes, that people could not wait until the importance of human rights came to be recognized automatically with the advance of democracy, and those rights might even be more important than any other political issue.[147]

Conclusion

It was within the context of the growing international recognition of human rights issues in Yugoslavia as well as Canada's growing human rights involvements and experience in Yugoslavia at the approach to the nineties that the stage was set for significant shift in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. The history of Canadian-Yugoslav post-war relations revealed that Canada had long supported Yugoslavia's integration into the West while at the same time participating in policies designed both to protect Yugoslavia from Soviet/Cominform intervention and to undermine Soviet hegemony over the region. Much of that support, indicative of an element of consistency in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, was provided within the context of Canada's multilateral involvements in institutions such as the UN, the CSCE, NATO, and the IMF. While that support was hinged on the respect for the basic tenets of the sovereignty of the state, especially during the earlier period of the Canada-Yugoslav relations, by the latter stages of those relations, intervention into the domestic affairs had become, to an extent, a more evident and acceptable aspect of Canadian foreign policy. The door to the permissibility of intervention into the domestic affairs of a state was unlocked when Mr. Pearson, in the early fifties, spoke of the need to further explore the redefinition of the principle of sovereignty and what constituted a "domestic matter". On the one hand, Pearson argued for the desirability of employing international institutions to buttress the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state against the menace of Soviet intervention, and on the other, he presented the fact that a yielding of sovereignty was forthcoming in a state like Yugoslavia as it becomes a part of the international community. It is interesting to note that Yugoslavia's gradual drift to Western political and economic pluralism - a long-standing Canadian foreign policy goal which arguably was accomplished - paradoxically threatened and eventually tore asunder the federal fabric of that state, and as exemplified by Canadian foreign policy towards the former Yugoslavia, brought to the forefront of international relations challenges to the conventional views of sovereignty and non-intervention.

Canada's concern for the cohesion of the Yugoslav federation was a constant element of Canadian foreign policy during the period from the forties to the nineties. There appeared to be no inclination on the part of the Canadian government, via its diplomatic representatives in Belgrade or its officials in Ottawa, to formally engage itself in or influence the decentralization debate and the domestic affairs of Yugoslavia. And yet Canadian foreign policy-makers understood that from the perspective of some of the republics, namely Slovenia and Croatia, further decentralization was looked upon in positive terms. These economically wealthier and more prosperous republics were also cognizant of the fact that the foreign policies of countries like Canada that were aimed at protecting the sovereignty and integrity of the Yugoslav state against Soviet hegemony had, at the same time, the net effect of threatening the integrity of Yugoslavia by encouraging and supporting the decentralization and democratization of Yugoslavia's economic system. Consequently, it was not surprising that they looked for support from the West in their attempt to further modernize their economies and to achieve greater autonomy. In the poorer, more dependent republics attempts to modernize the economy were, of course, resisted.

In terms of Canadian foreign policy, the political and economic initiatives which opened up Yugoslavia's economic system, in an effort to pull Yugoslavia away from the Soviet orbit, were counted as successes of that policy. Diplomatic appearances aside one must also contend that it had been an objective of Canadian foreign policy to promote greater decentralization and democratization of the Yugoslav economy. Did this policy, therefore, not imply that Canadian foreign policy favoured the wealthier and more Westward oriented republics which were amenable to the liberalization of Yugoslavia's economy which Canadian foreign policy sought and if so, was this not a subtle but profound form of intervention into the domestic affairs of a multiethnic state? When asked if the decentralization debate and drive in Yugoslavia he witnessed as Canada's Ambassador posed any kind of foreign policy dilemma for Canada, Mr. Fraser's reply belied the conventional response of diplomacy on the necessary compliance with the dictates of non-interference:

> You are dealing here with Yugoslav internal affairs. We might think that if we were doing it we would think it wise to have a greater redistribution of wealth and more done for underdeveloped areas; although God knows enormous amounts of money were poured into Kosovo. One of the problems with decentralization was that the people running Kosovo had a pretty free hand with what they did with this money which was mostly to waste it or to build enormous, prestigious hotels, university buildings, libraries and that sort of thing. It would

> have been thought most improper for us to say you ought to be doing this a different way.[148]

Former Ambassador Fraser's observations also reflected a congruency with the position of Canada's foreign policy establishment - particularly within the Department of External Affairs bureaucracy - that supported a cautious and orthodox approach to issues of state sovereignty. While in the area of the nationalities issue there may not have been much scope for direct diplomatic action aimed at influencing the domestic outcome of Yugoslavia's internal affairs, considerably more latitude was employed by the Canadian government in developing the economic aspect of Canada's relationship with Yugoslavia. The economic viability of economic ventures of which the Canadian government was a participant was, by and large, marginal, but the political viability, however, proved to be more profitable.

Yugoslavia's drift to the West also brought to the forefront of inquiry the manner in which Canadian foreign policy evolved and the part played by four major forces in the formulation of that policy. The history of Canada's relations with Yugoslavia suggests that there was little evidence of a leadership role being assumed by a Prime Minister. Some evidence of direct Prime Ministerial leadership and guidance in the formulation and conduct of Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia appears in the eighties. There was little the Prime Minister or his Secretary of State for External Affairs was prepared to do about the human rights abuses documented by Canadian diplomats in Yugoslavia. Even in the midst of the imminent threat of invasion of Yugoslavia by Cominform forces or in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia Prime Ministerial involvement was constrained considerably by geo-strategic prerogatives and a small but highly competent and influential foreign policy making bureaucracy.

East Europe had become isolated from the West. Information about what was transpiring behind the "Iron Curtain" was limited to diplomatic outposts of the Department of External Affairs such as Belgrade. Initially as a small but highly effective foreign service department External Affairs was able to exercise, with considerable autonomy, its influence over the Canadian foreign policy environment. The bureaucratic preferences of the foreign policy-making establishment, centered around the Department of

External Affairs, grew to become a dominant force in influencing the course of policy-making particularly during the earlier period of Canada's involvement with Yugoslavia. Having established itself as the primary purveyor of information and knowledge about Yugoslavia and East Europe, the Department of External Affairs urged caution in terms of establishing diplomatic relations with, and an Canadian Mission and later Embassy in, Belgrade. Societal pressures on the formulation of Canadian foreign policy played, for the most part, a secondary role to the bureaucratic preferences of the foreign policy-making establishment and ultimately to the international pressures brought to bear on Canada to accede to and promote a foreign policy based on a number of multilateral involvements in which middle powers could play a more significant role in resolving conflict. Where in the earlier phases of Canadian-Yugoslav relations Canada's middle power role was limited by the dominance of the super powers, in the later phases of those relations, ushered in by the sixties, Canadian foreign policy had found greater ground for maneuver and a rather unique role for Canada. The Department of External Affairs, having recognized earlier the unique and very significant role Yugoslavia played both regionally as well as internationally, was, therefore, in a strong position to influence the shape and the conduct of Canadian foreign towards Yugoslavia that had come to be distinct from its Western allies. In short, the preponderance of international pressures on foreign policy-making yielded opportunities for Canadian foreign policy to assert itself by offering, for example, conditional support for the non-aligned movement and the strengthening of multilateral institutions as adjudicators of conflict.

Societal pressures in the form of lobbying efforts exerted by Canadians of Croat, Serb and Slovene descent in seeking to persuade the Canadian government of the illegitimacy and brutality of Tito's regime - evidence of which was well documented and communicated by External Affairs to its political masters as well to the Canadian public by a sometimes sympathetic media - appeared to have limited impact in the formulation of foreign policy towards Yugoslavia. Its modest impact can be attributed to the fact that anti-Tito emigre activities tended to be isolated and representative of a small domestic constituency. In the context of the making of Canadian foreign policy, the human rights-related issues which these groups represented were ultimately subsumed by the acquiescence of the political leadership to the greater force of international pressures attendant with a Canadian foreign policy whose foremost objective was the maintenance of a delicate balance of power, as well as peace and security in the international system. At the same time, by the late eighties there were signs in Canada-Yugoslav relations that a rapidly changing post-cold-war environment was beginning to present opportunities for human rights based issues to surface, as never before, to the forefront of domestic and international relations.

Endnotes

1. Besides the establishment of an official legation the Yugoslav request entailed, in part, the dispersal of what amounted to the remaining members of their government to Canada and the United States. Records of the Department of External Affairs, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), File 10277-40, The High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (No. 1203), July 3, 1942.

2. It should be kept in mind that the Canadian government was also having to consider proposals from the governments of Greece, Norway and Poland to establish diplomatic missions in Canada. PAC, File 10277-40, The Secretary of State for External Affairs to the High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom (No. 1844), November 20, 1941.

3. PAC, File 26-EK-40, Dispatch from John Starnes, Canadian Legation to the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom, London, to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, February 15, 1945.

4. In March of 1945 a Council of Regents assumed office and established a united government composed of seven ministers from the Royal Government-in-Exile and fifteen from the National Committee - eight of which were communists.Tito was designated the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence and Dr. Subasic, the Prime Minister of the London government, became Foreign Minister.

5. PAC, File 10277-40. Memorandum for signature by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and written as an instruction to a Canadian Legation, 1950.

6. Ibid.

7. PAC, File 7805-40, Memorandum from Serbian Shield Society to W.L. MacKenzie King.

8. PAC, File 7805-40, Memorandum from Charge d'affaires, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs,(No.490), December 6, 1945.

9. PAC , File 7805-40 pt.1, Vol 3773, date not visible.

10. PAC, File 7805-10, September 9, 1949.

11. PAC, File 10277-40, Council of Canadian South Slavs to the Rt. Honorable W.L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, (No. 26-EK-40), December 18, 1946.

12. PAC, File 10277-40, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the President of the Council of Canadian South Slavs, (No. 26-EK-40), March 13, 1946.

13. PAC, File 10277-40. Memorandum for signature by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and written as an instruction to a Canadian Legation, 1950.

The memorandum goes on to add:

> Within Yugoslavia, a totalitarian governmental structure has been erected remarkably faithful to that of the Soviet Union. The Skupshtina (Assembly) is maintained as part of the facade of "democracy" but all power rests with the executive, controlled by the Communist Party. The all too familiar methods of the police state have been introduced on a large scale and civil liberty in any real sense has disappeared.

14. PAC, File 9623 -40, Minister for Canada in Norway to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (No. 142), May 27, 1947. In addition, in statements and speeches made by Yugoslav diplomats and government leaders the Yugoslavs were never reluctant to remind Allied governments of their extraordinary contribution to the war effort. As a consequence Tito's government was displeased by what they perceived to be an inequitable disbursement of aid, particularly when the recipients were ex-enemy or neutral states like Italy, Hungary, Austria and Turkey. Tito's government was also displeased with the attitude of the British and the Americans who were accused of shielding numerous war criminals - accused of committing atrocities against Yugoslavs - behind the facade of displaced persons. These and other examples were viewed, not infrequently, by Tito's government as evidence of the hostility displayed by the Western Allies against the new regime there.

15. A good example of External Affair's distrust of Yugoslav intentions can be noted in the following External Affairs which was later to outline the principles of Canadian foreign policy vis-a-vis Yugoslavia:

> The official representatives of Yugoslavia in Canada are enthusiastic Communists and the close association which they maintain with the Labour Progressive Party of Canada and with Communist Yugoslav groups in Canada has been a cause of concern. On a number of occasions Yugoslav officials have spoken from platforms of Communist organizations and have delivered distinctly partisan speeches.The political divisions of Yugoslavs in Canada have been deepened and intensified by this propaganda. Comparisons have been made between Canada and Yugoslavia to the disparagement of Canada. ... Although these frequent breaches of good taste and infringements of the code of diplomatic behavior have never reached the point where Canada has been forced to request the formal recall of a Yugoslav diplomat, informal admonitions have been given the Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires on the impropriety of any interference in Canadian political life, of reviving among Yugoslav-Canadians the divisions and dissensions of Europe and of offering gratuitous offense to large bodies of Canadian opinion. PAC, File 10277-40. Memorandum for signature by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and written as an instruction to a Canadian Legation, 1950.

16. PAC, File 10277-40. Memorandum for signature by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and written as an instruction to a Canadian Legation, 1950.

17. PAC, File 257-S, Memo from L.B. Pearson to Mr. St. Laurent, July 15, 1947.

18. PAC, File 257-S, Memo from L.B. Pearson to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 11, 1947.

19. Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Press Release*, Information Division, No.1 , January 2, 1948.

20. "Why a Legation in Yugoslavia?" *Montreal Gazette*, January 3, 1948.

21. Ibid.

22. "That Yugoslav Legation" *Ottawa Citizen*, January 8, 1948.

23. It should be noted that the Greek government did not look upon Canada's decision to establish a Mission in Yugoslavia with great favour given the poor state of relations between Yugoslavia and Greece.

24. PAC, File 10277-40, Memo for Minister's handbook prepared by Political Section -J.A. Wallis, January 16, 1948.

25."Review of World Affairs", Statement of the Right Honourable Louis S. St. Laurent, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on April 29, 1948, *Statements and Speeches*, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, p.1.

26. Ibid., p.8.

27. Ibid., p.8.

28. Ibid., p.15.

29. PAC, File 9760-J-40, January 23, 1948.

30. Dispatches from Canadian diplomats in Belgrade to the Department of External Affairs document quite extensively the repressive nature of Tito's government.

31. PAC, Vol No. 3773, File 7805-40 pt1, Memorandum from Vaillancourt, Canadian Legation, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, (No. 48), April 28, 1948.

32. Ibid.

33. In one of his memoranda to Ottawa Mr. Vaillancourt wrote:

> Although I agree that in time the process of making Yugoslavia unfit for re-westernization will be completed and all vestiges of western democratic civilization will disappear, I think ten years is much too short a period in which to expect this transformation to take place. This country, and particularly its Roman Catholic parts, still retains numerous western affiliations and characteristics and, after all, much of the Orthodox part survived five centuries of Turkish domination, although admittedly the cruel hand of the Turk was in many ways a caress in comparison with Tito's stranglehold. The Soviet regime has been in power for about

> 30 years or three times the period suggested for the elimination of all western traditions in Yugoslavia, but I am far from convinced that the Slavic parts of the Soviet Union there remain no spiritual, moral or cultural values on which to build a new civilized state which would not be incompatible with the ideals and methods of western democratic civilization. Ibid.

34. *Statements and Speeches,* Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, "Canada and World Affairs" Statement by Mr. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on November 16 and 17, 1949, p.10.

35. *Statements and Speeches,* Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, "Canada and World Affairs" Statement by Mr. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on November 16 and 17, 1949, p.10.

36. This was partly due to the fact that since the end of the war Canada had supplied over 22 million of UNRRA supplies to Yugoslavia and the Canadian Red Cross had contributed more than 3.5 million in medicines, surgical supplies, food and clothing towards assisting Yugoslavia in its recovery from the effects of war. Canadian UNRRA assistance consisted of machinery, wheat, fishing vessels, clothing footwear, textiles, automotive equipment and spare parts, medical supplies , and a penicillin plant.

37. PAC, File 10277-40, Memo from E. Vaillancourt, Minister, Canadian Legation, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (No. 405), December 30, 1949.

38. PAC, File 10277-40. Memorandum for signature by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and written as an instruction to a Canadian Legation, 1950.

39. "The Yugoslav's came to feel that a country's system was its own business and that revolution should not (and, indeed, could not) be exported as one might export Russian caviar." M. Zaninovich, **The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia**, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968), p.89.

40. RDEA, File 9623-40, "Summary of the Belgrade Press," attached to Memo from E. Vaillancourt, Canadian Legation, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (No. 239), December 31, 1948.

41. PAC, File 10277-40, Memo to John Holmes, Acting Head, United Nations Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa from A.C. Smith/JB, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 26, 1949.

42. PAC, File 10277-40, Memo from E. Vaillancourt, Minister, Canadian Legation, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (No. 405), December 30, 1949.

43. During the pre-war period of 1926 to 1939 Canadian exports varied from $140,585 in 1927 to $1,073 in 1934. Canadian imports from Yugoslavia ran from $6,881 in 1926 to $188,620 in 1939. PAC, File 10277-40. Memorandum for signature by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and written as an instruction to a Canadian Legation, 1950.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. The deterioration in relations between the United Kingdom and the Yugoslav government had abetted somewhat as Anglo-Yugoslav negotiations on compensating British interests affected by the Yugoslav nationalization decree of December 5, 1946 began to progress satisfactorily.

47. PAC, File 7805-40, Memo from E. Vaillancourt, Canadian Legation, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 31, January 23, 1950.

48. PAC, ,File 50004-40, Memo from Canada's Charge d'Affaires, Belgrade to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Despatch No. 651), November 8, 1956.

49. As reported by Mr. Crean in a memorandum to Ottawa:

> 1. You [The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa] have no doubt considered the possible implications of raising

> this mission to an Embassy but there are two points I feel I should mention:
>
> > (1) As Canada has never given any economic assistance (except through UNRRA) to this country, I would expect Yugoslavs to interpret our move as a recognition of their importance to us and as a corollary give them an expectation of material assistance in their present economic plight.
> >
> > (11) There are only four Ambassadors here - United Kingdom, United States, French and Turkish. Raising mission to Embassy is therefore likely to be unpopular with Dutch, Belgian and other Ministers. PAC, File 10277-40, Memorandum (No.76) from Charge d'Affaires, Canadian Legation, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, April 16, 1951.

50. It is interesting to note that the government's recommendation that UNICEF be used as a channel for Canadian food supplies to Yugoslavia ran into a barrier due to the fact it was established UNICEF policy not accept contributions earmarked to a specific country. As it turned out most of Canada's anticipated contribution was to be designated to Yugoslavia in any case, with a smaller portion destined to be allocated to Greece and Italy. PAC, File 50004-40, Memo for the Minister of External Affairs prepared by DEA and signed by A.D.P.H. (Heeney), February 13, 1951.

51. The rational for the sensitive manner in which Ottawa applied pressure on the Yugoslavs to release Stepanic can be noted in a memorandum from an External Affairs official, A.D.P. Heeney, to the Minister of External Affairs which reads:

> The main impression I [A.D.P. Heeney]gathered from this conversation with Mr. Pribicevic [appointed Yugoslavia's Minister to Canada in 1950] is that the case of Mgr. Stepanic is so enmeshed in the internal political life of Yugoslavia that it might be difficult for Tito to do much for the Archbishop without weakening his own regime. PAC, File 10277-40, Memo from (SGD.) A.D.P. Heeney to the Minister of External Affairs, April 21, 1951.

52. PAC, File 10277-40, "Relations between Canada and Yugoslavia," February 5, 1952.

53. In his report to Ottawa Canada's Charge d'Affaires suggested that with the potential improvement in the Yugoslav economy there would be the likelihood that Yugoslavia would be able to purchase greater quantities of Canadian wheat as noted in the following excerpt:

> Very great efforts will be required in the years to come to restore the balance of trade and Yugoslavia's credit status. If the economic pull from the East can be resisted, in several years Yugoslavia might be able to put some of its wheat purchasing on a normal commercial basis. PAC, File 50004-40, Memo - with attachment on "The Wheat and Grain Position in Yugoslavia," October 18, 1956 from Canada's Charge d'Affaires, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Despatch No. 651) November 8, 1956.

54. Section 4 of the dispatch reads as follows:

> 4. I do not know if the Yugoslavs would be eligible to use the resources of the Fund (whether United States or Canadian dollars or other currencies) to a sufficient extent to help them substantially in their present difficulties. Neither can I presume to judge whether those difficulties come within the Fund's interpretation of a 'temporary' disequilibrium (or fall under the 'relief' ban) or whether any large part of the general Yugoslav programme not already being financed by loans would be able to meet the lending requirements of the International Bank. It does seem to me, however, that if it would not give rise to serious problems, the use of the resources of the Bretton Woods institutions is a possibility worth very careful consideration not only from the point of view of getting over the difficulty of financing any Canadian supplies but possibly also from the point of view of helping the present Yugoslav government to avoid the Cominform criticism of 'subservience' to the United States. At the same time the use of those institutions would not , of course, prevent concerted representations to the Yugoslavs for reasonable modifications on their attitude or policies. PAC, File 50004-40, Memo from the High Commissioner for Canada, London to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (No. 1988), October 19, 1950.

55. PAC, File 50004-40, Memo for the Minister of External Affairs prepared by DEA and signed by A.D.P.H. (Heeney), February 13, 1951.

56. The case of Professor Maxwell Cohen, invited by the UN to come to Yugoslavia to undertake a study of Yugoslavia's public administration system illustrates the Canadian perception of the issue when the Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia reported:

> The task which the UNTAP has offered Professor Cohen will, I think, be the first time the public administration in Yugoslavia has been subjected to Western scrutiny. Since the proportion of party members in the State administration in Yugoslavia is inevitably much higher than in other fields, Professor Cohen will undoubtedly find the difficulties which confront him much more formidable than those which have faced Western experts in other fields here. The Yugoslavs may, therefore, prove more impervious to Western advice in this field but nevertheless it seems to be essential that any opportunity for exposing them to some Western ideas and views be exploited. PAC, File 50004-40, Memo from the Canadian Ambassador , Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa , (No. 400), June 27, 1956.

57. Confirmation of Canada's support of the re-arming of Yugoslavia can be noted in a 1951 memorandum from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canada's High Commissioner in London:

> The Canadian Government reaffirms the position it has taken in this regard in its Aide-Memoire of November 11, 1950 to the effect that the ability of Yugoslavia to continue as an independent nation is of great importance for the preservation of peace and the security of the North Atlantic area.
>
> The Canadian government, therefore, agrees that the provision of further assistance to Yugoslavia will contribute to the maintenance of peace and security. Such assistance is of importance for the defence of the North Atlantic area in view of the drought in Yugoslavia and in particular of its effect on the ability of the Yugoslav government to import raw materials and other supplies for the support of the Yugoslav armed forces. RDEA, File 50004-40, Memo from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, to the High

Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, London, March 28, 1951.

58. PAC, File 50004-40, Memo from the Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (Despatch No. 673), August 8, 1952.

59. This perception of the Canadian government is documented, for example, in an internal 1953 External Affairs memorandum entitled "Position of Yugoslavia in the event of war" which, in part, stated:

> The conclusion of a treaty of friendship and collaboration among Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey [March 25, 1953], Marshall Tito's recent visit to London, and other indications of Yugoslavia's willingness to co-operate with the free world, have probably increased the likelihood of Yugoslav participation on the side of the Western allies in the event of general war. PAC, File 9623-40, Memo from European Division, DEA to Defense Liaison Division, DEA, March 26, 1953.

60. PAC, File 9623-40, Letter from L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs to S. Tardy, Managing Editor, The Montreal-Granby Press Inc., September 25, 1953 with attached copy of letter from Mr. Tardy to Mr. Pearson.

61. For instance, the Yugoslav view on Soviet intentions regarding the Korean war, expressed through Kardelj, Tito's number two man, was noted with interest by the Canadian Charge d'Affaires to Belgrade:

> He [Kardelj] thought thought that the Russians were anxious to involve the United Nations (and especially the United States) and China in a war of attrition , not only because they would like to see UN forces so heavily committed that the Soviet Union would be left with a free hand elsewhere, but also because they would like to see China seriously weakened in the Far East. PAC, File 9623-40, Memo from Canada's Charge d'Affaires, Canadian Legation, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa , (Despatch No. 632), December 22, 1950.

62. By the mid-sixties it was becoming evident that the Yugoslavs were very interested in working closely with and supporting Canadian initiatives designed to secure a seat for China in the UN. The Yugoslav approach to facilitating a UN seat for China revolved around the belief that Canada was best country to lead the drive for Chinese membership in the UN. PAC, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from Canadian Embassy Belgrade to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, November 14, 1966.

63. "Review of the International Situation (Part 11)," Statement by the Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. J. Lesage, made in the House of Commons on March 25, 1952, No. 52/16, *Statements and Speeches*, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, p.3.

64. For a more detailed summary of the Yugoslav position see an article by Vjelko Vlahovic (former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and at the time of publication Chief Editor of *Borba*) entitled "Yugoslavia in Contemporary International Relations", printed in the June 1953 edition of *Nasa Stvarnost*, a monthly publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and cited in a memorandum from the Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. PAC, File 9623-40, (Despatch No. 527), August 17, 1953.

65. In reporting on a meeting with Yugoslavia's acting foreign minister in 1952, the comments of Canada's Ambassador in Belgrade typified the way in which Yugoslav relations were played out against the backdrop of the UN and Canada's involvement in that institution:

> Turning to the forthcoming Assembly of the United Nations, Dr. Bebler [Acting Yugoslav Foreign Minister] said that Yugoslavia would ask that the question of diplomatic immunities, which hitherto had been treated as a legal question, be put on the agenda of the forthcoming Assembly for consideration by the Political Committee. The treatment of their representatives had recently been receiving in Sofia, Bucharest and in the Cominform countries generally, led them to believe that it was now high time to have the matter threshed out on the political level in the Assembly and he trusted that Canada would support the Yugoslav stand.
>
> He [Bebler] also expressed the hope that Canada would support the candidature of Yugoslavia for a seat on the Economic and

> Social Council of the United Nations. He said the Canadian Government had already been approached through the Yugoslav representative in Ottawa but that he would appreciate it if I would mention it also to Mr. Pearson. PAC, File 9623-40, Memo from the Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Despatch No. 758), September 10, 1952.

66. An article, entitled "Two important elements in the UN General Assembly" by the foreign editor of *Borba* reflected Yugoslavia's frustration with "great power" misuse of the UN where it noted that:

> Mankind was expecting from the great powers, particularly from the one who was bearing the main burden of the armed action of UN in Korea, that they would do their utmost in the new situation in order to settle the Korean question through the UN. It was justly requesting this because they were all stressing all the time that the Korean question was a matter of the United Nation and that it never was only the matter of individual powers. However, at this session Korea was not discussed. The delegation of USA has asked that the discussion on Korea be postponed because Mr. Dean, their diplomatic representative, was conducting negotiations with the representatives of North Korea and China.The USA has requested that the negotiations be conducted by the delegations in Panmunjom and that Korea should not be discussed until these negotiations are completed. On the basis of all this and many other similar gestures the impression is that the USA has somewhat changed its opinion on the character of the Korean question and that now it is not a matter of the UN to such an extent as it was during the Korean War.
>
> As the case of these big international questions, the Chinese representation in UN and Korea, is not an isolated phenomenon, many observers of the work of UN believe that the great powers have certain tendencies to avoid the UN in order to treat the most important international problems outside the UN. Such negative tendencies of avoiding the UN were formerly strongly manifested by the attitude of the Soviet Union. Other great powers did not manifest such tendencies, particularly not during the Korean War, when some great powers have availed themselves of UN in the political field. But as soon as an alleviation of international

tension set in a certain change in the attitude of these powers was noticeable."Two Important Elements in the UN General Assembly Session" by Jose Smole in *Borba*, December 13, 1953, attached to a memo from the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (Letter No. 784), PAC, File 9623-40, December 15, 1953.

67. "National Sovereignty and International Organization," A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, delivered at Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. on April 15, 1952, No. 52/17, *Statements and Speeches*, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, p.1.

68. Ibid., p.1.

69. Ibid., p.2.

70. Ibid., pp.2-3.

71. Ibid., p.3.

72. Ibid., p.10.

73. "Report to Parliament," Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons during the debate on the Speech from the throne, December 8, 1952, No. 52/54, *Statements and Speeches*, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, p.1.

74. PAC, File 12898-Y2-40, "Economic Report on Yugoslavia" attached to "Memorandum for the Minister", October 20, 1961.

75. Trade with Canada:

(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961(4 months)
Imports from Canada :	0.2	0.2	0.2	2.6	3.2	0.7
Exports to Canada :	0.9	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.2

Main Imports from Canada (1960): machinery and parts 24%, aluminum in primary forms 15%, asbestos milled fibres 15%, cattle hides 10%, electric motors 8%.

Main Exports to Canada (1960): magnesia 37%, sports equipment 17%, furniture 37%.

PAC, File 12898-Y2-40, "Economic Report on Yugoslavia" attached to "Memorandum for the Minister", October 20, 1961.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Canadian authorities blamed the failure of the projects in terms perhaps best described by the Canadian Ambassador in Belgrade in a memorandum to Ottawa:

> What I was anxious to get across to the Yugoslavs here at the time of the failure of the Pancevo negotiations was much less the idea that they could expect no other credits for anything than that they could not expect credits if they pursued the kind of methods they had in negotiating over Pancevo. Unless it was played this way, we would continue to run the risk that they would go on feeling that they could negotiate in a most cavalier fashion with the general attitude of mind that they were doing us a favour by accepting Canadian credits. To get the point across to Micunovic I reminded him that the export credits legislation was designed to stimulate Canadian export industries rather than to sell to specific countries. While we

> were happy to have arranged a credit for Pancevo, it seemed to me that it did more harm to Yugoslavia than to Canada in the circumstances.
>
> I think the net result of this has been that the Yugoslavs do understand that their negotiating methods are not welcome. We are not alone in this feeling, I may add. PAC, File 12898-Y2-40, Memo from Canadian Ambassador, G.G. Crean to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External affairs, E.A. Ritchie, Ottawa, April 18, 1962.

79. Negotiations between the two countries which had been under way as well for the purchase of Canadian wheat in 1962 indicate that the government - while more cautious in its economic dealings with the Yugoslavs after the failure of previous joint-venture enterprises - was willing to be most flexible in its future involvements with Canadian companies willing to do business with the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav were interested, for example, in the purchase of over 300,000 tons of Canadian wheat under Section 21 of the Export Credits Insurance Act. The Export Credit Insurance Corporation was authorized to insure Canadian wheat exporters up to a sum of $26 million. It appears that the Yugoslavs were not too comfortable with the concept as outlined under Section 21A of the Export Credits Insurance Act that the application for financing must be submitted by the Canadian exporter before the appropriate Canadian authorities and ultimately Cabinet gave their approval. Canadian authorities appeared willing to compromise on procedure as it applied to the Yugoslavs when it was agreed that the Committee on Export Finance would in the future be willing to indicate the level of financing it might be willing to approve on a project so as to assure the Yugoslavs of Canadian intentions and to avoid putting the Canadian exporter into the position of bearing the direct cost of costly negotiations. In future negotiations for a paper mill projects in Mostar and Maribor undertaken by Stadler Hurter, Canadian authorities appeared to play a more cautious role in terms of the involvement of the Canadian government even though Canada's Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce visited Belgrade in September of 1963 to look into the matter of Canada's involvement in the two paper mill projects. In the midst of the paper mill negotiations a devastating earthquake struck the city of Skopje. Unable to make Section 21A credits available for the financing of reconstruction projects in Skopje, the Canadian government did respond to the disaster by contributing ten thousand dollars through the Red Cross.

In a memorandum for the Minister of External Affairs from his department the political significance of the proposed wheat deal is made clear when it was noted:

> The conclusion of such a contract with Yugoslavia would afford Canada an opportunity to sell substantial quantities of wheat in a market which, for the past few years, has been met by shipments from the United states under PL 480. (Yugoslavia bought wheat on credit from Canada both in 1952-53 and in 1954-55; there was no default on either of these contracts.) The sale would also be in accordance with our general policy of taking every available opportunity to loosen Yugoslavia's ties with the countries of the Soviet Bloc. It seems, therefore, that the recommendations put forward by the Department of Trade and Commerce and Agriculture is deserving of support. PAC, File 12898-Y2-40, "Memorandum for the Minister", November 30, 1962.

80. Ross Campbell , former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, personal interview, Ottawa, November 18, 1993.

81. Department of External Affairs Archives (DEA), File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade, to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, (No. 56), January 29, 1964.

82. Ross Campbell , former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, personal interview, Ottawa, November 18, 1993.

83. This point was expressed by the Canadian Ambassador to Ottawa as follows:

> Because of their experience they [Yugoslavs] can offer substantial dividends to the Soviet Union if the latter is sensible enough to let them do some of the running in the newly independent states. The forthcoming UN Conference on Trade and Development may provide an interesting test of how much use they are ready to make of Yugoslav talents and influence in the non-aligned world. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade, to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, (No. 56), January 29, 1964.

84. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa,(No. 476), September 2, 1964.

85. A Department of External Affairs summary on the broad aims of Yugoslav foreign policy speculated in 1964 that:

> Non-Alignment, as now positively defined, no longer conflicts with the foreign policy of the USSR. The rapprochement with the USSR, considered to be of the greatest importance by the Yugoslav government, has ensured Yugoslavia a respectable place in the evolving Soviet World. The ability simultaneously to have a satisfactory relationship with the West and to develop new prestige in the Communist world has given Yugoslavia considerable success among uncommitted nations, some of whom see it as a one-party state run by fairly liberal methods. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Department of External Affairs summary of broad aims of Yugoslav foreign policy as represented by Canada's Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade, (Despatch No. 476), September 21, 1964.

86. Ross Campbell , former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, personal interview, Ottawa, November 18, 1993.

87. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from the FarEastern Division to Department of External Affairs, December 2, 1964.

88. This view was repeatedly emphasized by Ross Campbell, former Ambassador to Yugoslavia during our interview of November 18, 1993.

89. Ross Campbell , former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, personal interview, Ottawa, November 18, 1993.

90. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, February 6, 1965.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ross Campbell , former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, personal interview, Ottawa, November 18, 1993.

96. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade, to Department of External Affairs, February 24, 1965.

97. Mr. Campbell's memorandum highlights the significance of this shift in Yugoslav foreign policy as being:

> ... one more indication of Yugoslavia's 'return to Europe' - its greater emphasis on European opportunities and the importance of the continent to Yugoslavia. This new emphasis appears to be at the expense of this countries historical membership and political stake in the non-aligned fraternity. There are many aspects of this apparent shift in Yugoslav foreign policy. Some of these we have already mentioned in previous communications and others we shall attempt to assess in the near future. But a significant factor of immediate interest is that a growing body of opinion here sees Yugoslavia as essentially a European country: there is growing impatience with the previous emphasis on Asia and Africa, which, in the changed circumstances, seem artificial, unrelated to the specific interests of Yugoslavia are there/these groups, and justified primarily on ideological grounds that appeal only to Communists who see the Third World as the most fruitful field of the conflict between capitalism and socialism. For Yugoslavia without the sense of Socialist mission - and this includes the overwhelming majority in the developed Republics of Croatia and Slovenia, who think of themselves and their interests in thoroughly 'European' rather than ideological terms - the Federal Yugoslav authorities have clearly found it both expedient and desirable to place greater emphasis on Europe. Certain apparent signs of a thaw in the 'Cold War' have provided the foreign ministry with the opportunity to redress this imbalance in foreign policy by taking a major initiative for greater detente and practical co-operation on the Continent. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from the Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (No. 128), February 22, 1967.

98. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (No.108), February 9, 1968.

99. In a memorandum to Canada's NATO delegation in Paris a senior External Affairs official expressed some appreciation of the Yugoslav proposal which called for higher levels of cooperation within the context of existing organizations when he advised:

> This accords well with Western thesis that detente must precede entente. It also accords with declared NATO objective of finding areas in which East and West can cooperate. Since it is difficult for NATO as an organization to make proposals to Warsaw pact countries, there may be much to be said for encouraging nine power group in this direction, particularly as the group includes responsible Western states, European neutrals and a communist state outside the Warsaw Pact. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from External Affairs (approved by J.G.H. Halstead), Ottawa, to NATO delegation, Paris,(No.487), April 19, 1967.

100. This concern was expressed, for example, by a high ranking official in External Affairs to Ottawa's NATO's delegation in Brussels as follows:

> We agree with the USA rep that exclusion of Canada and USA from process envisaged in Yugoslav initiative would be very undesirable. For Canada there is additional importance of developing relationship with Europe as element of balance with USA. Ibid.

101. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from the Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade, to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (No. 128), February 22, 1967.

As the Yugoslav domestic drama was beginning to unravel Canadian diplomats continued to monitor Yugoslavia's foreign policy involvements which called for support of wars of national liberation, the dismantlement of colonialism, support of developing countries through a strengthened UN and the non-interference by other states in the domestic affairs of a state and as Canada's new Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Bruce Williams, noted in 1968, "Tito's stubborn efforts to pump adrenalin into the moribund cause of non-alignment." In reporting to Ottawa Mr. Williams alluded not only to the transparency of much of Yugoslavia's foreign policy rhetoric on the issue of non-alignment but more specifically as well to the fact that time was no longer on the side the leader who inspired that rhetoric:

> The Yugoslav rhetoric about the 'struggle against imperialism' is at times pretty difficult to distinguish from the same kind of verbiage churned out in Moscow or anywhere else in Eastern Europe, though it is important that Yugoslavia considers that it is important that it is serving its own concept of its role in the international Communist movement. It is not, as far as one can guess, merely carrying out Moscow's instructions or functioning as the Soviet Union's Trojan horse in the Third World. Indeed, one of the reasons for whatever influence Belgrade exercises is that world is perhaps the the fact that it has achieved its own independence from Moscow.
>
> There may perhaps be some hope that a future conference of 'non-aligned and like-minded countries' may be sufficiently diluted in membership that its traditional anti-Western bias may be somewhat attenuated. Yet it seems highly doubtful that from the standpoint of the search for constructive solutions for the problems of the Third World any useful purpose can be advanced (except Yugoslavia's own need to have this particular show on the road) by a conference which takes place before solutions have been found and passions have cooled concerning the highly charged situations in Vietnam and the Middle East. I believe that a number of the more responsible officials in the Foreign Ministry clearly perceive this desirability of proceeding slowly. Tito, a man for whom only a limited amount of time remains, does not. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, (No.280), May 16, 1968.

102. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, to the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, August 27, 1968.

103. The implications of the Yugoslavs being caught between the two Blocs were noted in a correspondence from the Under-Secretary for External Affairs to the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade:

> The Yugoslavs have, of course, for almost twenty years been at least theoretically opposed to the concept of military alliances and politico-military blocs. Before the events of August 20 in Czechoslovakia they could take comfort from the

> fact that the cohesion of both NATO and Warsaw Pact appeared to be declining somewhat. Now this has changed, and the Yugoslavs find themselves caught again between the two pacts in a period of growing unease. Fears that either bloc might try to infringe on their independence are not ruled out. DEA, 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from the Under-Secretary for External Affairs, Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, (No.519), September 20, 1968.

104. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, October 4, 1968.

105. As expressed in an assessment later in 1969 passed on from the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade to Ottawa the:

> ... Yugoslavs also put some stock in the calculation that a Soviet occupation of Yugoslav territory would so gravely affect the power balance in the Balkans and the Mediterranean that it would be unacceptable to NATO. While this means that the Yugoslavs tacitly recognize NATO as a shield, the opposite side of the coin is that they also tend to conclude that for similar strategic reasons any excessive pro-Western orientation would be unacceptable to the USSR. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memo from Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, January 23, 1969.

106. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Memorandum from Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade, to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, February 13, 1969.

107. "Innovations in the Republic-Federation Relation: Republican Diplomacy," *Politika*, February 17, 1968, p.7.

108. This point was stressed during my interview with Mr. John Fraser, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1983 to 1987, in Ottawa on November 19, 1993.

109. It is worth noting that the Serbs in Croatia responded by initiating preparations to defend themselves in much the same way as they were to do later in 1991.

110. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Vol 10, Memo from Canadian Ambassador, Belgrade, to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, July 28, 1972.

111. This point was emphasized, for example, in a brief prepared by the Department of External Affairs for the Secretary of State in preparation for his visit to Yugoslavia and Roumania in June of 1970. It states:

> Yugoslavia can still rally it on functional issues, for instance in the UN Conference on Trade and Development where Yugoslavia led 77 under-developed countries in demands for a less inequitable pattern for world trade and for the allocation of a percentage of gross national product to aid programs.

Furthermore, according to the same brief:

> Given these varied connections with East and West and non-aligned Yugoslavia can often play a role in world affairs out of proportion to its size and stature. Even so, Yugoslavia's most important international role still lies in the mere fact of its existence, once as the only independent Communist state, now as a pioneer of 'revisionism', trying to adapt 19th century Marxist doctrines to the needs of the 20th century. Its economic and political experimentation has a great attraction throughout Eastern Europe, and may influence the evolution of other communist regimes in a healthy direction. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, "Yugoslavia, Foreign Relations", Brief prepared by Department of External Affairs for the visit of Secretary of State for External Affairs to Yugoslavia, June 3, 1970.

112. *Canadian-Yugoslav Communique*, No.84, Department of External Affairs, November 7, 1971, p.1.

113. *Canadian-Yugoslav Communique,* No.84, Department of External Affairs, November 7, 1971, p.2.

114. The communique describes economic relations between the two states as follows:

> The two sides noted with satisfaction the increased volume of commercial exchanges between Yugoslavia and Canada and

> particularly the increasingly prominent role which finished goods have come to play in this trade. The contribution of visits of delegations, businessmen and officials to the growth of bilateral trade was further noted and both sides expressed the belief that joint ventures between Yugoslavia and Canadian enterprises, standing on their mutually agreed merits and concluded on the basis of the regulations in effect in both countries, offered an effective means for further developing trade between the two countries. The two sides reviewed their current trade relationship and announced their mutual intention to bring it up to date through a renewal of the present bilateral trade agreement. Both sides would pursue their efforts to further develop and facilitate the flow of trade and other commercial exchanges between the two countries. Ibid., p.2.

115. Ibid., p.2.

116. In this regard the communique noted:

> Both sides noted the important role of the Canadian Export Development Corporation in the growth of economic co-operation between Canada and Yugoslavia. It was noted that the value to date of the value of the Export Development Corporation loans to Yugoslavia amount to approximately $20 million and that complete agreement has been reached on a new loan of approximately $40 million for the sale of locomotives which will be signed in the near future. In addition, negotiations are presently underway between the Export Development Corporation and five major Yugoslav enterprises representing loans amounting to approximately $100 million for projects in the chemical, aircraft, mining, transportation and tourist industries. They agreed to examine the possibility of concluding a framework agreement relating to the guarantee by the Export Development Corporation of Canadian private investment in Yugoslavia. Ibid., p.2.

117. Ibid., p.5.

A common complaint by the Yugoslavs was that in the area of disarmament Moscow tended to view it as the preserve of the Soviet Union or the United States. As a consequence the Yugoslavs continued to argue for other East

European states like themselves to present their own proposals - an argument that had the support of the Canadian government for two reasons: it would challenge Soviet hegemony and at the same time support Canada's foreign policy view which placed considerable emphasis on the importance of middle powers to act as a moderating influence on the two superpowers) the prohibition of chemical warfare, the need for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East - based on the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

118. John Fraser, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1983 to 1987, personal interview, Ottawa, November 19, 1993.

119. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Vol 10, Memo from Ambassador Williams, Belgrade, to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, July 28, 1972.

120. DEA, File 20-YUGO-1-3, Vol. 11, CO415, "Address by Milos Minic to the Federal Chamber of the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," December 26, 1974,

121. Ibid.

122. John Fraser, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1983 to 1987, personal interview, Ottawa, November 19, 1993.

123. John Fraser, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1983 to 1987, personal interview, Ottawa, November 19, 1993.

124. Ibid.

125. Actually established before Tito's death, the idea was to replace the single president with a committee in which each of the republics and provinces would have a member and a voice and in which the position of head of state, "president of the presidency" would rotate annually.

126. John Fraser, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1983 to 1987, personal interview, Ottawa, November 19, 1993.

127. DEA, File 20-1-2-YUGO, A7, Accession 546259, Vol 16, Memo from Department of External Affairs, Ottawa to Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, March 17, 1988.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

In terms of the balance of trade between the two countries in 1986 Canadian exports to Yugoslavia amounted to $40.8 million and imports from Yugoslavia totalled 41.8 million. Canada's exports consisted of materials such as wood pulp, asbestos, iron ore, as well as aircraft (CL-215 water bombers), motor vehicles, road graders and telecommunications equipment. Yugoslav imports consisted of primarily leather, furniture, food products, machine tools, tableware, textiles and footwear.

130. In May of 1986, for example, a major joint venture project worth $105 million was awarded to a Canadian firm, Combustion Engineers Canada, Inc. together with the Yugoslav company Minel, in the thermal power generation sector.

131. Furthermore, in their meetings as noted in an External Affairs memorandum:

> The Prime Minister [Mulroney] suggested that the two countries should examine the possibility of establishing a joint economic commission quote where we could on a sustained ministerial basis examine new possibilities, remove barriers and do business together to mutual benefit unquote. Prime Minister also stated his impression that in both the Paris Club and the IMF Canada was talking an open and helpful attitude. Ibid.

132. The report noted that:

> In the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations, it was important for all countries to work for a strengthened and liberalized multilateral trading system in order to combat the danger of protectionism. Both Canada and Yugoslavia had to play an active role in making the Uruguay Round work. Canada appreciated the Yugoslav support for a mid-term review conference to be held in late 1988 in Montreal. We intended to use the fact that the meeting was taking place in Canada to encourage support for GATT. Ibid.

133. It is interesting to note that common ground was found through Mr Clark's offer to share with Yugoslavia information used in Canada to support the construction of CANDU reactors. Evidently, there was considerable public opposition to the construction of a CANDU reactor in Yugoslavia.

134. Mikulic's meeting with Premier Bourassa, however, did not go as well the Federal authorities may have hoped:

> Meeting with Bourassa was less successful. According to Yugoslav Ambassador, Bourassa had not/not mastered his economic brief and discussion was mostly restricted to Quebec's position in Canadian federation and linguistic issues in bilingual and multilingual countries.. Bourassa somewhat shocked Mikulic by asking whether Yugoslavia had ever tried to remove language rights or protect the use of a language in certain circumstances. Mikulic assured him that the Yugoslav policy on contrary was to encourage use of all its languages. Ibid.

Like Prime Minister Mulroney and Ontario's Premier Peterson, Bourassa was also invited by the Yugoslav Prime Minister to visit Yugoslavia. Prime Minister Mulroney accepted Mikulic's invitation to visit Yugoslavia.

135. Ibid.

136. An agreement was reached whereby the two foreign ministries would make arrangements for negotiations to be undertaken by the two sides on a (bloc of cases?) number of cases rather than "on a case by case basis." Ibid.

137. Ibid.

138. DEA, File 20-1-2-YUGO A7, Vol 16, Memo from Terrance C. Bacon, Ambassador, November 25, 1988, Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. On the subject of staying in "the game" Mr. Bacon wrote:

> The current off-putting internal situation aside, Yugoslavia is a country of high potential, well endowed with important resources in agriculture, energy, minerals and forestry. As a venue for tourism, it remains largely untapped and is one of the most attractive in Europe. Opportunities for expansion in the industrial and energy sectors, as well as in the field of transportation, are excellent. When, not/not of, the moratorium on the construction of nuclear facilities is lifted, there are strong prospects for Canadian involvement in this field. Satellite communications, at present too expensive for the Yugoslav purse, eventually will be accorded high priority and we are on the ground floor with SPAR MONTL. The human resource in this country with its links to Canada is capable and competent and given the opportunity through reform has the energy to drive the eventual uplifting of the economy. Despite years of socialism, they are at heart private entrepreneurs capable of taking advantage of new opportunities for private ownership and building upon improved climate for investment. Investing further in Yugoslavia is a gamble of sorts, **but this is not/not no time to back out of the game.**[emphasis mine] Hopefully Canadian creditors/investors including EDC can be encouraged and convinced to see it this way. Ibid.

142. By 1990 the Yugoslav foreign debt stood at over 19 billion US with an inflation rate exceeding 1000 per cent. News of the troubles in Yugoslavia worried Canadian exporters and investors. By 1990 the balance of trade between the two countries favoured Yugoslavia: imports from Canada amounted to almost $ 49 million while Yugoslav exports to Canada totalled $93.7 million.158 The possible acquisition of a Canadian satellite system, Canadair water bombers and other ventures were also on the Canada-Yugoslav economic agenda. At this point as well Yugoslavia ranked 59th on Canada's export list. DEA, "Yugoslav Fact Sheet."

143. Source confidential: DEA, File 20-1-2 YUGO, 87/01/01 to 90/10/31, Vol 16, Memo of September 5, 1989 from Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to External Affairs, Ottawa.

144. Source confidential: DEA, File 20-1-2 YUGO, 87/01/01 to 90/10/31, Vol 16, Memorandum of September 5, 1989 from Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to External Affairs, Ottawa.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.

147. Vesna Pusic, "A Country by Any Other Name: Transition and Stability in Croatia and Yugoslavia," *East European Politics and Studies*, (Fall 1992), p.244.

148. John Fraser, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1983 to 1987, personal interview, Ottawa, November 19, 1993.

Chapter 3 - Recognition

Introduction

The recognition of Tito's Yugoslav state during the post-war period posed many of the same kinds of dilemmas for Canada and the international community as did the issue of recognizing the breakaway republics of the Yugoslav federation in the early nineties. The importance of the issue of recognition as it applied to the contemporary Yugoslav crisis at its inception was best demonstrated by Croatia's drive towards separation from the Yugoslav federation and its ultimate recognition as an independent state. In similar terms this chapter's focus on Croatia, rather than Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, demonstrates more clearly the various factors that influenced Canadian foreign policy in the region. After a brief conflict with federal forces the ethnically homogeneous republic of Slovenia played a very minor role in the ensuing and more distant conflict that engulfed Croatia and Bosnia in particular. Being ethnically homogeneous Slovenia did not represent the kind of quandary posed by Croatia with its well-established and formidable Serbian minority which occupied the Krajina region of Croatia and a staunchly nationalist government in Zagreb. In the case of Bosnia powerful events for the most part over-took issues related to Canada's role in recognizing that republic's separation from the Yugoslav federation. Complicating the matter for Canada and other states was the fact that Croatia, like the other republics of Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was determined to consummate the principle of self-determination while a part of a sovereign Yugoslav state, parts of which were prepared to forcefully block Croatian independence. By 1990 it had become evident to Canadian foreign policy makers that with the disengagement of the two blocs and, in particular, the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, growing ethnic tensions could pose a threat to the stability of the region. Growingly evident as well was the fact that these destabalizing factors might well require the search for a new rationale for a Canadian presence in the changing circumstances of Europe. The break up of the Yugoslav state and the issue of recognition, as illustrated specifically by the case of Croatia's separation, served also to expose the tension between the principle of self-determination and doctrine of the sovereignty of the state. This tension, as it related to the complexities surrounding Croatia's bid for international recognition, posed difficult problems for Canadian foreign policy-makers that prompted a search for a new rationale that would contribute to a perceptible shift in Canadian foreign policy.

The search for a new rationale as it pertained most specifically to Croatia was the product of a number of interacting domestic and international factors. There were the first signs of the emergence of the role of political leadership in the redirection of Canadian foreign policy that had to do with Prime Ministerial initiatives behind the early recognition of the Baltic states and a change at the helm of the Department of External Affairs. Greatly evident too were strong international pressures, particularly from the European Community, for a cautious stance to be taken on the question of recognition. Most noteworthy on the domestic front were the energetic debates in the House of Commons surrounding the issue of recognition, which put considerable pressure on the government to act more decisively on the issue of recognizing and protecting the secessionist aspirations of Croats, Slovenes and others. Shifts in views on state sovereignty and intervention at the international level also influenced Canadian foreign policy. The emergence of other new states and pro-secessionist European public opinion were among the new global realities. Transcending both domestic and international pressures and accompanying the shift in Canadian foreign policy was the growing acknowledgment that the strong correlation existing between the recognition of Croat (and Slovene) independence and Canada's traditional human rights concerns needed to be acted on through international intervention into the affairs of a sovereign state in conflict.

Secessionism on the Move: Canada Watches (Nervously)

By December 23, 1990, 90 per cent of Slovenians had voted in a referendum to disassociate Slovenia from the Yugoslav federation. Parallels were soon drawn between Canada's future and that of Yugoslavia. Analysts pointed out that plans by Slovenian authorities on the partition of the Yugoslav national debt were being drawn up in a process very much like the one that might take place in the event of the secession of Quebec from Canada. What was being done in one Yugoslav republic was being watched by other republics, especially Croatia , which were considering similar preparations and thoughts of secession much in the same way separatists forces in Canada - West and East - argue for the dismemberment of Confederation as we have known it. As Jeffrey Simpson of the *Globe and Mail* noted:

> Secessionist movements watch each other, and draw lessons and encouragement from the fate of ethnic minorities elsewhere. Central governments, too, watch the reaction of other central governments, which explains why the Soviet foreign minister criticized what it saw as Canadian meddling in the Baltic states.[1]

The Prime Minister was at times visibly annoyed by the analogies between events as they were beginning to unravel in the Yugoslav federation and the on-going Canadian constitutional drama, and he repeatedly characterized any parallels or analogies between the two cases as inaccurate. Nonetheless, noticeable were the comparisons made between Canada, the oldest federation and Yugoslavia, the newest. Of more importance was the fact that these analogies were also rooted in many of the government's foreign policy pronouncements in which Clark and later McDougall would draw analogies between international issues and domestic. A good example of this can be noted in Clark's speech September 1990 speech "Canada in the World: Foreign Policy in the New Era" in which he draws an open analogy between Canada's domestic experience and the international world as being something Canadians were proud of and unafraid to expose to international scrutiny. In other words, Canada's experience is not only an open book, but one which can be emulated as well as receptive to emulation. This close interplay between the domestic and the external continued to be a consistent theme in foreign policy under the Prime Minister and his subsequent Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall.

Soon events in Yugoslavia became more ominous and sinister with the rising level of tension and violence in Yugoslavia after Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991. On a domestic level there was a concurrent rise in the level of activity by Canadians of Yugoslav descent - particularly among those of Slovenian and Croatian descent - bringing pressure to bear on the Canadian government to do something about the escalating violence in Yugoslavia. The question of involvement not only had to do with the threat to the stability of the region but also with the question of what Canada's position should be in so far as recognizing the breakaway republics. The Canadian government now found itself in the position of having to deal with the federal Yugoslav state, and at the same time, the newly elected governments of the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the international community and its institutions

Discussions and pacts between the republics and the Serbian-controlled federal government on renegotiating a new federal structure and an end to the tension and violence between the Slovenian and Croatian militias and the federal army did not seem promising. The Canadian government, through its Belgrade Embassy and the Yugoslav Embassy in Ottawa, encouraged all efforts at sustaining a dialogue between the members of the federation. The federal authorities favoured retaining a strong federal system whereas the newly-elected non-Communist governments of Croatia and Slovenia favoured a loose alliance of sovereign states. By March of 1991 the eight-member federal presidency had been rendered ineffective by resignations. It was this rapidly deteriorating situation and the confused response to the events in the former Yugoslavia by the EC that Barbara McDougall inherited when, in April of 1991, she took over the External Affairs portfolio from Joe Clark who was seconded by the PM to assist him in the struggle for national unity in Canada.

The EC: Keeping Yugoslavia Intact

The response of the European Community, in May of 1991, to the widening cleavages within the Yugoslav federation reflected a Western consensus that every diplomatic effort should be made to persuade the

Yugoslav federation to stay together. However, even calls for Yugoslav unity by the CSCE in mid-June were ignored by Croatia and Slovenia as they proceeded with policies designed to disassociate and eventually secede from the federation. Generally speaking, the view that this "pro-federalist" attitude of the West towards developments in Yugoslavia may have made violence and civil war more likely was largely ignored. Academics like Lawrence Freedman at the Center of Defence Studies in London and James Gow, a London-based research fellow specializing in East European security made the argument that Western pressure on Slovenia and Croatia to remain within the federation emboldened federal authorities in Belgrade to use military force against the breakaway republics. At this point in the crisis the Canadian government was communicating to the breakaway republics its position that all parties should work towards ensuring that a peaceful accommodation can be reached if a renewed federalism could not be negotiated. Initially at least the Canadian government favoured a negotiated compromise which would see Yugoslavia remaining intact.

Sparked by the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991, events took a turn for the worse with a sharp rise in the escalation of violence between federal army units and secessionist militias. In the case of Slovenia certainly the eruption of fighting between the Slovenians and the JNA (Yugoslav Peoples Army) has been commonly attributed to the declaration of Slovenian independence on June 25, 1991. The simplicity of this assertion is corrected by Mark Thompson in his well-rounded and well received work about the downfall and destruction of Yugoslavia entitled **A Paper House**. Thompson describes the "decisive issue" which ignited the conflict between Slovenia and the Federal army as "control of international borders."[2] He argues that it was when the Slovenes took over border points along Yugoslavia's borders with Italy and Austria that the JNA sent armored units to seize them back. Evidence also suggest that the JNA acted unilaterally in this initiative and that Belgrade had been compromised by the army's action when it requested its assistance. Furthermore, Thompson points out that revenue derived from customs which went directly to the federal state contributed about 40 per cent toward the federal budget - with Slovenia's borders being the most lucrative. Thus the motives for the conflict at this stage at least were, as Thompson put it "federal-military and fiscal."[3] In his detailed 1993 account of the demise of the Yugoslav state, **Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia**, Lenard Cohen makes the same observation: the JNA had "Originally committed to the limited goal of securing control over Yugoslavia's borders as a means of demonstrating federal authority over the country..."[4] In an official June 27,1991 statement in response to the escalating crisis the new Minister of External Affairs was muted:

> We urge all parties involved in the current crisis to refrain from resorting to force or other actions which would complicate the situation further.[5]

Complicating the situation for Canada was the situation in Croatia where in the Krajina region the Serb minority had taken up its struggle against Croatia with the support of the JNA (Jugoslav Peoples Army) and Serbia. For Canadian policymakers the problem was of unravelling the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the sovereign federal republic of Yugoslav from the right of national self-determination as espoused, for the time being, by Slovenia and Croatia. Complicating the matter even further was the issue of those Serbs residing as a minority in the Krajina region of Croatia. A *Globe and Mail* editorial summed up the situation nicely when it stated:

> One of the problems is that many different peoples live together in not merely the same country, but the same region of the same country.This is the case in Yugoslavia, where, for example, a large Serbian minority lives in the republic of Croatia, and in the Soviet Union, where large groups of ethnic Russians live in several of the independence-minded republics. The nations of the world are ready to support the right to self-determination of the Croats and Slovenes; **they just hope they won't be asked to**.[emphasis mine] They feel the principle of self-determination is right and just, but important too is the stability of existing borders and existing sovereign nations.[6]

The editorial captured the essence of the dilemma the Minister of External Affairs inherited as she assumed office. However, international pressure - as exemplified by the role of the EC in the Yugoslav crisis, proved, at this point, to be stronger counter-weight against any tendency on the part of the Canadian government to advocate for and recognize the separatist aspirations of the breakaway republics.

Canada's position in early July did not include a readiness to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. On July 3, 1991 in Quebec city Barbara McDougall held to a conventional stance when she stated:

> It is too soon. The situation is very volatile, there is a considerable amount of violence. We are saying that when there is a democratic solution in Yugoslavia with an end to the violence, then we will consider our position.[7]

At the same time McDougall was able to concede the difficulty of arriving at a democratic solution given the level of violence in which all sides were participating. Nevertheless, for the Canadian position at this point the sovereignty of national borders overshadowed the case for the self-determination of Slovenia and Croatia. "Safe and secure borders are part of any national recognition - those don't exist," she stated on July 3. [8]

The Ethnic Lobby is Heard

By early July in response to the seeming intransigence of the Canadian government on the issue of prompt and early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, considerable pressure was being mounted by the Slovenian and Croatian communities in Canada for recognition of the former Yugoslav republics. Letters to the PM , the Minister of External Affairs and various MPs as well as demonstrations were becoming more prevalent. Fear that the violence in Yugoslavia would spread to Canada was evidenced by the hightened interest by CSIS in the domestic/international activities of Croat, Slovenian and Muslim organizations groups and individuals with connections to their homelands in the former Yugoslavia.

In Canada constitutional divisions were once again in the forefront of the news with a considerable number of the media drawing analogies between Canada and Yugoslavia. In an editorial in **Le Soleil**, Raymond Giroux expressed doubts about Canada's future:

> The Quebec government is improvising despite its commitment to hold a referendum on sovereignty before Oct.26, 1992, while looking for possible federalist solutions.
>
> English Canada, as in the case of Meech Lake, seems to think it's a bluff. It doesn't want to give anything exclusively to Quebec, according to the false principle of equality of the 10 provinces. It is playing with fire. There will come a time when all serene discussion on the shared economic risks of a loss of political control will be impossible.
>
> If there is one lesson to be drawn from the Yugoslav crisis, it is that the central government and the dominant forces were perfectly aware of the demands and the timetables of both the Slovenians and the Croatians. And nobody did a thing.[9]

Mr. Giroux's type of editorializing encapsulated much of the media analysis which frequently chose to draw analogies between the Canadian and Yugoslav experiences and no doubt reflected public sentiment on the subject of ethnonationalism whether it be applied to Canada or Yugoslavia. This expression of public sentiment and sensitivity, it should be concluded, placed even greater pressure on the government to recognize the legitimacy of the secessionist claims of the former Yugoslav republics. By this time it had become clear to the Canadian government that the eight-member Yugoslav presidency was ineffective in bringing the army in line and maintaining cohesion in Yugoslavia. Throughout August cease-fires were broken and then reinstated. Adding to the crisis and the problems faced by Canada's foreign policy makers was the announcement on August 13, 1991 by the government of the multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose 4.2 million people share borders with Serbia and Croatia, that it would hold a referendum to decide its future.

Splits in the EC Ranks

Germany was the first and most persistent country to urge the EC to recognize the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia. In a statement issued on August 27, 1991 German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was clear in laying the bulk of the blame on Belgrade for the continuation of the violence. He stated:

> The war against Croatia, being waged with the support and active participation of the Yugoslav People's Army, is apparently continuing undiminished... The world public, and especially European countries, cannot accept without acting.[10]

Italy and Austria also supported the German position to have the EC recognize Slovenia and Croatia. The battle for Vukovar - a city made up of a mixed ethnic population (43.7 percent Croat, 37.4 per cent Serb, and 7.3 per cent Yugoslav) and occupying a strategic point on the Danube River border with Serbia - claimed by both Serbs and Croats and located in Eastern Croatia and which was to symbolize the devastation and brutality of the violence between Serbs and Croats, had only begun in earnest. Vuk Draskovic a Serbian opposition leader may have most fittingly described the battle of Vukovar as the "Hiroshima of both Croatian and Serbian madness" and a "monument to insanity."[11] In a referendum held on September 8, 1991 the majority of Macedonians voted in favour for the republic to become a sovereign and independent state. The call for independence made Macedonia the third republic of Yugoslavia's six republics to declare independence. In spite of the establishment of a new truce brokered by the EC only days before, renewed clashes erupted between Serbs backed by the JNA and Croats in that republic. The EC was attempting not only to quell the violence between the hostile forces, but also to prepare a peaceful environment within which negotiations could take place. In addition the EC was attempting to warn the combatants that forceful changes of any borders would not be recognized. The EC sponsored peace plan also called for a freeze on steps towards independence until October 7, 1991.

Canada's consulate in Zagreb was operated by a small local staff with no Canadian diplomats stationed there. Ottawa had informed its small consular staff of two to maintain contact with Ottawa via the Canadian embassy in Vienna. A number of European countries that had previously not stationed diplomats in Zagreb and Ljubliana had already sent envoys to the two cities. It has been suggested that the lack of a significant Canadian diplomat presence in the two cities at this stage of the breakup of the Yugoslav state is likely to have impeded Ottawa's attempt to come to grips with the issue of Croatia and Slovenia's diplomatic recognition. As one of the frustrated part-time employees of the consulate noted: "They [Ottawa] don't even believe we've been bombed."[12]

While the Canadian government may not have been well informed of events that were taking place in Zagreb and Ljubliana, it was rapidly becoming clear to diplomatic observers that Serb forces backed by the federal army were gaining the upper hand on the military front as cease fires were created and then broken in rapid succession. What is particularly noteworthy is the observation by diplomats that each side saw an interest in continuing the conflict, albeit on a limited scale. According to a Belgrade-based diplomat: "[German Chancellor Helmut] Kohl keeps threatening to recognize Croatia's independence if Serbia keeps attacking so the Croats want to avoid peace breaking out while the Serbs want to take as much territory as they can get away with."[13] This observation was repeated by a Canadian correspondent for the *Globe and Mail* when he wrote that "while prominent Serbs and Croats will not say so publicly, in private many freely admit that a territorial compromise in exchange for international recognition of an independent Croatia is the likely outcome of the current hostilities.[14] This view of the war was supported by the view that Yugoslavia as it was known was finished. "What's at stake now," noted a foreign diplomat," is the emergence of those states that will take its place and the boundaries between them."[15]

On October 15, 1991 the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina announced that republic's sovereignty. Representative of the most explosive ethnic mix, that republic's total population of 4.2 million was made up of 44 per cent Muslim, 32 per cent Serb and 17 per cent Croat populations. Dire predictions that the tangle of nationalities and political alliances making up the republic would lead to all-out civil war were soon to be realized. The direction in which the republic was heading should not have been a surprise to anyone. By 1990 the republic's president, Alija

Izetbegovic, and leader of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) the largest party in the republic, made it clear Bosnia-Herzegovina would follow the same path taken by Slovenia and Croatia in their drive to secede from Yugoslavia. Soon after the parliamentary announcement, skirmishes between the republic's rival ethnic groups began to intensify. In response to the worsening situation in Yugoslavia and after a long period of dithering the EC, on November 8, 1991 announced its intention to impose sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Canada Joins EC Sanctions

The Canadian government followed with an announcement of its own limited trade sanctions. Neither the Canadian nor the EC sanctions banned trade, cut air links, imposed travel restrictions or froze Yugoslav assets abroad - features common to sanctions imposed on other states. Instead, the EC package of sanctions merely cut the EC's aid package valued at 1 billion, reestablished textile quotas, and terminated preferential trade treatment towards Yugoslavia. In Canada's case the government terminated preferential trade agreements with Yugoslavia and imposed a system of discretionary export permits for all exports to Yugoslavia. Canada's Minister of External Affairs also supported a bid by the members of the EC sitting on the Security Council (Britain, France, and Belgium) to seek a UN oil embargo against Yugoslavia. It was not until around the end of May of 1992 that the Canadian government froze Yugoslavia's financial assets in Canada. It was also confirmed by Canadian officials that there were no restrictions on Yugoslav exports to Canada. Acknowledged as well was the fact that no action could be taken to stem the flow of funds from the Canadian Croatian community to Croatia, a good part of which were directed towards the purchase of arms. It is also worth noting that while the Canadian and EC sanctions did not distinguish between the warring republics the Prime Minister had become clear in apportioning blame:

> We think that the army is completely out of control, its a rogue army. We haven't sought to blame anyone; we think we know where the blame resides. ... The remnants of a failed Communist regime is asserting itself through a rogue army.[16]

The Prime Minister's reference to the "remnants of a failed Communist regime" was undoubtedly an allusion to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's regime which had won electoral power in 1990 behind a renamed and supposedly reformed Communist party and to the belief that the Yugoslav army was dominated by Serbian officers most of whom were influenced by communist dogma.

In terms of the imposition of sanctions by Canada and the EC there was the view that even the application of comprehensive sanctions would have only a marginal impact on a weak Yugoslav economy already ruined by inflation, debt, war and a practically worthless currency. The Minister of External Affairs held out greater hope for the effectiveness of the oil embargo. McDougall stated that an "oil embargo will have an impact on the military, and it's important that the military understand the seriousness with which the international community views this situation."[17] On the subject of the effectiveness of the EC's attempt to resolve the conflict in Yugoslavia the Prime Minister noted that the EC should not be faulted for hoping for the greater effectiveness of sanctions. However, he also made it clear that the concept of sending UN peacekeepers - an idea that he and the Minister of External Affairs had been trying to promote for some time - would have been more effective. The Canadian government also announced at this time that it would be donating an additional $1-million worth of humanitarian assistance for the victims of the Yugoslav conflict via the International Red Cross - thereby bringing Canada's total contribution to $1.5 million.

The Brioni Agreement and European Public Opinion

On the political front the EC mediated its first cease-fire - referred to as the Brioni Islands declaration - in the region on July 7, 1991. Among other things, it called for a three month moratorium on decisions related to Croatia's secession and the establishment of negotiations between all parties concerned that would determine the future shape of Yugoslavia. By this time, however, public opinion in Europe was in favour of the independence of the break-away republics. By the fall of 1991 pressure had been mounting on the EC to act on the question of recognition, from essentially two quarters. Internationally and nationally public opinion reflected the view that the international community should be open to the secessionist aspirations of the Yugoslav republics. The monitoring of European public opinion in September 1991 indicated that a majority of Europeans supported the view that the right of self-determination and democracy should be respected as should be the independence of the Yugoslav republics.[18] In contrast to the mood of public opinion, the EC developed criteria which the republics would be required to meet should they wish to qualify for international recognition. There were five criteria as outlined by Patrick Moore:

> ... acceptance of the UN Charter and basic documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Helsinki process, guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities, respect for existing boundaries, adherence to current arms control and disarmament agreements, and support for negotiated settlements as the means of resolving political disputes. In addition, any Yugoslav republic asking for recognition would have to pledge to back the peace efforts of the UN and the EC.[19]

In their final and formal form these criteria were written into the "Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Guidelines for the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union" which the EC Council of Ministers adopted on December 16, 1991.

UN Opposed to "Premature" Recognition

Contrary to public opinion, the UN, like the EC, followed a policy of urging countries not to take any action that could worsen the situation in Yugoslavia - an obvious reference by some members who wished to head off German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. In spite of the Security Council reference Germany's foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, indicated that Germany would press the EC to grant diplomatic recognition to the two secessionist republics by Christmas. Germany's position was that the delay in the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was only emboldening the Federal army and those forces interested in carving out more territory. German pressure on this issue - which was forcing EC members to take sides among themselves - highlighted the divisiveness of the EC on the Yugoslav issue and, no doubt, the diplomatic quandary that Canada was facing in terms of maintaining a neutral stance via its potential UN involvement and the realization that the self-determination of peoples in a rapidly disintegrating federation were increasingly coming into play. From the perspective of the UN Secretary-General Javier de Cuellar "premature" recognition of the two republics would likely worsen the conflict because an independent Croatia would be legally entitled to rearm - a situation which would contradict the Security Council embargo which forbade the export of arms to Yugoslavia.[20] In spite of a UN-sponsored truce, battles continued across Croatia.

On December 17, 1991 the EC announced that it had agreed to plans that would recognize the breakaway republics by January 15, 1992 - on condition that they meet certain criteria, most notably that they respect the rights of ethnic minorities and that they agree to settle border disputes by peaceful means.[21] Contrary to the advice of the former UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, who had urged that the recognition of the breakaway republics be deferred while UN attempts to establish a cease-fire in the the Yugoslav civil war, Canada's Secretary of State, Barbara McDougall, after consulting with the new Secretary General, Boutros Gahli, was able to recommend to the Prime Minister that diplomatic recognition be extended.

Canada and the Recognition of Croatia

On December 19, 1991 the President of the Republic of Croatia sent a letter to the President of the EC Council of Ministers requesting that the EC recognize Croatia's independence. The process of judging Croatia's request for recognition was headed by the Arbitration Committee of the Conference on Yugoslavia which was made up of the presidents of the constitutional courts of five West European states. The Arbitration Committee reviewed numerous documents obtained from the Croatian government. The documents included copies of the republic's declaration of independence and new constitution, a report on the May 19, 1991 referendum held in Croatia, its constitutional laws to do with human and minority rights and the resolution of the Croatian Assembly in support of the government's request for recognition from the EC.[22] Besides declaring the integrity and sovereignty of Croatia as a state and detailing the basic rights common to most democratic states, the constitution made provision for the equal rights of all peoples and minorities and the "right of ownership, entrepreneurship and free trade ... the right to work and freedom of labour ... the right to strike."[23] Furthermore, the constitution recognized the organization of the government into a Chamber of Deputies, a Chamber of Counties and the Presidency, and established the independence of the judiciary. In large part due to pressure from the EC and the international community, the Croatian government, in December 1991, legislated the *Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities in the Republic of Croatia..*

Lord Carrington, as Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia received the report from the Arbitration Committee on January 15, 1992 which concluded that although Croatia did not completely meet all the criteria for recognition, it could be nevertheless granted. The report had concluded that "the constitution law of December 4, 1991 does not completely cover all the provisions of the Draft Agreement of November 4, 1991, ... it is therefore incumbent upon the authorities of the Republic of Croatia to complete the constitutional law of December 4, 1991, so that it satisfies the above-mentioned provisions of the Draft Treaty."[24] The report concluded, however, that "With this reserve, the Republic of Croatia fulfills the necessary conditions by the member states of the European Community according to the terms of the Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Guidelines regarding the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union." [25]

Besides attempting to meet the criteria for recognition imposed by the EC, the Croatian government was also having to meet the demands of multilateral financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in order to receive financial aid. The EBRD, established on May 29, 1990 to assist Central and East European States in their transition from command to free market economies, was explicit in outlining the political and economic criteria that had to be met before financial assistance could be extended to Croatia. The EBRD criteria focused on the intent of Central and East European countries to implement multi-party elections, the democratization of the political process and institutions, respect for human rights and an evolution towards free-market economics. The Canadian government, which signed and endorsed the *Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction*, approved of the approach taken by the EBRD in connection with Croatia's bid for financial aid. Canada was also supportive of the political and economic initiatives undertaken by the EC in terms of the issue of recognition of the breakaway republics. The Canadian government, however, did not support Germany when it broke ranks with the other twelve members of the EC and on December 23, 1991 recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. The displeasure of other members of the EC and Canada stemmed in part from Germany having ignored long-established conventions on diplomatic recognition related to a government's control of its territory and population. In part, as well, the opposition of the EC members had to do with the politically embarrassing fact that he EC's timetable for collective recognition was upset. Swift international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the EC and the international community, the German position argued, would force Serbia into accepting peace because the conflict could no longer be regarded as an internal one. The Canadian policy was that quick international recognition of the republics would run the risk of further exacerbating the conflict and hinder the process of negotiating a peaceful "divorce" between the members of the federation. However, events in December of 1991 marked a change in that policy.

Change in Canadian Foreign Policy

On December 23 Germany became the first major state to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Contrary to Germany's position, Canada had followed the position of the United States and UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar that the German move would only serve to worsen the conflict since Serbia would be of the opinion that it would now have little to lose by protracting the conflict. However, there was a subtle difference between the American and Canadian positions on recognition. Canada was not prepared to accept the conventional wisdom that Yugoslavia should be somehow held together. US Secretary of State Baker's visit to Yugoslavia with the message that Yugoslavia should be kept together - unity at the expense of the aspirations of the republics - has often been cited as seriously retarding the process of international recognition of the breakaway republics and providing an invitation to Federal Yugoslav authorities to escalate the level of violence by intervening forcefully in those republics. Publicly the reaction of the Canadian government to Baker's message was muted. Privately, in subtle contrast to the American position, the Canadian position on the escalating crisis in Yugoslavia, as conveyed by Canada's Belgrade Embassy, recognized and was more sensitive to the secessionist aspirations of Slovenia and Croatia at an earlier date. Moreover, from the Canadian perspective Baker's message to the Yugoslavs was not the one to be delivering in that it ignored the incompatibility between two conflicting concepts and the source of the crisis, the need to maintain unity versus the need to recognize the self-determination of peoples. As noted by the Second Secretary and Vice Council of the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade at the time:

> I think we were more supportive in terms of not necessarily holding the country together but that there needed to be negotiations. There had been a standoff in the Yugoslav situation. Everyone had recognized that the constitution was failing but no amendments could be undertaken without Croatia and Slovenia's participation and they refused to participate any further.[26]

Thus while Canada did not take the lead in the recognition of the breakaway republics, it had become more responsive to the nationalist aspirations of the seceding republics.

Recognition by Canada and a host of other countries of the independence of the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia came on January 16, 1992. In announcing the decision Canada's Prime Minister stated "the Yugoslav federation as we have known it no longer exists and cannot be reconstituted by force."[27] Belgrade responded by denouncing the recognition as "contrary to the sovereign rights of

Yugoslavia" and charging that recognition of the breakaway republics undermined the efforts of federal authorities to reach an agreement on the future relations of the republics with Yugoslavia.[28] It is important to remember at this junction that Canada's January 16, 1992 recognition of Croat and Slovenian independence did not bring to a close Canada's involvement in the recognition issue for it was not until April 14, 1993 that Canada finally established formal diplomatic relations with Croatia.

Parallel with Canada's multilateral activities and surrounding the question of recognition and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Croatia as they related to the Yugoslav crisis, were the difficulties and challenges faced by the government during the early development of bilateral relationship between Canada and Croatia. Although the Canadian government had shown signs of greater sensitivity and flexibility on the issue of the recognition Croatia and the other republics, it had been held in step by the European Community on that issue.

Human Rights and the Formalization of Diplomatic Relations with Croatia

The recognition by Canada that the Croatian government was heavily dependent on the international community was, in broader terms, an important factor in defining bilateral relations between Croatia and Canada. In specific terms that knowledge was pivotal to the Canadian government's central and fundamental concern with human and minority rights in Croatia and the role they played in defining relations between Canada and the new state of Croatia. The Canadian government's sensitivity to human and minority rights issues in Croatia was reflected at the outset by the decision to establish the Special Mission of Canada, under the legal framework of the UN convention of 1961 as defined in Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on Special Missions. For Canadian purposes the establishment of the Special Mission, which would operate in conjunction with the Honoraria Consulate of Canada - already operating in Zagreb prior to Croatia's independence - allowed for the conduct of "diplomatic relations" without having to establish formally diplomatic relations with

Croatia.[29] On February 1, 1992 Sam Hanson, as Canada's Special representative, presented to the Croatian government a letter from the Prime Minister officially confirming that the Canadian government was willing to begin the formalization of relations with Croatia by establishing a Special Mission in Zagreb. When asked by reporters soon after his arrival to Zagreb about the role of Canada's Special Mission, Mr. Hanson responded: "The role of the special mission lies in its liaison with the Government of the Republic of Croatia during this temporary period, and **in strengthening of potential diplomatic relations** [emphasis mine] between Croatia and Canada."[30]

The arrival of Mr. Hanson and the establishment of the Special Mission was greeted by the Croatian government with great pleasure and high expectations. The Croatian government had been pressing hard for Ottawa to establish formal diplomatic relations especially since Canada had granted recognition to Croatia on June 15, 1992. The Canadian government understood that Croatian independence was the product of the failure of Yugoslavia's system of governance to sustain an adequate economic system as well as to maintain unity among its heterogeneous population. Canada's Special Representative, in his correspondence to Ottawa, was particularly cognizant of the fact that Croatia - given the historic ethnic hatreds between Serbs and Croats within its borders - was in many ways subject to the same pressures as the former Yugoslav state and that "the development of adequate systems of governance will be [a] daunting task."[31] Croatia was in fact a country at war, subject to the arms embargo and a third of its territory was occupied by Serb forces. Moreover, Croatia was flooded with a large number of Croatian refugees and those from Bosnia-Herzegovina, some 700,000 constituting nearly 15 per cent of its total population. The strain placed on Croatia's economic and social system by these refugees was enormous. For the Canadian government the commission of atrocities, the forced exoduses of peoples and violence were another worrisome aspect of the conflict in Croatia. Soon after Mr. Hanson's arrival, this point was underscored in a March 30, 1992 article in *Glasnik* :

> According to Mr. Hanson, the Canadian Special Mission is neither diplomatic nor consular. Its role is specific, its task consists in the first place in overseeing the cease-fire; assistance in the placement of the peace forces of the United

> Nations, and specially in the cooperation with Canadians serving in the observation mission of the European Community, as well as the liaison officers of the United Nations units; promoting political solutions of the war in Croatia and, at the end, human and minority rights in Croatia.[32]

In economic terms the war had seriously damaged the country's infrastructure. Concerted efforts by the Croatian government to attract foreign investment, privatize state property and enterprises and to establish a free market system were underway. As reported by Mr. Hanson:

> Most urgent priorities for [Croatian] government are recovery of occupied territories, return of refugees, and reconstruction. For all of these it will be heavily dependent on [the] international community, which will thus be able to ensure that its standards are met. Croatia inherited highly-ramified system of social programs from ex-Yugoslavia; its challenge will be to keep social services at or near former levels when this was not economically-sustainable even before the conflict erupted.[33]

The primary goal of Canada's new Special Representative in Zagreb, besides establishing a good working relationship between Canada and Croatia, was to make recommendations on when to establish formal diplomatic relations with Croatia and how best to conduct that relationship.[34] Critical to establishing good relations from the Canadian perspective was the conduct of the Croatian government on human and minority rights issues. That point had been made clear in a letter, early in the month of February, from Canada's Prime Minister to Croatia's President, Tudjman, as well as in previous correspondence to Mr. Tudjman from the Secretary of State for External Affairs. It was also a point that Mr. Hanson repeatedly stressed in his meetings with representatives of the Croatian government. Interestingly, in one instance for example, Canada's past human rights record entered into the discussion with his Croatian interlocutors:

> During somewhat extended discussion of WWII analogy, I [Hanson] noted that issue of internment of Canadians of

> Japanese origin during previous conflict had had to be raised again many years later and that, after much painful debate and re-opening of old wounds, present government had issued [an] apology to those affected; **I expressed hope that present Croatian government would not do anything for which its successors might have to apologize.**[emphasis mine][35]

Mr. Hanson's reference to sensitive human rights issues was indicative of the extensive amount of attention that the government was giving to the domestic situation in Croatia which suggested a novel approach from previous experiences of recognition of new states by Canada.

Formal Diplomatic Relations Linked with Human Rights

Besides promoting its public stance that the protection of human and minority rights should be regarded as a basic value and fundamental principle of society, the Canadian government, from the beginning linked the establishment of diplomatic relations with human and minority rights in Croatia, as well as Croatia's cooperation in the deployment of UN peacekeepers and cooperation in international diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the Yugoslav conflict. Ottawa was particularly concerned that the implementation of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation, in which the government had a large stake, could be delayed by Croatian demands to attach conditions to its deployment. It is not surprising that the Canadian policy of linking the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Croatia's human rights and domestic behavior led to strains early in the relations between the two countries. Many Croats had expected to benefit immediately from an enhanced Canadian diplomatic presence in their country, Canadian pressure to have Croats legislate appropriate laws protecting minority rights was viewed as a challenge to their newly-established sovereignty. Adding insult to injury, Canadian intervention in Croatia's domestic affairs was often difficult to bear - especially when the Croats saw themselves as being the victims of a powerful federal army onslaught that led to the occupation of close to a third of Croatian territory by one of those minorities.

The Canadian government watched closely as the Croatian government adopted a new constitution and soon after, further legislation extending minority protection in Serbian dominated regions around Glina and Knin that contained provisions for the protection of minorities within its borders. The Canadian government was cognizant of the fact that human, religious and minority rights were entrenched in the new constitution in an effort to conform to CSCE standards. The Croatian government had also passed legislation providing for the protection of human rights and ethnic minorities and that included the creation of two autonomous areas in which Serbs were clearly a majority. While the Canadian government was pleased with the adoption by Zagreb of legislative measures designed to provide some protections for minorities within Croatia, it continued to reflect the skepticism and concern of its Special Representative with regard to the actual implementation of these legal and constitutional measures, as well as the activities of Croatia's often poorly trained and poorly controlled police and local government officials. The Canadian government also followed closely the development of electoral democracy in Croatia in an attempt to ensure that the new electoral system did not underrepresent minorities in Croatia. Canada's Special Representative monitored the first independent elections of August 1992, which elected Croatia's President and a lower house by proportional representation, and elections in February 1993 for Croatia's upper house. While the electoral process was described by the Canada's Special Representative as sometimes being "rough around the edges" and somewhat wanting in terms of voter education, it was ascertained by Mr. Hanson to be generally fair and adequate.[36] Nevertheless, as reported from the Special Mission to Ottawa, there still remained outstanding concerns as reported through Mr. Hanson:

> Helsinki watch has documented numerous cases in which rule of law, independence of judiciary, and protection of individual rights fall short of CSCE standards. Government[Croatian] continues to maintain that all such cases will be investigated and dealt with, and that Croatia will be, in frequently used phrase, 'pravna drzava'(state of law). But one law still on books makes it a criminal offence to belittle, libel, or slander state and officeholders. Recent attempt was made by public

> prosecutor to use this legislation to prosecute journalists who hold President Tudjman in less than perfect awe; it backfired spectacularly when judge threw out highest-profile case.
>
> Another disturbing development is opening of criminal proceedings for crimes including armed insurrection against thousands of residents of conflict areas; it appears highly unlikely that all these cases will make it to court, but at least part of intent would appear to be to prevent individuals from being elected to local government offices in areas concerned.[37]

Troubling as well from the perspective of Canada's Special Mission were the activities of the Croatian Party of Rights and its militia which, behaving on occasions as though it were above the law, posed a threat to the legitimate legal order.[38] Despite the concerns of the Canadian government, by the end of April 1992 twenty-seven countries had already established formal diplomatic relations with Croatia.

While good working relations had developed between Canada's Special Representative and his principal Croatian contact, Jelko Urbun, Assistant Minister of Foreign affairs for Relations with Non-European Countries , relations between Canada and Croatia continued to be subject to the conditions placed on Croatia by Ottawa. For many Croat officials Canada's preoccupation with the protection of human and minority rights in Croatia meant the protection of a Serb minority whose separatist claims had been established primarily by the aggressive use of force sponsored and abated by Belgrade. The responses of Croat officials to Canada's position on human and minority rights varied. "On some occasions I have been practically blasted out of [the] room by individuals who could not understand our concern for the rights of 'aggressors." reported Mr. Hanson. "On heartening proportion of occasions, however, I have encountered thoughtful and appreciative acknowledgment of fact that Croatia as a society will be judged by fate of Serb minority within it."[39] Another point of contention between Ottawa and Zagreb was the actions of the Croatian government vis-a-vis the situation in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina

In response to Croatia's role in violating the January 2 cease-fire agreement by taking the Maslanitsa bridge - a critical link to Croatia's

Dalmatian coast - on January 23, 1993 the Canadian government issued, through its Special Representative, a written protest indicating that Canada took a serious view of the Croatian military offensive. On at least ten occasions during the first year of the establishment of a Canadian Mission in Zagreb, Canada's Special Representative was instructed to make *demarches* on the Croatian government, most of them related to Croatian government's activities and role in Bosnia. Reports of the direct involvement of Croat military officers and Croat logistical support in the Bosnian conflict were reaching the Canadian Mission in Zagreb. For Croatia to permit its citizens to engage in fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina was construed by the Canadian government as a violation of the January 2, 1992 cease-fire established in Croatia. Repeatedly the reports were denied by the Croatian government. The Canadian government was also concerned about the political ties between the Croatian government and Mate Boban, the President of the so-called Croatian Constituent Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. It was Canada's policy that Bosnia-Herzegovina should retain its territorial integrity and not be carved up by either Serbia or Croatia and so Canada applied whatever diplomatic pressure it could to modify and influence Croatia's domestic and international behavior. The withholding of formal diplomatic relations, not surprisingly, was the key political instrument employed by Canadian foreign policy vis-a-vis Croatia.

By the end of May thirty-one countries had established diplomatic relations with Croatia. Canada was not among them. In fact, in June of 1992 the Canadian government viewed the extension of its Special Mission in Zagreb beyond its initial six month mandate as being conditional pending the establishment of diplomatic relations, the establishment of peace and security in Croatia and, in general, the good behavior of the Croatian government. When pressed by Zagreb on the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations Canada's Special Representative assured Croat authorities that the matter was "under active consideration" and that in view of the state of affairs in the region the term of Canada's Special Mission could be extended.[40] By August forty-five countries - including the United States and the United Kingdom - had established diplomatic relations with Zagreb. For the Croatian government and many of its representatives with personal ties to Canada, Canada's unwillingness to establish formal diplomatic relations was very disappointing. Canada, Croat officials often asserted, served as a model in the establishment of Croatian democracy and the safeguarding of human and minority rights.[41] They often pointed out to Canadian officials that the potential for a close and special bilateral relationship, especially in the economic area, was not being realized. There was from Ottawa's perspective also the awkward issue of what to do about the consular authority of Croatian representatives in Canada. The solution as far as Zagreb was concerned was the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. The Croatian government had also begun to urge the Canadian government to have the Secretary of State and or a high level Canadian delegation visit Zagreb in order to solve the log jam of issues related to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. At the same time, the Croatians were particularly interested in sending a high level delegation to Canada.

Canada continued to maintain a position that was diplomatic but non-committal. By September the number of countries establishing those relations was up to fifty-two. By January 3, 1993 sixty-one countries had committed themselves to establishing diplomatic relations with Croatia.[42] The "painful question" of the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Canada and Croatia was once again raised during President Tudjman's new year's reception, held on January 15, 1993 (on the first anniversary of Croatia's independence) for Zagreb's diplomatic community.[43] Mr. Hanson once again reiterated the Canadian position to his hosts that there was a linkage between the establishment of diplomatic relations, Croatia's role in the greater Yugoslav crisis as well as Croatia's responsiveness to the extension of UNPROFOR and its revised mandate "so that UNPROFOR would have means and authority (ie enforcement) to implement parts of Vance plan were not yet accomplished."[44] It was important to the Canadian government that UNPROFOR have the means and the authority to carry out its mandate effectively, for example, by disarming irregulars (Croat and Serb) and permitting the return of refugees. By the end of January Canada's position had begun to soften with the Secretary of State for External Affairs agreeing in principle to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Croatia on a conditional basis. A letter of January 23, 1993 from Canada's Special Representative to the Croatian government formalized Canada's new position:

> The Canadian Government believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Croatia is inseparable from the larger issue of the continuing crisis in the former Yugoslavia and Croatia's role in it.
>
> I have been instructed to inform you that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honorable Barbara McDougall, has agreed in principle to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and Croatia. This, however, could only take place subject to the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Croatia to the renewal of the mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia and its continuing positive approach to the Geneva negotiations on the former Yugoslavia.[45]

The letter also concluded with both an expression of the Canadian government's objection to the January 22, 1993 Croatian military offensive, which could undermine international and Canadian efforts at achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict, and a warning that Canada would "monitor with particular attention developments such as these in the period leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries."[46] Seventy-three countries had established diplomatic relations with Croatia by the end of January. While publicly Croat authorities saw the conditional establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada as a positive step, privately there was considerable displeasure with the conditionality attached to Canada's move.

While the promise of improved trade relations between Canada and Croatia could be held out by the Canadian government as an incentive in securing greater cooperation from Croatia in finding a political solution to the conflict, withholding diplomatic relations, which provided the Canadian government with some leverage earlier in its relationship with Croatia, soon proved eventually to be a case of diminishing returns. By January Canada had become a part of a small minority of countries not having established diplomatic relations with Croatia. The Canadian government and diplomats recognized as well that there were limits on its ability to influence the Croatian government on the humanitarian front. For example, the Croatian broadcast media was a state monopoly and further efforts to expand the process of democratization could be more effectively encouraged by Canada on the basis of formal and established bilateral relations. The Canadian government provided Croatia with humanitarian assistance through the Red Cross and its efforts through special immigration measures adopted by the Canadian government that allowed a large number of people in Croatia to immigrate to Canada. The Canadian government was also pleased with the positive contribution of Croatia during the Geneva negotiations.

On April 5, 1993 a letter from Mr. Hanson was sent to Croat authorities informing them of Canada's decision to establish diplomatic relations without conditions:

> The Special Mission of Canada presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and with reference to communications from the Government of the Republic of Croatia, has the honour to advise that the Government of Canada proposes the establishment without delay of diplomatic relations between Canada and the Republic of Croatia.[47]

On April 15, 1993 formal diplomatic relations were established between Canada and Croatia, thereby acknowledging formally the sovereignty of the Croatian state.

An Analysis of Policy: Domestic and International Factors

An analysis of Canadian policy on the recognition of the breakaway republics of the former Yugoslavia - with the primary focus being on the Croatian case - requires close examination. This examination reflects two distinct aspects at work. On one level, as far as formal recognition is concerned, the examination reveals a foreign policy moving in tandem with the European Community in the relatively early recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav republics. In conjunction with the EC, Canada recognized Croatian and Slovenian independence on January 15, 1992 and Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence on April 8, 1992. While there is some evidence to suggest that the government would have preferred to move earlier in recognizing the republics, the Canadian government acquiesced to the EC position and adopted a low profile posture by deferring to the Europeans. On another level, however, in delaying the extension of formal diplomatic relations to those republics - particularly in the case of Croatia - the government's foreign policy posture is seen to be distinct and salient by being at the forefront of those states willing to intervene in the domestic affairs in an attempt to ensure that human rights and democratic standards are being adopted before formal relations are established. Canada extended formal diplomatic relations to Slovenia on January 8, 1993, to Croatia on April 15, 1993 and to Bosnia-Herzegovina on December 15, 1995. In the final analysis the case of the recognition of Croatian sovereignty by Canada and other events related to the recognition issue, as reflective of a shift in Canadian foreign policy, were rooted in a series of international and domestic variables that came into play during the Yugoslav conflict. An examination of international and domestic pressures on Canadian foreign policy will suggest that international institutions, specifically the EC and the UN, were instrumental in restraining earlier recognition by Canada of the independence of the Yugoslav republics, while domestic pressures, as conveyed by the highly charged debates in the House of Commons, emboldened Canada's political leadership to respond with greater flexibility to the issue of recognition. The two opposing pressures - domestic and international - understandably produced tensions which were an integral part of a policymaking environment that was more conducive to accepting a more flexible and responsive policy towards issues related to humanitarian intervention and the recognition of sovereignty in secessionist states.

International Factors

Canada's earlier acquiescence with the EC's policy on recognition, as well as trade and economics, represented the dominant influence on Canadian foreign policy in so far as the international variables were concerned. European public opinion and the recognition of the secessionist republics were subsumed by the institutional pressures from the EC and the UN to have Canada follow a narrower and more cautious policy regarding the recognition of the separating Yugoslav republics.

By July the escalation in the violence, to a large extent the product of the attempt by the frequently out-of-control Yugoslav army to crack down on the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia, began to bring with it the gradual abandonment of a ultra cautious position adopted by European leaders to the unrest in Yugoslavia. British officials instituted a ban on some exports to Yugoslavia while Italy threatened to support the breakaway republics unless the army crackdown was ended even before any similar measures were taken by the EC. Moreover, the EC-led peace initiatives produced few positive results. In addition it should be noted that many of the member states of the EC had their own ethnic difficulties prompting them, at least during the initial phases of the Yugoslav conflict, to take a cautious approach in their mediation efforts and to be less than receptive to pressures by ethnic minorities to alter the borders of Europe. However, the aggressive actions of the Yugoslav army in particular led a number European leaders to become more attentive to the positions taken by the secessionist republics. The German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was the first to challenge the conventional stance taken by the EC as head of the CSCE crisis committee when he spoke of the Yugoslav army's attempt "to keep its old position of power and to preserve old structures is bound to fail and merely brings bloodshed to the people of Yugoslavia."[48] At the same time, the German position was that it was still premature to discuss the independence of the republics until and unless there was full support for such a decision from all EC members.

Knowing that over 50 per cent of Yugoslavia's trade was with the EC, the initial approach by the EC to bring about a peaceful solution in Yugoslavia was largely economic. In the spring of 1991 the EC attempted to use Yugoslavia's economic involvement and desire for closer association with it as an incentive for a peaceful solution. This policy, to the displeasure of the seceding republics, also represented a veiled attempt by the EC to hold the Yugoslav federation together by supporting the pro-federalist forces in the state. In other words, the EC was prepared to negotiate a privileged association agreement with Yugoslavia on condition that a peaceful resolution of the conflict and steps towards democracy were realized.[49] Canada was supportive of this tack taken by the EC. The EC also made it clear that federal military intervention into the republics would bring about the cancellation of financial assistance and credits.

The other aspect of Canada's resistance to recognizing the breakaway republics at this stage of the conflict may have also been influenced by the tangible possibility that Canadian troops, which the Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister had already volunteered, would play an important role in peacekeeping operations in the former republics. "If you want to be credible as a peacekeeper you have to be seen as not taking sides, " Scott Mullin, a spokesperson for McDougall stated. "Our credibility as peacekeepers could be undermined by what would be perceived by some parts as taking sides."[50] This explanation could do little to counter the Serbian perception that there was a close association between Canada and Croatia given the noticeable involvement of the Canadian Croatian community in the Yugoslav conflict and also the fact, for example, that the minister of defense for Croatia was a Canadian, as was a leading member of the right-wing Croatian Party of Rights.[51] Given the emerging policy of the government that saw it imperative that Canada play a leading role in a UN intervention into Yugoslavia, it was understandable that the government was prepared to allow the formal recognition of the republics to take a back seat to the imperatives of a peacekeeping role for Canada.

While the UN and the EC tended to assume a "pro-federalist" view of the Yugoslav crisis, European public opinion was in favour of the formal independence of the former Yugoslav republics. Nevertheless, public support for the independence of the former Yugoslav republics was not reflected in the institutional posture adopted by the European Community, which sought to maintain the integrity of the Yugoslav state. The EC's position was one which was also supported by the United Nations, another multilateral institution striving to accommodate the preservation of the Yugoslav state. The consequent divisions within the twelve-member EC, between those which held to the hope of maintaining a Yugoslav state and those who were able to recognize early divisions were irreconcilable, and contributed to mixed signals being sent to all parties involved in the conflict.

Domestic Factors

On the domestic front there was no evidence of a preference by the foreign policymaking bureaucracy to have Canada at the forefront of those states like Germany which called for the earlier recognition of the breakaway republics. By presenting a "neutral" policy with regard to trade and economic relations Canada's external affairs bureaucracy also reflected a cautious stance regarding recognition. However, that caution was also accompanied by a significant measure of flexibility regarding the eventual recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence. In terms of the impact of domestic variables on the conduct of Canadian foreign policy pertaining to the recognition issue, the effect of public opinion, particularly as expressed through parliamentary debates, was most significant. The opportunity offered Canada's political leadership by the strong public expression of empathy for the principle of self-determination as expressed by the breakaway republics, presented the Prime Minister and his new Secretary of State with occasion to enact a "change in emphasis" in Canada's foreign policy while appearing to appease diplomatic conventions regarding recognition.

The relationship between the issue of Canadian recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and Canada's economic ties, while not a paramount factor in determining the cause of Canada's rather lethargic movement towards granting formal recognition, is of some significance. While not dominating relations between Yugoslavia and Canada, trade and economic relations continued to develop before the outbreak of violence in the former Yugoslavia. 1992 statistics indicate that the balance of trade between Canada and "Yugoslavia" was definitely in Yugoslavia's favour with total exports of 23 million dollars and total imports from "Yugoslavia" over 79 million dollars.[52] Canadian exporters benefited from sales of commodities such as iron ore, coking coal and wheat to Yugosalvia. There were also water bomber, helicopter and mining equipment sales to Yugoslavia. The Canadian government had also participated in joint ventures with Yugoslavia involving the manufacture of steam generators and boilers and the expansion of the Kolubava power plant near Belgrade. Before the outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia approximately two-thirds of Canadian exports were directed to

Serbia.[53] Canadian exports to Slovenia and Croatia consisted mainly of pulp and hide. Of interest as well is the fact that about two-thirds of our imports from Yugoslavia were derived from products from Slovenia and Croatia. A highly placed Canadian trade official in External Affairs, Hans Himmelsbach noted that "in the past trade was one of the more powerful aspects of our relationship with Yugoslavia."[54] The trade division within the department, like Canada's former commercial attache in Belgrade, tended, understandably, to take a more positive view of the potentialities for improving longer-term trade relations and prospects with the former republics. Furthermore, officials in the trade division of External Affairs recognized that a neutrally-oriented policy on recognition would be a more prudent policy to adopt in the longer run. As Mr. Himmelsbach noted "Politically we're going to look better than our competitors because of our even-handed approach to the Yugoslavia problem."[55]

While Canada's commercial attache in Belgrade was discouraged from actively promoting business with the former Yugoslavia, he was allowed to give his advice to business people interested in the Yugoslav market. That advice included the potential in Serbia, for instance, for Canadian business interests willing to take the longer-term view of the situation in the Balkans that sees a resolution to the conflict and the establishment of economic relations between the former parts of Yugoslavia. The eruption of the Yugoslav conflict and the consequent imposition of sanctions and trade embargoes by Canada and the international community interrupted economic activity between Canada and the Yugoslav republics. While the level of Canadian-Yugoslav trade did not allow economic/trade relations to be a major lever in Canadian attempts at finding an end to the conflict in the region, it is acknowledged by Canadian authorities and clear from evidence in Canadian-Croat and Canadian-Serb relations, that the Canadian government has attempted and will continue to attempt to use economic and financial incentives in both bilateral and multilateral forums as means of resolving the conflict in the Balkans. This policy was motivated, as it was in the past, by political considerations over economic ones. Canada had developed meaningful political and economic links with the Yugoslav state prior to the conflict. Undoubtedly in foreign policy-making circles and within the foreign policy-making bureaucracies there existed a common forty year history of two states that had made some substantial political and economic progress in forging those political-economic links. By appearing to remain "neutral" on the recognition issue, Canadian foreign policy could exploit the possibility, in the future, that Canada would remain a politically and economically acceptable link with those states. Canadian foreign policymakers could claim that Canada did not rush into supporting or granting recognition to one side over another - as Germany, Austria and Italy did. As a Canadian management training consultant pointed out after a trip to Serbia:

> Given this [Canada's links to Yugoslavia through its multiethnic population and Canada's positive profile in Yugoslavia], Canadian businesses would be welcome in all the emerging Yugoslavian states, especially Serbia. As a direct result of acrimony with their former trading partners - especially Germany, the biggest of them - Serbians are looking for new ones.[56]

From the perspective of the government, any short term foreign policy advantages gained by granting early recognition were not going to be offset by longer term economic benefits. By appearing to move slowly and cautiously on recognition, Canada would be in the prudent position of being able to re-develop trade and economic relations with all of the former republics of ex-Yugoslavia, while at the same time ensuring that eventual recognition was linked strongly to the well-being of ethnic minorities within those former republics. Certainly in bilateral terms economic considerations played a small part in Canada's policy on recognition. A more salient factor in influencing Canada's cautious foreign policy approach with respect to Canada's trade and economic relations related to international pressures, primarily as exercised through the economic and political role played by the EC on the question of recognition.

Outside of Parliament as well, pressure on the Canadian government to recognize the independence of the break away republics intensified after Canada recognized Ukrainian independence immediately following a independence referendum held in that former Soviet republic. Slovenian and Croatian Canadians were quick to point out that while the Canadian government was quick to recognize the independence of the Ukraine following its referendum in which almost 90 per cent of the population endorsed separation, the Croatian referendum on separation which received a 90 per cent approval for separation and the Slovenian referendum of December in which almost 90 per cent of Slovenians voted for independence, did not bring about the prompt recognition of the former republics of Yugoslavia. The explanation provided by the spokespersons representing Canadian Croatians and Slovenes suggested it was largely a question of numbers - there being over a million Canadians of Ukrainian origin, whereas some 250,000 Canadians claim Croatian origin and only 30,000 Canadians claim Slovenian origin. Ottawa's position had not changed. For the External Affairs Minister "The key to independence is to end the violence and to have all parties negotiate in good faith."[57] In addition, as McDougall informed the Commons earlier in that week, a prerequisite for recognition was an agreement by all parties on the borders of the republics and guarantees that would protect ethnic minorities. The Slovenians were quick to point out that they were neither engaged in any fighting, nor did they have any border disputes and that the Slovenian government had agreed to recognize minority rights which included the establishment of seats in their parliament for ethnic minorities such as ethnic Italians.

Well before the imposition of sanctions on Yugoslavia by the EC and Canada, another sector of domestic/societal pressure had begun to have an impact on shaping Canada's foreign policy response to the crisis in Yugoslavia in general and the issue of Canada's recognition of the breakaway republics in particular. That sector of domestic pressure was transmitted through the House of Commons debates about the erupting crisis in Yugoslavia in May of 1991 and later during the November 1991 emergency debate. The Throne Speech called for individual members not to be bound by party discipline so that the candid views of individual Members of Parliament and their constituents could be more openly expressed on a variety of issues including the Yugoslav crisis and Canada's part in it. The issue of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in particular drew the attention of Canada's parliamentarians. Frequent analogies, as similarly expressed by and through the media, between what was taking place in Yugoslavia and what could happen to Canadian federalism became a commonly expressed theme during these debates.

Comparisons between the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia with the potential for the same in Canada were difficult to resist by Members of the House, particularly where the Member, as in Mr. Scott's case, was making a point that would favour the government side:

> **Mr. Geoff Scott (Hamilton-Wentworth)**: Indeed, Slovenia has already been heading outward toward western Europe. Slovenia's local parliament has passed laws of dissociation from Yugoslavia. Does that sound familiar? Outright independence in Slovenia is planned for June. Croatia would like to do the same except for one slight problem. Of its five million people 600,000 are Serbs. Again, does that sound familiar? Quebec has 5,300,000 population, the English speaking minority, 637,000.
>
> I do not want to see my country break apart the way we are watching it happen right now in Yugoslavia.[58]

While the government had encouraged a free debate surrounding the Yugoslav crisis, it became evident that differences were emerging between the government and the opposition on the form and shape Canada's foreign policy should take in response to the impending breakup of Yugoslavia.

Conservative MP's, like Scott, defended the position of placing greater and continued emphasis on a policy that would encourage the federation to remain intact, even to the detriment of the right to self-determination by the Croatian people for example. In responding to Scott's words to the House, Liberal MP Alex Kindy countered with the issue of the Croatian right to self-determination that had been confirmed, he emphasized, by free and democratic elections:

> **Mr. Alex Kindy (Calgary Northeast)**: The people of Croatia had spoken. They said: ' We want a somewhat looser association within that confederation.' Does he [Mr. Scott] believe that the will of the people should be respected?
>
> **Mr. Scott (Hamilton-Wentworth)**: It is a very tricky question that the hon. member for Calgary Northeast has put

> to me, about whether Croatia has the right to secession. The democratically expressed will of the people could mean it would have the right to secede if it did not affect the welfare, the outcome and indeed the entire viability of the country as a whole. ...
>
> I feel that if Croatia left Yugoslavia, it would be the end of Yugoslavia as we know it and that would be a tragedy. In the same way, if Quebec decided to leave Canada, it would be the end of Canada as we know it and that would be an even greater tragedy.[59]

The matter of Canada's response to the Yugoslav crisis in general and specifically whether to continue a policy of lending support to a rapidly decaying federation as opposed to recognizing the changing realities affirmed by the June 1991 referendum in which 94 per cent of Croatians approved independence was again taken up in the House of Commons on October 8, 1991. In leading the charge on this occasion and addressing himself to the Prime Minister, John Brewin (Victoria) confronted the Prime Minister with the question that since that over 94 per cent of Croats had approved independence what was he about to do about forcing the withdrawal of Federal forces from Croatia. The Prime Minister responded by acknowledging that:

> The Yugoslav army is absolutely out of control and has caused extraordinary damage to both the Serbs and the Croats in Yugoslavia who have lived for some four or five decades in a state of peace and economic growth and prosperity in that country.[60]

The continuing exchange in the House between Brewin and Mulroney indicated clearly that the opposition was leaning more strongly towards a greater acceptance of the secessionist aspirations of particularly Slovenia and Croatia and the principle of self-determination. Where the Prime Minister spoke of damage done to *both* Serbs and Croats by the Yugoslav army, the opposition saw the violence in terms of the damage done to Croatia and Slovenia by an out of control army. Where opposition members like Brewin were calling on "the government to move immediately on humanitarian assistance in Croatia"[61] the government advocated a "twin track approach" This approach, the Prime Minister explained in the House, "provides for those republics that wish it to gain recognition in a framework of a general negotiated settlement that would protect minority rights, ensure against unilateral and forcible changes of borders, and provide for a loose association or alliance of sovereign republics."[62] Opposition members continued to attack the government relentlessly for not formally recognizing the nationalist aspirations of the republics and their peoples. For Alex Kindy (Calgary Northeast) the violence erupting in Yugoslavia was caused by the Yugoslavian army "controlled by the communist Serbian government" attacking the "Croatian National Guard under the duly elected Government of Croatia."[63] In a letter to the Prime Minister which he quoted to the House on September 17, 1991 he urged the government:

> to recognize the independent republics of Croatia and Slovenia, and to immediately ask that all Yugoslavian troops be withdrawn from Croatian territory in an effort to help curb the further escalation of the conflict.
>
> Canada's support of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia would be viewed as our meaningful commitment to freedom and democracy.[64]

For the Liberals and New Democrats alike there was a close correlation between Canada's human rights concerns surrounding the Yugoslav conflict and Canadian recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. That correlation was also acknowledged by members on the government side. In a November 5 presentation of two petitions to House of Commons Don Blenkarn (Mississauga South) called on the government to "recognize without delay the independence of Slovenia and Croatia."[65]

The long-anticipated emergency debate on the the situation in Yugoslavia, under the provision of Standing Order 52 - seconded by the Liberal foreign policy critic, Mr. Axworthy, and the NDP foreign policy critic, Mr. Robinson which took place on November 18, 1991 continued to accentuate policy differences between the government and opposition on the recognition question. From Robinson's perspective, Parliament, and the government in particular, was long overdue in accepting "that Yugoslavia no longer exists as a nation."[66] As in the case of the Liberals, for the New Democrats as well, the *status quo* was no longer acceptable:

> **Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby-Kingsway)**: If we accept the fundamental principle set out in the CSCE documents of self-determination, surely we should recognize that the people of Slovenia, the people of Croatia have spoken loudly and eloquently for independence, for freedom and for democracy.
>
> We must understand and we must accept that it is not a question of when Croatia will be independent; it is a question of how much blood will be shed before that independence has been recognized. I say on behalf of my colleagues that too much blood has been shed and Canada has been silent too long.[67]

Robinson's point highlighted the opposition's view that in the midst of the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation the boundaries of one of its secessionist republics had, in fact, already been established and that the sooner Canada and the international community gave credence to that fact, by placing a peace-keeping force on the border between Serbia and Croatia, the sooner humanitarian intervention could be facilitated. The emergency debate, like the earlier debates in the House of Commons, accentuated the extent to which Canada's parliamentarians had begun to actively immerse themselves in the recognition issues and the considerable pressure that debate put on the government to act decisively. In short, the message from the opposition side especially was that sovereignty sensitivities related to the recognition issue were no longer an unacceptable excuse for inaction, that, in fact, it was the delay in granting recognition to the secessionist republics that had inflamed and extended the conflict.

While international pressures and bureaucratic preferences of Ottawa's foreign policy establishment - favouring a cautious and conventional pro-federalist approach - remained particularly salient factors in influencing Canadian foreign policy on the issue of the recognition of the breakaway republics, the role of political leadership provided by the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State for External Affairs was beginning to grow in importance. The issuance by Canada of formal diplomatic recognition of the former Soviet Baltic states on August 26, 1991, well before the US decision to do so, illustrated in specific terms the growing influence of the Prime Minister and his foreign minister in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy and in general terms, the growing predisposition of Canadian foreign policy to accept a more flexible view of recognition of a secessionist entity. The recognition of the Baltic states by Canada was looked upon by many observers as an important turnabout in Canadian foreign policy. The Canadian commitment to the recognition of the Baltic states (and eventually the Ukraine) reflected the view by Ottawa that the cohesion of the Soviet Union as a federation could no longer be ensured. It is to be noted that traditionally Canadian foreign policy had been very cautious about granting recognition to stateless peoples and secessionist regions of states. In the words of one foreign affairs journalist with *The Globe and Mail*:

> For decades Canada has tied itself up in diplomatic knots over the right to self-determination. Our politicians and mandarins have feared that, if we encouraged the dissolution of unworthy empires and championed the autonomy of downtrodden peoples, some international smart alec would call for our international dismemberment.
>
> Given the situation in Quebec, ask Ottawa-based intellectuals, how could we possibly demand that the Slovenes be permitted to establish their own democratic state separate from Yugoslavia? The implicit suggestion is that our bargaining position with Quebec will be compromised by any move to support even the most legitimate claims to self-determination.[68]

The same journalist went on to congratulate Mulroney for his independence by stating:

> So, congratulations on your Baltic coup, Prime Minister. Perhaps we're beginning to put one aspect of our Quebec complex behind us. In any case, it's nice to see you emerging from President Bush's shadow.[69]

Scott Mullin, spokesman for McDougall, alluded to this change when he stated during an interview that: "We are not encouraging other states to leave the Soviet Union," however, "it is a change ... a question of emphasis."[70] Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the Prime Minister acknowledged that the decision to recognize the Baltic states, even though they failed to meet all previous Canadian criteria for diplomatic recognition was, in fact, "a judgment call" initiated by himself and his advisors.[71] In short, even though the Baltic republics had not established full control over their borders, a central bank and full control of communications and currency, the decision was made, according to Mullin that, "they are sufficiently down the road... We're aware they're still some distance from full self-government. On Friday, they weren't there. On Sunday, somebody decided they crossed the line."[72] It appears that somebody was the Prime Minister. Early recognition by Canada of the Baltic states (which were incidentally quick to offer human rights guarantees to their Russian minorities) set a precedent for future Canadian action in the Balkans in that criteria for recognition could be applied with considerably less rigidity than had been applied in the past, that a state could be recognized by Canada even though, to borrow from Mullin's reference and that state was "still some distance from full self-government."

Conclusion

Canadian policy on the issue of recognition as it applied to Croatia leads to a number of salient conclusions that reflected a shift in Canadian foreign policy. To begin with, it illustrated the strong presence of international pressures behind the government's policy of moving forward cautiously on the recognition issue which caused the government, at least initially, to follow the lead of the international community and more specifically the EC towards recognizing Croatia and finally extending formal diplomatic relations with it. A more cautious or conventional policy on recognition was also more congruent with the norms of the foreign affairs bureaucracy in Ottawa and the perception of Canadian trade officials that a policy of "neutrality" would eventually pay political and economic dividends in future Canadian relations with a looser Yugoslav federation or a rump Yugoslav state and a group of newly-emerging sovereign states in the Balkans. Of some worry to the government as well was the concern that an overtly pro-secessionist tilt in terms of the recognition issue could undermine the Prime Minister's primary goal of having Canada play a leading part in initiating and participating in an important UN operation in Yugoslavia. Not to be forgotten in terms of a domestic factors on Canadian foreign policy was the government's growing preoccupation with the view that recognition had to be linked closely with an acceptable adherence to human rights standards by those states like Croatia aspiring to be recognized as sovereign. Frequently spoken of by the media and the public but rarely acknowledged by the government was its sensitive position regarding Quebec separatism within the context of the Yugoslav parallel. If the government was seen to be too responsive to the aspirations of the Croats and Slovenes, why should it not be equally as responsive to the legitimate aspirations of sovereignists in Quebec? In short, the government had to be susceptive to the possibility that Canada's meddling in the domestic affairs of another state would not rebound against a government focused also on finding new means of keeping confederation intact.

In contrast to those domestic and international factors that influenced the more wary and orthodox tendency of Canadian foreign policy on the issue of recognition there prevailed a series of domestic variables which contributed especially to the emergence in Canadian foreign policy of a more flexibly oriented and sensitive policy on the recognition issue. While appearing cautious, that policy directly challenged established principles of sovereignty and norms of international law by prematurely recognizing the sovereignty of the new state of Croatia *during* the course of a civil war. It also challenged the established principles of sovereignty by the degree of intervention that it promoted before the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. In other words, the establishment of diplomatic relations was driven by the government's particular concern about human rights. It is evident that on a consistent basis the government applied constant pressure on the Croatian government to have its new state subscribe to an acceptable level of human rights norms and standards. The same human rights standards were applied by the government in the cases of Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. The delay in the government's extension of formal diplomatic relations to Slovenia on January 8, 1993 is to be attributed to the time required to go through conventional diplomatic procedures. The delay in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was extended formal diplomatic recognition on December 15, 1995 was attributed to concerns about the ability of Bosnia-Herzegovina to exercise effective control over its territory. This latter concern of the Canadian government was alleviated by the signing of the Dayton agreement in December of 1995. In both the Slovenian and Bosnian cases, the Canadian government was assured that the two governments would safeguard human rights standards within their respective jurisdictions.

In terms of the timing of the recognition of Croatia (and Slovenia), there was, in retrospect, a little over one month separating Germany's "premature" recognition on December 12, 1991 and Canadian/EC recognition on January 15, 1992. Canadian foreign policy makers were aware that the granting of sovereignty recognition to a seceding state prior to the conclusion of the conflict between the seceding state and the state from which it was once a part was a form of intervention. In protesting loudly the government of Belgrade understood the implications of Canadian/EC actions on recognition as being contrary to the sovereign rights of the Yugoslav state. By laying the blame on Germany for forcing early recognition of the republics, Canada, like other states, could avoid the diplomatic stigma associated with early recognition, while at the same, the government could and did use the withholding or granting of recognition as a fairly powerful weapon of interventionary persuasion where human rights issues especially were concerned. This is not to suggest that Canada's foreign policy leaders, such the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State for External Affairs were not actively considering advocating the early and prompt recognition of the break-away republics. There had been a great deal of pressure exerted on the government by domestic public opinion to have Canadian foreign policy respond positively by recognizing and affirming the secessionist aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples. Domestic factors, as indicated by the energetic and frequently emotional parliamentary debates, loomed large in applying considerable pressure on the government to act more promptly and intrusively against the Yugoslav state with regard to the recognition of Croatia (and Slovenia). Never before had the people of Canada spoken so forcefully through their representatives about advocating the secession of constituent parts of a sovereign state. The Croat and Slovene ethnic lobby, to the extent that it may have influenced Members of Parliament during the course of parliamentary debate, showed some effectiveness. The debates also indicated that the opposition appeared more interventionist than the government largely as a consequence of public opinion, domestic and international, which had come to identify more closely with the secessionist demands of peoples.

In terms of domestic pressures on policy making, the development of a more flexible and human rights-oriented policy regarding recognition can also be attributed to the role of political leadership. Soon after the change at the helm of Canadian foreign policy, the Prime Minister and his new Secretary of State played a key role in the quick recognition of the Baltic states and the Ukraine. Traditionally Canada had been quite wary of recognizing stateless peoples or secessionist regions. The relatively early decision to recognize the Baltic republics, and soon after, the Ukraine, marked an important turnaround in Canadian foreign policy. Even though the early recognition of the Baltic States may not have played a direct role in Canadian recognition of Croatia and Slovenia that was, eventually, to follow, it had served to further acclimatize Canadian foreign-policy makers to the new post-Cold War realities and the fact that Canada was willing and capable of moving the international markers surrounding the issues of sovereignty and non-intervention. Furthermore, early recognition of the Baltic republics also revealed the emergence of a more interventionist Prime Ministerial hand at the controls of foreign policy. There is also some evidence to suggest that both Mulroney and McDougall regretted not having promoted earlier recognition which would have made it easier for the international community to be seen as intervening effectively in an external matter between states, rather than an internal, domestic matter between recognized peoples occupying that state. As early as June 1, 1992 McDougall characterized the initial decision by European states and the US to support Yugoslavia's territorial integrity as "a fundamental error ... a bigger error than I would have foreseen at the time."[73] Admission of this "error" is significant in that it is an acknowledgment of a change in Canadian foreign policy.

In short, in participating in the collective recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, Canada had contributed to the further erosion of many of the traditional premises upon which recognition was granted. Foreign states like Canada had taken sides in the affairs of Yugoslavia by recognizing its secessionist components in the midst of civil conflict. From the perspective of the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State it was unfortunate that sides had not been taken earlier by the European Community. Moreover, from the perspectives of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada's involvement in the recognition issue as it related to the EC's role in the Yugoslav conflict indicated that the EC influence on the crisis in Yugoslavia was weak. EC negotiated cease-fires were short-lived and generally ineffective. Observing the deterioration of the situation under the auspices of the EC, the Prime Minister was forming the view that reason and negotiations, in the absence of stronger political and military coercion by the outside world, were only exacerbating the conflict. While publicly attempting to show their appreciation and support of EC efforts in the former Yugoslavia, Mulroney and McDougall had for some time come to the conclusion that the EC's role in the former Yugoslavia was largely ineffective. The Prime Minister, like his Secretary of State, was also more than cognizant of popular pressure to recognize the independence of the former Yugoslav republics that was being exerted on his government. This popular pressure to recognize the former republics would become a complementary factor to the fact that the stage had already been set by the Prime Minister to play a greater role in the shaping and conduct of Canadian foreign policy that had been driven in good part by cautious bureaucratic imperatives of domestic foreign policy making institutions and the conventional reactions of multilateral institutions such as the EC to the Yugoslav conflict. The crisis was viewed as a litmus test for how well the EC, as the new source of institutional power in Europe, would do in diffusing the conflict. The Prime Minister came to the conclusion quite early in the EC's involvement that it had failed. More to the point, he understood that without some military intervention capability any future involvement by another international organization was bound to fail as well.

Endnotes

1. Jeffrey Simpson,"The drama in Yugoslavia has special meaning for Canada and the USSR," *Globe and Mail*, February 22,1991. pA14.

2. Mark Thompson, **A PAPER HOUSE The Ending of Yugoslavia**, (Vintage, London, 1992), p.8.

3. Ibid., p.8

4. Lenard Cohen, **Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia,** (Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1993), Reviewers copy, p. 224.

5."Yugoslav troops battle Slovenian secessionists," *Globe and Mail*, June 28,1991, p.A10.

6. "How the world reacts to Yugoslavia's turmoil," [Editorial], *Globe and Mail*, July 3, 1991, p.A16.

7. "European Leaders abandon caution on Yugoslav crisis," *Globe and Mail*, July 4, 1991, p.A1.

8. "European leaders abandon caution on Yugoslav crisis," *Globe and Mail*, July 4, 1991, p.A10.

9. Pauline Couture, "Canadians could take 'a lesson from Yugoslavia," *Globe and Mail*, July 10, 1991, p.A15.

10. "Bonn to seeks EC recognition of rebel Yugoslav republics," *Globe and Mail*, August 27, 1991, p.A10.

11. Lenard J. Cohen, **Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia,** (Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1993), Reviewers copy, p.266 , originally cited from FBIS-EEU, March 13, 1992, p.29.

12. Paul Koring, "Canada invisible in troubled city," *Globe and Mail*, September 21, 1991. p.A11.

13. Paul Koring, "EC leaders fail first major test," *Globe and Mail*, October 7, 1991, p.A9.

14. Paul Koring, "Croatia may win freedom by losing the war," *Globe and Mail*, September 21, 1991, p.A1.

15. Ibid., p.A1.

16. Paul Koring, "Sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia," *Globe and Mail*, November 9, 1991, p.A2.

17. The Soviet Union, Libya and China were the main suppliers of oil for Serbia. Ibid., p.A2.

18. The monitoring of European public opinion in September 1991 is shown in Table 1 which supports the view that most Europeans in each country, except Greece and Romania, sympathized the right of the Yugoslav republics to exercise the right of self-determination and democracy.

Table 1 Attitude of European Citizens Toward Yugoslavia's Future Cohesion, by Country, September 1991 (in percent)

Country of Respondents	Preserve Yugoslavia's Territorial Integrity	Respect Democracy and Self-Determination (including possible independence of republics)	Don't Know
Belgium	20	73	7
Denmark	12	70	18
Germany	18	63	19
Spain	17	71	12
France	20	73	7
Iceland	13	74	13
Luxembourg	19	69	12
Netherlands	20	65	14
Portugal	13	76	12
United Kingdom	17	73	9
Greece	39	36	25
Italy	22	63	15
Romania	48	33	19
Bulgaria	22	54	24
Albania	4	85	11
Hungary	16	72	17
Poland	22	61	17
Estonia	16	68	15
Latvia	13	72	15
Lithuania	11	78	11
Czechoslovakia	28	63	9

European Russia	38	45	18
Total EC countries	19	68	13
Total Eastern European without European Russia	20	65	15

Source: "The Yugoslav Crisis," Eurbarometer, No. 36 (December 1991),p.A41 cited in Lenard J. Cohen **Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia** (Westview Press, Boulder , Colorado, 1993).

19. Patrick Moore, "Diplomatic Recognition and Slovenia," *RFE/RL Research Report*. 1 (January 1992), p.10.

20. "UN votes to send team to Yugoslavia," *Globe and Mail*, December 16,1991, p.A10.

21. The EC's announcement was received differently by the primary antagonists in the conflict. Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic charged that the EC had gone beyond its mandate by "abolishing" Yugoslavia. Serbia responded by announcing that it would recognize Serb-inhabited Krajina regions of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This announcement was seen by critics of the Serb regime as tantamount to formal annexation of these regions by Serbia. It was also seen as a signal that the war in Croatia could very well spread into the ethnically mixed republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that nearly all the breakaway republics would have to pay a territorial price for their independence. Bosnia-Herzegovina's President Aliya Izetbegovic cautioned the federal army against involving itself in his republic and suggested that he would request Turkey's assistance if threatened. Mr. Izetbegovic formally requested that the EC recognize the independence of his republic as well. Mr. Izetbegovic also requested that the UN deploy a peacekeeping force to prevent the spread of the civil war from Croatia.

By early 1992, the focus of international attention had begun to turn toward the ethnically-mixed republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moslems and Croats, in a referendum held at the end of February 1992, voted overwhelmingly for Bosnian independence - with Bosnian Serbs, by and large, boycotting the referendum. It would not long before interethnic violence was ignited. Diplomatic recognition soon followed in the belief that the eventual diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia had contained hostilities in those former republics. EC recognition came in April of 1992.

It is also interesting to note that on January 3, 1992 Serbian nationalists and Communists met in Belgrade as members of some 159 political parties which - upset with the demise of the federation - proclaimed the establishment of a Serb-dominated state.The final document signed by participants, while not legally binding reflected a political proposal for a successor state explained Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs. It is interesting to note too that Milosevic and leaders of the army stayed clear of the conference held at the federal parliament in Belgrade. It was, however, attended by Branko Kostic who led what remained of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav collective presidency and was known to be a close Milosevic ally.

22. The constitution of the Republic of Croatia that provided the basis for Croat independence is made up of nine chapters and begins with the following Preamble:

> Proceeding from historical facts, previously mentioned in the Constitution concerning various forms of state-political organization of the Croatian people as well as from the historical right of the Croatian people to full state sovereignty, the universally-accepted principles of the contemporary world and inalienability, indivisibility, untransferability and undisposability of the right to self-determination, including the right to secession and association, the Republic of Croatia is established as the national state of Croatian people and the State of members of other peoples and minorities who are its citizens. *Yugoslav Survey,* 1992, p.31.

For more details see "Report of the European Community Arbitration Committee: Opinion No.5 - The recognition of the Republic of Croatia," *Yugoslav Survey*, 1 (1992), pages 126-127.

23. *Yugoslav Survey*, 1992, p.32.

24. *Yugoslav Survey*, 1992, p.127.

25. *Yugoslav Survey*, 1992, p.127.

26. Shelley Whiting, International Security and Defence Relations Division, External Affairs and Trade Canada, personal interview, Ottawa, November 24, 1993.

27. *The Globe and Mail*, January 16,1992, p.A1

28. Ibid., p.A1.

29. It is interesting to note that Canada made use of this UN provision even though Canada, unlike the former Yugoslavia, had not ratified the 1961 Convention.

30. Karlo Papic, "A Special Mission in Croatia," *Glasnik* ("The Messenger") March 30, 1992, p12.

31. DEA. Documents received under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum of August 31, 1992 from S. Hanson , Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, p.2.

32. Karlo Papic, "A Special Mission in Croatia," *Glasnik* ("The Messenger") March 30, 1992, p.12.

33. DEA. Documents received under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum of August 31, 1992 from S. Hanson , Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, QLGR0276, p.13.

34. Sam Hanson , Canadian Charge d'Affaires to Zagreb, personal interview, Calgary, Alberta , January 21, 1994.

35. DEA. Documents received under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum of February 18 from S. Hanson, the Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to the Department of External Affairs , Ottawa, QLGR0015, p.5.

36. Sam Hanson , Canadian Charge d'Affaires to Zagreb, personal interview, Calgary, Alberta , January 21, 1994.

37. DEA. Documents received under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum of August 31, 1992 from S. Hanson , Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, QLGR0276, pp.5-6.

38. DEA. Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum

of August 31, 1992 from S. Hanson , Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, QLGR0276, p.6.

39. DEA. Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum of August 31, 1992 from S. Hanson , Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, QLGR0276, p.11.

40. DEA. Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum of June 30, 1992 from S. Hanson, Special Representative, Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to the Department of External Affairs , Ottawa, QLGR5063, p.1.

41.Personal interview. Source confidential.

42. DEA. Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum of January 6, 1993 from Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to the Department of External Affairs , Ottawa, QLG5002, p.3.

43. DEA. Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum of January 15, 1993 from Special Representative, Sam Hanson , Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, QLGR0011, p.1.

44. DEA. Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Memorandum of January 15, 1993 from Special Representative, Sam Hanson , Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, QLGR0011, p.1.

45. DEA. Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Letter of January 23, 1993 from S. Hanson, Special Representative of the Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb to "Croatian authorities" as attached to memorandum of January 23, 1993 from Special Mission of Canada to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, QLRC5031.

46. DEA. Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Letter of January 23, 1993 from S. Hanson, Special Representative of the Special

Mission of Canada, Zagreb to "Croatian authorities" as attached to memorandum of January 23, 1993 from Special Mission of Canada to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, QLRC5031.

47. DEA. Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Letter of April 5, 1993 from S. Hanson, Special Representative of the Special Mission of Canada, Zagreb, to the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

48. "European leaders abandon caution on Yugoslav crisis," *Globe and Mail*, July 4,1991, p.A1.

49. Trevor C. Salmon, "Testing times for European political cooperation: the Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992," *International Affairs*, 68 (1992), p.249.

50. Jeff Sallot, "Croats, Slovenes, left in limbo," *Globe and Mail*, December 5,1991, p.A6.

51. Not forgotten as well was the Canadian businessman who was caught with a planeload of arms by the Yugoslav army.

52. Statistics Canada data sheet received from Hans Himmelsbach.

53. Hans-Joachim Himmelsbach, Deputy Director, Central and Eastern Europe Trade Development Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, personal interview, Ottawa, November 22, 1993.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Mel Goldberg, "Riskey business: making deals with a war going on," *Globe and Mail*, February 11, 1992, p.A19.

57. Jeff Sallot, "Croats, Slovenes left in limbo," *Globe and Mail*, December 5, 1991, p..A6.

58. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Wednesday, May 15, 1991, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, p.133.

59. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Wednesday, May 15, 1991, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, p.134.

60. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Tuesday, October 8,1991, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, p.3465.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, September 17, 1991, p.2251.

64. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, September 17, 1991, p.2251-2252.

65. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 5, 1991, p.4512.

66. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.49552.

67. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.49554.

68. John Cruickshank, "Finally developing a diplomatic spine," *Globe and Mail*, August 30, 1991, p.A15.

69.Ibid.

70. Ross Howard and Graham Fraser, "Baltic recognition marks turnaround in foreign policy," *Globe and Mail*, August 27,1991, p.A11.

71. Ibid., p.11.

72. Ibid., p.11.

73. Paul Koring, "McDougall urges fast action in European disputes," *Globe and Mail,* June 1, 1992, p.A11.

Chapter 4 - Canadian Foreign Policy and the United Nations

Introduction

Canada, as of the beginning of 1992, stood poised to enter a European conflict in a manner that would have been difficult to predict only a number of months before. The Yugoslav conflict was supposed to have been a European affair - one that was to be contained and resolved by the Europeans. Through the summer of 1991 the Yugoslav conflict had begun to take on a dangerous momentum. The level and nature of the violence had already reached horrific proportions. The Canadian government had been signalling its increasing frustration with this state of affairs. The Prime Minister, supported by his Minister of External Affairs, sensed the opportunity for Canada to play a more prominent role on the international stage and challenged the international stalemate in a profound and provocative manner.

The centerpiece of that challenge was the United Nations. It was the United Nations which provided the key institutional platform for Canadian foreign policy initiatives pertaining to the escalating crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, it is within the context of Canada's UN involvement in the Yugoslav conflict that the strongest evidence of a shift in Canadian foreign policy is to be found. The shift in Canadian foreign policy - exemplified by the Canadian government's actions in the UN and on the ground in Yugoslavia - calls as well for an examination of domestic and external factors that inspired and shaped the shift. The shift in Canadian foreign policy challenged the United Nations and indirectly the world community to transgress the doctrine of non-intervention. In specific terms the Canadian government led in two ways: first, by prodding the Security Council to take up the conflict in Yugoslavia and calling for the speedy dispatch of UN peacekeepers to Yugoslavia (Canada already having made an unsolicited offer to contribute Canadian forces for use in any proposed UN operation). On September 25, 1991 Security Council Resolution 713 - a direct product of action initiated by Canada's political leadership - was passed and opened the door for UN intervention in Yugoslavia. The second manifestation of a change in Canadian foreign policy, is evidence of the Canadian government being clearly at the forefront of those UN states promoting and supporting a re-thinking of that institution's position on intervention in the domestic affairs of a state. As early as July of 1991 Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, in an address to the General Assembly, challenged the UN to transgress its principle of non-intervention in the case of Yugoslavia. Besides being in the forefront of a drive to reform UN thinking on issues and policies related to intervention and peacekeeping, the diplomatic and political initiatives undertaken by the Conservative government in the UN were accompanied by a third manifestation of a change in Canadian foreign policy, namely, two noteworthy military operations involving Canadian forces on the ground in Yugoslavia. In both operations the Canadian government allowed Canadian peacekeepers to assume a prominent role in leading two dangerous UNPROFOR operations: the regaining of Sarajevo airport, which effectively reestablished a UN presence in the Bosnian capital, and the establishment and active defence of Srebrenica as the first UN "safe area".

In analyzing the government's actions an explanation of the change or shift in Canadian foreign policy can be found in an examination of domestic and international factors which impacted on the formulation of that change. While both factors played a role in redefining Canadian foreign policy, it was the manner in which the domestic pressures, international pressures, bureaucratic preferences and political leadership interacted that allowed for the shift in Canadian foreign policy. In this interaction the preeminence of domestic pressures and political leadership as part of the governmental setting that emerged as key factors for the shift in Canadian foreign policy and contributing to the reshaping of Canadian foreign policy.

A Prime Minister's Directive and Security Council Resolution 713

By the end of July there appeared the first outward manifestations of a change in the position on the Yugoslav crisis taken by the Canadian government. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly on July

25,1991 Canada's External Affairs Minister expressed the view that the UN should violate its principle of non-intervention in order to end the conflict in Yugoslavia. It was rapidly becoming clear to Canadian diplomats that Serb forces backed by the federal army were gaining the upper hand on the military front as cease fires were created and then broken in rapid succession. What was particularly noteworthy was the observation by some diplomats that each side saw an interest in continuing the conflict, albeit on a limited scale. In the words of Paul Koring, a *Globe and Mail* correspondent stationed in Zagreb:

> Rarely do both sides have limited military objectives where the political aims of one can be helped by the territorial ambitions of another. ... Despite dire predictions of all-out war unless a cease-fire is arranged, there is a symbiotic confluence of interests in Serbia gaining ground while Croatia wins international recognition by losing a limited war.[1]

This view of the war was supported by the persistent reports that Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman and Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic had conducted secret meetings on the redrawing of borders between the two republics. "Yugoslavia is finished," were the words used by a Western diplomat in Belgrade in the end of September. "What's at stake now is the emergence of those states that will take its place and the boundaries between them."[2]

Having already, by the summer of 1991, formulated the view that Yugoslavia, as it had been constituted, was finished and having already become, for some time , disturbed by the rapidly escalating level of violence there, the Prime Minister took the lead by directing Canada's UN delegation in New York to intensify its efforts to have the UN address the worsening crisis in Yugoslavia. By September of 1991 Canada was increasing its pressure on the UN to consider a peacekeeping mission to Yugoslavia. On September 20, 1991 the Prime Minister sent a letter to United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar urgently calling upon the Security Council to summon an emergency meeting to deal with the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia as well as offering Canadian assistance as a part of an international peacekeeping force. The Prime minister cited an out-of-control Yugoslav army and the needless deaths of many Serbs and Croats as reasons for his call for UN action. This stance adopted by the Canadian Prime Minister ran contrary to the view of most other Western leaders, such as British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd who argued in Ottawa, while on his way to the UN, that any UN intervention in a peacekeeping role would be pointless unless there was strong enough evidence that a cease-fire could be maintained. "Trouble with you Canadians you think there is a solution to every problem," Mr. Hurd commented to the Prime Minister during their meeting.[3] Hurd's comment displeased the Prime Minister because it typified a convenient and smug international rationale for inaction. Besides British objection to his proposal Mulroney was aware that there was resistance to UN intervention from the non-aligned members of the UN. A member of Canada's UN delegation in New York at the time captured the predicaments Canada was facing when it had begun lobbying for UN action in Yugoslavia:

> The trouble was that Yugoslavia was a founding member of the non-aligned movement. Everybody in New York could see that the fighting was going to get worse and at that stage no one had recognized any of the parts of Yugoslavia. It had not 'spilled over' and there wasn't a big refugee problem yet. Therefore, even if we had brought it into the Security Council, the countries most reluctant to bring it in were the non-aligned countries. Here is a founding member of the non-aligned movement with an internal problem and they didn't want it [Yugoslav crisis] brought in.[4]

Resistance to Canadian initiatives to having Yugoslavia put on the Security Council agenda came not only from the non-aligned and those Western states not willing to be seen as imposing their views on the non-aligned group. There were a number of countries neighboring Yugoslavia which also wanted to have Yugoslavia put on to the Security Council agenda. Most of the these countries, however, had vested interests in what was taking place in the Balkans. Austria, for instance, which at the time was on the Security Council, had wanted to have the Yugoslav issue brought on to the Security Council but had been persuaded by non-aligned countries its initiative would not succeed largely because it was an internal matter. In the meantime the Prime Minister's patience had all but run out - he had reached the stage where he wanted Yugoslavia brought before the Security Council. The Prime Minister's close friendship with Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, Yves Fortier, with whom he was in very frequent telephone contact on the Yugoslav issue, had facilitated Canadian pressure to have the Security Council place Yugoslavia on its agenda. The log jam - in terms of all the arguments related to the view that the Yugoslav crisis was an internal matter, that Canadian involvement would damage its credibility, and that Canada would "fall on its face" if it promoted a more intrusive UN action - was finally broken when the Prime Minister instructed his Ambassador that his letter dated September 19, 1991 (S/23053) requesting that Yugoslavia be placed on the Security Council agenda for action was to be sent to the President of the Security Council.

On September 19, 1991 Canada was hosting a reception with Austria at the United Nations. A peacekeeping documentary, made jointly by Canadian and Austrian television companies, was being presented at the reception. While attending this reception Canada's Ambassador, Mr. Fortier, received, in the company of the Austrian Ambassador to the UN, word from Ottawa that the Canadian letter of September 19, 1991 requesting that Yugoslavia be inscribed on the Security Council, was to be forwarded to the President of the Security Council that evening. Having been party to the instruction given to the Canadian Ambassador, the Austrian Ambassador promptly instructed one of his aides to inform Vienna of the Canadian initiative with, presumably, the request that Austria should put its letter in as well. The Canadian letter was sent directly to the French President of the Security Council on the evening of September 19, 1991. The Austrians received their instructions from Vienna to submit a letter to the Security Council the next morning of September 20. However, because Austria was a member of the Security Council it was able to convince the Secretariat to number the Austrian letter first (S/23052) and the Canadian second (S/23053).17 As a consequence one finds the following preambular paragraphs in Resolution 713:

> **Taking note** of the letter dated 19 September 1991 to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of Austria (S/23052),

> **Taking note also** of the letters dated 19 September 1991 and 20 September 1991 to the President of the Security Council from respectively the Permanent Representative of Canada (S/23053) and the Permanent Representative of Hungary (S/23057).[5]

A third preambular paragraph refers to over a dozen letters that had been sent to the Security Council expressing concern about what was taking place in Yugoslavia during July and August of 1991. Clearly though, it was the Canadian letter of September 19, 1991 which served as the catalyst that was to put Yugoslavia on the Security Council agenda via Resolution 713 of September 25, 1991(19) - the same day on which Canada's Minister of External Affairs, Barbara McDougall gave her "sovereignty-can-take-a-second-seat-to-higher-principles" speech to the UN General Assembly. In this speech the minister clearly made the case that the UN should by-pass its principle of non-intervention in the interest of ending the conflict in Yugoslavia. She stated that:

> A collapse of effective governmental authority in Yugoslavia, if it continues, could ... endanger peace and security in neighbouring countries. So the concept of sovereignty must respect higher principles, including the need to preserve human life from wanton destruction.[6]

Canada had already requested that the UN Security Council consider dispatching a peacekeeping force to the region. The Minister repeated Canada's offer to participate in a peacekeeping force and made the important point that the time had come for the UN to "open our horizons a bit on what peacekeeping and peacemaking means."[7] As a member of Canada's UN delegations noted of this period:

> A lot of people had said to us 'you're crazy. This is an internal matter. Nobody is going to buy it [Canadian call for UN intervention].' All of a sudden [after Canada's letter of September 19 and the passage of Resolution 713] it wasn't crazy. A lot of the people said we wanted to do it, but didn't have the courage to do it.[8]

It is very likely too that the Canadian initiatives in September of 1991 acted as a catalyst that softened the reluctance in some quarters of the foreign-policy making bureaucracies of the Departments of External Affairs and Defence to having Canada adopt a more interventionary policy vis-a-vis the UN's and Canada's role in Yugoslavia. The reluctance or resistance to a policy that favoured a more interventionary role in conflict resolution was particularly well-grounded in the United Nations itself as the Canadian government sought and promoted a new role for that institution.

A New Role for the UN

In so far as UN involvement was concerned, McDougall acknowledged the point that the UN Charter stipulates "an initial regional effort" before a problem is brought before the Security Council. The question then on the minds of the Mulroney government as expressed by McDougall was, "How long can these efforts be made and made again, while the killing obscenely goes on, before some resolute action is required?"[9] Clearly implied here is the view that the EC effort, while noble, was essentially ineffective and that the EC had been given more than enough time to come to grips with the Yugoslav crisis. McDougall's statements also indicated that the Canadian government was becoming increasingly frustrated not only with the inaction and ineffectiveness of the EC but also the lethargic response of the world community to recognize the problem as one in which the UN should have involved itself much earlier.

Procedural formalities within the UN were also a source of frustration for the Canadian government as it tried to move that body to action.The Minister explained to the House of Commons on November 18 that:

> The reason that Canada did not speak to that motion is that the rules of the Security Council did not permit us to, **despite repeated requests** [emphasis mine]. Our view is that the Yugoslav crisis poses not only a human tragedy of enormous proportions but also a direct threat to international peace and security in the area.[10]

The Canadian call for action was not only exacerbated by procedural obstacles within the Security Council but also by the view of some of the Council's members that the Yugoslav tragedy was largely an internal affair. According to the Minister:

> Unfortunately - despite our pleading, despite our own lobbying, despite our work with each and every member of the Security Council, including the permanent five and the rotating members - that view [Yugoslav crisis as an internal affair] has been held by one permanent member, China, which has a veto.[11]

McDougall described the stance taken by China as representing not only "outmoded thinking" but also"deeply damaging in the circumstances."[12] The Minister also noted with evident relief that in the previous week the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav presidency and Croatia had called for the UN to send peacekeepers although some issues of contention remained to be ironed out. Canadian monitors under EC auspices would remain in Yugoslavia for a period of time while the UN Secretary-General's special envoy Cyrus Vance and the Under-Secretary-General were in Yugoslavia to discuss arrangements for a peacekeeping effort. That effort, according to the Minister, could have several roles:

> ... first, the supervision of a cease-fire and the disengagement of rival forces; second, basic protection for the security of minority groups in the republics; third, assistance in the distribution of humanitarian aid and the return of displaced persons to their homes; fourth, the supervision of relief for blockaded army camps and the general monitoring of the activities of the Yugoslav army; sixth, assistance in the re-opening of crucial road and rail networks; and, finally, the establishment of confidence-building measures at the grassroots level between the rival factions.[13]

The Canadian approach, McDougall reiterated, "sought to use economic and political levers for peace in an even-handed way, while at the same time providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the violence."[14] Canada's decision on sanctions was seen by the Minister as being more than prompt:

> When the crisis began, I instructed my Department to refuse systematically to issue any permits for the export of arms or other military goods to Yugoslavia. Canada has thus not only supported UN Resolution 713, but, indeed, moved in advance of it.[15]

In the House of Commons the Minister was candid in acknowledging the strains the conflict in Yugoslavia was having on Canadians of Yugoslav descent and that, nevertheless, it was important to uphold the Canadian values of respect for diversity and differences of opinion. "We ask them to help us," she noted. "They are involved emotionally and otherwise. We ask them to help us in calling for leaders in all parts of Yugoslavia and its component states to stop shooting and to come together at the table."[16] Certainly from the perspective of the Serb government many Canadians of Yugoslav origins were doing more than trying convince their compatriots in Yugoslavia to seek peaceful solutions to the conflict there. It was reported that Serbian governmental officials had raised some objections about Canada's presence on the UN force given what was perceived by the Serbs as excessive influence of the Canadian Croatian community on the Canadian government.[17] McDougall's remarks in the House of Commons were an acknowledgement by the government that at least one segment of the domestic emigre constituency was having some influence on the government and the conduct of Canadian foreign policy in the Balkans.

Since September of 1991 a team of 11 Canadian Forces observers had participated in the EC's monitoring mission in Yugoslavia in an effort to maintain cease-fire arrangements between the waring parties. As a consequence of Security Council Resolution 727 of January 8, 1992 three Canadian military observers became a part of some 50 military liaison officers United Nations Observer Mission sent to Yugoslavia to promote the maintenance of cease-fires in the area.

As already noted in the previous chapter the Prime Minister and his foreign minister, contrary to the position taken by the former UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, proceeded with the recognition of the breakaway republics. This situation of recognizing the former Yugoslav republics while almost simultaneously offering Canada's participation in a UN peacekeeping force was not considered by

McDougall as placing Canadian peacekeeping in an awkward position. From the government's perspective it was understood that without international recognition of his state, Croatia's president would not have been able to go along with the Vance/UN plan which was supported by Canada. Furthermore, the Secretary of State's adamant stance on this issue reflected her government's determination that Canada play a prominent role in the intervention of the UN into Yugoslavia:

> Canada's record in terms of peacekeeping is second to none. Our position in Yugoslavia has been moderate. We have called for an end to the violence. And that remains our priority, recognition or no recognition.[18]

In addition McDougall appeared equally undaunted by the perils of sending Canadian peacekeepers to the Balkans and the possibility that the peacekeeping mission could drag on indefinitely. The rationale employed by McDougall was that there was a strong enough commitment among the adversaries of the civil war to observe a cease-fire to allow for the entrance of a UN peacekeeping force into the conflict. McDougall's rationale was further evidence of the Mulroney government's interest in making a place for itself in the Yugoslav crisis. Despite or perhaps because of the the continuous EC failures in maintaining cease-fires in the region, the Canadian government insisted on early intervention. That insistence can only be viewed as being politically motivated by the belief of the Mulroney government that western inaction and non-intervention could no longer be justified given the extreme loss of life and the scale of destruction in Yugoslavia.

Security Council Resolution 743: Canada Sends Peacekeepers to Yugoslavia

The approval of the Security Council of Resolution 743 on February 21, 1992 led to the deployment of a force of more than 13,000 with Canada's contribution of 1,200 troops among the largest. It is interesting to note that the Security Council accepted this resolution in spite of the evidence which suggested that the level of fighting was increasing in apparent disregard of a cease-fire that was supposedly in effect since January 3, 1992.[19] The apparent escalation of the violence did not dissuade the Canadian government from its goal of being an active participant in the 13,000-person, 31-country UN mission which had become the largest UN peacekeeping operation since the Congo operation of 1960.

UNPROFOR, established by the Security Council Resolution 743 for an initial period of 12 months, began its operational existence with a $10-million appropriation from the General Assembly that was followed in March 1992 by a 251.5 million dollar appropriation. In obvious reference to the conflicts over the sovereignty of the Serb-controlled enclaves the Security Council Resolution 743 stressed that the UN plan to deploy peacekeepers was " in no way intended to prejudge the terms of a political settlement."[20] While the operational mandate of UNPROFOR eventually extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, UNPROFOR was initially deployed into three areas of Croatia designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs). The three UNPAs - Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina were divided into four sectors : East (encompassing Eastern Slavonia, North (the northern section of the Krajina UNPA), South (the southern section of the Krajina UNPA, and West (Western Slavonia). In short, UNPROFOR was given the mandate to undertake the demilitarization of the UNPAs and to provide protection to all persons living within them until an overall political solution to the conflict could be found. UNPROFOR was also given the difficult mandate of allowing for the return of civilian populations displaced by the fighting from their residences in the UNPAs. Political opposition to the UN plan from the leadership of the Krajina enclaves was being contained, to some extent, by Belgrade. The UN had to be concerned with not only opposition to its plan from the Krajina enclaves,[21] and the status of a shaky truce, but also with Zagreb's insistence that Serb enclaves must be bound by Croatian law.

Originally the Croatian position was based on the deployment of UN forces along the original republican boundaries and the immediate withdrawal of Federal forces from territory it had occupied in Croatia. The new realities of the battlefield narrowed Croat hopes for a UN peacekeeping presence in the disputed areas that would eventually lead to the displacement of the Serb-backed federal army and the demilitarization of occupied areas so that Croats could be persuaded to re-settle those areas and thereby strengthen Croatia's position that it boundaries cannot be altered. In terms of the Serb minority in Croatia, Croatia's foreign minister, Zvonimir Separovic promised new legislation, with some stipulations, that would endow that minority with enhanced local autonomy but not the right to secede That stipulation was not well received in those areas which had declared their independence from Zagreb. With thousands of its population killed in the fighting, hundreds of thousands forced to flee their traditional homes, thereby forcing in some areas of the republic dramatic shifts in population which have already redrawn Croatia's demography, large swaths of its territory lost to the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army and its economy precariously close to collapse, the Croatian government had little alternative but to turn to the UN for respite. In the meantime, evidence showed that Serb-occupied areas of Croatia, to the chagrin of Zagreb, were already being systematically settled by Serbs from other parts of Croatia with the support and encouragement of Belgrade.

The Canadian force of 1,200 included an infantry battalion based in Lahr, Germany and a combat engineer squadron designated for mine clearing duties. Their destination was western Slavonia, a bitterly contested area southeast of Zagreb that includes Nova Gradiska and Pakrac and is comprised of a cluster of Serbian and Croatian villages. The announcement of the dispatch of Canadian forces from Lahr and Baden-Soelingen, which effectively reduced Canada's combat strength committed to NATO by 50 per cent and was part of the expanding debate on the future role of Canada's military, was made at about the same time the government was announcing its decision to close European bases by 1994. Defense Minister Masse also announced that a Brigadier-General Lewis Mackenzie would serve as chief-of-staff to Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar, the commander of UN forces in Yugoslavia. An additional UN request to Canada for civilian police monitors was studied by the Canadian government and eventually led to the placement of over forty RCMP monitors in various regions of Yugoslavia in April of 1992. The Canadian military force was deployed in three enclaves of the Serb-dominated Krajina area of Croatia - designated as areas protected by the UN - in the hopes of facilitating a peaceful conclusion to the fighting between Croats and Serbs who hold claims to the area.

Under the UN plan residents of the effected areas would eventually be given the opportunity to vote on joining Croatia or joining Serbia. Understandably this aspect of the Vance/UN plan - that is, those proposals concerning the eventual self-determination of residents of disputed regions by plebiscite - was the most critical, and therefore, because of the dynamics of the conflict was deliberately vague. Neither Serb extremists, particularly in the disputed regions, nor Croat extremists were supportive of the plan. One of the ultranationalist leaders of the Krajina region, Milan Babic, defiantly rejected the Vance plan even though it had gained acceptance by most Serb leaders and the federal army when he stated: "We have to express our disagreement with the plan to disarm legal armed forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, while the proposal does not envisage disarmament of the Croatian armed formations."[22] In spite of the danger to the UN sponsored Vance plan posed by extremists on both sides of the conflict , Vance , the UN's special envoy, in a meeting with the new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali was "cautiously optimistic" that the cease-fire would hold and the UN plan take effect.

For Canadian peacekeepers in Croatia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina, the difficulties of dealing with their mandate became abundantly clear. The spectacle of bombed-out villages, families fleeing the civil war, and the often passionate hatred between Serbs and Croats were all too common a sight for the Canadians. In the hills and those areas not in view of the Canadian peacekeepers Croatian and Serb units sporadically continued to engage in sniper fire, artillery duels, and atrocities against each other as Canadian peacekeepers attempt to pacify their areas and clear them of deadly mines and booby traps. The horror of the death and destruction prompted one Canadian soldier on patrol east of the Canadian base of Daruvar to remark: "I hope Quebec stays in Canada but if they want to leave I hope we let them go lock, stock and barrel. ... Not turn Canada into this."[23]

Having played a key role in initiating UN involvement in the Yugoslav crisis, Mulroney's government re-doubled its efforts at being at the forefront of a drive to reform and rejuvenate UN thinking on matters related to intervention and peacekeeping. Canada's political and diplomatic efforts during this period were also directed at strengthening the political resolve and military capability of the UN so that Security Council resolutions would carry the necessary weight and authority that would ensure that humanitarian aid would reach its destination so that peace could be attained either through mutual agreement of the warring parties or by means of UN imposition. The debate surrounding Canada's role in the former Yugoslavia had both political and practical aspects in the close but often frustrating relationship Canada had with the United Nations as it pertained to their role in the former Yugoslavia.

Prime Minister Urges Stronger and More Decisive UN Intervention

By May of 1992, the Prime Minister - frustrated by the lack of progress in the peace process in Yugoslavia, intolerable levels of violence and the glaring evidence of ethnic cleansing policies - was able to confirm his suspicions by drawing the conclusion that it was "painfully obvious... that the United Nations capability to intervene effectively on behalf of the innocents is inadequate,"[24] that in fact, the UN would have to reconsider its philosophy on peacekeeping. Besides ordering the closure of Yugoslav consulates in Vancouver and Toronto, calling repeatedly for the toughening of economic and trade sanctions against the Yugoslav government, the Prime Minister, like his Secretary of State for External Affairs, was often be quoted as vigorously denouncing the slow response of the international community to the ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia and the often shaky resolve of that community to maintain a stronger presence. To an international youth conference in May of 1992 Mulroney message was blunt: "In Yugoslavia, where no one could have been in any doubt what was going to happen, the world has been, at best dilatory and dangerously indifferent."[25] Moreover, the Prime Minister was also critical of the UN for taking far too long in sending peacekeeping forces to Croatia, almost several months after his government had urged intervention:

> The UN and its member states must be prepared to intervene earlier and stronger in the future to prevent such disasters... What kind of signal does it send when the world turns a blind

> eye to the carnage? ... Bosnia and Herzegovina followed the rules established by the UN... They took the world's word, but they were left to fend for themselves against heavily armed opposition. The result has been, in the words of the Bosnian foreign minister, 'a disgrace for humanity.'[26]

The Prime Minister was also adamant that UN forces ensure that the Sarajevo airport remains open so that relief supplies could be brought in. Clearly, as the UN Secretary-General was aware, the Prime Minister's message was designed to give credence to the view that UN forces in Yugoslavia should be given a new mandate from the Security Council, when he correctly characterized Mulroney's speech as support of the notion that UN peacekeepers, where necessary, should have the option of imposing peace which the Secretary General appropriately described as "an entirely different operation."[27] The distinction between the traditional peacekeeping option and the peacemaking/peace enforcement option that the Prime Minister was calling for was not lost on Mr. Boutros-Ghali who, contrary to his predecessor, appeared more willing to keep the door to peace enforcement option open when he stated "if tomorrow there is a new operation proposed, we will need a new mandate from the Security Council."[28]

Where foreign policy issues concerning Yugoslavia were concerned, there was the conspicuous presence of the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State for External Affairs. With the realization that Canadian/UN peacekeeping efforts were doing little to bring about a peaceful solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina by way of the Vance-Owen peace plan and the fact that a tenuous cease fire agreement was being regularly broken by clashes between Croatian and Serb forces in the Krajina region and other Serb-held territories of Croatia, Mulroney and McDougall had come to the conclusion that a more muscular and forceful intervention necessary to impose a peace on the warring sides was long over due. The conflict continued and at times intensified, the carnage and devastation by all accounts unequalled since WWII. The Serbian objective of partitioning Bosnia into three distinct states - a concept repugnant to the European powers, the United States and Canada - seemed to be creeping closer to becoming a *fait accompli* and was beginning to appear to be the ultimate price Bosnian Muslims and the international community will have to pay for "peace." Instability in the region could spread, Canadian policy makers were aware, to other areas of the Balkan region.

Canadian peacekeepers continued to serve in Bosnia -Herzegovina and Croatia with courage and distinction, operating under frustrating limited rules of engagement. Those rules of engagement were broadened somewhat, with Canada's urging and approval, through the passage of Security Council Resolution 770 on August 13, 1992. Security Council Resolution 770 toughened the UN's mandate by allowing those agencies or states in coordination with the UN to take "all measures necessary" to realize the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and by demanding that "all parties and others concerned take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of United Nations and other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance."[29] While the Canadian government did not see Resolution 770 as a public pacifier, it became increasingly frustrated and concerned with the fact that the warring factions, most frequently the Serb forces, with considerable frequency challenged UN resolve to implement "all measures necessary" to facilitate the passage of humanitarian aid and found rather soon that there was both a lack of political resolve and military capability by the UN to fall back on the use of force if necessary.

Another important source of Canadian frustration with the UN had to do with the issue of funding. While the Prime Minister was urging the UN to rethink its peacekeeping philosophy and to apply far tougher sanctions against Belgrade in May of 1992, he was also cognizant that the UN's ability to take on either a peacekeeping or peacemaking mandate could be seriously undermined by financial problems. In a speech on May 25, 1992 he reminded an international youth conference in Montreal:

> The Secretary-General of the United Nations is the holder of one of the most important offices in the world and as Prime Minister of Canada I speak for all Canadians when I say the Secretary-General should not be treated as a modern-day mendicant, forced to wander around wealthy capitals, imploring the decision-makers to pay their bills so the UN can do its job.[30]

Canada was recognized as the eighth largest contributor - with annual payments of over 41-million - and one of only 14 member states that has kept up-to-date in paying its dues and peacekeeping levies. The UN's annual budget in 1992 was about $1.03 billion and the projected cost of peacekeeping in excess of $2.5 billion. The Prime Minister also made the point that while these were very large sums of money they were "the bargain of the 20th century"[31] and sound investments for individual states. In obvious reference to US defence spending and the lack of US commitment to UN operations the Prime Minister hit home with the point that the "price of two B2 bombers would cover the entire cost of UN peacekeeping." The Prime Minister added:

> Peacekeeping is not cheap; the force in Yugoslavia will cost $650 million this year. But compared to even the financial price of war - $1-billion a day in the Persian Gulf - let alone the carnage and destruction that results, peacekeeping is very, very cost-effective.[32]

The overriding issue brought out by Mulroney at the international youth conference was that the world community had to be reminded that the "integrity and effectiveness" of a very important international organization was at stake if member states continued to neglect their financial commitments. The Prime Minister also reemphasized the importance of sharing the burden of peacekeeping more equitably among UN members and in this light called for greater participation from the United States and Russia. He also reiterated Canada's position that changing international realities would have to be reflected in changes to the Security Council. Japan and Germany, for example, should be given seats on a new Security Council. Not only that, the Prime Minister went so far as to suggest that Canada would look forward to changes to German and Japanese law that would allow German and Japanese troops to participate in peacekeeping operations. In the meantime, much to the chagrin of the Canadian government, Canada continued to pay what it considered a disproportionate share in support of its peacekeeping operations. Canada remains an outspoken proponent of equal contributions being assessed against all UN members irrespective of whether they participate in peacekeeping duties.

Canadian efforts to try to multilateralize intervention through the UN revealed two sides of the Canada-UN relations as far as the Balkans were concerned. On the one hand, the relationship revealed the Mulroney government's new-found propensity to identify very closely with and support tendencies in the UN that promoted the expansion of that body's mandate beyond the traditional boundaries set by state sovereignty. On the other hand, it showed the complementary nature of the sometimes severe Canadian criticism of the UN's handling of its peacekeeping mandate. Much of the debate surrounding Canada's views on the UN's peacekeeping mandate in Yugoslavia stemmed from an important report, **Agenda for Peace**, issued in 1992 by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Canada Amplifies "Agenda for Peace"

Agenda for Peace, which was strongly endorsed by the Mulroney government, recognized the necessity for the organization and its precepts to accommodate the "changing context" of the post-Cold War world. The government identified closely with changing developments in the direction peacekeeping was taking in the UN. Barbara McDougall underlined the government's close identification with the report in a speech "Co-operative Security in the 1990's from Moscow to Sarajevo" on May 17, 1993 when she stated:

> Canada played an important role in the development of this document. Much of it reflects not only our philosophy as a nation, but our long-term experience in multilateralism and peacekeeping. The Secretary-General has forcefully argued that the UN must be both more active and more interventionist in preventing and resolving conflict. This approach is not a reversion to colonialism, under which the UN simply becomes a new instrument for the interference by the major, richer, developed world into the affairs of poorer countries and regions. Instead, it is something new, something creative, that will ensure we have a political instrument that parallels the globalization already taking place on the economic side of world affairs - and political co-operation on a global basis is as essential as economic co-operation.[33]

The report communicated a subtle but significant modification to the concept of sovereignty and the doctrine of intervention. The report acknowledged the importance and indispensability of the sovereign state, but presented the view that it should be more flexibly defined:

> The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international process. **The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory never matched reality**. [emphasis mine] It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and find a balance between the needs of good governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.[34]

The Minister's speech echoed this point when she presented a radical interpretation of sovereignty:

> We have to reconsider the UN's traditional definition of state sovereignty. I believe that states can no longer argue sovereignty as a licence for internal repression, when the absolutes of that sovereignty shield conflicts that eventually could become international in scope. Some standards are universal: human rights must be respected; democratic institutions must be safeguarded; judiciaries must be free and independent; national sovereignty should offer no comfort to repressors, and no protection to those guilty of breaches of the common moral codes enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[35]

The Secretary General's words and Canada's support of and identification with them are noteworthy. Those words suggest the narrowing of the definitional parameters of sovereignty. The Boutros-Ghali report can be said to have facilitated Canada's leadership in supporting of a more intrusive UN role in peacemaking in the two trouble spots of Yugoslavia and Somalia.[36]

Well before her May 1993 speech Barbara McDougall's stinging address to the forty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly in September of 1992 had already epitomized the Canadian government's frustration with and criticism of the UN's role in the

Balkans. In language described by diplomats as the strongest ever used at the United Nations by a Canadian representative, McDougall vented her anger at the Security Council for forcing Canada to pay a disproportionately high share of peacekeeping costs in the UN instead of spreading the growing cost of peacekeeping in Yugoslavia across the UN membership. More importantly, this inequity according to the Minister set "an unfortunate precedent and goes against the UN's principle of collective responsibility."[37] The tough speech, that was preceded by a private meeting with the UN Secretary-General in which McDougall suggested that Canada might no longer be willing to supply peacekeepers, reflected how strongly the Canadian government was committed to the multilateralization of its peacekeeping efforts, as well as its commitment to broader acceptance of "universal respect for human rights", preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.[38] In her speech to the UN, McDougall once again stressed Canada's commitment to the concept of *peace enforcement* by noting that:

> Recent events demonstrate that the use of force may be a necessary option, and we urge full consideration of the Secretary-General's views in this regard. For our part, we insist on the right of Member Nations to take part in any decision involving their nationals.
>
> We also believe that further work is required, on an urgent basis, to determine the circumstances under which enforcement activities be undertaken and the limits of potential enforcement action.[39]

It is not difficult to deduce from the Minister's statement that her view of Canadian foreign policy included a Canada prepared to help lead a movement among states that was willing to challenge, and where feasible, expand the boundaries of peace enforcement.

Both the UN missions in Somalia and Yugoslavia, and Canada's role in them, indicated the importance of establishing more clearly defined criteria for operations that transcend peacekeeping into peacemaking. First of all, under what conditions could peacemaking missions be undertaken? Second, which body within the UN should have the clear authority to authorize intervention? Third, what form should the intervention take? Does or can the UN have the right to establish formal trusteeship in areas that have fallen under anarchy? Finally, does the UN need to give its forces new "peace-making" powers where they are warranted.? Both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs called on UN members to address these questions so that new approaches and policies could be implemented in common to meet the changing face of international conflict as evidenced by Yugoslavia. McDougall was candid in admitting that although clearly defined criteria for enforced intervention had not been methodically and carefully worked out, her government had, nevertheless, lost patience, as she put it bluntly, "with much of the posturing that historically masquerades as international diplomacy," while the body count in Bosnia rose daily and thousands faced starvation in Somalia.[40] In obvious reference to many of the theoretical principles and diplomatic language of non-action , the Minister forcefully concluded: "Let us not spend the next four or five years debating the niceties of 'this' principle or 'that concept'. Let us all get on with the job of building peace and prosperity."[41] By calling on the UN members to review the financing of peacekeeping missions, pay their dues, support the agenda outlined in the Secretary General's Report, **Agenda for Peace**, specifically in terms of peacemaking initiatives and a closer consideration of the parameters for "peace enforcement" by the United Nations, the Mulroney government laid the groundwork for an important evolution in Canadian foreign policy thinking.

The decision to advocate UN intervention and the offer of Canadian peacekeepers at an early stage of the conflict may have been partly instinctive. However, the length to which the Canadian government was willing to go to realize a bolder and more muscular interventionary role by the UN suggests that Canadian initiatives had gone beyond being the instinctive Canadian response to conflict resolution and indicated that the Mulroney government was willing to escalate Canada's involvement beyond the conventionally-accepted parameters established by the Pearsonian legacy.

As the events in Yugoslavia continued to unfold, the Canadian government began to view the limited success of the UN mission there a product of a lack of decisiveness, and that in fact UN action should have been undertaken at a much earlier date. Policy statements by the PM and his Minister of External affairs clearly reflect the view of the government that *peacekeeping* - in retrospect - was not enough. Repeated calls by Mulroney and McDougall for decisive international action clearly implied the use of an international UN force mandated to make the peace since attempts to keep it were built on flimsy foundations at best and as a consequence *keeping* the peace became, to a large extent, ineffective and inconsequential. At the same time, the Minister was careful to acknowledge that the lack of decisiveness by the international community was not only a product of a lack of political will, but also the absence of an established machinery and coherent procedures to undertake preventative intervention. "We're looking at an era when we are going to have to step in earlier, [but] we don't know how to do that yet as an international community."[42] The failure of the international community and the UN to intervene earlier and with more decisiveness and the necessity of forging the necessary machinery of action was to become an often-repeated theme of the Prime Minister's Balkan statements.

The Mulroney government's reaction to the inaction of the world community was exemplified, yet again, by the government's June 10, 1992 announcement in the House of Commons that it was ready to redeploy a contingent of 850 troops to open and secure Sarajevo airport, less than a week after it had been asked to do so by the UN and so soon after most of the original UN (and EC) contingent had beat a hasty retreat from Sarajevo.

Canadian Peacekeepers Regain Sarajevo

In Sarajevo the situation had deteriorated very seriously by mid-May. On May 12,1992, after burning their records, the last 12 European Community observers in Sarajevo made a hurried departure from Bosnia. On that same day the membership of the CSCE meeting in Helsinki, with Canada's grudging approval, suspended Yugoslavia (effectively speaking Serbia and Montenegro), an action unprecedented in the 20 year history of the 52-member organization. However, contrary to the plan of European states and the US to isolate Yugoslavia diplomatically in protest against the Serb-dominated army's role in its offensive against Muslim and Croat forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada did not agree to the withdrawal of its Ambassador, James Bissett, from Belgrade. McDougall argued that because of the extreme delicay of the situation it was especially important to have a high ranking diplomat in Belgrade representing Canadian interests. In Ottawa opposition critics stated that Canada should do more to help arrest the conflict. "Polite diplomatic notes," according to Liberal foreign policy critic Lloyd Axworthy, were not enough. "[43] The situation was so bad that the UN headquarters in Sarajevo was not able to function and UN troops there frequently came under fire as fighting between Serb, JNA, Muslim, and Croat units began to escalate even further. As in the case of Croatia, Serb militias, backed, at the beginning of the war in Bosnia, by the heavy firepower of the Serb-dominated JNA, began their well-planned drive to carve out as much territory as possible. Croat and Muslim forces, at times in alliance and at times not, responded with equivalent ferocity but weaker fire power in their effort to stake out and hold their territory. The UN staff spent a good part of a week in mid-May in the basement of their hotel as shells rained down. On one occasion a group of Canadians narrowly escaped death as a mortar shell burst through the ceiling and exploded nearby, prompting Mackenzie to recall that they had been "the luckiest people in the history" of UN peacekeeping.[44] The deteriorating situation in Sarajevo prompted the UN operation to withdraw its headquarters in Sarajevo. Brigadier-General Mackenzie who was among a group of twelve Canadian soldiers who escaped Sarajevo for Belgrade on May 17 stated in frustration: "The situation is out of control."[45] A token presence UN staff of about 100 people remained in Sarajevo as a demonstration of UN determination to preserve its presence. Rockets and mortar fire continued to slam into humanitarian convoys, such as a Red Cross convoy which was bringing medicine into Sarajevo. The Red Cross's head of their Sarajevo mission died of wounds he suffered during that attack.[46] On a daily basis innocents in Sarajevo were being picked off by snipers and often indiscriminate shelling from hill top positions surrounding the Bosnian capital occupied mostly by Serb forces.

Even before obtaining final approval from the Security Council, which Canada had been urging, an advance party of 60 UN peacekeepers, under the command of of Brigadier-General Lewis Mackenzie, was already in Sarajevo to attempt to establish a cease-fire and the placement of heavy weapons under UN guard to prevent further attacks against the airport.

After the UN request in early June for the deployment of Canadian soldiers (from Daruvar in Croatia) the Prime Minister and cabinet approved of the plan on June 9, 1992 and the decision was announced in the House of Commons on June 10, 1992. The government appeared strongly resolved in its decision to promote the use of Canadian peacekeepers, on such short notice, in the potentially more hazardous objective of opening up and protecting Sarajevo airport.[47] This job could only be started after the Canadian troops had completed a dangerous 300 kilometer journey along a road from their base in Daruvar to the besieged city of Sarajevo.

The convoy of over 800 Canadian peacekeepers, 300 vehicles, including 80 armored personnel carriers, non-combat engineers and medical staff, stretching over 50 kilometers began its journey with orders to return fire only in self-defence. More significant was the Security Council's strongly worded resolution (761), passed on June 29, 1992, which was aimed specifically at notifying all parties concerned that forceful measures could be taken if the safety of the Canadian peacekeepers was put in jeopardy. After a difficult two day journey through the mountainous terrain of central Bosnia the Canadian convoy arrived in Sarajevo on July 2, 1992. The convoy had been delayed by fighting between opposing forces and a tense standoff between Canadian forces and a defiant Serb militia leader. The commander of the Canadian convoy Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Jones described the situation as "force diplomacy" in which "I deployed my people and deployed my weapons" before further negotiations were resumed.[48] After having deployed his troops in a combat formation Lieutenant-Colonel Jones issued the following ultimatum to the Serb militia commander : "At 2 p.m., I'm moving. And if you shoot, we'll return fire." "Force diplomacy" and a final meeting produced an agreement to allow the Canadian convoy through.[49] In good part due to the political leadership of the Canadian government and the military leadership of Canadian Major-General Lewis Mackenzie in Sarajevo, June 30, 1992 witnessed the withdrawal of Serbs forces from the airport and the raising of the UN flag by a small contingent of UN troops under MacKenzie. Major-General Mackenzie was also very much responsible for obtaining a written guarantee that the belligerents in the fighting "will not take advantage of the presence of the very modest number of our personnel who are at the airport now."[50]

The special importance of Canada's Sarajevo initiative to the government was revealed by the fact the Prime Minister and Cabinet were monitoring on an hourly basis, through the PMO and PCO, the progress being made by Major-General Mackenzie's forces in opening up Sarajevo. The Department of National Defence - in first of all having its forces at the forefront of a operation with serious military as well as political consequences and secondly, in preparing and presenting briefings to the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State for External affairs on Major-General Mackenzie's progress - was especially cognizant of the importance of the Canadian operation to the government.[51] As far as the Canadian government was concerned the lesson drawn from the Sarajevo operation was that although the machinery necessary to act may not have been fully mobilized - the Sarajevo operation being mobilized on the basis of limited military resources - the presence of the political will by the government to support a peace *enforcement* option proved to be a most significant factor in realizing the success of this type of interventionary UN operation. Equally important from the government's perspective, the Sarajevo operation was an example to other UN members that a stronger UN presence, buttressed by the political will of member-states to act more decisively and forcefully in intervening in the domestic conflicts of other states, in the Yugoslav conflict was necessary if the UN wished to remain a relevant institution of conflict resolution.

Yet another example of Canadian resolve to do something decisive about the worsening situation in Bosnia during the end of June are the reports, confirmed by the Minister of External Affairs, which showed that Canada, along with its allies, was making plans for a peace enforcement operation in Yugoslavia. Canada, admitted McDougall, was considering new options "to see if we can bring these people to their senses."[52] The Minister was particularly incensed by attacks against UN peacekeepers near Sarajevo, describing them as being in violation of "even the most basic rules of war."[53] General John de Chastelain, chief of Canada's defence staff, confirmed Canada's readiness to intervene militarily by confirming that Canadian Forces had the capability of becoming part of a "peace-enforcing" operation in Yugoslavia, although it would require a number of weeks of preparations before Canadian ground and air forces would be ready. General Chastelain also confirmed that Canadian CF-18 crews had been practicing air-to-ground exercises at CFB Bagotville in Quebec in preparation for a *peacemaking* operation in Yugoslavia. CF-18 crews were also practicing the same exercises at Cold Lake, Alberta with the full knowledge that they were preparing for possible air-support operations in the former Yugoslavia.[54]

In the final analysis, while it was clear that Canadian peacekeepers did not have the mandate to fight their way through to Sarajevo, the fact was, in specific terms, that a local UN commander - in this case a Canadian - was allowed and prepared to interpret the UN mandate in more interventionary terms and that in broader terms the UN was seen to be prepared to act in the form of direct military intervention was an important marker in a shifting Canadian foreign policy. The fact that the Canadian government was seriously preparing for the possibility of future peace-enforcement operations is another significant indicator of how far Canadian foreign policy had moved towards challenging many of the tenets surrounding the doctrine of non-intervention. At the very least, the success of the convoy in getting through to Sarajevo, under constant intimidation and threat by Serb forces which the Canadians were prepared to challenge with force, coupled with Major General MacKenzie's determined leadership in negotiating the opening up of Sarajavo airport, strengthened both militarily and politically Canada's leading role in re-establishing a UN presence in Sarajevo and a humanitarian life-line to that besieged city.

The March 31, 1993 Security Council resolution 816 authorizing, under Chapter V11 of the Charter, military intervention in the former Yugoslavia and its approval of the use of force to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia, like the deliberate decision to deploy some 300 Canadian peacekeepers in the Bosnian Muslim town of Srebrenica - all with Canada's encouragement and full support - are additional evidence of Canadian advocacy for a more interventionary UN role in the world's trouble spots. In particular the story of Canada's direct involvement in Srebrenica highlighted a greater willingness to promote with more assertiveness Canada's foreign policy role in rolling back the doctrine of non-intervention where human rights especially were concerned.

Srebrenica: The Creation of a Safe Haven

By the winter of 1992 and into early 1993 the situation in Bosnia had become increasingly desperate. Few aid humanitarian aid convoys were getting through to beleaguered sand besieged Muslim settlements such as Cerska, Konjevic Polje, Gorazde and Srebrenica. A major Bosnian Serb offensive was being conducted in Eastern Bosnia causing large-scale suffering and the massive dislocation of Muslim communities in the region as well as renewed allegations of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serb forces. Lieutenant-General Philippe Morillon, in his capacity as commander of Bosnia-Herzegovina command, had been continuously pressing UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb about the need for UN troops to do something about the deteriorating situation in Eastern Bosnia in particular. Canadian Major Ted Itani, serving as Morillon's G-5[55] Executive Assistant at the time, recalled that in response to Morillon's pressure for political guidance "there appeared to be a great deal of heel dragging on the part of senior military and political officials in Zagreb [HQ,UNPROFOR] and the same degree of heel dragging in New York [UN]."[56] The indecisiveness from Zagreb stemmed, in part, from the fact that there was no agreement between Wahlgren, Force Commander, UNPROFOR, the most senior military commander and UN officials in Zagreb about what course of action should be recommended to the Secretary-General. A change in the mandate of UN forces in Bosnia, Zagreb HQ was aware, would be accompanied by a number of uncomfortable implications. As reported by Major Itani: "Knowing that his probability of getting any kind of support or guidance [from Zagreb or New York] on how to handle the situation would not be forthcoming, Morillion took it upon himself as a humanitarian gesture to initiate some action."[57]

On his own initiative, therefore, in early March Lieutenant-General Morillon - accompanied by reconnaissance elements from Bravo Company of the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment, a French security detachment and British escort - made his way on the force of his rank and reputation through checkpoints and Muslim/Serb lines to Srebrenica where he raised the UN flag. Aware that Zagreb HQ would order Morillon not to go to Srebrenica, it had been concluded by his Canadian staff member during discussions with Morillon "that if you ask for permission you will be waiting for ever. So its easier to do something, catch shit and then apologize for what you've done."[58] Morillon's convoy was also to have been joined by a humanitarian convoy and its Canadian military escort which, however, was turned back by Serb forces on the road to Srebrenica. Major-General Gaudreau, Canada's highest ranking commander was aware of Morillon's decision and approved Morillon's request to have him accompanied by members of Bravo company "You have to remember," Major-General Gaudreau pointed out, "that Morillon was a Legionnaire and was still thinking like a Legionnaire when he undertook the operation to save Srebrenica."[59] Once in Srebrenica Morillon stated that the arrival of the stranded Canadian-escorted convoy was "a matter of life and death" and that he would not leave the besieged town until the humanitarian convoy guarded by Canadians was allowed in.[60] Morillon remained in Srebrenica for eighteen days during which time he symbolically proclaimed the town as his personal headquarters and thereby focused international attention on the plight of its inhabitants.[61] In spite of the fact that Canadian troops had taken on, what could be legitimately described as their most dangerous mission to that point of the Balkan war, the Canadian military expressed its confidence in Morillon's leadership and the competence of the General's Canadian escort. Major Mark Sellars of Canadian Forces commented: "They're in the hands of a four-star general. They are well-trained solders. They are there under the full glare, almost, of the international press. I'm not concerned for their safety."[62] Canadian officials were also aware that Lieutenant-General Morillon's actions in leading a small contingent of Canadians to Srebrenica would be met with considerable anger at UNPROFOR head quarters in Zagreb. The decision to take Morillon out of Srebrenica in March and the decision to delay the stationing of a Canadian contingent in Srebrenica was no doubt an outcome of deliberations by senior UN officials, including Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and the overall commander of UN forces in Yugoslavia, Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Whalgren, to have Morillion constrain his actions. In fact Lieutenant-General Wahlgren informed General Morillon that he was no longer entitled to act on his own with regard to what was taking place in Srebrenica - in effect undermining Morillon's pledge to save Srebrenica.

Although he had to leave Srebrenica, Morillon and the small Canadian group of peacekeepers left behind were committed to preventing the destruction of the town and the rapidly swelling population that was seeking refuge there. Morillon had succeeded in drawing international, and especially Canadian, attention on to Srebrenica. That attention contributed to the UN success in brokering a cease-fire between Muslim and Serb forces in the region. UNPROFOR had in fact sent the Bosnian Serb military command a message on April 7, 1993 warning of a catastrophe should the Serb advance on Srebrenica continue. The UN-brokered cease-fire agreement in early April called for the establishment of demilitarized safe havens as well as transport of humanitarian aid to those safe areas under the supervision of UN forces.

In response to the cease-fire agreement an advance contingent of Canadian soldiers - made up of 44 soldiers in eight armored personnel carriers, to be followed on April 8 by an additional group of 98 Canadian troops - departed from their base at Visoko on April 7, 1993 under the direction of Lieutenant-General Morillon. The advance UN contingent was sent out with two purposes in mind: to establish observation posts and patrolling operations to ensure that both parties were honoring the cease-fire agreement and to facilitate the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid. This action would, in effect, protect the the besieged inhabitants of Srebrenica from the latest Serb advance and would help in organizing the removal of thousands requiring urgent medical care. "Morillon felt he had to go," stated Commander Barry Frewer, a Canadian spokesperson for the the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).[63] What is significant about Canada's prominent role in Morillon's return to Srebrenica was that it was carried out without any permission or assurance of safe passage from the combatants and, therefore, was seen to defy convention by extending the UN's mandate.

In the absence of Morillon, Serb forces once again resumed their heavy bombardment of the town which served to further outrage world public opinion. Morillon's response was to disregard Gen. Wahlgren's order and to set out once again for Srebrenica. Only some 25 kilometers from his destination Morillon's armored vehicle was "attacked" by what appeared to be a well-staged demonstration by a crowd of Serbs under the watchful eye of Serbian police and military officers, one of whom who appeared in a military helicopter - in defiance of the no fly edict - and offered to have his helicopter lead Gen. Morillon's vehicle away from the demonstration.

The inability of the UN to send sufficient food and medicine into Srebrenica and to evacuate sufficient numbers of refugees from the town as well as its inability to halt the assault on Srebrenica by defiant Serb forces was becoming even more evident and unacceptable. All of this was being witnessed by a small UN contingent, which included seven Canadian peacekeepers, that had already been established in Srebrenica after Morillon's first trip to Srebrenica. A Canadian official of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees witnessed one of the deliberate shellings of the civilian population at the time and stated: "It was definitely calculated to launch a series of precise hits. ... it was a bloodbath. .. Heavy barrages of shells were systematically hitting the main street in Srebrenica, moving from the north to the south, meant to kill as many as possible."[64] The small group of Canadian peacekeepers found themselves repeatedly under fire as they attempted to bring the wounded to a hospital. Numerous appeals by the UN to Serbs to restrain their attacks on the Muslim enclave were, by and large, ignored.

As it was becoming obvious that the over 60,000 Muslim refugees crowded into Srebrenica were facing extermination by rapidly advancing Serbian forces which were enclosing the city, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted resolution 819 on April 16,1993 declaring Srebrenica a "safe area".[65] Besides reaffirming "the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," resolution 819 took note of the fact:

> that the International Court of Justice in its Order of 8 April 1993 in the case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unanimously indicated as a provisional measure that the Government of the Federal republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide. [66]

Clearly the resolution was aimed at blocking attempts by Bosnian Serb forces to force the civilian evacuation from Srebrenica and other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and warning them against participating in the "the practice of 'ethnic cleansing."[67] The key to the resolution was the provision which demanded "that all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act."[68]

With resolution 819, came the order on April 16, 1993 for a company of three hundred Canadian troops to move into Srebrenica. The Serb military command agreed on April 17 to allow a contingent of 150 Canadian troops to cross Serbian lines in order to undertake the demilitarization of Srebrenica and the evacuation of part of its population. The agreement also recognized the establishment of an air corridor through which the sick and wounded could be evacuated by British and French helicopters.

A company of 139 Canadian troops, 22 armored personnel carriers and other assorted vehicles arrived in Srebrenica on April 18. While many were making the argument that the arrival of the Canadian troops and their job of disarming and protecting the refugees of Srebrenica symbolized an international capitulation to Serb aggression, Morillon, the commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, was able to cast a positive light over the situation. "We can now guarantee the survival of Srebrenica. The agreement was reached to demilitarize the town. ... With Bosnian defence forces disarmed, if the Serbs continued to subject Srebrenica to pressure and bombardment, this would be a direct attack on UNPROFOR, and this is a guarantee it would not happen," Morillon announced.[69] A United Nations trip wire, had in effect been set.

For the besieged inhabitants of the town, the arrival of Canadian troops was a welcome sight. Having secured a landing zone for British and French helicopters, the Canadians began the delicate and difficult task of collecting weapons from the town's defenders. Under the truce agreement UN forces had 72 hours from the morning of April 18 to remove hundreds of sick and wounded, disarm the town's defenders and ensure that the surrounding Serb forces clear the immediate area around Srebrenica. "It will be very difficult to have this completed within 72 hours, given the complexity, detail and procedures and the need for full assurances that it will be respected by both sides," noted Canadian Commander Barry Frewer.[70] What was not as clear initially to the UN was what action Canadian troops were to take in the event they and the town came under fire. An UNPROFOR spokesman, Canadian Commander Barry Frewer, acknowledged the potential risks involved in the operation. Those risks involved not only the Canadian peacekeepers in the potential line of fire but also the UN being drawn into a novel situation of how it proposes to act in the event of renewed attacks on the Muslim enclave. The fact was that up to this point UN troops in Bosnia had neither a formal mandate to protect safe havens nor did they posses the capability of withstanding a potential Serb attack. Their mandate simply boiled down to providing humanitarian assistance to the inhabitants of Srebrenica.

Srebrenica and the *De Facto* Expansion of the UN Mandate

In an attempt to strengthen international resolve, on April 23, 1993 the UN ordered Canadian forces not only to protect themselves but to defend Srebrenica itself. Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, overall commander of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, made it clear that Canadian peacekeepers had been ordered "to protect this demilitarized zone [Srebrenica] ... That means if someone tries to enter it with force, they will use force in self-defence."[71] The order was understood to mean a *de facto* expansion of the UN's mandate which had allowed for the use of force only for the purpose of defending humanitarian convoys, but not territories or populations. In the words of an unnamed Canadian diplomat: "There is a line being drawn in the sand for the first time. ... We can't do the impossible, but Canada and the members of the Security Council would view any attempt by the Serbs to invade the demilitarized zone as demanding a response."[72] The Secretary of State for External Affairs' response of April 22, 1993 to these developments was a call for troops from other countries to be deployed along side of the 150 Canadian troops already in place in Srebrenica. "There needs to be more people in there. ... It should be an international effort,"[73] Ms. McDougall stated on April 22, 1993 while attending a NATO meeting in Athens. It was reported that during NATO meetings involving foreign ministers and senior UN officials, McDougall had indicated a preference that Britain and France, both members of the Security Council, deploy troops to Srebrenica. The aim of the Canadian request, besides buttressing an outgunned and outnumbered Canadian force, was to raise the stakes by internationalizing the consequences should an attack on Srebrenica be resumed. McDougall would not be specific about what military action UN or NATO would undertake in the event of an attack on Srebrenica and its Canadian protectors but added the warning "that attacking a UNPROFOR unit would change the dynamics in the whole situation."[74] The *de facto* extension of the UN's mandate was also reflected in a statement from Zagreb by Major Sandy Robertson, staff officer to Major-General Robert Gaudreau, deputy commander of UN forces in Bosnia and senior Canadian officer in theatre:

> If they [the Serbs] are making a non-violent, almost administrative entry, certainly the Canadians would block them. And if push comes to shove and it's a company of Serbs against a company of Canadians, I would wager that the Serbs aren't going to get in. But if there is a full-blown, co-ordinated offensive against the town of Srebrenica, all the Canadians would do is form a company stronghold and force the Serbs to bypass on either side.[75]

The significance of this action, and Canadian compliance with it, was that an unprecedented decision was taken by the UN and the Canadian government to deploy its forces as a "trip wire" in order to forestall a military offensive against a certain objective. In essence it was situation in which one hundred and fifty lightly armed Canadians were placed in front of a massed force of over six thousand Serbs backed by heavy artillery and armour. Nevertheless, both Canadian military sources and External Affairs officials offered confirmation that Canadian forces in Srebrenica would resist an attack on Srebrenica. "The Serbs better understand that any attack on Srebrenica is going to change the situation dramatically, " reiterated External Affairs spokesman Scott Mullin. "The international community is already considering military intervention."[76] Mullin's statement was an obvious reference to the possibility of NATO/American air strikes against Serb positions.

The Canadian troops found conditions in Srebrenica appalling: thousands without shelter, a severe shortage of water and medical facilities. Under difficult conditions and limited resources, the Canadians did an admirable job protecting civilians in the enclave.[77] Both the Canadian commander of UN forces in Srebrenica and the commander of UN forces in Bosnia, Lieutenant-General Morillon, stated that the bold initiative to deploy UN forces in Srebrenica had been successful and would be worthy of serving as model for other besieged Muslim enclaves. Certainly for Morillon, who in March forced his way into the enclave with only an escort of seven Canadian peacekeepers, efforts to enlarge the size of the protected enclave became paramount. Even with only 330 Canadians in Srebrenica by early May the Canadian commander in Srebrenica Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Geburt, saw the partial demilitarization of the Muslim defenders and the maintenance of a partial cease-fire as achievements. "Not a single shell has hit the centre of town [since the arrival of the Canadians]. ... At that level it is a success."[78] Col. Gebrut also described the possibility of attempting to expand the enclave as feasible. Canadian Commander Barry Frewer confirmed Geburt's assessment of the UN precedent set in Srebrenica by stating of the situation in Srebrenica: "If it works, it could be a model for other enclaves, like Zepa and Gorazde."[79] These commanders were also no doubt aware that British , French and US aircraft carriers were positioned in the Adriatic in preparation for a quick response in the event of an attack on Canadian forces protecting Srebrenica. The leaders of these countries also publicly pledged immediate air support in the event of an attack on the Canadian garrison.The situation was grim in other parts of Bosnia as well. Reports of atrocities committed by Croat forces against Muslims around Mostar, for example, had begun to surface and signalled for many another wave of ethnic cleansing, this time committed, albeit on a smaller scale, by Croats against Muslims.

On May 6, 1993 the application of the safe haven concept in the Yugoslav conflict was expanded and further institutionalized. Under resolution 824, the Security Council declared "that the capital city of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, as well as Srebrenica, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas by all parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act."[80] Somewhat paradoxically, the Prime Minister, in the midst of his farewell tour, took a rather more cautious tack when he stated that the safety of Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia must be considered as the West looks at military options to put an end to the conflict. It is possible that the Prime Minister recognized that the election of his successor to power required a more cautious approach to foreign affairs where there was the potential for substantial Canadian casualties in a UN intervention. At a news conference in Bonn the out-going Mulroney communicated a cautious stance by stating that until the Security Council changed the role of Canadian peacekeepers (in total 2,200 serving with the UNPROFOR, about a thousand of which were in Bosnia) their deployment in the former Yugoslavia was essentially to keep the peace. The Prime Minister was also aware that even with the recognition of Srebrenica, for instance, as a safe haven, there has been mounting criticism that, in fact, Srebrenica was neither safe, nor a haven but merely a UN sponsored ghetto that was was giving support to the Serb policy of "ethnic cleansing". To the consternation of some UN observers and others, the initial recognition of Srebrenica as a safe haven and the accompanying accord calling for its demilitarization may have averted a humanitarian catastrophe but in reality served to facilitate the achievement of the Serb command's main goals - ridding Srebrenica and surrounding area of its Muslim inhabitants without a battle. In the words of one frustrated UN official the accord led the way "to another chapter of ethnic cleansing."[81] McDougall viewed the safe haven plan in terms of a temporary alternative. Life in the safe heavens "would be like living in a ghetto or in a fortress. There is no freedom of movement, no freedom of economic activity," McDougall acknowledged on May 25 (1993) "Nobody should have to live like that for very long."[82] The Secretary of State was also among those concerned that the plan would be viewed by Bosnian Serbs as rewarding their seizure of Bosnian territory.

Despite the skepticism surrounding the safe haven plan, the Security Council proceeded further by voting on June 4, 1993 to deploy heavily armed forces, backed by air power, to defend the six Muslim enclaves. It appears that the European-sponsored resolution, passed by a surprising 13-0 with two abstentions (Pakistan and Venezuala), had not gone further, however, in planning its implementation. Then Defense Minister Kim

Campbell's response reflected some of the international disarray over implementing the June 4 resolution and the cautious foreign policy stance of an outgoing government when she stated that Canada would find it difficult to commit a greater number of troops to the former Yugoslavia. "We're very stretched. ... it would be very difficult for us," the Defense Minister acknowledged. [83] Besides the disarray, there seemed to be some confusion as to the precise role and mandate of Canadian troops in Srebrenica and potentially in any other safe areas. UN commanders in Bosnia seemed to view the Canadian presence in Srebrenica as one of a protector. At the same, the out-going Mulroney government was sending mixed messages: on the one hand, viewing the Canadians in Srebrenica as simply a UN presence ready to resort to the use of force only to protect themselves, and on the other, calling for other UN states to join Canadian forces in the trenches of Srebrenica in an effort to protect innocent civilians from further Serb attack.

The situation in Srebrenica continued to be difficult, neither worsening nor improving.[84] A number of disputes between Serb forces and the Canadian contingent erupted, for example, in the second week of July over Serb allegations that many of the Muslims in Srebrenica were still hiding their weapons from the Canadians. Captain Bruce Stock, spokesman for the 1,000-strong Canadian force in Bosnia, stated on on July 14, 1993 : "Things have really tensed up in Srebrenica. ... The Serbs are now saying if you guys don't demilitarize this place we're going to kick you out."[85] The Canadians in Srebrenica remained poised and steadfast under Serb pressure as well as the pressures accompanying the complexities and difficulties of life in Srebrenica until their departure in March of 1994.

For Bosnian Serbs, the creation of safe areas fueled an already well-developed belief and fortress mentality that the world was not sensitive to their fears and concerns; that it was incomprehensible that the UN and the world community could not see that Muslim forces, as often claimed by the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, had been holding their own civilians hostage within the safe areas in order to win international sympathy and thereby, increase the likelihood of international intervention on behalf of the Muslims. Canadian policymakers were faced with a dilemma: the realization, on one hand, that there were dangers associated with the contradiction between the objectives of keeping the peace and forced intervention and on the other, the argument that in the absence of large-scale military intervention, safe havens, with all their faults, offered a modicum of relief for Bosnian Muslims faced with the likelihood of even more death and suffering. This dilemma was very much reflected in the sometimes inconsistent - sometimes cautionary , sometimes tough and forceful - public responses of the Prime Minister Mulroney and his Secretary of State for External Affairs to the horrific events as they unfolded in Bosnia.[86] In short, the Canadian government, while playing an active role in establishing and sustaining Srebrenica as a safe area, was equally aware of the shortcomings and controversies that the establishment of safe areas in Bosnia represented.

Among Canadian officials there was a grudging recognition that the inhabitants of Srebrenica had become pawns in international diplomacy and that a safe area policy adopted by the UN was fraught with complications and short-comings. The Bosnian Serbs wanted the safe areas emptied, while the Bosnian Muslim leaders of Srebrenica realized that without refugees, there would be no assistance from the UN and other aid agencies. UN military resources in planning and maintaining UN safe areas were inadequate. However, whatever the weaknesses associated with the establishment of UN sponsored safe areas, they were over-ridden by the belief of the Canadian government Canada's involvement was correctly inspired and driven by the view that the refugees of Srebrenica could not be allowed, as a consequence of international inaction, to be victimized by a very prevalent wave of Serb "ethnic cleansing" in the spring of 1993. The political will to support the establishment of Srebrenica as the first safe area made it possible for UN-sponsored Canadian forces there to save lives, ameliorate some of the suffering, assist in the evacuation of over 20,000 civilians and signal to the combatants and the international community that there were limits to the conflict that the world community was willing to uphold. Canada's acquiescence with the establishment of safe areas was also the product of the realization that in their creation by the international community, sides would have to be taken. With sides taken, there would be greater pressure on the international community to intervene on behalf of one side over another. Canada's out-going commander of UN forces in Sarajevo, Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, was clearly aware of this dilemma when he stated "Obviously, you can't devolve to an intervention scenario while you have a peacekeeping force on the ground, because the first thing that would happen is that force itself would be threatened."[87]

Ultimately Morillon's initiative to act alone by moving into Srebrenica as well as the establishment of Srebrenica as a safe haven and arguably a "trip wire" manned by Canadian troops required the approval and close support Canadian authorities from the bottom to the top of the Canadian military and foreign policy chain of command. Major-General Bob Gaudreau was approached by Morillon before his decision to have Canadian escorts join his reconnaissance mission to Srebrenica. Major General Gaudreau, in his capacity as the senior Canadian officer in Yugoslavia, had the authority to approve of the manner in which Canadian troops were used in Morillon's initial trips to Srebrenica and subsequent involvements of Canadian forces in UN actions that established Srebrenica as a safe haven. Major-General Gaudreau's approval was based on his interpretation of the mandate given to UN forces involved in reaching and assisting the inhabitants of Srebrenica. Asked if his approval for the use of Canadian troops fell within the mandate of the UN , Major-General Gaudreau candidly responded: "Yes and No. Our presence in Srebrenica was not exactly just to provide humanitarian assistance but I, as contingent commander let them go. In theory nations no longer have control over [their UN] troops. In practise they are consulted. I have the latitude to interpret if the task assigned to us is within the spirit of the mandate."[88] Canada's Deputy Chief of Staff, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, in describing Major-General Gaudreau as " a commander who was willing to move the yard sticks," agreed that Canada's involvement in Srebrenica was, in part, the result of a broader interpretation of the UN mandate which in simple terms called for the establishment of humanitarian aid to the inhabitants of Srebrenica and in ambiguous terms the creation of that community as a safe area.[89]

Major General Gaudreau's decision to allow the deployment of Canadians in the manner suggested by Morillon was not reversed as it wound itself up the national chain of command to cabinet and the Prime Minister. Morillon's choice of Canadian troops was based on the fact that other available French, British, Ukranian or Egyptian units were stretched to the limit and his knowledge that that the Canadian government was likely to be receptive to his request. The Canadian battalion had only recently been deployed into Bosnia and was in the process of developing their operations for escorting humanitarian convoys. Major-General Gaudreau's decision to support Lieutenant-General Morillon was also prompted by the calculation that the Serbs, already being severely castigated by the international community for their offensive in Eastern Bosnia, were not likely to attack and overrun a lightly armed UN forces in Srebrenica - an action that would most certainly invite a much stronger reaction from the world community. Ultimately, Lieutenant-General Morillon's request for the use of Canadian forces involvement in Srebrenica in the unmandated manner specified by the Lieutenant-General and approved by Major-General Gaudreau, had to go to the Prime Minister. As one high ranking Canadian officer assigned to Morillon noted "I cannot foresee a nation putting its men and women at risk under those circumstances unless the military has recommended that we take part in the operation and the final decision, I believe, would be made by the Prime Minister and cabinet."[90] In acting, both politically and militarily to place Canadian forces in Srebrenica the Canadian government was willing to force the hand of the United Nations and the international community into assuming a more interventionary role and the evolution of the UN's role from *peacekeeping* to *peacemaking* and to accept the political risks of using Canadian forces as a "trip wire" for greater international intervention. In other words, the calculation that the setting off of the Canadian "trip wire" could produce a stronger interventionary response had to be accepted as a realistic contingency by the government and its military and political planners.[91]

It was not until March 21, 1994 that the Canadians were taken out of Srebrenica and the saga of the Canadian presence there came to an end. The 45,000 Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica clearly did not want them to leave. For many, like Major Yvan Bouchard, in charge of the 155 members of Quebec's Royal 22nd Regiment, the famous "Van Doos", besides gaining a strong sense of pride for the job done by his "guys", there was something to be learned from his experience in the Muslim enclave : "If the population of Quebec could come here and see what happens to a country in war, no one would complain any more. ... What's happening here is the same as the guys in Quebec in the 1970s - just a few student guys cause the problem while the rest of the people want peace. I hope I never see again what I have seen here." As for the grips and complaints of may of his fellow Quebecers Bouchard commented caustically: "They p... me off. All they have to do is watch TV with remote control, drink a pint of beer, eat chips and they're still complaining."[92]

The images of suffering of Srebrenica's inhabitants remained with all those Canadians who served there. Private Luc Gauthier's comment was perhaps most succinct in its simplicity when he stated "I'll always remember Srebrenica."[93] The comments and experiences of Major Bouchard, Private Gauthier and other Canadian peacekeepers are congruent with an observation in Pierre Martin and Michael Fortmann's recent analysis of Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in which they write: "On the domestic front, some Canadians think that peacekeeping constitutes a source of consensus-building that has the potential to bridge linguistic and regional differences. Peacekeeping helps create a political basis on which Canadians can agree."[94] Besides exposing our own domestic challenges and realities as a reflection of our social values, Canada's leading role in Srebrenica served as salient example, in military as well as political terms, of the government's willingness to have Canada become a catalyst for change in the international system.

Explanatory Factors: Domestic and International

As noted in this chapter's introduction, explanations for the shift in Canadian foreign policy are found in the interplay of domestic and international factors which allowed Canada's political leadership, representative of the political executive, to play a leading role in reshaping Canadian foreign policy. International factors related to post Cold War instability, the role of multilateral institutions such as the UN especially, the Gulf war experience and the emasculation of the EC at the outset of the Yugoslav conflict are among those influencing the direction of Canadian foreign policy. The domestic factors examined center around the role of the foreign policy bureaucracy, the influence of Canadian public opinion and the media, the impact of the emotional but thoughtful debate in the House of Commons, and the pivotal role played by the Prime Minister in responding to those international and domestic factors in a way that would result in the molding of a new foreign policy.

International Pressures

The imposition of pressures by the international environment on the development of Canadian foreign policy has always been a complex issue. Certainly within the past context of Canadian-Yugoslav relations, this paper suggests that the international system was a dominating factor in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy due in large measure to the alliance and balance of power system established with the conclusion of WWII. By the late eighties , however, the break-down of super-power bipolarirty created considerable instability and uneasiness as states sought means by which to find security and resolve conflict in a rapidly changing post-cold war environment. This new environment, fraught with uncertainties and dangers, also created opportunities for countries like Canada which saw solutions in the re-energizing and strengthening of international multilateral institutions. In the case of Canadian foreign policy some of the origins of the shift in Canadian foreign policy were attributable to the responses of the Mulroney government to changes in the international landscape before the emergence of the Yugoslav crisis. Under then-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, the government initiated a process of redefining Canadian foreign policy, especially in relation to the role of the UN in a new world order. Canada's experience in the Gulf war further emphasized the need for the government to redefine Canada's foreign policy, particularly in terms of the role of the UN as well as concepts of peacekeeping and peacemaking. The emergence of Yugoslavia as a crisis point in international relations and the subsequent inability of the international community via primarily the EC to deal effectively with the crisis provided Canadian foreign policy and Mr. Mulroney's government with the latitude to promote an interventionist vision of the UN as a more effective institutional means of resolving the Yugoslav conflict and other conflicts like it.

Redefining Foreign Policy

Even before the Prime Minister's call - the first from any government - for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission for the former

Yugoslavia in the fall of 1991 to arrest the civil war between the Serbian-led federal Yugoslav army (JNA) and armed units of the secessionist republics of Slovenia and Croatia - the international stage had been set for a re-examination of Canada's role in the area. Conventional assumptions about Europe were beginning to erode. Cold war divisions which allowed Canada a place in NATO and Europe were becoming questionable. The necessity of redefining what Mr. Mulroney called a "new European architecture" resting "on a foundation of common security" as he noted in a March 9,1990 speech, was at hand.[95] By the spring of 1990 a review of Canadian foreign policy towards Europe had been initiated by the Mulroney government. Central among the issues to be reviewed by the government was pressure to reduce Canada's military presence in Europe.[96] For Canadian policy-makers Eastern Europe posed a particular challenge. This point was made clear, when, in announcing the review, Clark highlighted the importance of supporting reform efforts with patience and a "clear recognition of what we in the West can do - and what we cannot."[97] Clark reiterated the point that the West could not solve the problems facing Eastern Europe, but it could "provide a stable context for the development of democracy and prosperity."[98]

The question of redefining or rediscovering a new role for the UN was also on the minds of the Canadian government and policy-makers. In fact, it is noteworthy that Canada's interest in enhancing the UN can be traced back to the 1984 throne speech of the new Mulroney government which announced as one of its primary foreign policy objectives the shoring up of international institutions like the UN in the wake of a perceived belief that US policies were at best denigrating the UN, and at worst impeding it potential as a multilateral institution. Canada's commitment to and identification with an expansion of the UN's role in conflict resolution was expressed in a speech to the United Nations Association on January 30,1989 where Clark typified Canada's willingness to see the UN to exercise a broader mandate when he stated of Canada's involvement:

> We have fought when necessary to preserve the independence of nations.

> We have surrendered sovereignty when necessary to join with other countries in working for world peace, global prosperity, a sound environment and human rights.[99]

Security too had begun to take on a new dimension for the Mulroney government. In a speech to the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly in September of 1990 the Minister of External Affairs spoke of security in the following terms:

> I believe our first challenge is to re-define the concept of security.
>
> Security has ceased to be something to be achieved unilaterally. Security has ceased to be something to be attained through military means alone. Security has become multidimensional and it has become cooperative. Canada believes that a regional approach to confidence-building has much to offer. That approach can involve a variety of measures: dialogue itself designed to exchange perspectives and increase understanding; greater transparency in terms of military capacity; agreements to inform other members in the region of activities they might consider threatening in the absence of warning; and, eventually, institutions and processes of conflict resolution and crisis prevention.
>
> Confidence-building is not a blueprint or a grand solution. It does not prejudice outcomes or impose solutions. It is not rigid. It is what this Organization [UN] has always done best. It is step-by-step. It is functional. It is flexible.[100]

In addition to referring to Canadian proposals for new initiatives for the CSCE Mr. Clark stressed the UN's "unique capacity" to offer peacekeepers for regional conflicts and the necessity to improve the UN's peacekeeping capabilities.

Canada and the Persian Gulf Conflict: From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking

The Persian Gulf conflict brought to the fore many important questions about UN peacekeeping and Canada's role in it. Many Canadians found Canada's role in the UN sponsored war against Iraq incompatible with what was perceived to be Canada's traditional support for peacekeeping. In addressing the annual meeting of the Canadian Center for Arms Control and Disarmament on November 8, 1990 Clark described the distinction drawn between Canada's role on the Gulf War and traditional peacekeeping involvements as "false distinctions."[101] Clark's point was reiterated in a January 24, 1991 speech entitled "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: The Persian Gulf Crisis and its Consequences," in which Clark focused on the significance of the distinction and the kinds of choices Canada and the world community would have to make. To begin with Clark dismissed any notion of incompatibility between the two concepts. Just as Canada's contribution during the Korean conflict did not prevent Canadians from serving in UN peacekeeping operations, so too, he argued, Canada's peacemaking efforts in the Gulf would not preclude Canada's peacekeeping efforts for the UN. Peacekeeping according to Clark followed from peacemaking - it could not be considered a substitute. "Canada" in Clark's words, "will continue as a peacekeeper and we will continue as a peacemaker."[102] According to Clark then Canada would play the role of a peacekeeper and a peacemaker while at the same time maintaining common cause with the UN. In short, what the Gulf war resurrected was the reminder that well before the development of the Pearsonian idea of peacekeeping in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis, there existed another vision of the UN related to keeping the peace and that was collective security. The position taken by the Mulroney government was that Canadian military involvement in the UN's use of force against Iraq was designed to deter or reverse aggression and should be viewed as as part of peacekeeping in a broader sense and that it had always been envisioned by the founders of the UN, Canada included. Whatever discomfort the opposition or some Canadians had with Canada's role in the UN-sponsored Gulf effort should be viewed within the context of a major shift in superpower relations that had now allowed the Security Council to take action where it could not have before. In prophetic or exaggerated terms Bernard Wood, executive director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security noted of Canada's Gulf War experience:

> What the international community is now doing ... is to feel its way through to implementing the UN's basic preventative and enforcement functions... If successful this would render peacekeeping unnecessary.[103]

Recognition of the validity and usefulness of the charter's prescription for collective security as well as the need to enhance and repair the UN Charter was also echoed by the Liberal Party's external affairs critic, Lloyd Axworthy, when in the aftermath of Canada's involvement in the Gulf war, he wrote:

> The charter's hands-off approach to 'internal' disputes - and the resulting inability of the UN to respond effectively to the slaughter of Iraqi Kurds and Shiites at the war's end - reflects a perception of the prerogatives of national sovereignty that does not fit our growing interdependence.[104]

Another interesting outcome of the Gulf war debate and its aftermath which helped to set the stage for the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards the rapidly disintegrating Yugoslav state had to do with Canada's support of the UN plan to designate a Kurdish enclave in Iraq. Initially the concept of a UN-imposed sanctuary, proposed by Prime Minister Major and endorsed by the EC in April of 1991, was received cautiously by Canada in that the plan would be viewed as an intrusion into Iraqi sovereignty and therefore it could be blocked by a veto in the Security Council. In the event that a veto would be forthcoming Clark offered an alternative Canadian plan which relied on civilian, rather than military UN personnel to supervise the proposed sanctuary. Both Mr. Major's European plan and the Canadian plan would result in the forced intervention of UN authority into Iraq. Iraq's objections to the plan not withstanding, the Kurdish refugee situation, in Clark's words, "threatens peace and security in the region, and that consequently justifies action by the Security Council."[105] Clark's support of the establishment of a UN safe sanctuary plan and a donation of 7.3 million dollars to assist the Red Cross and UN relief organizations coping with the refugee crisis along the Turkish-Iraqi border, underscored the government's willingness to test a relatively novel concept mindful of the threat of a veto by members of the Security Council that saw in the safe sanctuary concept a potential threat to their own territorial sovereignty.

The EC Fails

Very soon after the declarations of Croatian and Slovenian independence, with Yugoslavia on the brink of civil war, the European Community began to take an active part by negotiating its first cease fire on June 29, 1991. In fact, even prior to the declarations of independence the EC had signed a substantial five-year loan agreement with Yugoslavia as an incentive for the federal authorities to seek peaceful solutions to the impending crisis. Yugoslavia, from the EC's vantage point was going to be a European affair, one which would prove that the EC was capable of resolving and managing conflict on its doorstep and one which would reflect a uniquely European approach to security. Of equal concern to the Canadian government was that it appeared that the United States was quite pleased to leave Yugoslvia to the Europeans.

Initially the cease-fire was broken only by sporadic clashes. On July 8 a more substantive agreement (the Brioni Agreement) between the Yugoslav government and Slovenia was brokered by the EC. While the EC attained some success in mediating the conflict in Slovenia, this was not to be the case in Croatia where violence between Serbs and Croats continued to escalate. Repeated attempts by EC negotiating teams succeeded in brokering a series of short-lived ceasefires. A September 31 meeting of the EC in Brussels considered and postponed a decision to send a multinational force to stop the fighting in Croatia which up to the end of September had claimed over 600 lives. A number of military options were considered, ranging from the dispatch of 2,000 unarmed peacekeepers to the deployment of a force of 30,000 troops to stop the fighting. However, the EC made the point that it would reconsider its position on intervention if military action was called for by Lord Carrington, chairman of the EC sponsored peace negotiations on Yugoslavia.

Despite frequent references to direct military intervention and the threat of recognition of the breakaway republics as well as the the threat of economic sanctions, the EC was proving to be an ineffective instrument of conflict resolution - a perception that had already taken hold of the the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs.The 12-member EC was simply not able to project a common foreign policy. The EC, the Canadian government was aware, had not evolved to the point that it possessed the necessary military capability for the purposes of peacekeeping. EC failures lent credence to the view that the Yugoslav problem should then be passed on to the UN or NATO. As the director of the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy observed, the EC was "being inexorably drawn into military involvement or else doing nothing."[106] In the end the EC chose to do what amounted to nothing. Direct military intervention did not find a consensus and a political will . Economic sanctions proved to be ineffective and the issue of recognition divided the EC members .

The death toll continued to rise - by early October well over 1,000 people had been killed since the Croatian declaration of independence. An October 7 precision attack by the Yugoslav air force on the presidential palace in Zagreb which almost killed Yugoslavia's Prime Minister and Head of State, Ante Markovic, a Croat, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, did little to ease tensions between the waring factions. On October 11, 1991 an EC relief convoy designed to bring food and medicine to the besieged Croatian city of Vukovar faced confusion, delay and shell fire as it made its third attempt in as many days to reach its destination. Dissention was clearly evident in the ranks of of the EC team leading the convoy - with some monitors arguing among themselves and expressing a desire to turn back while others appearing more determined to achieve some kind of success on behalf of the EC.[107] By October 17 the Yugoslav army backed by massive airpower and Serb irregulars launched a large-scale offensive in different parts of Croatia in an effort to gain control over more territory before the next round of EC sponsored talks on the countries future were to resume. Particularly offensive to world public opinion was the bombardment by the Yugoslav airforce and navy of the medieval walled city of Dubrovnik. There was also an increase in the level of tension in other republics of Yugoslavia such as Bosnia-Herzegovina where, soon after the October 15, 1991 declaration of independence by its parliament, violent skirmishes erupted between its rival ethnic groups.

In response to the worsening situation in Yugoslavia and after a long period of dithering, the EC, on November 8, 1991 announced the realization of its threat to impose limited sanctions against Yugoslavia. The Canadian government followed with an announcement of its own limited trade sanctions. Neither the Canadian nor the EC sanctions banned trade, cut air links, imposed travel restrictions or froze Yugoslav assets abroad - features common to internal sanctions imposed on other states. Instead, the EC package of sanctions merely cut the EC's aid package valued at 1 billion, reestablished textile quotas, and terminated preferential trade treatment towards Yugoslavia. In Canada's case the government terminated preferential trade agreements with Yugoslavia and imposed a system of discretionary export permits for all exports to Yugoslavia. Canada's Minister of External Affairs also supported a bid by the members of the EC sitting on the Security Council (Britain, France, and Belgium) to seek a UN oil embargo against Yugoslavia. [108] It was also confirmed by Canadian officials that there were no restrictions on Yugoslav exports to Canada.

While the Canadian and EC sanctions did not distinguish between the warring republics the Prime Minister was clear in apportioning blame. The Prime Minister's reference to the "remnants of a failed Communist regime" was undoubtedly an allusion to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's regime which had won electoral power in 1990 behind a renamed and supposedly reformed Communist party and to the belief that the Yugoslav army was dominated Marxist-trained Serbian officers.[109] On the subject of the oil embargo the Minister of External Affairs initially held out some hope for its effectiveness. It soon became apparent to McDougall that the oil embargo was not having the desired impact on the military. This was a view shared by many who argued that even the application of comprehensive sanctions would have only a marginal impact on a weak Yugoslav economy already ruined by inflation, debt, war and a practically worthless currency.[110] On the subject of the effectiveness of the EC's attempt to resolve the conflict in Yugoslavia the Prime Minister commented publicly that "you can't fault [the EC] for trying."[111] However, he also made it clear that the concept of sending UN peacekeepers - an idea that he and the Minister of External Affairs had been trying to promote for some time - would have been more effective. Privately, he lamented the fact that valuable time and opportunity had been lost while the EC served as a well-intentioned, but relatively ineffective moderator in Yugoslav conflict. It was also evident to the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State, already sensitive to the EC's policies which threatened to exclude Canada and North America from a new Europe, that the EC did not possess the capability to contain the conflict and that Canada through a UN role in Yugoslavia could still be assured of an international role in Europe.

With Serb-dominated federal forces poised to take Vukovar and reports of massacres by both sides already emerging and the Adriatic port of Dubrovnik still under siege, the EC could do little more than to stress through its chief negotiator, Lord Carrington, that a firm cease-fire would have to take hold before consideration could be given to the deployment of peacekeepers. The repeated failures by the EC to establish a firm cease-fire confirmed for the Canadian government the inadequacy of the EC's efforts to control the Yugoslav conflict. The international environment in which Canada had found itself at the outset of its involvement in Yugoslav had changed and had influenced the governmental foreign policy making community to adapt to the greater interdependencies and new dangers of the post Cold war era by calling for the enhancement of the interventionary capacity of the UN and other multilateral institutions and the re-defining of sovereignty.

Domestic Factors

Societal pressures, evidence suggests, also have had a bearing on the formulation of Canadian foreign policy as it pertained to the Yugoslav crisis. A coherent relationship existed between societal pressures - as reflected by public opinion, the views of Members of Parliament during the debates in the House of Commons and views of the media - and how Canadian foreign policy reacted to and met the challenges posed by the violent breakup of the Yugoslav state. A coherent relationship also existed between Canada's foreign policy-making bureaucracies and the political leadership of the country with regard to the formulation of Canadian foreign policy as it directed itself and responded to the crisis in Yugoslavia.

Bureaucratic Preferences Rearranged

The government's foreign policy making bureaucracy, primarily found within the Department of External Affairs, has always been involved in the formulation of foreign policy. In fact the country's political leadership has relied heavily on that bureaucracy's highly regarded expertise and reputation. Traditionally the influence of the department's bureaucrats on the political leadership has been regarded as being formidable. The department, frequently heralded for its long tradition of expertise and professionalism, was also noted for its bureaucratic tendencies such as its cautious and pedantic approach to its work, particularly when called upon to offer advice to its political masters. The Department had been, to an extent, caught off guard by the rapidity of international developments that followed the sudden collapse of the Soviet Empire and the consequent developments of national minorities seeking self-determination. The Department had monitored carefully and accurately the gradual disintegration of the Yugoslav state. What it was less capable of or willing to do was to offer advise that went beyond traditional diplomatic conventions that emphasized caution over action. Offering advice to the Prime Minister advocating that he challenge some of the fundamental tenets of the sovereignty of the state as a means of having the world community resolve more effectively the explosive conflict in the Balkans was beyond the prudent parameters of advice the Department was able to give the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External affairs.

Mulroney, recognizing this propensity and frustrated by the lack of effective international action chose to exercise more directly his prerogative as Canada's Prime Minister. Once the Prime Ministerial will to have international action on Yugoslavia had taken root in the UN by September of 1991 it became quickly apparent that the primary bureaucracy responsible for carrying out our foreign policy towards

Yugoslavia responded with considerable enthusiasm to the opportunity to take some action in the midst of international inaction. Here was an opportunity for the various elements of Canada's foreign policy-making establishment to be on the leading edge of bolder and more dangerous foreign policy initiatives. It was understandable that initially there was less impetus in the Department of External Affairs to take a bold initiative on Yugoslavia for another reason and that was that the Department would not want to expose the Prime Minister or the Minister of External Affairs to the potential of embarrassment or failure. Certainly there were also elements within that institution who felt that their traditional authority over and historical expertise in foreign policy-making matters was being threatened, or at the very least, overlooked by Mulroney. The automatic caution within the bureaucracies that were attempting to read and measure the growing conflict was understandable as well. However, once the executive decision by the Prime Minister was made and the political signals from the government were transmitted through Ottawa's bureaucratic system, evidence suggests that the foreign policy-making bureaucracies responded positively. Graham Greene, a foreign policy officer with the Central and East Europe Relations Division of External Affairs observed an interesting contrast with the American foreign policy-making system:

> I've always found it interesting to see American State Department people dealing with Yugoslavia resigning because their government is not doing enough. If anything people here were concerned that maybe the government wanted to do too much. So there may have been some resistance in that regard but it was a very different approach in comparison to the American. People here were sometimes feeling this urge to do something versus the reality of just what we could do, and secondly, what others were prepared to do because we alone could not do it.[112]

Although a tougher Canadian plan was not incorporated in Security Council Resolution 713, the UN Security Council agreed on an arms sales embargo on Yugoslavia, largely because of Canadian efforts to place Yugoslavia very high on the UN agenda. According to comments made by Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin to Barbara McDougall the Security

Council had crossed a crucial dividing line with regards to Yugoslavia.[113] Subsequent Prime Ministerial initiatives towards Yugoslavia, evidence indicates, were carried out with effectiveness and considerable enthusiasm by an External Affairs bureaucracy that had, for the most part, recognized that it was participating in what was part of a bolder and more assertive foreign policy.

Having staked out Canada's position, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs continued to have their government apply pressure on the UN to intervene more directly and forcefully as a consequence of the intensifying nature of the conflict and the inability of the EC to cope with it.

Public Opinion

There are few who would dispute the fact that Canadian public opinion has traditionally supported Canada's role in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping has been a special interest of Canadians because of the way we have viewed our role in international relations and because of our longstanding involvement in it. It has been broadly accepted that Canada's traditional role as international peacekeeper has always had the strong backing of Canadian public opinion and has been recognized as an important symbol of our national self-esteem and international worth. What is novel about the early period of Canada's interest and involvement in the Yugoslav crisis is that traditional support for Canada's role as a peacekeeper found growing receptivity for the concept of a more intrusive "peacekeeping" role for Canada. An Angus Reid-Southam News survey conducted from July 27 to August 9, 1992 and another Angus Reid poll released on May 7, 1993 are illustrative of the views of the Canadian public on Canada's role in UN sponsored interventionism, and more surprisingly perhaps, the expansion in the support by Canadians for interventionary *peacemaking*.

The Angus Reid-Southam poll - conducted on July 27,1992 , before pictures from Bosnian detention camps were seen by Canadians - showed that 30 per cent of Canadians agreed that UN forces should turn from peacekeeping to *peacemaking* in order to establish a peaceful solution to the conflict. In other words, the Angus Reid poll revealed a sizeable minority of 30 per cent of Canadians had favoured a more aggressive approach by the UN in the region. In fact, three in ten Canadians favoured "a military role, including possible offensive action in order to re-establish peace in the region." and only 14 per cent of respondents called for a cessation of the UN's "peacekeeping efforts by removing all [UN] forces from the region."[114] Support for military action against Yugoslavs in order to bring peace to the region was highest in Alberta with an approval rating of 35 per cent and lowest in B.C. with 22 per cent approving. Just over half of those polled (53 per cent) indicated a preference that the UN maintain its limited involvement in the Balkans in order to ensure that humanitarian aid can reach its destination. The overall backing shown by Canadians during this period is supported by Pierre Martin and Michael Fortmann's findings in "Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World." In their recent article Martin and Fortmann observed:

> In spite of their wish to benefit from the peace dividend after the Cold War, a majority of Canadians, shocked by the violence in the former Yugoslavia, offered their support for a strong Canadian presence in Bosnia. In fact, they showed more activism then ever before. According to Gallup taken in September 1992, 64 per cent of Canadians would have accepted the use of weapons by the Canadian forces to enforce peace in Yugoslavia. Only 26 per cent opposed their use.[115]

The Angus Reid poll released on May 7, 1993 revealed considerably stronger support for an interventionary role by Canada and the UN than the poll taken by Angus Reid in July of 1992. It suggested that most Canadians agreed that the UN should dispatch forces to regions of conflict while fighting is going on. The response by Canadians to the poll revealed a high level of support for a more assertive UN role in spite of the increased risk involved is such a role. Although support by Canadians tapers off slightly in the case of of the involvement of Canadian peacekeepers in UN operations, the poll supports the conclusion that more Canadians support a more assertive Canadian role than oppose it. In contrast to peacekeeping, which is normally implemented after the secession of hostilities, the poll defined *peacemaking* as the dispatch of troops to those areas in the midst of conflict (as in the case of Yugoslavia and Somalia) . Sixty per cent of respondents supported a peacemaking role role for the UN and 28 per cent indicated their belief in the traditional peacekeeping role for UN forces.[116] In terms of participation of Canadian troops, 49 per cent were in favour of a new *peacemaking* role as opposed to 38 per cent favouring a traditional peacekeeping role. Furthermore, while support for *peacemaking* could be found in "Canadians from all walks of life" and various regions of the country, the poll makes it clear that younger Canadians are more receptive to *peacemaking*. Sixty-eight per cent of Canadians between the ages of 18-34 supported *peacemaking* whereas 51 per cent over 55 supported *peacemaking* over peacekeeping.[117]

It is interesting to note that Conservative, like New Democratic Party, supporters were generally supportive of Canadian involvement in peacemaking operations while those who would vote Liberal split almost evenly - 46 per cent in favour of peacemaking and 44 per cent in favour of peacekeeping. The poll also indicated that approval of *peacemaking* increased correspondingly with level of income and education. An interesting aspect of the poll also was that only 5 per cent offered the opinion that the UN should not be involved in either *peacemaking* or peacekeeping in unstable regions of the world, while 8 per cent stated that Canada should not take part in any UN-sponsored military activities, be they peacekeeping or *peacemaking*.

Once again Martin and Fortmann's analysis support the Angus Reid poll where, for example, they note:

> Two identical questions asked by CROP [Centre de Recherche sur l'Opinion Publique] and Environics in December 1991 and October 1992 yielded impressive majorities in favour of increasing or maintaining Canada's commitment. The maintenance of such a high level of support is very revealing if one considers that the two polls were taken before and after the involvement of Canadian peacekeepers in a very dangerous mission in Sarajevo.[118]

It is interesting to point out as well that with the upsurge of support for a more interventionary role for Canadians in Yugoslavia, there was a corresponding shift in the minds of Canadians as who was responsible for the conflict as documented by Martin and Fortmann:

> ... in the seven months between Gallup's October 1992 poll and Decima's in May 1993, an appreciable portion of the public made up its mind about who was responsible for the fighting. The proportion of those pointing the finger at the Serbs rose from 13 to 31 per cent while the number of those identifying all the protagonists fell from 29 to 15 per cent.[119]

If one is to accept the validity of the polls, there was a growth in the sizable Canadian constituency that favoured a more interventionary Canadian role in the international community. This was made evident by the numerous media editorials and articles which demanded some form of direct action to be taken - even when it was recognized that there were numerous pitfalls, dangers and other limitations involved in direct intervention.

International Inaction and the Voice of Media

It is somewhat surprising to learn that editorials concerned with the Prime Minister's initiatives toward the Yugoslav crisis were highlighted by one common theme: that whatever forceful action was to be taken, it must be taken with speed, decisiveness and might. "Yet if Serbia is oblivious to words," were the words of one *Globe and Mail* editorial in May of 1992, "it should be vulnerable to action - providing the ruler comes down quick and hard."[120] Further implied in many of these editorials and the words of international observers and media was the view that while the world community may be excused for having been caught off guard by events in Slovenia and Croatia, the Bosnian nightmare which followed was foreseeable and thus avoidable.

Earlier in the conflict Canada was maintaining only a ban on trade with Belgrade. On a broader scale European states were beginning to feel the pressure on their resources from having to cope with the more than one million refugees who were fleeing Bosnia-Herzegovina. The situation was described by many as the most serious refugee crisis in Europe since

World War II. As described in the same *Globe and Mail* editorial of May 13, 1992, even after 14 years of dealing with conflict in the Third World Jose-Maria Mendiluce, a prominent official of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees was not prepared for what he saw in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

> What is happening in Bosnia passes all imagination. What we seeing in is something like World War II, with population centres being destroyed and towns and villages attacked not as military objectives but with the sole purpose of driving the people away. **The difference from other conflicts I have seen is that in Bosnia the creation of a legion of displaced persons is not the consequence of military action but the aim of it.**[emphasis mine] I have seen irregulars drive into villages ... just to terrorize the population into leaving because they are of another ethnic group. Uncontrolled snipers are everywhere, shooting at anyone on the streets. Every day people are found dead at the wheels of their cars, shot through the head by a sniper bullet. ... The outside world must find the political means to put an end to this state of horror. This war has to be stopped. [121]

Public opinion in Europe and in Canada had become cognizant of the distinction drawn by Mendiluce as the public viewed and read about "ethnic cleansing". At the United Nations Western countries on the Security Council had been busy trying to gain support from Russia and China for trade sanctions and an oil embargo in an effort to arrest what was widely perceived to be Serbian aggression in Bosnia. China's position was that it opposed the imposition of sanctions while Russia would not apply its veto against sanctions should the fighting continue. Canada at this point had lifted the landing rights for Yugoslav airlines, recalled its ambassador from Belgrade and shut down Yugoslav consulates in Toronto and Vancouver. On May 28 plans by the External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall to visit Canadian peacekeepers in Croatia were suspended due to the volatility of the situation.

The efforts of the European Community and the brief involvement to date of the UN had brought about many truces and cease-fires but nothing resembling a permanent solution. It is possible that diplomatic pressure by the EC and threats of sanctions may have contributed to the withdrawal of JNA units from Sarajevo and Bosnia starting at the end of May. However, many media critics argued it was too late and too little; that, in fact, the JNA presence had accomplished its objective in giving Bosnian Serbs an early advantage on the military front in much the same way it gave Serbs in the Krajina regions of Croatia earlier in the conflict.

The *Globe and Mail* editorials, like many others published in newspapers and journals throughout Canada , communicated a growing popular sentiment that some kind of more effective direct action by the world community had to be taken. An August 8, 1992 editorial in the *Vancouver Sun* was more cautious but at the same time more specific in delineating what it considered to be the acceptable parameters of intervention:

> The general [Lewis Mackenzie] also warned against the UN getting tangled up in a guerrilla-style war in the rugged Bosnian countryside. No doubt he's right that full-scale military intervention would be crazy. But limited military intervention is now essential.
>
> With the Yugoslav war becoming a massacre of civilians, the UN or NATO must quickly provide forces to open up suspected concentration camps, take out the Serbian guns raining mortars on to Sarajevo, and possibly bomb the bridges linking Bosnia with Serbia.
>
> There's no way embargoes against Serbia can work when supplies are brought in via the Danube on ships disguised with foreign flags. Only force will make the thugs now controlling Serbian troops realize the world won't stand by forever and watch an entire country being brutalized.[122]

A review of editorials and political opinion expressing public anger about what was taking place in Yugoslavia and calling for more forceful intervention indicates that they were not prompted so much by the fact that the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia was so horrid, or that the level of misery in Yugoslavia was somehow unique in the world.[123] The common theme linking the editorials and public opinion which were in favour of interventionary action was the belief that the conflict in Bosnia in particular, had, in the words of one well-respected Canadian columnist, Richard Gwyn, "escalated into an absolute evil" as a result of the consistent and planned administration of the policy of "ethnic cleansing" dubbed by some as "a contemporary re-creation of the Holocaust."[124] As a consequence, in the words of Gwyn: "Either we take a stand against 'ethnic cleansing' or we betray our own humanity."[125] It was within this context that Gwyn was particularly condemnatory of the Security Council Resolution 770 empowering UN peacekeepers to use "all measures necessary" to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to besieged communities in Bosnia. Gwyn, like other critics of UN inaction, viewed the resolution, which avoids mention of "ethnic cleansing," as a means of pacifying public opinion and forestalling the kind of full-scale intervention required to stop it. The journalism of Gwyn, like that of his colleagues, reflects what Nossal has described as the growth of a "wider sense of public responsibility" in the media.[126] The impact of media coverage of the Yugoslav civil war on Canadian foreign policy is difficult to measure. In the Yugoslav conflict the media have played, without a doubt, "a critical role in structuring and shaping society's perceptions of issues and their relative importance" to use Nossal's words.[127] The government was obviously sensitive to the fact that media coverage of carnage and destruction was having an effect on public perceptions about what should be done. In terms of "structuring and shaping" society's perceptions the media helped to generate a debate about the need to do more in Yugoslavia, which could essentially be rephrased in terms of whether or not Canadians were willing to allow the UN to assume a larger interventionary role in the domestic affairs of member nations. For the most part that media-generated debate proved helpful to the government in rationalizing its course of action. Evidence of the "structuring and shaping" of issues by the media also found a forum in the House of Commons.

Parliamentary Debates and the "New Ethic of Intervention"

As noted in Chapter 3 the Yugoslav conflict sparked a rather intense debate in the House of Commons in May of 1991 and was the subject of a formal emergency debate in the House on November 15, 1991. The earlier debates reflect how closely Members of the House of Commons were following the unfolding of events in Yugoslavia as well as the tone of public opinion in so far as it is expressed through its elected representatives.

One member, Geoff Scott (Hamilton-Wentworth) in relating his remarks to the throne speech (which called for members to avoid being obligated to the dictates of party discipline) shared with the House on May 15, 1991 his experiences as a member of the Inter-Parliamentary delegation, officially known as the Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association, that had visited Yugoslavia in March of 1991, and urged the government to call upon the United Nations to intervene in a mediating role that could promote the peaceful dissolution or restructuring of the Yugoslav federation. Terry Clifford (London-Middlesex), as the leader of the Canadian delegation, presented the report of the Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association on its visit to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to the House of Commons on May 16, 1991. The report , among other recommendations, urged the government to press for UN mediation in Yugoslavia.[128] While in Yugoslavia the Canadian delegation urged Yugoslavia's leadership to follow a peaceful solution to the country's problem - a point Scott emphasized in dramatic fashion to the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic:

> I can vividly remember the moment I sat next to the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic. I literally erupted. I had my finger wagging, pleading with the communist boss of Serbia that we Canadians do not mind demonstrations. We tolerate and occasionally enjoy them in our country, including all the horn honking in front of the Parliament Buildings today. 'But please, please for God sake,' I asked the Serbian president, 'try to avoid the international bloodstains of Yugoslavia's reputation by keeping your demonstrations peaceful as we try to do in Canada.'[129]

Mr. Scott's reference to "keeping your demonstrations peaceful" was, in specific terms, a direct reference to the violent reaction of federal authorities to the March 9 demonstrations in Belgrade and those in Kosovo earlier which was the subject of persistent questions posed to Yugoslav authorities by the Inter-Parliamentary delegation, and in broader terms, increasing reference to human rights by Members of Parliament participating in this debate. Regardless of the fact that the government had urged an open debate on the throne speech identifiable differences surfaced between the government and opposition approaches to the conflict in Yugoslavia.While the government had encouraged a free debate surrounding the throne speech, it was evident, as outlined earlier, that discernable differences were emerging between the government and the opposition on the form and shape Canada's foreign policy should take in response to the impending breakup of Yugoslavia. In some significant respects the opposition appeared to be ahead of the government in calling more vigorously for quicker and more forceful intervention. Michael Pearson, foreign policy advisor to the Research Bureau of the Liberal caucus and foreign policy advisor to Mr. Axworthy at the time of the 1991 debates, and presently Senior Policy Advisor with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre Oulette, recalled the context in which the Liberal opposition formulated its attack against the government:

> The view among the Liberals was that Canada had an initiative-setting and assertive role to play in seeking to resolve international conflict. We had by means of our tradition , by means of our reputation, by means of our expertise in peacekeeping a responsibility to be activists at the Security Council or wherever in helping to find solutions to these kinds of conflicts. I think the frustration that we felt was that the Tories were not inclined to be so interested in initiating action or initiating ideas in the international arena to solve that conflict. In our minds the Tories were following a more cautious, a more non-interventionary and more non-initiation-oriented policy. We're also talking about a time when there was a recent change in foreign ministers from Clark to McDougall. McDougall was not someone well versed in foreign affairs. She had, therefore, little inclination to be an activist foreign minister. We were, therefore, frustrated by her incapacity to demonstrate any political leadership.[128]

While for both the opposition and the government the prospect of intervention was prompted by humanitarian concerns for all the peoples of Yugoslavia, in the case of the government, it was, to this point, directed at maintaining some semblance of a multiethnic state in which, from the Prime Minister's perspective, Serbs and Croats could realize a common destiny by working peacefully and productively together. For the opposition, however, a more prominent tendency, was to see intervention in terms of accepting and protecting the legitimate nationalist and democratic aspirations of the republics and their peoples. Where opposition members such as Bob Horner (Mississauga West) were speaking to the House about self-determination as "being increasingly established as the right of people in every corner of our changing world,"[131] the government continued to cling to its "twin track approach."

In calling for an emergency debate on the situation in Yugoslavia on November 5, 1991 Lloyd Axworthy, as the Liberal Party's foreign policy critic, continued the opposition attack on the government for doing nothing to halt the onslaught of the Yugoslav army in Croatia and for not assuming a "leadership role" role in the consideration of a United Nations trade embargo against Yugoslavia.[132] By the November 18 start of the emergency debate on the situation in Yugoslavia divergences in policy between the government and the opposition on Yugoslavia had become more clearly accentuated. The formal emergency debate began with Benno Friesen (on behalf of the Secretary of State for External Affairs) outlining and updating, for the members of the House, the general situation in Yugoslavia. The Liberal opposition immediately took the position that the government's reaction to the suffering and tragedy of the Yugoslav crisis was lethargic and anemic:

> **Hon. Llyod Axworthy (Winnipeg South Centre)**: I must say that I waited with some anticipation for the comments of the parliamentary secretary (Benno Friesen) to see what initiatives the government may be announcing tonight to provide further involvement, further engagement, further intervention,, and unfortunately and sadly there was nothing more to say.[133]

Svend Robinson also chastised the government for a failure to show leadership on the international stage as well as in the CSCE, NATO and the UN. Where the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, as Axworthy put it, "were standing at the barricades ready to do anything possible" in the case of Canada's involvement in the Gulf war, the governments response to the Yugoslav crisis represented a retreat "from the brave new world or the new world order of a year ago."[134] With reference to the use of force as "the big stick that beats people back" Axworthy stated that the sovereignty of states brings with it "duties as well as rights" and that "the primary duty of any nation is to protect the lives of its citizens and when it begins to abuse that right and not fulfill that duty then the international community has a right to intervene."[135] While Axworthy was complementary of the Prime Minister's Stanford Speech which promoted the right of international intervention, he expressed his disappointment at the government's unwillingness to put that principle into practice. From the opposition point of view the imposition of tougher sanctions and an oil embargo were some of the kinds of measures required. Both Axworthy and Robinson also called attention to a perceived failure by the government to have multilateral institutions such as the CSCE, NATO and the UN take stronger and more effective action to stem the Yugoslav crisis. Axworthy also alleged that the government had not gone along with those other CSCE members at the CSCE Conference in Moscow (September 1991) in calling for the strengthening of CSCE mechanisms. "Where is", he asked, "the Canadian voice of the CSCE talking about the need for tougher mechanisms and the need for a new security structure for all the kinds of incredible challenges and tests that will emerge in that part of the world?"[136] This aspect of the opposition's criticism of the government found expression even before the formal emergency Commons debate, during, for example, October meetings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade from both politicians as well as some of those academics invited to appear before the Committee.

Professor Andre Donneur, a political scientist from the University of Quebec was among those academics proposing a strong interventionary role for Canada when assessing the situation before the Standing Committee on October 22, 1991:

> As one can see quite clearly at the present time, the situation is such that collective intervention is absolutely necessary. I think that the best mechanism to use is the Conflict Prevention Centre, located in Vienna, which is part of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In this regard, Canada should launch an initiative once again to get this Conflict

> Prevention Centre involved. Although the Conflict Prevention Centre did already intervene in July, I think we should redouble our efforts. If this mechanism is not sufficient, the matter will have to be brought before the CSCE's Council of Foreign Minister's. ... All the countries of Europe are represented at the CSCE, and for this reason, it would be possible to intervene. We must put a stop to these massacres. If the CSCE is powerless, we would have to go back before the Security Council, as Canada has already done. I think that a force must be sent to intervene, separate the two parties and monitor the situation.[137]

Professor Aurel Braun of Carleton University's Department of Political Science, in describing Yugoslavia as an "artificial construct," was , however, more cautious about placing undue expectations on the CSCE, reminding the Committee that the CSCE was still "in the process of acquiring institutional form" and as a conflict resolution mechanism, it was still in its "infancy".[138] Axworthy, during an earlier meeting of Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade reacted as follows to a statement by David Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe Branch , Department of External Affairs who had claimed that the government had been pressuring the CSCE to play a stronger role in helping to resolve the conflicts in Yugoslavia.

> **Mr. Axworthy (Winnipeg South Centre)**: I am a little confused about your comment. You say we are keeping the pressure on through the CSCE. When I was there last week, in Moscow during the conferences, there were proposals coming forward from eastern European countries - Czechoslovakia, Poland, Germany - for the CSCE to take direct action in relation to new mechanisms for intrusion for involvement, and the Canadian delegation was not supporting those. We were totally silent and we were not speaking out in support of those. As I understand it, we were under instructions not to. How can we,, on the one hand, be talking about a new order of dealing with human rights superseding the national sovereignty when at the CSCE we were totally silent and in fact retreating from the position taken at Copenhagen?[139]

Whether or not Axworthy's assessment here is accurate does not detract from the very intrusive policy stance on the intervention issue assumed by the opposition. During the emergency debate of November 18 as well, Axworthy accused the government of timidity and an unwillingness to be innovative and to take on a leadership role:

> There is a need to begin putting into place a new security arrangement that will be absolutely essential if we are not going to have combustion in eastern Europe as it goes through the throes of freeing itself of the former imperialist system and now finds itself in a new era. There is nothing sacred about the *status quo*.
>
> We must let evolution take place through democratic elections. We must let self-determination take place through peaceful means, through protection of minorities. That will require a very effective, international, multilateral framework, and this is the time to start building that. This is the time to show that we really mean business. **It is time for a new ethic of intervention, one that will move us beyond where we are now**.[emphasis mine][140]

The "new ethic of intervention" would explain the question by Stan Keyes, a Liberal representing (Hamilton West) posed during the debate: "Are we so morally superior that we can race to the Persian Gulf but not to Vukovar?"[141] From Robinson's perspective, Parliament, and the government in particular, was long overdue in accepting "that Yugoslavia no longer exists as a nation."[142] As in the case of the Liberals, for the New Democrats as well, the *status quo* was no longer acceptable. Of particular interest as well, was Robinson's view that in calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Yugoslav army from Croatia and the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the region, that deployment take place "not within the territory of Croatia, but in fact **on** [emphasis mine] the border between Croatia and Serbia."[143]

Robinson's point highlighted the opposition's view that in the midst of the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation the boundaries of one of its secessionist republics had, in fact, already been established and that the sooner Canada and the international community gave credence to that fact, by placing a peacekeeping on the border between Serbia and Croatia, the sooner humanitarian intervention could be facilitated. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and its inherent humanitarian dimension was seen by the opposition side as an important test case for Canada and the international community. Moreover, it had served notice to the world that the time had come accept a "new ethic of intervention" to use Axworthy's term. From New Democrat John Brewin's perspective international inaction based on the fear of becoming involved in a quagmire constituted an "international crime."[144]

For the opposition, humanitarian intervention was defined by the necessity of establishing a peace so that the peoples of Yugoslavia could freely and democratically give form and shape to their national aspirations. The objective of humanitarian intervention was not only to alleviate the suffering of all the peoples of Yugoslavia victimized by the fighting but more specifically those bearing the brunt - such as the Croats, Kosovans and Slovenes (to a lesser extent) - of federal army and "Greater Serbian" aggression. Ultimately, for the opposition, the fault of the government lie in not working more effectively and more swiftly for the implementation of a bolder policy of humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia. From the opposition standpoint, the root of that inaction could be traced to government's lack of political will.

The government's response to opposition criticism during this debate continued to be hinged on establishing peace in Yugoslavia on the basis of a comprehensive agreement, acceptable to all parties in the conflict, that would, at worst, make provision for the secession and independence of those constituent parts wishing to break away and, at best, provide for a reconstituted and probably looser federation. The Secretary of State's statements to the House provide a useful summary of Canada's role in conflict resolution in the former Yugoslavia to that date. In McDougall's words:

> From the outset, Canada has been outspoken and clear. We seek for all the peoples of Yugoslavia a peaceful, comprehensive and negotiated settlement that protects minority rights; ensures no unilateral or forcible changes of borders; and provides for appropriate financial and legal arrangements among constituent parts.[145]

The Minister reminded the Commons that Canada had "worked through international mechanisms to make our views known to the Yugoslav government and to the peoples of Yugoslavia."[146] and that Canada had played an active role in CSCE efforts to find a peaceful conclusion to the conflict. She reminded the Commons as well that Canada supported the CSCE declaration that differences within Yugoslavia must be resolved through a process of negotiations compatible with the CSCE's Helsinki principles and that changes of territorial boundaries wrought by force and violence were unacceptable. In offering Canada's full support of CSCE initiatives, the Minister also recognized that the CSCE was able to act with only limited effectiveness because a number of the membership were unwilling to "move on a conflict within the borders of a member state."[147] for resolution. Although the Yugoslav situation was in the EC court it was important, from Canada's perspective, that it be recognized 'in the context of the larger CSCE responsibility,"[148] and as such Canada (in addition to Poland, Sweden, and the Czech and Slovak republics) was willing to participate in the EC-sponsored observer teams sent to Yugoslavia.

The parliamentary debates, in reflecting an aspect of public opinion and societal pressures on the government, spotlighted both commonalties and differences between government and opposition. Parliamentary debates indicated that with the exception of the Reform party there was near unanimity among MPs that some form of international, humanitarian intervention into Yugoslavia was necessary. The NDP's position on the Yugoslav crisis - from the very beginning - remained constant. Throughout the crisis the NDP had applied pressure on the government to play an active and leading part in the interventionary capacity of the international community to ameliorate the situation in the former Yugoslavia and in more specific terms, to do something about the suffering and injustice inflicted against so many of the peoples of the former republic. The institutional renewal of the United Nations, support for the blueprint for international cooperation and peace found in Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, and the increased promotion of "Canadian and UN capacity for peacekeeping, preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding"[149] were among the hallmarks of NDP policy towards the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Another distinguishing characteristic of NDP foreign policy has been the Party's constant advocacy of the implementation concept of peacemaking in conjunction with peacekeeping. In short, the international view of the NDP on Yugoslavia was very much grounded in the recognition that "nations can no longer live in splendid isolation and win advantage through confrontation."[150] Moreover, NDP foreign policy advocated the view that "Sovereignty, the right of a state to do whatever it wants within its borders, is being challenged by the rights of individuals, women's and minority groups, unions, non-governmental organizations and church groups."[151]

In fact, Canada's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis illustrated among all the parties - with the possible exception of the Reformers - the view that the sovereignty of the state would, in some measure, have to be constrained further by new international realities surrounding international humanitarian rights. The Liberal Party's foreign policy handbook issued in May of 1993 declared, for instance, that "the traditional importance accorded to the principle of national sovereignty has made a mockery of many human rights obligations" and went on to assert: "Changing assumptions about state sovereignty and minority and individual liberties offer a chance for the international community to make a serious commitment to review international human rights standards."[152] The New Democratic Party was, for example, receptive to the idea that an important step towards the peaceful resolution of international conflict could be achieved by strengthening the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and as Svend Robinson, the NDP's foreign policy critic, pointed out in an 1992 article, having more countries accept "the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court."[153] The title of the article itself, *Justice and Human Rights; Inspiring Canadian Foreign Policy* underlines the belief that Canadian's special commitment to justice and human rights has influenced, and will succeed in further influencing, Canada's foreign policy. It is, therefore, not surprising that the NDP was a very strong proponent of the creation of a new international tribunal "to adjudicate crimes against humanity." Furthermore, as Robinson wrote in 1992, "Such a body could not only rule on crimes committed, for example, in the ongoing ' ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but hopefully deter others from committing similar crimes in the future."[154]

Both the Liberals and New Democrats expressed similar views on issues concerning sovereignty of the state and human rights issues as related to the Yugoslav conflict. Both were critical of the Conservative government for not *acting* quickly and decisively enough to head off the impending crisis during its early emergence. Both parties chastised the government for not acting quickly enough to recognize the separatist aspirations of the Slovenes and Croats who were being beaten up by militarily superior federal army-Serb forces. Both parties, like the Conservative government itself, were also subject to intense and sustained pressure from their domestic Croat and Slovenian constituents to have the opposition and government respond more actively to the violence and carnage that had begun to erupt in Yugoslavia. The Liberal opposition - heralding the arrival of the "new ethic of intervention" - led the charge against the Conservative government, attacking it for being indecisive, weak and slow in responding to the Yugoslav conflict. The Liberal opposition was also highly critical of the Conservative government for not allowing greater public consultation and parliamentary input in the development of Canada's foreign policy response towards the Yugoslav crisis and so was it was able to promote the concept of the "democratization of foreign policy"[155] prior to the election campaign which brought the Liberal party to power. While the promotion of the concept of the "democratization of foreign policy" by the opposition parties during the parliamentary debates on the subject of Yugoslavia could be attributed to some extent to partisan rhetoric, to a more significant extent, the concept conveyed the view of the opposition that too much of the conduct and management of Canadian foreign policy related to Yugoslavia had been usurped by the Prime Minister himself .

Role of Political Leadership

Well before the emergence of the Yugoslav crisis on the Prime Ministerial agenda there were a number of indications that Canada's new Prime Minister wished to have his presence felt in the management of Canadian foreign policy. When he came to power on September 17, 1984 Brian Mulroney began "demonstrating what every prime minister had before him: a desire and a capacity to dominate the process of foreign policy decision-making."[156] With Canada's involvement in Yugoslavia, Mulroney not only succeeded in dominating the decision-making process of foreign policy, he succeeded dominating it beyond the norm established by previous Prime Ministers.

There are many means by which the Prime Minister can hope to achieve dominance over foreign policy. In institutional terms Mulroney was able to establish his dominating imprint on foreign policy by increasing the power that he gave to two of his executive support agencies, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO) at the expense of the Department of External Affairs. As noted by a journalist in 1985 "Mulroney's PMO has already become the largest, the costliest and perhaps the most powerful that Ottawa has ever known."[157] Where in Trudeau's time three policy advisers out of total complement of 90 were used by the Prime Minister, the new PMO employed 13 policy advisers and the total complement was increased to over 114 members. This increase in the size of the PMO reflected not only the broader scope of administrative responsibilities taken on by the PMO, it also reflected the strengthening of the political character of PMO operations. Given the nature and the mandate of these two supporting agencies, Mulroney, by working through them, chose to rely more exclusively on their advice, thereby strengthening his and their influence, and assuring himself of more intimate and responsive control over foreign as well as domestic policy. There were opposition members and bureaucrats who responded to this trend by accusing the Prime Minister and his more intimate advisers of establishing, in the words of a journalist, "a quasi-presidential system, concentrating real power in the hands of executive appointees - and away from Parliament and cabinet ministers."[158] Significant as well was the fact the power of the PMO was enhanced at the expense not only of the Department of External Affairs but also at the expense of the PCO by usurping some of the policy-making responsibilities of the bureaucrats operating in the PCO. The new head of Mulroney's PMO, Bernard Roy, confirmed the shift in power from the PCO to the PMO when he stated: "To the extent that you have a new government that brings with it new policies, I think the PCO people will acknowledge the fact that they expect the lead to be taken by the policy people in the PMO."[159] As "a valve at the junction of the bureaucratic and the political"[160] the PMO provided the Prime Minister with the direct means to enhance his powers over foreign policy through his prerogative to appoint the key members to the PMO, usually with political appointees, and PCO, with non-partisan appointees. Robert Jackson observed, however, that the traditional, non-partisan character of the PCO was altered when "Prime Minister Mulroney appointed his friend and political advisor, Dalton Camp as the Senior Policy Advisor in the PCO. Under all recent Prime Ministers the PCO, like the PMO, has flourished in size and scope, but rarely had political appointees on its staff."[161] By increasing the politicization of the PCO the Prime Minister was able to extend his control over an already impressive research and coordinating agency, thereby establishing a second countervailing structure in the PCO within which he was able to formulate, launch and co-ordinate foreign policy initiatives that frequently challenged international convention and were more dangerous.

The ground for Brian Mulroney's activist foreign policy in Yugoslavia (Haiti and Somalia) was broken, in fact, when the Prime Minister gave his famous Stanford University speech of September 21, 1991. Even well before this period Mr. Mulroney's impact on foreign policy was becoming evident in his role in re-directing Canadian foreign policy towards South Africa in the mid-eighties by adopting a policy that favored increasing sanctions. The Stanford speech, however, was the clearest signal that Mulroney was determined to fulfill his priministerial capacity to dominate foreign policy making. During that speech, and in direct reference to Yugoslavia, the Prime Minister staked out his position when he defied international convention by stating that he found it offensive when inaction by the world community was explained away by invoking the principle of state sovereignty. In his words:

> We must recognize that there are certain fundamental rights that all people possess - and that, sometimes, the international community must act to defend them. What is needed to close the gap between human progress and international practice is leadership and cooperation.[162]

The further strengthening of the role of the PMO and the PCO in the Prime Minister's second term illustrated the Prime Minister's proclivity for being the directing force of Canadian foreign policy certainly as far as Yugoslavia was concerned. The appointment of individuals like Robert

Grauer as the PMO's deputy chief of staff operations, Reid Morden as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, and Paul Heinbecker as Mr. Mulroney's foreign policy speech writer signalled the arrival of those considered to be receptive to the Prime Minister's thinking on foreign policy matters.[163] It is not surprising, therefore, that the Prime Minister would require that through the PMO and the PCO he be kept intimately aware of developments surrounding the Yugoslav situation so that he and his Secretary of State for External Affairs could more effectively oversee and direct their foreign policy initiatives vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. The initiative, for example, by Canadian forces under Major General Mackenzie to open up Sarajevo and its airport was intensively monitored on a 24 hour a day basis by the PCO which provided the Prime Minister and his Cabinet with constant updates and full-scale briefings of the progress made by Canadian forces. The PM and his office, as well as Cabinet were also being closely appraised of Canada's role in Srebrenica. "The Prime Minister would always want to hear from DND [Department of National Defence] Chief of Staff details of the operational aspects where Canadian peacekeepers were involved" recalled a senior member of the Prime Minister's PCO.[164] One insider close to Cabinet commented on Canada's Srebrenica role: "We came to the realization that in involving ourselves in Srebrenica in the way we had, we were redefining the adage 'hostages to fortune."[165] The attention by the PMO and the PCO to Major General Mackenzie's operation to open up Sarajevo airport as well as the role played by Canadian forces in establishing Srebrenica as a safe area are particularly significant in that the Prime Minister, like his Secretary of State for External affairs, was very much aware that these operations were particularly dangerous and that they went beyond the conventional roles mandated of typical peacekeeping operations. As Paul Heinbecker, Mulroney's chief foreign policy advisor in the PCO, recalled distinctly: "The Prime Minister was under no illusions as to the dangers inherent in those operations."[166] It was clear as well from other informed sources that the Prime Minister was prepared to accept the risks in order to indicate that a more muscular response from UN forces was necessary to stem the tide of violence and conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as well as to bolster the institutional credibility of the UN. In directing his friend and Canada's Ambassador to the UN, Yves Fortier, to break the impasse of inaction at the UN one arrives to the conclusion that forcing the UN to act and to intervene for a higher purpose was a consequence of more than a desire to be recognized as a high-ranking statesman in world affairs; it was personally important to *him*. The elevation of the PCO and especially the PMO in their foreign policy making roles was very important in facilitating Mulroney's stronger policies on human rights and intervention in Yugoslavia and elsewhere.

Conclusion

In reviewing the significance of Canada's contemporary UN involvements in Yugoslavia it is noteworthy to point out that the Secretary of State's words during the early Commons debates offered an interesting blend of caution typified by the traditional and conventional parameters of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state and, at the same time, notification that the government was prepared to pursue new and unconventional avenues of action in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy and that during the early stages of the conflict in Yugoslavia the government was more in tune with the opposition's views on intervention than it had been able to admit. Statements made by MPs as early as the spring of 1991, the Commons emergency debate of November 1991, and the proceedings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade during the fall of 1991 highlighted a number of important developments regarding the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. Punctuated by the Commons emergency debate those developments illustrated publicly that Canadian foreign policy was at the crossroads of change and that Canadian public opinion - as highlighted by the Angus Reid polls - was in tune with that development. Public opinion polls revealed a remarkable level of support for a more intrusive Canadian-UN presence in not just *keeping* the peace, but even more so, in *making* it. Reflective of that public opinion was the consensus among parliamentarians that the protection of human rights and its elevation as an issue called for a rethinking of how Canada and the international community should conduct inter-state relations. The impetus for change came not only from a government that was itself frustrated by international inaction and saw a more activistic role for Canada but also from the parliamentary opposition which demanded that Canada intervene more forcefully in the affairs of another state.

As mentioned, considerable impetus for change was also a consequence of the Prime Minister's prerogative to curtail the influence of his foreign policy bureaucracy - having been from the perspective of many Conservatives far too long under the influence of successive Liberal governments - in the shaping of Canadian foreign policy. While there was initial resistance from some quarters of that bureaucracy to Mulroney's UN-Yugoslav initiatives, the political leadership provided by the Prime Minister and his minister of foreign affairs, in general, struck many responsive chords within the foreign policy bureaucracies soon after those earlier initiatives had taken hold in the international arena. The willingness to "buy into" the initiatives of the political leadership, provided the bureaucracies with fresh opportunities to ensure their *raison d'etre* and their part in a uniquely Canadian contribution to international affairs. In the minds of many bureaucrats, Canadian foreign policy initiatives towards Yugoslavia, inspired by the political leadership, provided them with new opportunities to participate in the assertion of a stronger and more active Canadian foreign policy presence in international affairs.

In terms of the role of domestic lobbying groups it cannot be denied that the the Yugoslav - primarily Croatian and Slovenian - emigre community exerted a significant amount of pressure on the opposition, as well as the government, to intervene on behalf of the seceding republics. The Croatian community in Canada showed itself to be active, well-organized and well-funded. However, the fact was that their numbers were small in comparison to Ukranian Canadians who played a more significant role in pressuring the government for early recognition of the Ukraine. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the government was notably swayed from its course by their energetic lobbying activities. Consistency demographics indicate pockets of Canadian Croats were few in terms of the overall representation of the domestic constituents by Members of Parliament. In other words, what inspired the opposition to call on the government to adopt a more interventionary policy was not so much any perceived lobbying by the small Croatian and Slovenian domestic constituency, but rather, the appalling magnitude of the carnage in which it was to a large extent civilian rather than military targets that had become the object of planned and calculated violence of the federal armed forces, their Serb allies and their political masters. Furthermore, from the opposition perspective, like that of the Canadian public in general, that violence was seen to have been deliberately directed against those who, through a reasonably democratic process, had freely chosen to separate. As Axworthy exclaimed in frustration in a heated verbal exchange with McDougall during the hearings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade: "It's not the Croatians who are invading Serbia. It's the other way around."[167] While there were some differences between the opposition and the government on the form, shape and objectives of humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia (and elsewhere), there was consensus in the House that its time had come. In appearing before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on November 19, 1991 the Secretary of State for External Affairs was cognizant of the support from public opinion and the pressure from the opposition for Canada to assume a more interventionary posture when she candidly admitted to the formidable challenges facing Canadian foreign policy as it pressed forward in adapting, and frequently leading the way, to change:

> Turbulence means unpredictability and the occasional surprise. It involves making broad strategic choices in foreign policy and tailoring specific actions in a principled but pragmatic manner to the opportunities that arise and the conditions that obtain at any given moment. It means confronting new and more difficult policy decisions. Peacemaking is harder than peacekeeping. Abandoning the principle of non-intervention in favour of a more intrusive concept of human rights is harder than relying on old slogans. These are the types of hard choices and new decisions that Canada must confront and that will mark an international order in the process of fundamental change.[168]

Canada's foreign policy involvement in Yugoslavia was fraught with unpredictability and surprise as the government confronted new policy decisions as it led the way in initiating UN entry into the Yugoslav conflict, calling for the UN and other member states to be prepared to assume a more pro-interventionary-peace enforcing stance in international conflicts and in approving the participation of its armed forces in unconventional UN operations. Of special relevance was the Prime Minister's role, as the key figure responsible for initiating the shift in Canadian foreign policy that could not have been made possible without the interplay of favourable international and domestic factors. International factors provided a context for change and the shift in foreign policy by creating an opportunity for Canada's political leadership to redefine its response to crises such as Yugoslavia. Domestic pressures in support of a more interventionary Canadian foreign policy also provided a context for change. Within a permissive domestic environment Canada's political leadership had greater flexibility to act more boldly and assertively.

Endnotes

1. Paul Koring, "Croatia may win freedom by losing the war," *Globe and Mail*, September 21, 1991, p.A1.

2. Ibid., p.A1.

3. Paul Heinbecker, Canada's Ambassador to Germany and formerly Mr. Mulroney's foreign policy speechwriter and chief foreign policy advisor in the Privy Council Office, personal interview, Vancouver, B.C., October 1994.

4. Graham Greene, Central and East Europe Relations Division, Department of External Affairs, personal interview, Ottawa, November 18, 1993 and November 23, 1993.

5. **The United Nations and the Situation in The Former Yugoslavia**, *Reference Paper*, United Nations Department of Public Information, May 7, 1993, p.43.

6. "An Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly, *Statement*, New York, September 24, 1992.

7. "UN urged to help end bloodletting," *Globe and Mail*, September 26,1991, p.A16.

8. Graham Greene, Central and East Europe Relations Division, Department of External Affairs, personal interview, Ottawa, November 18, 1993 and November 23, 1993.

9. "Statement by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the Situation in Yugoslavia in the Emergency debate in the House of Commons," Ottawa, Ontario, November 18, 1991, 91/95, *Statements and Speeches*, External Affairs and Trade Canada, p.2.

10. Ibid., p.3.

11.Ibid., p.3.

12. Ibid., p.3.

13. "Statement by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the situation in Yugoslavia in the Emergency Debate in the House of Commons," *Statement*, Ottawa, Ontario, November 18, 1991, External Affairs and Trade Canada, 91/59, p.4.

14. Ibid., p.4.

15. Ibid., p.5.

In more specific terms the Minister described the package of sanctions that Canada supported when its joined in support of the EC sanctions that were announced in early November of 1991. She explained to the House:

> we suspended Canada's general preferential tariff treatment to Yugoslavia;
>
> we put Yugoslavia on the area control list, which means that any export to Yugoslavia now requires an export permit;
>
> we announced that all applications concerning Yugoslavia made under the Program for Export Market Development and the Renaissance Eastern Europe Program would be refused; and
>
> we suspended trade promotion and trade support measures to Yugoslavia. "Statement by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the Situation in Yugoslavia in the Emergency Debate in the House of Commons," Ottawa, Ontario, November 18, 1991, *Statement*, 91/59, External Affairs and Trade Canada, p.6.

16. Ibid., p.7.

17. The Canadian explanation of the affair was that Serbian concerns were not raised by high-ranking Serbian and Yugoslav officials. This explanation could do little to counter the Serbian perception that there was a close association between Canada and Croatia given the noticeable involvement of the Croatian community in the Yugoslav conflict. (Footnote: The minister of defense for Croatia is a Canadian as is a leading member of the

right-wing Croatian Party of Rights. Croatia's Minister of Emigration, Goijko Susak, is also a Canadian. Croatian President's personal security is overseen by a former officer of the Ontario Provincial Police, Rosie Tomasic. A former resident of Mississauga, a computer specialist acts as a senior advisor to Croatia's Minister of Telecommunications.The list goes on. Not forgotten as well was the Canadian businessman bound for Croatia who was caught with a planeload of arms by the Yugoslav army. Besides numerous examples of Croatian Canadian business people and developers establishing important economic links between Canada and Croatia, an example of the close connection that many Canadian Croats have with their native country is illustrated by the fact that not only did a large number of them go back to Croatia to assist in the rebuilding of their new country but were also given the opportunity to vote in Croatia's first free elections. The census of 1986 there were 35,000 Canadians of Croat descent living in Canada.

18. *The Globe and Mail*, January16, 1992, p.A13.

19. "Canada considers sending peace force to war-torn country," *Vancouver Sun*, February 15, 1992, p.B10.

Evidently a vote by the Security Council had been postponed due to the concern by the United States and other Western members that the anticipated cost of $634 million (US) for the UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) was far too excessive. Peacekeeping operations are normally financed by assigning special assessments to UN members based on their ability to contribute.) Another matter that remained to be determined was what Canada would have to pay for the deployment of its own troops to the peacekeeping effort.(Footnote: It is worth noting that Canada has maintained Canadian soldiers on standby for the possibility of peacekeeping duties for the past several years. The costs of maintaining these standby units are included in the regular Department of National Defence budget. However, when these units are sent abroad such as in the case of Yugoslavia, there are extra costs for transportation , hazardous duty conditions , life insurance and larger costs for food and shelter that are involved. UN calculations indicate that are about $900 dollars per month for every soldier included in a peacekeeping operation. Normally Canada and other countries providing peacekeepers are reimbursed this additional cost from a particular UN budget. What was particularly troubling to Canadian authorities was that there was consideration being given by the UN to target Canada and other participators in a peacekeeping operation with a special assessment to pay for the Yugoslav operation.

20. **The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia**, *Reference Paper*, May 7, 1993, United Nations Department of Public Information, p.50.

21. Hardliners in control of the Krajina region succeeded, for example, in eliminating the region's police chief and disarming of those volunteer militias who was supportive of the UN plan.

22. "Canadians try to defuse minefields of hate," *Vancouver Sun*, April 18, 1992, p.A13.

23. Ibid., p.A13.

24. Andre Picard and Paul Koring, "PM urges UN sanctions", *Globe and Mail*, May 25,1992, p.A1.

25. Ibid., p.A1.

26. Andre Picard and Paul Koring, "PM urges UN sanctions", *Globe and Mail,* May 25,1992 p.A2.

27. Ibid., p.A2.

28. Ibid., p.A2.

29. Reference Paper , 7 May 1993, *The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia,* United Nations Department of Public Information, p.69.

30. Andre Picard, "Mulroney implores UN member states to pay their dues," *Globe and Mail,* May 25, 1992, p.A8.

31. Ibid., p.A8.

32. Ibid., p.A8.

33. "Co-operative Security in the `1990's from Moscow to Sarajevo," External Affairs and Trade Canada, *Statement* 93/36, May 17,1993, pp.2-3.

34. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, **An Agenda for Peace**, (United Nations, New York, 1992), p.9.

35."Co-operative Security in the 1990's from Moscow to Sarajevo," External Affairs and Trade Canada, *Statement* 93/36, May 17,1993, p.5.

36. It is worth noting as well that Mr. Boutros-Ghali's report had caught the attention of Parliament's standing committee on external affairs and international trade which recognized it as being "lauded for its vision but ignored or opposed for its specifics." "*An Agenda for Peace* concretely advanced," by Michael Valpy, *Globe and Mail*, March 18, 1993, p.A2.

37. Dave Todd, "McDougall vents anger at UN" by , *The Gazette, Montreal*, September 25, 1992 p.A9.

38. "An Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations Assembly," *Statement*, New York, September 24, 1992 , p.4.

39. Ibid., p.4.

40. Ibid., p.9.

41. Ibid., p.9.

42. Paul Koring, "McDougall urges fast action in European ethnic disputes," *Globe and Mail*, June 1, 1992, p.A6.

43. Jeff Sallot, "Ottawa rejects plan to isolate Yugoslavia," , *Globe and Mail*, May 13, 1992, p.A9.

44. Alan Ferguson, "UN troops frustrated, Canadian officer says," *Vancouver Sun*, May 20, 1992, p.A10.

45. Ibid., p.A10.

46. "Europe faces refugee crisis as war rages," *Vancouver Sun*, May 20, 1992, p.A10.

47. The Canadian contingent was to act as the core of the UN presence in Sarajevo supported by a French contingent of some 300 troops.

48. Paul Koring, "For Bosnians, more war is... " *Globe and Mail*, July 3, 1992, p.A1.

49. Andrew Phillips, "Courage Under Fire," *Maclean's*, July 13, 1992, p.27.

50. Geoffrey York, "Canadians headed for Sarajevo,"*Globe and Mail*, June 30, 1992, p.A2.

51. Vice-Admiral Murray, Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of National Defence, personal interview, Ottawa, June 15, 1994.

52. Geoffrey York, "Military involvement not ruled out in Sarajevo," *Globe and Mail,* June 27, 1992, p.A4.

53. Ibid., p.A4.

54. Member Canadian Forces, personal interview, Calgary July 2, 1994. Name and rank of source confidential.

55. Civil Military Cooperation.

56. Major Ted Itani, Canadian Forces, personal interview, Ottawa, November 26, 1993.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Major-General Gaudreau, personal (telephone) interview, Ottawa-Montreal, June 17, 1994.

60. "General takes stand in Bosnian town," *The Gazette, Montreal,* March 15, 1993, p.A1.

61. From the perspective of many Canadians and others in Bosnia, Morillion had also, in fact become a friendly hostage of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica who for some period of time were not willing to let him leave. (Interview (telephone) with major-General Gaudreau, Ottawa, June 17, 1994

62. "General takes stand in Bosnian town," *The Gazette, Montreal,* March 15, 1993, p.A1.

63. Paul Koring, "Canadians try to save town," *Globe and Mail*, April 8, 1993.

In connection with the Bosnian-Serb offensive and the Srebrenica initiative involving Morillion and Canadian forces, there were other examples of attempts by UNPROFOR/UN officials to play down events that could lead to an escalation in UN military involvement in Yugoslavia. For example Canadian and UNPROFOR Forces in Bosnia were aware - through intelligence operations - that the Bosnian Serb offensive was being directly supported by Serbian artillery positions in Serbia proper. Canadian forces in Bosnia understood that the United Nations did not want to publicize this situation for fear of escalating the situation and or embarrassing UNPROFOR. As a matter of fact, UNPROFOR forces were discouraged from gathering intelligence of this kind. The reality, from the perspective of Canadian forces on the ground, was that the gathering of military and political intelligence was essential in doing what was possible to ensure their own security and safety. In short, Canadian forces in Bosnia were well aware that it would not be good politics to publicize this kind of information because of the embarrassment it could cause the UN and the possibility that the knowledge of the fact that from within Serbia proper Serb artillery was actively shelling Muslim positions could contribute to an international escalation of the conflict. Source confidential

64. "Serbs given stern warning," *Globe and Mail*, April 15, 1993, p.A5.

65. Besides facing starvation - with relief convoys only getting through intermittently - the terrified inhabitants and refugees in Srebrenica had been facing repeated shelling - often deliberately targeted against the masses of refugees huddled in the open waiting and hoping for evacuation and protection. The relief convoys that were eventually allowed through did so on Serb terms which called for the abandonment of Canadian armed escorts and the agreement of General Morillon to arrange for the removal of Serbs from Tuzla a Muslim community. There was also an agreement between the General and Serb militias to allow for the evacuation of the most seriously wounded from the besieged city. It should also be noted that the UN resolution declaring Srebrenica a safe haven was accompanied by a threat to toughen existing sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

66. **The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia**, *Reference Paper*, 7 May 1993, United Nations Department of Public Information, p.98.

67. Ibid., p.98.

68. Ibid., p.99.

69. Paul Koring, "Srebrenica airlift begins,"*Globe and Mail* , April 19, 1993, p.A1.

70."Canadian troops battle tight deadline," *Globe and Mail*, April 20, 1993, p.A6.

71. Paul Koring, "Protect town, Canadians told," *Globe and Mail*, April 23, 1993, p.A2.

72. Paul Koring, "Paris backs Canadian call for help in Srebrenica," *Globe and Mail*, April 24, 1993, p.A8.

73. Paul Koring, "Protect town, Canadians told," *Globe and Mail*, April 23, 1993, p.A1.

74. Ibid., p.A2.

75. Paul Koring, "Paris backs Canadian call for help in Srebrenica," *Globe and Mail*, April 24, 1993, p.A8.

76. Ibid., p.A8.

77. Some setbacks were faced by the Canadians. After the Canadian troops arrived on April 18 (1993) they negotiated an agreement with the Serbs to clean up a water filtration plant just inside Serb lines. With the town facing an acute shortage of clean water, the Serbs once again seized the water plant in late May and prevented members of the Royal 22nd Regiment from obtaining access to the plant. Cease fire violations were too numerous to count.

78. Paul Koring, "Conditions grim in Srebrenica, Canadians say, " *Globe and Mail*, May 11, 1993, p.A7.

79. Ibid., p.A8.

80. **The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia**, *Reference Paper*, 7 May 1993, United Nations Department of Public Information, p.107.

81.John Burns, "Bosnian generals agree to make Srebrenica safe", *Montreal Gazette*, April 18, 1993, p.A2.

82. "UN orders tribunal to prosecute war crimes," *Globe and Mail*, May 26, 1993, p.A8.

83. "UN votes to send troops to protect Muslims," *Globe and Mail*, June 5, 1993, p.A10.

84. Local inhabitants, for example, resented the incoming refugees. Money was of no value. Crime and corruption often associated with the distribution of humanitarian aid was prevalent. Local Muslim warlords had final authority over the allocation of UN aid and any attempt to "democratize " the distribution was dealt with quite ruthlessly. As reported by Paul Koring of the *Globe and Mail* following a riot on May 21 outside a warehouse, refugees frustrated by the inequitable distribution of food, elected a person to represent them. On the same day of his election their representative was found shot dead. Relief convoys escorted by Canadian armored personnel carriers managed to get through with some regularity. What semblance of order the UN presence lent to the town was threatened not only by disease, hunger and Serb snipers but by a breakdown in social order and conflicts between the original inhabitants and the newly-arrived refugees.

85."Serbs threaten peacekeepers," *Calgary Herald*, July 15, 1993, p.A3.

86. On a broader scale perhaps, there emerged the view that the UN operations such as in Somalia could eventually lead not to a safe haven as such but to the establishment of some form of UN trusteeship over those areas , a half measure not much more palatable to many than the creation of so-called safe havens in Bosnia. Intervention in the form of a trusteeship creates another set of problems that could seriously burden the international community and the UN specifically. In the words of one journalist writing for the *Toronto Star*:

> Campaigns for increased humanitarian intervention could increase the continent's dependence on the international community - and prolong the conditions that have created crises such as Somalia. Michael Clough, "Colonialism with a humane face," *Toronto Star*, December 9,1992, p.A19.

In other words, well-intentioned intervention may result in the "re-establishment of dependency rather than self-sustaining government" or the establishment of another form of colonialism, only this time with a so-called "humane face". Ibid., p.A19

87. Paul Koring, "Haven plan offers little to Muslims of Bosnia" *Globe and Mail*, August 1, 1992, p.A1.

88. Major-General Bob Gaudreau, personal (telephone) interview, Ottawa-Montreal, June 17, 1994.

89. Vice-Admiral Larry Murray , Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of National Defence, personal interview, Ottawa, June 15, 1994.

90. Major Ted Itani, Canadian Forces, personal interview, Ottawa, November 26, 1993.

91. One Canadian peacekeeper interviewed in Ottawa was quite comfortable in describing the deployment and presence of his colleagues in Srebrenica as "the bait" that would have led to stronger and more intervention by UN forces in the Bosnian conflict.Source confidential

92. Moira Farrow, "Fellow Quebecers anger hero of Srebrenica," *Vancouver Sun*, March 22, 1994, p.A12.

93. "Mixed emotions as troops head home," by Stephen Ward, *Whig Standard,* March 17, 1994. pA1.

94. Pierre Martin and Michael Fortmann, "Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World," *International Journal,* Spring 1995, p.383.

95. Mulroney's March 9, 1990 speech.

96. As noted prophetically by one journalist:

> In External, officials are asking: What is Canada's overriding interest in Europe? Stripped down that interest is stability. As the Prime Minister said: 'What is required now is a fine balance between the needs of stability and the requirements of change.'

> Stability, in the age of 'common security,' might mean multinational forces in Europe monitoring disengagements or verifying agreements. This wouldn't be peacekeeping as such, but a variation on it. Canada might be useful in contributing to 'common security.' Jeffrey Simpson, "Canada examines role in Europe," *Globe and Mail*, March 30, 1990, p.A6.

97. "Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the Department of Political Science and Economics of McGill University," Montreal, Quebec, February 5, 1990, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, p.4.

98. It is interesting to note, at this point in the evolution of events, the tone and substance of Clark's message which are careful in calculating and delineating our capabilities as opposed to the tone and substance of Ms.McDougall's policy statements and rhetoric would employ about breaking through many conventional diplomatic and foreign policy conventions and assumptions. Ibid., p.4

99. "Speech by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the United Nations Association," Toronto, Ontario, January 30, 1989, p.7.

100. "Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Forty-fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," New York, United States, September 26,1990,External Affairs and International Trade Canada, pp.4-5.

101. Mr. Clark in making his point stated:

> Peacekeeping is building international order. What we are doing in the Gulf is seeking to keep and build international order. And that is the most fundamental purpose of Canadian foreign policy....
>
> ... The same hopeful forces which are shaping a new future for peacekeeping are behind the world's response to the Gulf. That too is the result of the new international consensus, the new collective will, the new belief in the international order. What the world is doing in the Gulf is not departing from the UN Charter. It is returning to it. Returning to the notion that the best guarantee of peace is the guarantee that war will not

> be accepted. That guarantee poses risks and dangers and new responsibilities. That is the responsibility of international order. It is a burden worth bearing. That is what Canadian foreign policy is all about."Peacekeeping and Canadian Foreign Policy," Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State foe External Affairs, at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Center for Arms Control and Disarmament, Toronto, Ontario, November 8, 1990, External Affairs and Trade Canada, p.1)Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the Department of Political Science and Economics of McGill University," Montreal, Quebec, February 5, 1990, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, p.8.

102. "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: The Persian Gulf Crisis and its Consequences," Notes for a Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Seventh Annual Seminar of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Ottawa, Ontario, January 24,1991, *Statements and Speeches*, External Affairs and Trade Canada, p.4.

103. Hugh Winsor, "War's foes and friends claim Pearson's legacy," *Globe and Mail*, February11,1991, p.A5.

104. Lloyd Axworthy, "Perfect chance to repair the UN Charter,"*Globe and Mail*, August 14,1991, p.A13.

105. Ross Howard, "Canada offers plan for Kurdish plight," *Globe and Mail*, April10, 1991, p.A10.

106. Paul Koring, "EC leaders fail first major test," *Globe and Mail*, October 7, 1991, p.A9.

107. Paul Koring, "Dangerous farce portrays Yugoslav cease-fire," *Globe and Mail*, October 12, 1991, p.A2.

108. Apparently it is not until around the end of May 1992 that the Canadian government freezes Yugoslavia's financial assets in Canada. Reference to this is made in "Yugoslav ambassador resigns post in Ottawa," by Jeff Sallot in the *Globe and Mail*, June 2,1992, p.A6.

109. Paul Koring, "Sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia," *Globe and Mail*, November 9, 1991, p.A.2

110. Ibid., p.A2. The Soviet Union, Libya and China were the main suppliers of oil for Serbia.

111. Paul Koring, "Sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia," *Globe and Mail*, November 9, 1991, p.A2.

112. Graham Greene, Central and East Europe Relations Division, Department of External Affairs, personal interview, Ottawa, November 18, 1993 and November 23, 1993.

113. Jeff Sallot, "It's no longer all talk and no action," *Globe and Mail*, October 3, 1991, p.A19.

114. *The Reid Report,* Volume 7, Number 9, The Angus Reid Group, October 1992, p. 36.

115. Pierre Martin and Michael Fortmann, "Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World," *International Journal*, Spring 1995, p.386.

116. *The Reid Report*, Volume 8, Number 5, The Angus Reid Group, May 1993, p. 30.

117. Ibid., p. 30.

118. Pierre Martin and Michael Fortmann, "Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World," *International Journal*, Spring 1995, p.392.

Decima's question in November 1991 and May 1993 read as follows:'Some people say the United Nations should do more to stop wars, like the one in Yugoslavia, even if this means interfering in the internal affairs of an independent country. Others say the United Nations should not interfere in the internal affairs of an independent country, even to stop wars like the one in Yugoslvia . Which statement comes closer to expressing what you believe?'

119. Pierre Martin and Michael Fortmann, "Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World," *International Journal*, Spring 1995, p.391.

120. "Bosnia's state of horror," [Editorial] *Globe and Mail*, May13, 1992, p.A14.

121. Ibid., p.A14.

122. "We should move on this man's advice," [Editorial] *Vancouver Sun*, August 8, 1992, p.A12.

123. A plethora of editorials and articles expressing outrage at the state of affairs in Yugoslavia and calling for forceful action on the part of the international community appeared in the press in the 1992-93 period. To name a few: "It's time to act against the evil in the Balkans," by Frank Rutter in the *Vancouver Sun* , August 10, 1992 p.A9; "It's time the UN bared its teeth in Bosnia, Somalia," by Frank Rutter in the *Vancouver Sun*, November 27, 1992, p.A14; "We should move on this man's advice," Editorial, *Vancouver Sun*, August 8, 1992, p.A12; "Chorus builds for military to take action in Bosnia," by Knight-Ridder(New York Times) in the *Montreal Gazette*, April 17, 1993, p.A16; "Bosnia needs more help," Editorial, *The Montreal Gazette*, April 14, 1993, p.B2; "Politics of self-deception," by Marlene Nadle in the *Toronto Star*, August 20, 1992, p.42; "Is this Munich all over again?" by William Pfaff in the *Vancouver Sun*, August 5, 1992, p.A13; "We're letting Serbia get away with it," William Pfaff in the *Vancouver Sun*, August 31, 1992, p.A8; "Few options left for Western intervention in Bosnia," by William Pfaff in the Vancouver Sun, January 11, 1993; "End to 'ethnic cleansing ' sought," by Douglas Todd in the *Vancouver Sun*, March 19, 1993, p.B2; "Foreign intervention threat could bring peace plan for Bosnia," by Clare Nullis in the *Vancouver Sun*, January 6, 1993, p.A8. In 1993 there were examples of more of the same: "Spineless 'leaders' have failed to do their job," by Gwynne Dyer in the *Montreal Gazette*, July 22, 1993, p.B3; "The price of cowardice," by Gwynne Dyer in the *Montreal Gazette*, March 25, 1993, p.B3; "Blustering in Bosnia," by Christopher Young in the *Montreal Gazette*, July 10, 1993

124. Richard Gwyn, "Ethnic cleansing': we must take a stand," *Vancouver Sun*, August 19, 1992, p.A10.

125. Ibid, p.A10

126. Kim Richard Nossal, **The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy**, (Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., Scarborough, Ontario, 1989), p.115.

127. Ibid., p.115.

128. In the report the Canadian delegation made three concluding requests: first, that the "Secretary of State for External Affairs should urge the use of UN mediation facilities quickly in Yugoslavia if the need arises"; second, that Canadian trade officials and Canadian companies be alerted "to the opportunities in the Yugoslav market place"; and third, that it be brought "to the attention of Canadian trade officials the criticism of Yugoslav officials directed at the use of Canadian quotas, restraint agreements and anti-dumping procedures against Yugoslav leather goods, textiles and other goods." (*The Report of the Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association; Pursuant to standing order 43(1) and presented to the House of Commons on May 16, 1991*, pages 31-32)

129. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Wednesday, May 15, 1991, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, p.132.

130. Michael Pearson, Senior Policy Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Andre Ouellete, and formerly, foreign policy advisor to the Research Bureau of the Liberal Caucus and Mr. Llyod Axeworthy, Liberal Foreign Policy Critic, personal (telephone) interview, Kelowna-Ottawa, September 13, 1992.

131. Commons Debate, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, September 17, 1991, p.2250.

132. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 5, 1991, p.4512.

133. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.4950.

134 .Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.4950.

135. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.4950.

136. Commons Debate, House of Commons, November 18, 1991, p.4952

137. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, House of Commons, Issue No.11, Third Session of the Thirty-fourth Parliament, October 22, 1991, pp. 11:8 - 11:9.

138. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, House of Commons, Issue No.11, Third Session of the Thirty-fourth Parliament, October 22, 1991, p.11.

139. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, House of Commons, Issue No.8., Third Session of the Thirty-fourth Parliament, October 1, 1991, pp. 8:12 - 8:13.

140. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.49552.

141. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.49552.

142. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.49552.

143. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.4955..

144. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, November 18, 1991, p.4955.

145. *Statement and Speeches*, External Affairs and Trade Canada Ottawa, Ontario , November 18, 1991, 91/59, p.2.

146. Ibid p.2.

147. "Statement by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the Situation in Yugoslavia in the Emergency debate in the House of Commons," Ottawa, Ontario, November 18, 1991, 91/95, *Statements and Speeches*, External Affairs and Trade Canada, p.2.

148. Ibid. p.3.

149. **Canada's Stake In Common Security**, *International & Defence Policy*, Canada's New Democrats, August 1993, p.17

150. Ibid., p.17.

151. **Canada's Stake In Common Security**, *International & Defence Policy*, Canada's New Democrats, August 1993, p.17.

152. **Liberal Foreign Policy Handbook,** May 1993

153. Svend J. Robinson, "Justice and Human Rights: Inspiring Canadian Foreign Policy" *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol.1, No.1, (Winter 1992/93), p.19.

154. Ibid., pp.19-20.

155. **Liberal Foreign Policy Handbook**, May 1993.

156. Kim Richard Nossal, **The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy**, (Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., Scarborough, Ontario, 1989), p.169.

157. Michael Rose, "A quiet exercise of power in the PMO," *Maclean's* , Vol 98, No.14, April 8, 1985, p.14.

158. Source confidential.

159. Michael Rose, "A quiet exercise of power in the PMO," *Maclean's* , Vol 98, No.14, April 8, 1985, p.14.

160. Cited in Colin Campbell and George J. Szablowski, **The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies**, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), p.172.

161. Robert J. Jackson, and Doreen Jackson, **Politics in Canada**,Third Edition, (Prentice Hall Canada Inc., Scarborough, Ontario, 1994), p.305-306.

162. "Notes for an address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on the occasion of the Centennial Anniversary Convocation Stanford University," California, U.S.A. September 29, 1991, *Office of the Prime Minister*, p.30.

163. Interview; Source confidential; Ottawa, June 20, 1994.

164. Ibid.

165. Source confidential.

166. Paul Heinbecker, foreign policy speech writer for Mr. Mulroney from the spring of 1989 to September of 1991 and Senior Foreign Policy Advisor in the PCO from October 1991 to August 1992. Currently Mr.

Heinbecker in Canada's Ambassador to Germany. Personal interview. Vancouver, October 31, 1994.

167. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on* **External Affairs and International Trade**, House of Commons, Issue No.15, November 19, 1991, Third Session of the Thirty-Fourth Parliament, 1991, p.15:14.

168. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on* **External Affairs and International Trade**, House of Commons, Issue No.5, November 19, 1991, Third Session of Thirty-Fourth Parliament, 1991, p.15:10.

Chapter 5 - The CSCE, NATO and UN: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Institutionalization of Multilateral Intervention

Introduction

In conjunction with the United Nations two other instruments served as an integral part of Canadian efforts to institutionalize the multilateralization of intervention in Yugoslavia. They were the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The CSCE, NATO and the UN have been for some time important institutional instruments of Canadian foreign policy. With the emergence of the Yugoslav crisis, they became vital institutional components in the goal of Canadian foreign policy to establish concrete institutional linkages as a more effective means of facilitating international intervention in the Yugoslav conflict. In describing Canada's promotion of multilateral intervention, this chapter outlines the evolution of Canada's CSCE and NATO policies and its relationship to two significant CSCE/NATO operations in which the Canadian government was a front-line player. It will be evident that Canada was at times a leading promoter of policy initiatives which suggested a keen governmental interest in pushing these institutions into interventionist activities. Against the backdrop of international disarray, witnessed by the initially confused, fragmented and often inept responses of international institutions attempting to cope with the emerging Yugoslav crisis, the prominent role of political leadership in conjunction with a supportive and energetic foreign policy making bureaucracy are suggested to be the more prominent variables in the making of Canadian foreign policy where these institutions are concerned.

NATO's Initial Rhetorical Reaction

By the late summer of 1991 the seriousness of the crisis in Yugoslavia had clearly manifested itself in an upsurge of violent conflict. It was that conflict, largely isolated for a time in Croatia, which provided greater meaning and urgency, to what had been up to that point, largely rhetorical exercises by the CSCE, NATO and the UN and national governments about the need to strengthen the CSCE and to properly institutionalize the linkages between those institutions. Quite suddenly the peace and security of the new Europe were being seriously and immediately threatened in the Balkans. In the absence of an actual institutional framework designed to meet a potential crisis in Eastern Europe as envisaged by NATO, and countries such as Canada, NATO's initial response to the Yugoslav conflict was limited to being rhetorically supportive of efforts by the European Community, the CSCE and later, the United Nations to diffuse the Yugoslav conflict. The tone and content of that rhetoric, as expressed in a communique issued by Heads of State at a NATO meeting in Rome in November of 1991, were remarkably consistent with the views expressed by the Canadian government on the situation in Yugoslavia. The communique, among other things, called on all parties to "comply fully with the principles of the CSCE" and to avoid "attempts to change existing borders through the use of force."[1] The communique, like statements from Canada's Prime Minister, strongly condemned the part played especially by the Federal forces in the conflict:

> We condemn the use of force to achieve political goals. Continuing attacks by the Yugoslav National Army on Dubrovnik and other Croatian cities are out of all proportion to any provocation, ceasefire violation or requirement to protect Serbian communities or Army garrisons. ... We remind all those responsible for acts of violence in Yugoslavia and for violations of ceasefire agreements that under international law they are personally accountable for their actions in contravention of relevant norms of international humanitarian law.[2]

In terms of recognizing the secessionist aspirations of some of Yugoslavia's nationalities, the position taken by the NATO communique was virtually identical to the one adopted by Canada:

> We urge all parties concerned to agree on a peaceful resolution in the framework of the Hague Conference on

> Yugoslavia. The prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it, can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement, that includes adequate guarantees for the protection of human rights and rights of national or ethnic groups. The right to self-determination of all peoples of Yugoslavia cannot be exercised in isolation from the interests and rights of national or ethnic groups within the individual republics. Authorities at all levels should respect international norms and international obligations, especially those embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other CSCE documents.[3]

The "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" of November 8, 1991 issued by NATO member Heads of State, marked an important stage in NATO's transformation that was initiated in at the London NATO conference the year previous. An important aspect in NATO's transformation highlighted by the Rome Declaration was the reemphasized position that the creation of a "new security architecture" had to be addressed by:

> ... a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. Regional frameworks of cooperation will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.[4]

Adding to the political and bureaucratic complexity of giving greater substance to the creation of framework of interlocking institutions was the entry of the Western European Union (WEU), a defence component of the European Union, as an institutional player in European, and specifically, Balkan affairs . The WEU was presented by NATO as " a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." Important to NATO was the establishment of close links between the Alliance and the WEU to "ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and the Alliance, including giving all European members of the Alliance the possibility of fully participating in its activities, and that all NATO Allies are adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security."[5] By the end of 1991 NATO stood ready, as noted in a communique issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting at a ministerial session on December 19, 1991, to "implement practical arrangements" and "the synchronization of dates and venues of meetings and the harmonization of working methods" with the WEU to facilitate the close cooperation between the two organizations.[6] The communique also outlined the political parameters of the relationship between NATO and the WEU:

> We support the objective of developing WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. ... We are appreciative of the WEU's stated intention to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of the WEU member states in the Alliance and to act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Alliance. We welcome the invitation to member states of the European Union to accede to the WEU, or to become observers if they so wish, and the simultaneous offer to other European member states of NATO to become associate members of WEU, giving them the possibility of fully participating in its activities. This will help ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security identity and defence role and the Alliance.[7]

Besides the entry of the WEU into European affairs during the Yugoslav crisis, there was the emergence as well of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). It was designed to improve NATO's liaison and cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries as well as to foster among those countries a stronger sense of security and a predisposition for democratic change. The December 20 meeting of NACC in Brussels was inaugurated by the Foreign Ministers of Canada, fourteen NATO and nine East European states. In addition to reaffirming its political purpose, the inaugural meeting stressed the need "to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues."[8] The concept involved in this connection had to do with associating ex-Warsaw Pact member states, as well as ex-member states of the Soviet Union, with NATO through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council made up of some 38 states (16 NATO and 12 former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union). With the threatened demise of the NATO collaborative defence paradigm, Canadian foreign policy and defence analysts explored the potentialities of NACC as a broad thirty-eight member organization capable of keeping or making peace in a broad Europe. However, NACC, as an organizational entity was soon superseded by the "Partnership for Peace" concept. Canada, by exploiting the NATO-NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) connection, was attempting to ensure its relevance in Europe. As a former defence advisor to Canada's Ambassador to NATO and the Canadian member of an ad hoc working group on the peacekeeping role that NACC could potentially play, Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley pointed out: "Canadian support for the NACC connection has been most evident as it has been perceived by the government as an opportunity to re-engage in the security issues of Europe in practical terms."[9] From the Canadian perspective Canada's support for the "NACC connection" stemmed from the knowledge that a large part of UNPROFOR states was also made up of NACC states and consequently if NATO found itself in support of a peace plan for the former Yugoslavia, elements of NACC - with its focus on consultation , cooperation and peacekeeping - could be incorporated into that plan. In broader terms as well NATO's public support of harmonizing multilateral efforts, particularly those spearheaded by the CSCE, allowed NATO the time to develop a clearer and more affirmative policy on the peacekeeping role it was prepared to play in Yugoslavia.

Setting the Stage for Change: Canada's CSCE and NATO Policies

Even before the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, the ground had been prepared for Canada's entry into the conflict, in part, by Canada's strong commitment to the on-going renewal of the CSCE process, as well as a strengthening of its institutional character. It is interesting to recall that the Yugoslav response to the creation of the CSCE in the early seventies, like the Canadian, had been positive and constructive and the two delegations worked very well, and often very closely, on the CSCE through the eighties and into the nineties.

Central to the evolving role of the CSCE and its eventual application to the Yugoslav crisis was the human dimension mechanism that became firmly established in the Vienna Document of 1989 which was heralded at the CSCE's inaugural Conference on the Human Dimension in 1989 and was, in the words of External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, "a concept without precedent in the history of Europe and the world."[10] In addressing this conference Clark stressed, among other things, the particular significance of the the human rights dimension in promoting European stability and security. From the perspective of the Canadian government the CSCE was to play a key role in the changing environment of Europe where fundamental assumptions and decades-old policies had to be challenged and re-thought. There were member states, Clark acknowledged, which were not fulfilling the commitments they made at the Vienna Conference, all too frequently hiding behind the cover of state sovereignty. In concluding his address Clark stated:

> We have said may times that we do not seek to impose our ideology or our political system on anyone. What we seek is a secure and stable Europe in which people will be free to speak, to travel, to worship; where minority cultures and traditions are nurtured, protected, and freely practised: where the arbitrary exercise of state authority is curbed by the rule of law; and where trust and confidence grow with dialogue and the freer movement of people, information and ideas. This was the dream of those who wrote the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen; it is the attainable objective of all Europe today.[11]

The relationship between security and change - "stability for the purpose of proceeding with change," as Clark put it - was also evident in the role that , according to Canada, a new NATO would be called upon to play.[12] In a February 1990 at McGill, Clark announced a review of Canada's policy towards Europe, and spoke about his government's definition of security in the context of the remarkable changes sweeping the region:

> The old NATO was based largely on a stark military mission. The new NATO will be based on a definition of security which goes beyond arms to the psychology and politics of security relations. NATO's long-term relevance will hinge on its ability to supplement its military role with a political mission.[13]

Soon after in May 26, 1990 speech at Humber College Clark reiterated the fact that Canadian foreign policy towards Europe saw not only NATO and the CSCE as two complementary institutions in developing a new Europe, but the European Community as well.

> A new direction for NATO, an expanded role for the CSCE, and an intensified relationship with the EEC: those are the institutional pillars of our new policy towards Europe. They reflect our assessment of the most effective means by which new Europe can be built. And they also reflect Canada's interests and assets - political, security and economic - in ensuring that we are at the table, that trans-Atlantic links are maintained and that our priorities are addressed.[14]

Designing a Reformed CSCE

The Canadian government played an important part in the reform of the CSCE. Besides taking the lead at the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension "in proposing strengthened commitments and the rights of minorities," Clark stressed the close relationship between the development of human rights and democracy when he stated that the "pursuit of human rights and democracy is central to Canadian foreign policy."[15] In concluding his speech to the International Conference on Human Rights in Banff on November 11, 1990 Clark reemphasized Canada's commitment to strengthening human rights in a "world where justice knows no borders and human rights no caveat."[16] Canada also played an important role in promoting the greater institutionalization of the CSCE process that led to the Paris Summit of 1990. The tone and direction of Canada's approach at the CSCE was affirmed in the Prime Minister's opening speech to the CSCE summit in Paris on November 19, 1990 when he declared: "We have entered a world where the conventions of national sovereignty are becoming too narrow a base from which to resolve the broadening global and regional problems of environmental deterioration, debt, drugs, population growth and human rights."[17] Canada's position was that an institutional framework was required to ensure, Clark's words , that the CSCE becomes " the drawing board for the new European architecture."[18] In that context Canada had called for regularized, high level meetings of CSCE representatives with annual meetings of Foreign ministers and biannual meetings of Heads of States. Within the CSCE the Canadian government also proposed the establishment of a CSCE Assembly in which parliamentary representatives from member states could meet regularly to deal with problems and issues. Canadian efforts seemed to bear fruit as witnessed by the signing of the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* at the Paris Summit in November of 1990. Along the lines of earlier Canadian proposals, the Charter presented a modest group of recommendations that called for the establishment of a small office in Prague, a conflict prevention office in Vienna and an elections-monitoring office in Warsaw. As confirmed by a senior Canadian diplomat with lengthy involvement in the CSCE: "The conflict prevention centre was not a Canadian idea per say, but we pushed very hard for its implementation. We were one of just a few countries that got it as far as it did get."[19] The Charter also approved of the creation of a parliamentary body to be called the CSCE Parliamentary "Assembly of Europe."[20]

Canada's promotion of a reformed CSCE also held economic connotations. Speaking at the 1990 CSCE Conference on economic co-operation in Europe, John Crosbie, Minister for International Trade, went further in highlighting the multilateral significance of the CSCE's role by expounding on the need for the West to oversee and encourage an economic and political transition in Central and Eastern Europe. He advocated greater OECD assistance in providing technical assistance to East European States and spoke glowingly of Canada's contribution in establishing the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. "This bank," the Minister explained, "will have a more distinctive orientation than other regional development banks in that its purpose (Article 1) states clearly that loans will only be extended to countries which have adopted the principles of multiparty democracy and market economies."[21] The CSCE process and the role of of global economic institutions and multilateral trading institutions "anchored in the GATT" were, for Canada's Minister of International Trade "... a turning point in world history, the beginning of a new area of multilateral cooperation for the CSCE region, and for the whole trading community."[22] In short, they suggested a move towards greater multilateral intervention in national economies.

Under the leadership of Canada's new Secretary of State, Barbara McDougall, Canada's vigorous diplomatic attempts to give the CSCE an identity and a form that would complement Canada's capabilities and meet Canada's policy objectives in the human rights field in particular were evident at the Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in the fall of 1991.[23] What is significant about the development of the human dimension mechanism was Canada's leading role in trying to make the mechanism more intrusive. A very highly placed member of the Department of External Affairs specializing in CSCE affairs explained that:

> What we wanted to able to do was not simply exchange bits and pieces of information in writing at some sort of bilateral meeting. What we wanted to have was the ability for the CSCE to send fact finding missions on to the territory of the state to have a look at the situation and we actually managed to do that at the Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE.[24]

With the adoption of the Moscow Document, the CSCE now had the means to take on a significantly more intrusive stance in terms of its mandate. For example the introduction declared that:

> **They** [participating states] **categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned**.[emphasis mine].[25]

At the Moscow meeting Canada was emphatic about supporting the establishment of CSCE "rapporteurs" who would make up "missions of experts" responsible for reporting on clearly defined questions and issues within a host state. While the Moscow Document did not allow the imposition of a CSCE mission on a state, it did allow for participating states to engage this mechanism without the consent of all the member states. Earlier a consensus was required. However, the Moscow Document stipulated that there are provisions in the human dimension mechanism that allow a group of states to engage that mechanism notwithstanding the fact that the approval of the state that may be targeted as receiving a CSCE mission had not been granted. This limitation was understood by the Canadian delegates who were also cognizant of the fact that there would likely be tremendous moral and political pressure on a state to accept these missions.[26] The Moscow Document also reinforced the independence of the mission of experts while it would be operating within the borders of the "inviting state". Article 6 of the Moscow Document states:

> The inviting state will co-operate fully with the mission of experts and facilitate its work. It will grant the mission all the facilities necessary for the independent exercise of its functions. It will, *inter alia* , allow the mission , for the purpose of carrying out its tasks, to enter its territory without delay, to hold discussions and to travel freely therein, to meet freely with officials, non-governmental organizations and any group or person from whom it wishes to receive information. The mission may also receive information in confidence from any individual, group, or organization on questions it is addressing. The members of such missions will respect the confidential nature of their task.[27]

In order to forestall any recriminations that befall individuals or groups of "the inviting state" that have co-operated with the CSCE mission of experts, Article 6 goes on to add:

> The participating States will refrain from any action against persons, organizations or institutions on account of their contact with the mission of experts or of any publicly available information transmitted to it. The inviting State will comply with any request from a mission of experts to be accompanied by officials of that State if the Mission considers this to be necessary to facilitate its work or guarantee its safety.[28]

The Moscow Document, building on earlier CSCE documents, imposes a host of responsibilities on the participating states. These responsibilities, incorporated in over forty articles, are all-encompassing, ranging from the necessity of recognizing the rule of law to the elimination of "all forms of violence against women."[29]

It was through its participation in the evolution of the CSCE and eventual meetings such as those which produced the Moscow Document of 1991 that Canada, along with other countries that shared a more activist view, pressed for both a more intrusive as well as operationally capable role for the CSCE. The Canadian efforts in helping to bring about the Moscow Document are noteworthy. Most notably the Moscow Document had established a way for the CSCE to take some action *without* the consent of the state in which there was trouble. It marked a departure from the consensus role that had governed CSCE proceedings. In sum it represented, to this point, the culmination of Canadian initiatives which began with the Helsinki accords of 1973 that inaugurated some basic human rights standards for participating states to follow which was then followed by the further institutionalization of the CSCE under Clark in 1990, and the development in 1991 under McDougall of the first of the CSCE documents that facilitated unprecedented interference in the internal affairs of a state.

The EC Flounders, the CSCE Moves to the Forefront and NATO Remains on the Sidelines

As noted, the early reaction of the CSCE to the conflict in Yugoslavia was predictable. Calls for Yugoslav unity by the CSCE in the spring of 1991 were largely ignored by Slovenia and Croatia as they proceeded with policies designed to disassociate and eventually secede from the federation. On July 3, 1991 at an emergency meeting in Prague, the CSCE, in a statement supported by Canada, called for an an immediate cease fire and a dispatch of a mission to Yugoslavia to undertake outside monitoring of the situation. At this point in the conflict, the EC's role in the conflict was beginning to flounder. EC-led peace initiatives had produced few positive results. In addition it should be noted that many of the member states of the EC, like those of the CSCE, had their own ethnic difficulties prompting them, at least during the initial phases of the Yugoslav conflict, to take a cautious approach in their efforts and to be less receptive to pressures by ethnic minorities such as the Slovenes or Croats to alter European borders. With the concept of some kind of European peacekeeping force under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU) - a security grouping of nine European Community States - a doubtful starter, the CSCE, for a time was looked upon as the best forum upon which to begin the resolution of the conflict. NATO, at this point during the summer of 1991, was looked upon by most observers as a defense alliance. NATO's position on trying to control the crisis continued to be one of deference to the EC. Although NATO continued to maintain that Yugoslavia was not its affair, in its statement on Yugoslavia NATO expressed the concern that the fighting in the Balkans posed a grave danger to the stability of the region and that the use of force to alter existing borders was unacceptable. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, NATO's response to the early phases of the Yugoslav crisis indicated that in redefining its purpose, the stability of Eastern and Central Europe was becoming its new focal point. During this period the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was the first to challenge the conventional stance taken by the EC as head of the CSCE crisis committee when he spoke of the Yugoslav army's attempt "to keep its old position of power and to preserve old structures is bound to fail and merely brings bloodshed to the people of Yugoslavia."[30] Throughout August cease-fires were broken and then reinstated as the federal presidency and the presidents of Yugoslavia's six republics attempted to negotiate a new framework for the country while fighting intensified between Croat and Serbian forces.

Throughout the summer of 1991 Canada was actively involved itself in CSCE efforts to find a peaceful solution to the fighting. The belligerents were reminded that territory gained by the use of force was unacceptable and they were called upon to resolve their differences through negotiations based on the Helsinki principles. The Canadian government recognized, as McDougall reminded the House of Commons during the emergency debate on Yugoslavia, that the effectiveness of the CSCE was being hampered by the indisposition of CSCE members to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states. Although the Yugoslav situation was still in the EC court, it was important to the Canadian government that the CSCE continue to maintain an active presence in the conflict.

As documented, Canada played an active role in developing the intrusive character of the 1991 Moscow mechanism on human rights. The development of more intrusive mechanisms by the CSCE did not necessarily mean that member states were prepared to apply them. At subsequent CSCE meetings in 1991 the conventional wisdom that the integrity of the Yugoslav state should be maintained generally prevailed. However, this did not mean that the Canadian government was satisfied that the institutional effectiveness and intrusive capability of the CSCE could not be utilized or further improved. Although it was a fact that the Moscow Document was developed within the context of potential multi-ethnic/minority conflict posed by the crumbling Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, the Canadian government was quick to appreciate its applicability to the emerging Yugoslav crisis. Not surprisingly by early in 1992 Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs had become increasingly frustrated by the belief that the CSCE's potential had not been applied in Yugoslavia. In addressing a Summit of the CSCE in Helsinki on July 8, 1992 McDougall contrasted the optimism prevalent during the Paris CSCE meeting in November of 1990 to the brutality of the present period. The Minister called for fundamental changes to the CSCE as she lambasted the body for its lack of "political responsibility" and sarcastically noted:

> The 1992 Helsinki document weighs about half a kilo but does not even mention the torment in Bosnia-Hercegovina. During the weeks that our officials negotiated and bickered over the political statement, thousands were killed in Bosnia-Hercegovina.[31]

More to the point she added:

> Security in this world - the world we live in - must be underpinned by basic values. The CSCE, as our security framework, has to be able to act - **to intervene** [emphasis mine]- if these values are trampled.[32]

In this speech in which she denounced, in particular, the atrocities taking place in Yugoslavia, McDougall, emphasized the necessity of having the means to "interposition forces, before or during a conflict" and to develop a closer link between "the ability of the CSCE to create security with NATO's ability to provide security"[33] Of equal, if not greater significance was the Minister's warning that the failure of the CSCE to achieve significant progress beyond issuing pre-drafted and out of date declarations condemning the violence in Yugoslav, would result in that body's descent into disrepute and irrelevance. The point that McDougall was conveying was that because the CSCE decision-making was based on consensus, the effective application of the CSCE's role in Yugoslavia had to be accompanied by the political will of all the CSCE states involved in the crisis. In her public scolding of the CSCE the Secretary of State for External Affairs was also acknowledging that international and domestic public opinion were demanding, as noted in her speech, "More action, more decisiveness, more leadership" from multilateral institutions.[34]

It was somewhat ironic that Yugoslavia, which had adopted a stance on the development of the human dimension completely supportive of the Canadian position, became the object of this provision found in the Moscow Document.[35] "Canada and Yugoslavia, when there was a Yugoslavia, worked very well on the CSCE," Jill Sinclair, Deputy Director of Cooperative and Regional Security Affairs at External confirmed. "The Yugoslav's had been very interested in strengthening the human dimension mechanism" before their suspension from the CSCE precluded their further involvement in the CSCE.[36]

Canadian Leads CSCE Fact-Finding Mission

David Peel, a highly placed diplomat with extensive expertise in Canada's CSCE involvement, was chosen to head the first fact-finding mission to be sent to Kosovo in May of 1992.[37] The authority for the CSCE fact-finding mission came from the Committee of Senior Officials - one of the agencies created by the 1990 Charter of Paris.[38] The Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna played a key role in implementing the decision taken by the Committee of Senior Officials. Some CSCE member states were displeased with the action taken by the Committee, wanting this kind of authority to be limited to a more senior body. While this fact-finding mission lasted only a little over a week and focused its attention on the military situation in Kosovo, it did set an important precedent for the CSCE to be present on the ground and to interfere in the affairs of a state on a continuing basis.The Yugoslavs agreed to provide Peel and his group of CSCE observers with briefings, transportation and escorts. For the most part the CSCE rapporteurs were taken everywhere they requested. The CSCE was particularly concerned that Yugoslavia, as Peel put it, "was loading up in Kosovo".[39] Questions on the numbers and deployment of military forces as well as the treatment of the local population were usually - with occasional delays - answered forthrightly by the Yugoslav military in Kosovo. Peel's group was also committed to "confidence building to help bridge the gap between the two sides in Kosovo who basically were not talking to each other." Peel went on to explain: "They had lost the ability to communicate. The CSCE was known on both sides. We had talked to the Kosovo Albanian representatives and the Serb authorities to attempt to bring about a dialogue."[40] A fact-finding report , focusing largely on the military situation, was produced by the group. The report, which found that a tense political situation existed in Kosovo, was sent on to the Conflict Prevention Centre then to the Helsinki Conference of 1992. The report concluded that over the recent period nothing significant had changed in terms of the military situation in Kosovo. While the report did not make any recommendations, Peel, did make, upon his arrival to the Helsinki conference, the recommendation to the Committee of Senior Officials, with Ottawa's approval, that because the political situation so bad, the CSCE should try to do something about it by sending in a team for a considerably longer duration "to get," as Peel put it, "the Albanian population and the Serb authorities in Kosovo talking to each other."[41] Peel's recommendation, supported by some other countries, was not taken up by the CSCE immediately. Some of the major players in the CSCE were clearly not enthusiastic about the CSCE or the Conflict Prevention Centre trying to take on a role that the CSCE had never adopted before and felt that the situation in Kosovo was a diversion from the real and immediate focus of the conflict in Bosnia. However, over the summer of 1992 the concept initiated by the Canadians was pursued and by the fall of 1992 agreement was reached in CSCE ranks that such a mission should be pursued and even enlarged to report on human rights abuses and the treatment of minorities in Sandjak, a Muslim area within Serbia that spans the Serb-Montenegran borders, and Vojvodina, a province north of Serbia which holds a large Hungarian population.

Extension of CSCE Mission to Yugoslavia

The CSCE decision on Yugoslavia led to the establishment of the first series of long-term missions that actually went into a state for an extended period of time to establish dialogue between opposing forces as well as to monitor the human rights situation there. The decision on the Yugoslav mission and subsequent ones in other areas was taken by the Committee of Senior Officials with the Conflict Prevention Centre playing an implementing role in actually organizing and deploying them. Each of these missions - some half a dozen in total - had its own mandate that reflected the requirements of the situation. The first long-term mission for Yugoslavia was designed to do what Canada had originally suggested in an informal way and that was to bring opposing parties together to talk about opening up lines of communication in order to discuss political solutions. This first long-term mission began in late September of 1992. Its central headquarters were in Belgrade and it was under the leadership of a Norwegian Ambassador. It produced, according to Canadian officials, useful reports and was successful in promoting discussions and trying to solve problems at the local level, besides trying to establish the facts when their was violent conflict between the local authorities and the population.[42] Each of the teams assigned to one of the three regions encountered different levels of resistance and cooperation from the local authorities. As a Canadian diplomat stationed in Belgrade recalled:

> Each team had a different experience. The team in Vojvodina had an easier time of it than either the teams in Kosovo and Sandjak. What they were doing in Kosovo was actually two pronged if you will: at the same time as they were helping the ethnic Albanians and acting as a mediator with the Serbs, the CSCE mission was also very good in ensuring that any foreign observers who came - such as parliamentary delegations for example - at least met with Serbian officials. This was

> important for two reasons: at least the foreign observers could say that they saw them [Serb authorities] and it deflected Serb criticism that no one wants to talk to them. In that regard the CSCE was very useful in ensuring balance.[43]

In July of 1992, the Yugoslav authorities refused to renew the mission mandate that the "suspension" of Yugoslavia from the CSCE was undertaken. The problem was that when the former Yugoslavia had disintegrated, the successor state, Serbia-Montenegro, which applied for re-admission failed to meet certain commitments, standards and principles. Leading the movement to take Yugoslavia out of the CSCE was Austria. While the Canadian government was privately opposed to the Austrian initiative, publicly the Canadian government could not be seen condoning the Federal/Serb aggression that was at the time very much in the political spotlight. As a consequence of not wanting to appear to be condoning Federal/Serb aggression and the fact that as a result of the Moscow Document consensus was no longer required from members to affect CSCE decisions, the Canadian delegation, with considerable reluctance, went along with the decision not to re-instate Yugoslav membership in the CSCE.[44] The authorities representing the new Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were distressed by the suspension and when renewal of the CSCE missions came up at the end of June of 1992 the Yugoslav authorities refused to renew the CSCE mission mandates until the reconstituted Yugoslav membership was renewed by the CSCE.[45] Some CSCE members, like the United States and especially Austria, took a hard line on suspending Yugoslavia from the organization. Canada's position on the ostracism of Yugoslavia remained more flexible since the government saw merit in having Yugoslavia back in the CSCE fold where its activities and behavior could be more easily monitored and modified.

The suspension of Yugoslavia from CSCE membership and the withdrawal of the CSCE mission from Yugoslavia did not dampen Canada's interest in promoting CSCE activities in the former Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia refused to renew the mandate of the CSCE mission, which subsequently departed, the Canadian government cooperated fully with a request made by the the Committee of Senior Officials to have the Embassies of CSCE countries in Belgrade continue the work the CSCE mission had initiated in Yugoslavia. There was considerable reluctance expressed by some Embassies because they did not want to be seen as taking over a CSCE job. In more specific terms there was concern that the dual tasking of Embassies could put their bilateral relationships with Yugoslavia in peril, not to speak of practical concerns of staffing and logistics. Agreement was soon reached to co-ordinate activities when trips were planned to any of the three regions of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandjak and to circulate reports among the participating embassies and the CSCE. Therefore, Canadian diplomats, in addition to their usual assignment, also continued the work of promoting dialogue and observing the human rights situation in Vojvodina, Sandjak and Kosovo.[46] Predictably Belgrade's response was that this kind of activity by diplomats and foreign embassies was beyond what the Vienna Convention allowed diplomats to do. Belgrade officials pointed out that while diplomats from Belgrade travelled to the three regions as CSCE representatives, the reports compiled by them were signed in their individual capacities as Ambassadors and/or diplomats of foreign countries. The unconventional task of Canadian diplomats undertaking the CSCE mandate was not without challenge and difficulty. It was one thing to employ a CSCE monitoring group to investigate the domestic affairs of a state; however, it was another to make use of Canadian diplomats assigned to Belgrade to undertake CSCE activities. The fact that Canadian diplomats in Belgrade were prepared to go as far as they did underlines the determination and commitment of Canadian political leaders to challenge some of the basic tenets associated with the sovereignty of the state.

A New Role for NATO

It is clear from her CSCE pronouncements that the Minister of External Affairs articulated the Canadian position that NATO should also take on a peacekeeping role in greater Europe. In an address to the House of Commons on the subject of Yugoslavia on June 10,1992 Barbara McDougall stressed this point when she stated:

> We trust that our common commitments to the principles of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe - democracy, peaceful settlement of disputes and, above all, the legal acceptance and tolerant treatment of minorities - will be a formula for peace. But, if there is a need to resolve conflicts through peacekeeping, all of Europe welcomes the application of NATO's unique abilities to provide real resources and expertise. In Oslo [June 4, 1992 NATO meeting], NATO agreed to consider just such CSCE requests. In my view, this could well prevent Yugoslav-type tragedies from occurring in the future.[47]

The decision in Oslo on June 4 by NATO to indicate its willingness, on a case-by-case basis, to take on a peacekeeping role represented a very important precedent - one that was prepared to take the 16 member alliance beyond the simple defence of its borders. It also added, from Canada's perspective, some muscle to the pivotal role provided by the 52-member CSCE through which requests for NATO's involvement would be directed and "co-operative security " in Europe attained. A *Globe and Mail* editorial of July 3, 1992 reflected the promise and optimism that the evolution of multilateral institutions, as well as linkages between them, seemed to present during this period of crisis:

> Still, the logic of the CSCE as a European security vehicle is compelling. Knitting together the nations of what once were East and West, from 'Vancouver to Vladivostok' it remains free so far of domination by any one power and possesses unimpeached credibility - the product of its years of work on human rights during the Cold War. Similarly, NATO is a logical enforcement arm. Unlike the UN's blue helmets, with their shaky funding, light arms and restrictive rules of engagement, NATO has the money, the equipment and the training to be an effective peacekeeping force. Together, these two Cold War orphans could become a powerful source of stability in the disorderly post-Cold War world. [48]

NATO, like the CSCE, was under a great deal of pressure to maintain its political relevance. Although the Oslo meeting did not produce a comprehensive agreement on the possibility of NATO intervention, it and other developments in NATO had ensured, as far as the Secretary of State for External Affairs was concerned, that Canada had a "distinguished position of leadership in peacekeeping" and a continuing role to play in a modernized pro-active and, by implication, pro-interventionary NATO.[49] At the same time, the Canadian government also had to contend with the competing interests of its allies in Europe as illustrated by the jurisdictional frictions between NATO and the WEU. It was evident by early 1992 the oft-repeated theme of the need to establish a framework of interlocking institutions was being increasingly framed in terms of a direct response by NATO members to the eruption of conflict in Yugoslavia and the attendant inability of the international community and its representative institutions to deal effectively with a crisis of growing proportions and complexity. Congruent with Canadian foreign policy objectives NATO's response was also framed as a response to the institutional rivalries and "restrictive interpretations of individual roles" that were hampering the international and European institutional responses to the crisis in Yugoslavia.[50] The stability and security of Europe, from Mr. Worner's personal perspective as well as that of the Canadian government early in 1992, could be achieved by making the NATO-CSCE relationship more operational by having NATO contribute its logistical, intelligence and military resources to CSCE or UN-led peace missions.

By February Secretary General Manfred Worner had become more explicit in sketching out his views on the establishment of interlocking institutions. In addressing a conference of parliamentarians on CSCE issues planned by the North Atlantic Assembly, while underlining the need for a "coordinated, mutually reinforcing division of labour among the CSCE, EC/WEU and NATO," Worner stated that "we no longer live in an age when a nation state can achieve these objectives alone or in concert as in the past."[51] Moreover, strengthened CSCE rules and mechanisms, Worner proposed, would attain real credibility if they were supported by the kind of military capabilities to conduct peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations only in the possession of NATO. Worner candidly admitted in April of 1992 that the Yugoslav crisis had revealed, that "no institution has the full set of political, economic and security management tools to exercise decisive influence alone."[52] These were views shared and promoted by Ottawa, and they found formal expression at the pivotal Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo on June 4, 1992.

By the middle of July of 1992 the move to establish a closer institutional linkage between NATO and the UN began to take on a tangible form with the agreement of NATO, in close cooperation with the WEU, to monitor compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 which initiated the UN embargo on Serbia and Montenegro. The deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia resulted in the preparation of preliminary contingency plans for supporting future UN resolutions by the Chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council as well as frequent calls by NATO for an end to the attacks on UN peacekeepers, the violence and human rights abuses taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In terms of air power, at Boutros-Ghali's request, NATO officials had by the end of 1992 mapped out plans for the military enforcement of a "no-fly zone" in Bosnia-Herzegovina to enforce Security Council resolution 781 which, on October 9, 1992, had declared a ban on military flights in the air space over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canada, along with France, had been urging the Security Council to pass a resolution authorizing NATO planes to shoot down Serb aircraft known to be violating Security Council Resolution 781 with impunity. NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft had been monitoring the Serb violations and reporting them regularly to the UN. The matter of Serb violations of resolution 781 was very disturbing to Prime Minister Mulroney. Equally as exasperating for the Canadian government was NATO's difficulty in planning for the possible commitment of a force of tens of thousands of troops designated to enforce, on behalf of the UN, an international peace plan drawn up by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance that would essentially divide up Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 regions. While supportive of NATO's involvement in a Yugoslav peace plan, Canada's Defence Minister understood the implications on the alliances resources when she stated : "If you want to put 75,000 troops in Bosnia, you have to have a backup of two or three times as many."[53] Besides the uncertainty to do with troop commitments by the 16-member alliance, the Canadian government was also concerned about continuing disagreements among NATO members on the command structure that would be required to implement a large-scale NATO peace enforcement operation.

The UN Security Council Resolution 816 of March 31,1993, authorizing NATO's air force to down aircraft violating a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia, marked a further departure from NATO's conventional role. Interestingly it was only Russian pressure in the Security Council that had ruled out the use of preemptive air strikes by NATO warplanes. NATO warships had already been patrolling the Adriatic to back up the UN trade embargo against Serbia. The concept of having NATO "subcontract" the peacekeeping effort under a UN resolution was also endorsed by Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, generally perceived to be an opponent of broadening the scope of intervention, when he wrote: "Whatever the mandate from the political leadership of the West, it is timely to start looking to NATO to support the UN as it attempts to cope with the peace-enforcing efforts in the Balkans, especially since NATO is made up primarily of Europeans."[54]

The deployment of NATO warplanes to bases in Italy was put into effect in early July of 1993. While this step showed some resolution on the part of NATO and the UN, the "dithering" on the part of NATO members caused some serious strains within the alliance and was seen by NATO Secretary-General Manfred Worner as having contributed to the failure of the international community to deal more effectively with the Balkan crisis. In statements similar to those made by Canada's Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Worner argued strongly that the war in Yugoslavia would have stood a far better chance of being more effectively contained had European leaders responded at the outset of the crisis in Yugoslavia with clear and resolute political will. Worner had repeatedly urged European leaders and the Clinton administration to intervene, or at the very least, demonstrate force to underscore the West's determination for a resolution to the conflict and the general credibility of the alliance. As he stated with frustration: "It is not that we waited so long because no one could define political objectives. It's more a lack of political will, especially in Europe."[55] Worner went on to note :

> The UN turned to us because nobody else could do the job. There were only two possibilities: either the U.S. does it, forming a coalition like they did in the gulf, like they did in Somalia, or NATO does it."[56]

The Canadian government continued to press for NATO - in close conjunction with the UN - to have a stronger interventionary capability in the Balkans. The credibility of any future role for NATO was then seen by Canadian policymakers as very much at stake as it sought to work more closely with the UN in the Balkans. The Canadian government clearly favoured the NATO option under UN auspices. Canada's consistent support for linking NATO's involvement to the Yugoslav crisis was tied closely to Canada's interests in maintaining a European connection in the face of mounting forces and events promoting the greater exclusion of North America from the new Europe promised by Mastricht. While Canada's military contribution to NATO in terms of soldiers and material was modest and under constant erosion by budgetary cutbacks, Canada did play a significant role in helping to bridge the gap between NATO and the United Nations as they became involved in ever closer proximity to the Yugoslav crisis. This bridging role was prompted by the desire of the Canadian government to promote the establishment of strong institutional links between the CSCE, NATO and the UN as a means of responding more effectively to conflicts such as in Yugoslavia and ensuring that Canada would not be excluded from Europe.

In undertaking large-scale preparations to mount air strikes, to insert ground forces into Yugoslavia, and to protect UN-mandated "safe havens," NATO marked the first time the alliance was to conduct military operations outside of its area of operations and the first time operations were conducted to buttress the UN. While there was considerable willingness within NATO to intervene in Yugoslavia, there was within the institution a surprising lack of understanding about how the United Nations operated and how to create effective lines of communication and an effective *modus operandi* between the two institutions. The clandestine decision to employ a NATO communications battalion for UN use in Sarajevo and the implementation of "Operation Sea Monitor" through resolution 787 (November 16, 1992) - which incidentally, does not mention NATO or the W.E.U. by name but rather calls upon States "acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements"[57] to enforce the embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, were reflective of Canada's proactive function in facilitating a greater role for NATO in Yugoslavia as well as the establishment of more effective channels of communication and joint planning between the two institutions.

Canada contributed by participating directly in the NATO and WEU naval force sent to the Adriatic to enforce the UN embargo against Serbia/Montenegro as well as to seal off the former Yugoslavia from arms shipments destined to fuel the fighting there. The Canadian destroyer, the *HMCS Iroquois*, patrolled the Otrano area - a narrow choke-point between Southern Italy and Albania- and a zone further to the north from mid-October 1992 to April 1993. Unidentifiable vessels were challenged, boarded and searched by the *Iroquois*. It has been acknowledged by most observers that the presence of the NATO/WEU fleet, bristling with a formidable array of firepower and high technology, has had some success in enforcing the embargo of Serbia/Montenegro and the import of arms from the sea as well as in monitoring and limiting the use of the Serb air force and navy. However, when the Security Council passed the resolution authorizing NATO warships to monitor the embargo of Yugoslavia, Canada's NATO delegation quickly became concerned about the absence of a central co-ordinating point or body in NATO to implement and manage the operation. Information was channeled by and large through NATO delegates then relayed to the NATO secretariat. Compounding the problem surrounding the lack of a central coordinating body and operational guidelines were the frequently serious differences among the participating NATO members on the funding, deployment and mandate of their navies which participated in implementing the UN resolutions in the Adriatic. There were jurisdictional friction between the national fleets. The division of costs and from whose budget were a constant source of friction and confusion that further complicated the logistical and political problems faced by NATO as it deepened its involvement in the UN action in Yugoslavia. The situation, certainly during the early period of its direct involvement in Yugoslavia, as ascertained by Canada's NATO delegation, was close to chaotic. Canadian efforts, therefore, were directed at promoting arrangements that would ease tensions between NATO members, and at the same time, improve the capability and efficiency of NATO in undertaking its new operational mandate. Helpful to the Canadian position was Secretary General Worner's determination for NATO to play a role in the Balkans and Canada's acquiescence with it, as illustrated in NATO's active involvement in UN operations even before the implementation of Security Council Resolution 787 which had called for the enforcement of the embargo by NATO warships in the Mediterranean. Operation Sea Monitor - strongly backed by the Canadian government and Canada's NATO Ambassador in Brussels - constituted another step in Canada's NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia.

Canada Supports "Masked" NATO Operation in Bosnia

Even before the December 1992 NATO meeting in Brussels which formalized a working relationship between NATO and the UN, Worner seized an ideal opportunity for NATO to establish its presence in Yugoslavia - albeit not publicly - by offering to redeploy one of its European communications battalions to Sarajevo. Worner's decision to supply a mobile communications headquarters was in response to his offer to the UN to provide some assistance in Yugoslavia. The mobile headquarters battalion, made up of wheeled and tracked vehicles and personnel with a sophisticated communications capability of commanding and controlling large military operations, was taken from NATO's Northern Army Group.The establishment of a NATO communications headquarters in Sarajevo marked the first operation in UN history involving the "contracting out" of its mandate. The political implications of this operation were significant. NATO was sensitive to the fact that it could not go into Bosnia under its own flag. Having obtained the political approval for the operation that would provide the UN headquarters in Sarajevo with a fully functional and effective communications system, the task of actually implementing the operation, as in the case of the sea embargo, proved to be extremely difficult given a complicated array of cost-sharing formulas which overlapped numerous operational budgets. The Canadian approach as expressed by Canada Ambassador to NATO, Jim Bartleman, was that a political commitment had been made by NATO to undertake the operation establishing a communications headquarters in Sarajevo and consequently all NATO members should share in the cost of its implementation. This point was emphasized by the Canadian Chairman of NATO's Military Budget Committee: " When the French and Spanish made the political decision to commit NATO to supporting UN operations, they were, therefore, also obligated to supporting that decision financially."[58]

The French and Spanish position was that since they were not part of NATO's integrated command, as such they were not under obligation to cover the bill.[59] The French view, while less than enthusiastic about the operation to move a NATO communications battalion, was, however, that the operation would be allowed to continue and that the UN should be billed for the expense retroactively. The NATO communications battalion, in fact, had already been sent on its way to Bosnia, in October of 1992, *before* any co-ordinative mechanism on its use had been established between NATO and the UN and *before* an understanding was reached among NATO members as to how the cost of the operation would be borne by NATO members. Under the Canadian chairmanship of NATO's Military Budget Committee a creative formula was found by which the operation could be funded.[60] As a consequence, in Bosnia a "masked" NATO operation was established and operated - using NATO equipment and specially trained NATO personnel for a period of time - before any formal mandate for its use had been established by the UN. For Worner it was imperative that the political decision to establish a NATO presence in Yugoslavia be undertaken as quickly as possible in order that, first of all, a precedent for a NATO presence be set, and second, to decrease the likelihood that logistical, bureaucratic concerns would succeed in undermining his initiative. In similar terms, from the Canadian perspective, the government privately identified with and supported the view that the imperative to reach political decisions would have to take precedent over any qualms about their operational feasibility if an expansion of NATO's involvement in Yugoslavia was to be realized. What was important was that NATO had taken an important step beyond its traditional role with Canada's political and financial support and encouragement. Moreover, the confusion and disarray surrounding the operational deployment of the communications battalion and "Operation Sea Monitor" offered the Canadian government, which was already committed to formalizing institutional links between the CSCE, NATO and the UN, an opportunity to contribute its experience and expertise with the UN and other multilateral institutions. Of relevance here as well was Canada's position in NATO that emphasized the belief that if the political decision to act is made by the alliance members, those alliance members should be expected to pay equally for the operational cost.

Canada, specifically through its NATO delegation in Brussels, contributed in a positive way by employing its knowledge and expertise in terms of how the United Nations operated particularly in the area of peacekeeping. The process of actually implementing a NATO operation under the United Nations certainly posed as much of a challenge as finding the political will to establish the concept. The Canadian government, in response to the problems associated with the deployment of a NATO communications battalion to Sarajevo, sent experts in logistics and financial planning (seconded from the Department of National Defence) to NATO to help in the integration of NATO involvement in UN operations.[61] The Canadian team of experts - joined by experts from Norway, Denmark and the UK - began its mission by putting together a framework of informal discussions with their UN counterparts. The informality of the discussions was due to the fact that NAC (North Atlantic Council) had not yet authorized Worner to open negotiations with the UN for the financial reimbursement of the operation he had initiated. Canadian diplomats in Brussels understood that Worner did not want financial matters to get in the way of forward movement on the political front in so far as the movement towards greater NATO involvement in a UN operation was concerned. The deployment of Canadian experts, taken from DND's Directorate of Financial Services to Brussels, in conjunction with the work of Canada's NATO delegation, was instrumental in educating NATO officials on the intricacies of the logistical support and financing of UN operations. "NATO was moving into an area it, as an institution, knew nothing about, recalled a member of Canada's delegation and Canada was there to play an active role to assist in its transition."[62] At the NATO Council level, Canada's Ambassador to NATO, Jim Bartleman, continued to press for the establishment of a coordinating unit within NATO headquarters. Eventually a coordinating unit to facilitate the coordination and communication of political and financial matters between NATO and the UN was established within NATO.

Canada Presses for the Formalization of Institutional Links

Before the establishment of Operation Sea Monitor and other NATO involvements in UN operations in Yugoslavia, the Canadian government had been diligently pressing forward to establish *formalized* institutional links between the CSCE, NATO, NACC, the EC, WEU and the United Nations. As early as 1990 the Canadian government supported Worner's contention that Europe, faced with either slipping "back into the old power politics and balance of power politics of past centuries or moving "along the road to a new order of peace and freedom - whether this be of multinational or supranational nature", should, with NATO backing, move forward with the second alternative.[63] Of particular importance for NATO's Secretary General was the "substantive content" of this new order which emphasized "human rights and free choice for all its citizens, equality before the law, openness of borders, self-determination, democracy and the protection of minority rights."[64] Essential to moving forward and a point of particular sensitivity for Canada was the recognition that the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community were not rivals but rather serving complementary purposes in a broader and overarching Atlantic framework that would link European and North American security interests. Canada also concurred with Worner's view that one of the key elements of a new order was the role of the CSCE process as "the embryon of a future security architecture." [65] As in the case of NATO-EC relations, the CSCE-NATO relationship was also seen to be complementary.

Canada supported the consensus reached by the foreign ministers of the NATO alliance at Turnberry in June of 1990. At Turnberry NATO not only emphasized the growing importance of the CSCE process "as an instrument for cooperation and security in Europe" but also that the CSCE "should be strengthened and given effective institutional form."[66] The recommendation by NATO to further institutionalize the CSCE, such as through the establishment of a CSCE parliamentary body - the Assembly of Europe - and a small CSCE secretariat, was reemphasized in the London Declaration issued by heads of state participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on July 5-6, 1990. Eastern Europe, Canada policy-makers agreed, could not be left out of this process. In explaining the further institutionalization of the CSCE Worner explained to members of the USSR Supreme Soviet a week later in Moscow that: "Our aim is to have a CSCE that allows all the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to play a full role in building with us the future European order"[67] While problems in Yugoslavia had not yet erupted, there was an appreciation by NATO leaders and the Canadian government of the place that Eastern Europe would hold in further institutionalizing the CSCE as well as in developing closer links between multilateral institutions dedicated, each in their own way, to securing a new order for Europe.

The principle of establishing stronger interaction between NATO and the EC, on one hand, and NATO and the CSCE on the other, had been urged on and approved by Ottawa. The Canadian government had been one of the earliest supporters of the emerging NATO view that a threat to the Allies was not as likely to materialize from its former adversaries as it was from "the unforeseeable strategic consequences of instabilities that might emerge in a period of rapid and widespread political and economic transformation."[68] The call for the increased interaction between these institutions was particularly significant for Canada in that it was congruent with the stated intention of NATO to realize "a full and equitable sharing of leadership and responsibilities between Europe and North America."[69] The recognition that the security of Europe and North America was seen by NATO to be indivisible was interpreted by Ottawa as a positive step in maintaining a role for Canada to play in Europe in particular, and on the international stage in general. In early 1991 the indivisibility of security and desirability of establishing "interlocking institutions" from NATO's perspective was reiterated by Worner on the occasion of the visit to NATO by the Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel:

> Security and cooperation in the Europe of tomorrow can best be achieved by a framework of interlocking institutions in which the interests of all European states can be accommodated.[70]

By 1991 NATO communiques emphasized the establishment in Europe of democratic systems of government and respect for human rights based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Public statements issued by the Canadian government echoed those themes.

Moreover, NATO and the Canadian government took the position that while the major multilateral players in the Yugoslav crisis should retain their institutional integrity, more formalized institutional links had to be established in order to cope more effectively with regional conflicts. The Canadian government was certainly pleased that it had a place in Worner's concept of interlocking institutions in general and the Alliance in particular which it had promoted with increasing vigor as the conflict in Yugoslavia was escalating. In a surprisingly brief period of time the first steps towards the creation of a system of interlocking institutions had been taken. As noted the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in July of 1992 endorsed NATO's direct support of peacekeeping operations on a case by case basis and only three months later NATO declared its willingness to support UN peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia if requested by the United Nations. Not only was NATO prepared to support UN peacekeeping operations if asked by the UN, NATO, as noted in Worner's speech of October 30, 1992 to the Atlantic Treaty Association, was also prepared to make the transition from peacekeeping to *peacemaking*. within the context of a system of interlocking institutions.[71] The adaptability to varying circumstances and situations of the system of interlocking institutions, the Canadian government stressed was also critical to ensuring its effectiveness.

Even before the spring of 1993 the Canadian government understood that in the evolution of the Yugoslav crisis the UN had reached its limits in terms of the complexity and scope of its operations in the region. By placing its expertise in the service of CSCE or UN operations, NATO could insure its relevance and NATO-UN cooperation in responding to regional instabilities could become what UN Under-Secretary Marrack Goulding described as a "perfectly viable model."[72]

On April 12, 1993, when NATO began its operations to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 816, plans were underway for a meeting between the Secretary General of the United Nations and NATO's Secretary General, on April 19, 1993 in Laeken. The primary issues on their agenda were the situation in the former Yugoslavia, NATO's evolving role in peacekeeping, and NATO-UN relations. By mid-May of 1993 NATO was clearly communicating its willingness to participate in ensuring the security of the proposed safe areas for parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina if and when called upon to do so by the UN. Within NATO itself planning was initiated to meet the demands of changing strategies designed to address NATO's new peacekeeping/peacemaking role. Ottawa was pleased to see that the development by NATO of rapid reaction forces and capabilities was given a high priority. A joint session of the North Atlantic Council and the Council of the Western European Union, held in Brussels on June 8, 1993 for the purposes of better coordinating NATO-WEU embargo operations in the Adriatic, indicated how far the concept of interlocking institutions had moved forward. The joint session went so far as to approve of establishment of a single NATO/WEU command structure, operating under the authority of the Councils of the two organizations, to oversee the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 820. NATO was also working very hard at projecting the impression that NATO-UN relations were developing effectively. However, those relations, contrary to official pronouncements, were not proceeding smoothly, and in terms of substance, the development of institutional linkages between the two institutions were tentative and ad hoc. Nevertheless, considerable momentum had been attained. Even in philosophical terms NATO had identified itself ever more closely with Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* as noted in the NATO Foreign Minister's communique of June 10, 1993.

The establishment of direct contact, encouraged by Canada, between Worner and Boutros-Ghali, served to underline further the commitment of both leaders to institutionalize the relations between the two organizations and to begin that process by calling for the development of appropriate mechanisms of communication and coordination between the two organizations. The WEU's move to Brussels and a single command for NATO-WEU operations in the Adriatic as well as the formulation of arrangements that would facilitate NATO participation in CSCE operations were illustrative of the kind of institutional linkages that could be achieved and that were promoted and supported by Ottawa. It was readily acknowledged as well that its was the destabilizing effect and the scale of cruelty of the Yugoslav conflict that inspired and drove the pressures to formalize and strengthen institutional linkages between those organizations attempting to cope with the crisis. While the institutional linkages envisioned by their stronger proponents were still relatively far from realization, issues and concepts related to the drive to establish strong multilateral linkages were being forced to the top of institutional agendas. "Canada's NATO delegation in Brussels" stated Paul Meyer, Political Councilor to Canada's NATO delegation at the time, "played an important part in establishing the policy mood that made it easier to facilitate institutional reform."[73]

A June 11, 1993 report by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, endorsed by Canada, illustrated the significance of the debates among institutions concerning conceptual approaches to the problems facing those institutions and the importance Canada placed on maintaining their development so that further linkages between multilateral institutions could be realized. The Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping "was established with the aim of developing a common understanding on the political principles of and the tools for peacekeeping, and to share experience and thereby develop common practical approaches and co-operation in support of peacekeeping under the responsibility of the UN and the CSCE."[74] The report, among other things, attempted to provide a clearer definitional framework and guidelines for institutions participating in what was traditionally referred to as peacekeeping.[75] In short, the report represented a small but significant attempt by states like Canada which saw merit in standardizing and codifying those institutional linkages necessary to respond more effectively to international crises of the kind taking place in the Balkans. In the words of the statement issued by the Foreign Ministers and representatives of NAC members the report "sets out a common understanding on conceptual approaches and a common programme for practical cooperation aimed at sharing information and experiences, undertaking joint training and education and possibly conducting joint exercises."[76]

The development of closer and more intricate NATO-UN ties were more tangibly highlighted in early August of 1993 by the drawing up of closely-coordinated plans between NATO military planners and UNPROFOR for potential air strikes - designated to support humanitarian relief - and the appropriate command and control mechanisms necessary to implement them.[77] Soon after NATO-UN preparations for air strikes were made public, a second meeting between the Secretary General of NATO and the Secretary-General of the United Nations was announced for September 1, 1993 in Geneva. Both NATO and the UN publicized the meeting as yet another indication of ever-increasing cooperation between NATO and the UN. The United Nations had begun, by this time, to look upon NATO as a partner in its peacekeeping endeavors. "Out-of area" operations were no longer looked upon by NATO as an impediment to supporting UN operations. The Yugoslav crisis had required of NATO, the UN and other international institutions an attempt to re-define and re-establish their relevance. This was a view shared by Canada's Secretary of State who argued that closer institutional linkages would re-establish NATO's relevance and that it was unfortunate that those linkages and NATO's unique potential within them had not been facilitated earlier in the conflict. From NATO's perspective, it was not to be regarded as a military subcontractor to the UN, but rather true partner in a clearly structured relationship with the UN. For Canada the attainment of the political will by the international community to act decisively and the full realization of the potential of linking multilateral institutions capable of responding flexibly to crisis could have rendered the Yugoslav conflict containable, if not preventable. Institutional flexibility in terms of responding more effectively to conflict could be attained, for example, by the realization of the "concept of Combined Joint Task Forces," "mobile, multinational, triservice headquarters, which could be detached from existing command structures for operations under WEU auspices," and "separable but not separate' forces"[78] - concepts that Canada encouraged and supported as NATO and other multilateral institutions attempted to react to the evolving complexities of the Yugoslav conflict. And so by the end of 1993 the Canadian government, through the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence, remained committed to a policy that was at the forefront of actively promoting and supporting the further development of institutionalized multilateral linkages designed to respond more effectively to conflict of the sort demonstrated by Yugoslavia.

Explanatory Variables: Domestic and International

An assessment of the variables that contributed to a shift in Canadian foreign policy initiatives aimed at formalizing institutional linkages and thereby facilitating the more effective intrusion of multilateral institutions in the domestic affairs of a state, highlights the significance of the role of political leadership in providing the guidelines and impetus for Canada's foreign policymaking bureaucracy to undertake and promote with considerable energy, determination and expertise the reform of multilateral institutions involved in the Yugoslav conflict. The drive to reform these institutions is not without opposition in the international arena and from some of those institutions themselves which are frequently preoccupied with jurisdictional imperatives. Societal/domestic pressures played a negligible part in influencing the shaping of Canadian foreign policy initiatives as they pertained to institutional reform discussed in this chapter.

International Pressures

In attempting to promote the reform of multilateral institutions Canadian foreign policy was under some pressure from certain states, such as the US as well as certain European states containing visible minorities, that regarded the intrusive character of the CSCE's role as potentially dangerous to their sovereignty and independence. In terms of Canadian policy objective of establishing closer and more formalized linkages between multilateral institutions as a means of more effectively ameliorating the Yugoslav problem considerable resistance was displayed by the European Community which saw the Yugoslav conflict as a problem to be solved by the Europeans and the EC's security body the WEU. Initially Canada deferred to the EC until it had become obvious the EC, on its own, was incapable of stemming the Yugoslav crisis. The retreat of the EC and the unwillingness of the United States to become actively involved in Yugoslavia opened the door to Canadian initiatives involving institutional reform.

Bureaucratic Preferences and Political Leadership Work in Tandem

This chapter indicates that the Department of External Affairs played an important role in pressing forward with initiatives designed to strengthen the intrusive capabilities of the CSCE - the Moscow Document of 1991 being a final product. Canada's foreign policy bureaucracy also offered its expertise in an attempt to bridge gaps between multilateral institutions. Considerable bureaucratic initiative was shown in supporting a "masked" NATO operation in Bosnia and the dual tasking of Canada's Belgrade Embassy in an effort to continue the monitoring work started by the CSCE. Policy initiatives directed at the reform of the CSCE, NATO and the UN were carried out by the foreign policy bureaucracy with determination and creativity. Sparking the implementation of foreign policy initiatives directed at reforming the CSCE, NATO, the UN and the relationship between them, was the response of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State of External Affairs to the indisposition of multilateral institutions as constituted to act more decisively in resolving Yugoslavia's domestic conflict.

Under Joe Clark's leadership as Secretary of State for External Affairs a great deal was done to strengthen the CSCE as an institution and to undertake initiatives that would prepare NATO as an institution to respond with greater flexibility to new Post-Cold War realities. Under the stewardship of Prime Minister Mulroney and Clark's successor Barbara McDougall the message to the foreign policy bureaucracy on providing institutions such as the CSCE with greater power to carry out their mandates was clearly and repeatedly stated. Just as the CSCE's Moscow Document of 1991 was precedent-setting in terms of its intrusiveness, so was the Oslo NATO meeting of 1992 in terms of having states and institutions come to the realization that a "framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions," as expressed in Oslo's *Final Communique*, could greatly improve the performance of these institutions in the resolution of conflict.[79] As noted in section 11 of the *Communique*, the other matter of particular significance was the precedent-setting agreement by NATO to support CSCE peacekeeping, if requested.[80] Furthermore, from the Canadian view, the CSCE process was concerned with three "baskets": economics, human rights and security. What is particularly interesting about the Canadian approach to the CSCE vis-a-vis the crisis in Yugoslavia was the Canadian attempt to integrate more closely the human rights and security baskets by promoting the position that human rights is an element of security, in Canadian parlance "co-operative security." In short, by maintaining the relevance of the multilateral institutions examined here, relying on these institutions to support and implement more intrusive foreign policy objectives, reconciling disagreements among these institutions and developing a more effective response to the Yugoslav conflict, Canada's political leadership placed a high priority on the foreign policy initiatives summarized in this chapter.

Conclusion

Multilateralism has been a key and integral part of Canadian foreign policy. Canada's involvement in Yugoslavia indicated that the Yugoslav conflict could undermine that aspect of Canadian foreign policy if the multilateral institutions engaged in Yugoslavia were perceived to be ineffective or incapable of fulfilling their mandates. In other words, the Yugoslav crisis was threatening the credibility of multilateral institutions. Canada's political leadership, just like Canada's foreign policy bureaucracy, recognized the threat posed to multilateralism should institutions such as the CSCE, NATO and the UN fail to bring the Yugoslav war to an acceptable conclusion. It is understandable, therefore, that considerable attention was directed towards, first, strengthening the institutional relevance of these institutions, second, providing those institutions with stronger intrusive capabilities, third, developing workable interlocking mechanisms so that each institution could enhance its capabilities by doing better what it does best, and finally, urging those institutions and their member states to assume the necessary political will so that those institutions could act in concert to end decisively and forcefully the fighting and bloodshed in Yugoslavia or elsewhere for humanitarian as well as strategic and economic reasons. Canada's involvement was not merely a matter of identifying a way in which the CSCE, NATO and the UN could respond to dangerous and difficult domestic conflicts. While the conflict in the former Yugoslavia provided the international context for greater institutional cooperation, Canada's interest in this process pre-dated the conflict. What the Yugoslav conflict did was provide for the necessary impetus to accelerate Canada's foreign policy activities and to solidify

Canada's commitment to reform international relations through more cooperative arrangements and along more interventionist lines.

Endnotes

1. Press Communique, "The Situation in Yugoslavia," Statement issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991, *NATO Press Service*, November 8, 1991, p.1.

2. Ibid., p.1.

3. Ibid., p.1.

4. Ibid., p.1.

5. Press Communique, "Final Communique," Issued by the Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 12th and 13th December, 1991, *NATO Press Service*, December 13, 1991, p.2.

6. Press Communique, "Final Communique Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, 19th December 1991," *NATO Press Release,* December 19, 1991, p.4-5.

7. Ibid., p.4.

8. Press Communique, "North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, 20th December 1991," *NATO Press Release,* Brussels, December 20, 1991, p.2.

The first step in further institutionalizing relations between NATO and NACC was to:

> - hold annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;
>
> - hold bi-monthly meetings of the North Atlantic Council with liaison partners [Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roumania and the Soviet Union] at the Ambassadorial level, beginning in February 1992;
>
> - hold additional meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at Ministerial level, or of the North Atlantic Council

> in permanent session with Ambassadors of liaison partners, as circumstances warrant;
>
> - hold meetings at regular intervals of NATO subordinate committees with representatives of liaison partners. This will include inter alia meetings with the Political and Economic Committees, as well as with the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO military authorities, and NATO's Atlantic Policy Advisory Group. Press Communique, "North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, 20th December 1991," *NATO Press Release*, Brussels, December 20, 1991, pp.2-3.

NATO member Ambassadors were also were given the task of preparing a workplan in order to implement the institutionalizing process.

9. Lieutenant-Colonel Bentley went on to add:

> The difficulty is that having withdrawn most of our forces in Europe and having eschewed the development of a rapid deployment force[based in Canada] we have no readily available capability of redeploying back to Europe in a NACC peacekeeping role.
>
> Lieutenant-Colonel Lorne W. "Bill" Bentley, Head Peacekeeping Section, International Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of External affairs and Trade Canada, personal interview, Ottawa, November 25, 1993. Lieutenant-Colonel Bentley served as defence advisor to Canada's Ambassador to NATO from 1990 to 1993

10. "Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension," *Statements and Speeches*, Canadian Foreign Policy Series, Paris, France, External Affairs Canada., May 30, 1989, p.1.

11. Ibid., p.6.

12. "Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the Department of Political Science and Economics of McGill University," *Statements and Speeches*, Montreal,

Quebec, February 5, 1990, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, p.5.

13. Ibid., p. 5-6.

14. "Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Humber College, Lakeshore Campus on Canada and the New Europe," Toronto, Ontario, May 26,1990, *Statements and Speeches*, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, p. 8-9.

15. "Human Rights and Democratic Development," Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the International Conference on Human Rights, Banff, Alberta, November 11, 1990, *Statements and Speeches*, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, p.6.

16. Ibid., p.8.

17. "Notes for an address by the Right Honorable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Summit," *Statements and Speeches*, External Affairs and Trade Canada, Paris, France, November 19, 1990, p.2.

18. Joe Clark, Speech on "Canada and the New Europe," *Statements and Speeches*, Toronto, May 26, 1990, External Affairs and Trade Canada, p.5.

19. David Peel, former Ambassador to Prague, Director General for International Security and Arms Control, and Ambassador and Head of Delegation to the Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe and the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building, personal interview, Ottawa, November 25, 1993.

20. John Halstead, "A New Order in Europe: Evolving Security Systems," **After the Cold War**, F. Hampson and C. Maule eds., (Carleton University Press, Ottawa) p.158.

21. "Notes for a speech by the Honourable John C. Crosbie, Minister of International Trade , at the CSCE Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe, " *Statements and Speeches*, Bonn, External Affairs and Trade Canada, April 10, 1990, p.4.

22."Notes for a speech by the Honourable John C. Crosbie, Minister of International Trade , at the CSCE Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe, " *Statements and Speeches*, Bonn, April 10, 1990, External Affairs and Trade Canada, p.25.

23. It was, in fact at the Copenhagen CSCE meeting of 1989 Canada first proposed strengthening the human dimension mechanism by adding a rapporteur provision. However insiders within External suggest that there were concerns that such a provision would negatively affect federal-provincial sensitivities in Canada. Consequently the Canadian proposal was shelved temporarily. Canada's CSCE delegation was sensitive to the establishment of a more intrusive mechanism , even though it was realized that the mechanism would be politically but not legally binding. Source confidential.

24. Jill Sinclair, Deputy Director of Cooperative and Regional Security Affairs, International Security and Defence Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs, personal interview, Ottawa, November 23, 1993.

25. **DOCUMENT of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE**, Moscow, October 3, 1991, p.29.

26. Jill Sinclair, Deputy Director of Cooperative and Regional Security Affairs, International Security and Defence Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs, personal interview, Ottawa, November 23, 1993.

27. **DOCUMENT of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE**, Moscow, October 3, 1991, p.32.

28. Ibid., p.32.

29. Articles of the Moscow Document call upon "participating" states to provide "effective means of redress" (Article 18.3), to "respect the internationally recognized standards that relate to the independence of judges" Article 19.1), to "ensure that law enforcement acts are subject to judicial control" (Article 21.2), to "treat all persons deprived of their liberty with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person" (Article 23), to "endeavour to take measures, as necessary, to improve the conditions of individuals in detention or imprisonment" (Article 23.2), to "ensure that their military and paramilitary forces, internal security and intelligence services, and the police are subject to the effective direction and control of the appropriate civil authorities" (Article 25.1), to "reaffirm the right to freedom of expression" (Article 26), to

"will endeavour to ensure that the legal guarantees necessary to uphold the law will remain in force during a state of public emergency" (article 28.8), to "increase their preparedness and co-operate fully to enable humanitarian relief operations to be undertaken speedily and effectively" (Article 39.1), to "ensure that all CSCE commitments relating to the protection and promotion of human rights are applied fully and without discrimination with regard to sex" (article 40.1), to "seek to eliminate all forms of violence against women" (Article 40.7), to" make information on all CSCE human dimension provisions available to their educators" (Article 42.4), and to "recognize as NGO's those which declare themselves as such according to existing national procedures" (Article 43). 22 **DOCUMENT of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE**, Moscow, October 3, 1991.

30. "European leaders abandon caution on Yugoslav crisis," *Globe and Mail,* July 4,1991, p.A1.

31. *Statement*, Secretary of State for External Affairs,"An Address by the Honourable... , Helsinki, Finland, July 9, 1992, p.2.

32. Ibid., p.2.

33. Ibid., p.5.

34. Ibid., p.2.

35. It should also be noted that in the military area the CSCE has developed provisions which commits member states to accept inspectors or observers if there are military activities that worry neighboring states. These provisions can be found in the Vienna Document of 1992. The ability in this provision, which allows one state to look at unusual military activities of another, was, as in the case of the Moscow Document, equally as supported by the Canadian government. The Hungarian government attempted to use this provision to allow the CSCE to observe what was taking place in a military context in Yugoslav territory adjacent to its border.

36. Jill Sinclair, Deputy Director of Cooperative and Regional Security Affairs, International Security and Defence Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs, personal interview, Ottawa, November 23, 1993.

37. The mission was headed by David Peel, Canada's Ambassador to the CSCE, and made up of a Czech Ambassador, a military officer from Britain, France, Denmark and Holland respectively, officials from Denmark and Switzerland, and a Spanish member of the staff of the Conflict Prevention Centre.

38. The Charter of Paris called for regular and on-going meetings between the ministerial representatives of member states.

39. David Peel, former Ambassador to and Head of Delegation to the Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe and the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building, Department of External Affairs, personal interview, Ottawa, November 25, 1993.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Reports produced by the first CSCE mission to Yugoslavia have not been made public in the interest of gaining the confidence of the CSCE as an arbitrator of conflict and in the interest of promoting a frank and more constructive dialogue between the conflicting parties in the three areas that were the focus of the first CSCE mission. Reports drawn up by Canadian diplomats in their unofficial capacity as CSCE observers were also passed on to Ottawa and CSCE officials. Interestingly, many NGO's have maintained that these reports should be made public. Arguing to the contrary are those Canadian diplomats who make the point that a degree of discretion in the reporting done by the CSCE is necessary in order to advance the process of opening up dialogue. By making the reports public, Canadian diplomats stress, the work of these missions can be defeated since it would reduce the willingness of the conflicting parties to co-operate more openly on issues that often go beyond those strictly related to human rights.

43. Shelley Whiting, former Second Secretary and Vice Councel, Canadian Embassy , Belgrade and currently with the International Security and Defence Relations Division, External Affairs and Trade Canada, personal interview, Ottawa, November 24, 1993.

44. The Moscow Document set a precedent by establishing the "consensus minus one" formula.

45. While this marked the end of the formal involvement of the CSCE in Yugoslavia, other CSCE missions have been undertaken in Estonia, Moldova (headed by a Canadian diplomat, Timothy Williams), Latvia, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

46. Shelley Whiting, former Second Secretary and Vice Counsel, Canadian Embassy , Belgrade and currently with the International Security and Defence Relations Division, External Affairs and Trade Canada, personal interview, Ottawa, November 24, 1993.

47. "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the House of Commons on Yugoslavia," *Statement*, External affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa, June 10,1992, p.2.

48. "A New Role for NATO," [Editorial], *Globe and Mail*, July 3, 1993, p.A14.

49. "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the House of Commons on Yugoslavia," *Statement*, External affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa, June 10,1992, p.2.

50. *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, February 12, 1992, p.1.

51. *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, February 12, 1992, p.1.

52. *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, April 2, 1992, p.1.

53. "Moment of truth for NATO," *Globe and Mail*, March 30, 1993, p.A6.

54. Lewis Mackenzie, "How to handle the Balkans," *The Montreal Gazette*, February 9, 1993, p.B3.

55. Paul Koring, "European leaders' dithering on Yugoslavia condemned," *Globe and Mail* , May 1,1993, p.A9.

56. Ibid., p.A9.

57. United Nations, *Reference Paper, 15 March 1994*, **The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia**, Department of Public Information, New York, p.106.

58. Richard Adams, former Chairman, NATO Budget Committee, now with the Department of National Defence, personal interview, Ottawa , June 13, 1994.

59. Interestingly the US position on payment of NATO forces involved in the UN operations in Yugoslav was somewhat ambiguous. This ambiguity can be traced back to the fact that because the United States, which wanted to control and operate the military aspect of NATO operations in Yugoslavia under its Commander of Allied Forces South, owes the UN a considerable sum, the US contribution to NATO's involvement could, in effect, be deducted directly from that debt.

60. NATO's Military Budget Committee was under the Chairmanship of Richard Adams, Department of National Defence.

61. Richard Adams, former Chairman, NATO Budget Committee, now with the Department of National Defence, personal interview, Ottawa , November 25, 1993.

62. Ibid.

63. Speech by the Secretary General of NATO, Mr. M. Worner at the Bremer Tabak-Collegium, Brussels, "The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 90's," , *NATO Press Service*, May 17, 1990, p.10.

64. Ibid., p.1.

65. Ibid., p.5.

66. Press Comunique, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry, United Kingdom, 7th-8th June `1990, Message from Turnberry, *NATO Press Service*, June 8, 1990, p.1.

67. "A Common Europe - Partners in Stability," Speech by the Secretary General of NATO , Mr. Worner to Members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Moscow, July 16, 1990, *NATO Press Service*, p.4.

68. North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, December 30,1990, "Moving Forward from the London Declaration," *NATO Press Service*, December 18, 1990, p.3.

69. North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, December 30,1990, "Moving Forward from the London Declaration," *NATO Press Service*, December 18, 1990, p.3.

70."Statement Made on Behalf of the North Atlantic Council by the Secretary General, Mr. Manfred Worner, on Occasion of the Visit to NATO by Mr. Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 21st March 1991," *NATO Press Service*, March 21, 1991, p.1.

71. In the context of NATO willingness to adapt to a peacemaking role, Worner stated:

> Looking towards the longer-term, I personally believe that it makes little sense to restrict NATO's role to peacekeeping in the classic meaning of the term, i.e. when parties in a conflict are exhausted and ready to make peace or observe cease-fires. Before we reach this stage, the international community may well have to intervene to create the conditions of peace. NATO's military structure, transatlantic dimension and consultative mechanisms will, in my opinion, become essential to this type of operation either under a UN or CSCE mandate and overall UN or CSCE authority, or even a combination of the two.
>
> "Speech by the Secretary General of NATO Mr. Manfred Worner at ATA's 38th General Assembly, Cophenhagen," October 30, 1992, *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, October 30, 1992, p.4.

72. Speech by the Secretary General of NATO Mr. Manfred Worner at the 25th Session of the Academy of Peace and International Security in Collaboration with the French Association for the United Nations, Monaco, Friday, 5 March 1993, "The Alliance is Now Ready to be an Active Partner for the UN in Europe," *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, p.7.

73. Paul Meyer, formerly Political Counselor, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Canadian Embassy, telephone interview, Washington, D.C., December 22, 1995.

74. Press Release M-NACC -1(93)40, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Athens, Greece, 11 June 1993, Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, June 11, 1993, p.1.

The report of the NACC Ad Hoc Group addressed, first of all, the basis for and definition of peacekeeping and the overall need for international institutions to develop common conceptual approaches by stating:

> There is no single, generally accepted definition of peacekkeeping. There is a need to develop a common understanding of peacekeeping, proceeding from the definitions and concepts of peacekeeping contained in the relevant UN and CSCE documents, including the UN Secretary General's Agenda for Peace. Traditionally, peacekeeping has been used to describe operations based on Chapter V1 of the UN Charter. Operations similar to those conducted under Chapter V1 may be carried out under the authority of the CSCE on the basis of the 1992 Helsinki Document. Operations based on recent extensions of the concept of peacekeeping, aimed at the protection or establishment of peace and based on Chapter V11 of the UN Charter, have been carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council.
>
> Press Release M-NACC -1(93)40, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Athens, Greece, 11 June 1993, Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, June 11, 1993, p.1.

75. The report, for instance, suggested "useful" definitions for different types of operations involving various multilateral institutions. They include: *Conflict Prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Peace-enforcement and Peace-building*. The report also takes a step forward by outlining and promoting "General Principles" designed to support the development of "Criteria and Operational Principles" for preventive deployment, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement" operations.

Press Release M-NACC -1(93)40, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Athens, Greece, 11 June 1993, Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, June 11, 1993, p.4.

76. Press Communique M-NACC-1(93)39, Statement Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Athens, Greece, 11 June 1993, *NATO Press Service*, June 11, 1993, p.1.

Among the first of a wide range of measures designed to improve practical cooperation in peacekeeping the NACC Foreign Minister's meeting of June 11 in Athens endorsed a seminar on peacekeeping to be held in Prague and attended by high level government officials. The seminar organized by the Czech Ministry of Defence and NATO focused on a series of themes on "the nature of peacekeeping" and the "military challenges of multinational peacekeeping."

Press Release (93)45, NACC High Level Seminar on Peacekeeping, 30 June - 2 July 1993, *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, June 25, 1993, p.1.

77. In terms of the decision-making authority to call for air strikes NATO was explicit:

> In particular, the Council [North Atlantic Council] agrees with the position of the UN Secretary-General that the first use of air power in the theatre shall be authorized by him. With respect to NATO, the NAC shall be the political authority that will decide on the conduct of air strikes, which will be carried out in coordination with the UN.
>
> Press Release (93)52 Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9th August 1993, *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, August 9, 1993, p.2.

78. Speech by the Secretary General of NATO Mr. Manfred Worner, at the WEU Assembly in Paris, Monday, *NATO Press Service,* 29 November 1993, Brussels, November 29, 1993, p.4.

79. Press Communique M-NAC-1(92) 51, "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, Norway, 4th June 1992," Final Communique, *NATO Press Service*, Brussels, June 4, 1992, p.1.

80. Section 11 of the *Communique* reads as follows:

> 11. The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful

settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. We have asked the Council in Permanent Session to address, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, the practical options and modalities by which such support might be provided. This will be done without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organizations to these operations.

Press Communique M-NAC-1(92) 51, "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, Norway, 4th June 1992, Final Communique, *NATO Press Service,* Brussels, June 4, 1992, p.1.

Chapter 6 - Canadian Foreign Policy and International Law

Introduction

International law - especially where human rights are concerned - has always played a part in Canadian foreign policy. Canada's foreign policy involvements in the former Yugoslavia, however, not only accentuated the part played by international law in Canadian foreign policy, they also advanced a bolder Canadian presence through which initiatives were undertaken to not only promulgate new legal norms but to institutionalize them as well. In short, the Canadian government pursued a policy of wielding international law into a shaper instrument of intervention in defence of human rights.

The desire of the Canadian government to take a prominent role in human rights matters was evidenced by Barbara McDougall's early call for a thorough analysis of information related to violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, which led to the establishment of the United Nations Commission of Experts (UNCOE) and the establishment of an international tribunal, responsible for prosecuting those accused of committing serious breaches of international humanitarian law in Yugoslavia since 1991. These initiatives undertaken by the Canadian government also contributed to the establishment of an international tribunal to try war crimes committed in Yugoslavia and the establishment of a permanent international criminal court as an institutional means of bringing to justice those in the international community unwilling to abide by the basic tenets of humanitarian law.

The impetus behind these initiatives indicates the strong presence of international public opinion and the even stronger and immediate presence of domestic pressure on the government to bring to justice those criminally responsible for perpetrating atrocities in the Yugoslav conflict. It, furthermore, revealed another dimension of Canadian leadership which was supportive of an interventionist foreign policy congruent with what political observers have dubbed "the new internationalism". Finally, Canadian initiatives surrounding the development of an international tribunal to try those accused of committing "war crimes" in Yugoslavia, exposes not only the contribution made by Canadian expertise drawn from the foreign policy bureaucracy, but even more importantly, the deeply personal commitment and activism of the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the reshaping of Canadian foreign policy.

Canadian Foreign Policy and the Establishment of UNCOE (UN Commission of Experts)

In reaction to worldwide and domestic expressions of shock and anger at the level of carnage and genocide being committed in the former Yugoslavia, Canada, very early in the conflict, strongly advocated the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 780 of October 6, 1992 which requested the Secretary-General "to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of Experts [UNCOE] ... with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia."[1] Besides requesting member states to make available to the UN Commission of Experts (UNCOE) collated information related to violations of humanitarian law in Yugoslavia, resolution 780 also requested them "to provide other appropriate assistance."[2] The Secretary-General, in a October 12, 1992 report to the Security Council, announced the establishment of a Commission of Experts (UNCOE). On October 23 the Secretary-General announced the names of the five-member commission designated to begin initial probes into the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia. The chairman of the commission was designated as a full-time position while the four other members of UNCOE were part-time members. Commander W.J. Fenrick, Director of Law for Operations and Training in the Canadian Armed Forces, was selected as one of the five members UN Commission of Experts.[3] While appreciative of the significance of the establishment of the UNCOE and his place on that Commission, Commander Fenrick was soon struck by the Commission's very limited budget and resources.[4] In an article in the *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* Commander Fenrick wrote:

> The staff consisted of, at various times, two or three professional staff from the UN Secretariat, two or three administrative staff, and one to three professional staff contributed by states. As the UN budget did not provide for the accumulation of a data base or for the conduct of on-site investigations, a voluntary trust fund was established and UNCOE relied heavily on contributed personnel, funds and equipment to conduct their activities. Although the additional resources made available allowed` UNCOE to fulfill its mandate, it was compelled for financial reasons to be extremely selective in its choice of topics to investigate and somewhat experimental in its approach. [5]

Besides being among the first states to call for the establishment of UNCOE, Canada was the first to respond to the Secretary-General's request for the establishment of a trust fund by contributing generously to the UNCOE fund.

Commencing its work in early November of 1992 UNCOE undertook its mandate to examine and analyze information gained from a variety of sources; to identify cases warranting deeper investigation; and to verify facts and consider issues of law. In order to assist the Commission in undertaking on-site investigations, the Canadian government also offered the services of a War Crimes Investigative Team (WCIT) made up of a small group of military lawyers and military police personnel. In additional support of these initiatives in January of 1993 the Canadian government established a position designated to co-ordinate information on war-crimes allegations in the former Yugoslavia.

By February of 1993 UNCOE had submitted its first interim report to the Secretary-General. Besides presenting a review of the Commission's work, the report offered prefatory conclusions on the evidence it was able to study and its plans to conduct further investigations of mass executions and on-site investigations of prisoners and detainees at selected locations. Among its plans was to examine reports of the systematic rape of women and "ethnic cleansing." Having visited Belgrade, Ljublana, Sarajevo and Zagreb as well as Knin, the self-proclaimed capital of Serbs in Croatia, UNCOE delegations received assurances of support and cooperation from authorities of the respective capitals.

In compliance with resolution 780 the Canadian government itself presented two reports (dated March 9, 1993 and June 21, 1993) based on numerous reports from NGO's, the United Nations and individual Canadians. While the reports were essentially a compilation of facts, they did reflect a legal opinion to the effect that the war crimes provisions of the Geneva Conventions were applicable to the Yugoslav situation.

By May of 1993 UNCOE, as highlighted in Security Council resolution 827, was being encouraged by the Security Council to pursue its work "on an urgent basis" pending the appointment of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal. UNCOE undertook several investigative missions in the former Yugoslavia and on September 6, 1993 UNCOE presented its second interim report. The report - dealing with the February to August 1993 period - outlined progress being made in collating and assessing information on the commission of mass atrocities, treatment of prisoners, "systematic" sexual assaults and practices of "ethnic cleansing." Commander Fenrick, as a member of UNCOE, was able to conclude, on the basis of an investigation by his military investigators assigned to probe war-crime allegations, that the systematic rape of Bosnian women had taken place. While in Sarajevo Fenrick's team of seven investigators studied three categories of war-crime allegations: the rape of Bosnian women, the deaths by sniper and artillery fire of civilians in Sarajevo over a specific period, and the killing by shellfire of civilians attending a soccer game in Sarajevo. In referring to the probe conducted by Canadian military investigators Fenrick acknowledged the difficulties which lay ahead:

> This is going to be like trying to prosecute a gang of organized criminals. ...
>
> There is no Balkan penchant for meticulous record-keeping. It's obvious that it will be very difficult to get senior people before a court, unless there's a change of regime. It is, however, possible to come up with reasonably good cases against low-level and mid-level people and to work up from their.[6]

UNCOE continued to operate closely with the international tribunal, born of Security Council resolution 808 (February 22, 1993) as well as with a number of international organizations involved in the former Yugoslavia. On April 30, 1994, after the appointment of an Acting Deputy-Prosecutor for the international tribunal, UNCOE concluded its work and submitted its final report to Secretary-General of the UN. When passing on the final report to the president of the Security Council, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, in an accompanying letter, concluded:

> On the basis of the information gathered, examined and analyzed, the Commission has concluded that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia on a large scale, and were particularly brutal and ferocious in their execution. The practice of so-called 'ethnic cleansing' and rape and sexual assault, in particular, have been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they strongly appear to be the product of a policy, which may be inferred from the consistent failure to prevent the commission of such crimes and to prosecute and punish their perpetrators.[7]

As Commander Fenrick, the Canadian member of the Commission, noted when summarizing the role played by UNCOE:

> UNCOE has now fulfilled its mandate. It has advised the Secretary-General that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of humanitarian law have been committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia on a large scale. ... UNCOE was neither a court nor a prosecutorial entity. UNCOE was a group of legal experts who relying on their own expertise and efforts, together with the efforts of lawyers, investigators, forensic scientists and others made available to assist them, attempted to assess the tragic events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in a particularly rigorous fashion, bearing in mind evidentiary and procedural considerations. UNCOE was not an advocacy group or human rights oriented NGO. Such organizations do have an extremely important role to play in the former Yugoslavia but the mission of UNCOE was different. Its focus on individual criminal responsibility required the imposition of much higher standards of proof than would be required for assigning state responsibility before human rights tribunals.[8]

In short, UNCOE had laid some of the important ground work for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICTFY) in early 1993 via Security Council Resolutions 808 (February 22, 1993) and 827 (May 27, 1993).

The Vancouver Conference

It was very important to the Canadian government, and in particular, the Secretary of State for External Affairs to have Canada host an international meeting of legal experts in Vancouver from March 22-27, 1993. For the Canadian government the conference represented a positive step in directing the attention of the world community to the lawless inhumanity of the Yugoslav conflict. The Vancouver meeting of over 65 international legal experts, opened by Barbara McDougall, convened to consider, in effect, the establishment of both a permanent international criminal court and the first war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg trials. A fundamental goal of the legal experts was to find common ground on their development. The week-long conference produced a report on the recommended structure of a war crimes tribunal required to cope with the scope and nature of atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia. A Canadian journalist, Phil Needham summed up the proceedings in Vancouver by writing: "A new world legal order under which individuals could be prosecuted for war crimes moved closer Friday at the end of a week-long international conference in Vancouver."[9]

If Mr. Needham was thinking in terms of the concept of a world criminal court, the concept was not a new one. After WW1 it emerged at Versailles and in the early 1950's it was the subject of considerable study and debate following the Nuremburg war trials. In the aftermath of the Cold War and especially since the recent end of super-power bipolarity, the idea of a world criminal court has taken on new life - sparked, in particular by the inhumanity of the Yugoslav conflict. While the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) is a distant reach from a world criminal court, the establishment of the ICTFY is a move in the direction of the latter. Vincent Del Buono, President of the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, which hosted the conference, explained the value of lessons to be drawn from the establishment of a criminal tribunal and their potential application toward a permanent international criminal court by noting:

> The meeting recognized that justice is a very real human need. Injustice ignored breeds continuing injustice. Only through a determination to ensure that those individuals who commit or order atrocities are brought to justice can the world community hope to break the cycles of war, death and misery in which one generation's atrocities become the compost for those of the future.
>
> To ensure that justice is done, the international community must create conditions in which victims of the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, especially the policies of ethnic cleansing and systematic rape, can come forward in safety.[10]

Alfred Rubin, a noted specialist in international law described the UN resolution 808 as having the possibility of impacting very seriously on the world community in general and the role of the UN specifically when he stated:

> This [resolution 808] is serious. They repeatedly use the word decision - its their law-making word. They also refer to the atrocities as a threat to peace and security. That's a trigger word for Article 39 of the [UN] Charter.[11]

Article 39 refers to the Security Council's ability to determine whether a situation is deemed to be a threat to peace and security. It is interesting to note that this determination is required before the Security Council is able to invoke Articles 41 and 42 which open the door to the use of economic sanctions and military force.

Canada's Position on the ICTFY

In supporting the establishment of the tribunal for Yugoslavia and the development of a new international legal order Canada contributed with the view, as expressed in a letter to the Secretary-General from Canada's UN Ambassador, Louise Frechette, in early April of 1993 that the war-crimes tribunal be empowered to prosecute a broad range of humanitarian transgressions with the provision that Canada "strongly opposes the imposition of the death penalty, not withstanding that the evidence committed may be of a particularly heinous nature."[12] In more specific terms the Canadian proposals recommended that: superiors should be regarded as being responsible for the actions of their subordinates and that subordinates could not absolve themselves of responsibility by claiming that they were simply following orders of their superiors; accused individuals should not be tried *in abstentia*; defendants, tried or convicted in other in other courts or jurisdictions, should not be re-tried "except where the matter was not diligently prosecuted in the national courts or international standards for the protection of human rights were not met"[13]; in addition to the establishment of an appeal process, both the prosecution and defence should be given opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses; and the broad sweep of the tribunal's jurisdiction should be included to cover any "inhumane act or omission that is committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons, and that constitutes a contravention of customary international law or conventional international law."[14]

In terms of article 4 of resolution 827 which relates to the extradition, transfer or surrender of individuals to the tribunal, the Canadian government recognized the difficulties posed by international law in terms of its application on and "interference" with the sovereignty of the state over domestic law. The Canadian position on this , and other issues related to the establishment of the ICTFY were presented by Barry Mawhinney, Assistant Deputy Minister for Legal and Consular Affairs and legal advisor to Canada's UN delegation, during his speech to a meeting of the International Law Commission (ILO) - 6th Committee Intervention - in October of 1993. Mr. Mawhinney noted:

> The court's legal status within state parties and its capacity to see its orders - such as requests for assistance or the production of documents and persons - enforced raises important questions. The obligation on state parties to give effect to the provisions included in the statute may, for constitutional reasons, be difficult for some states. States could find themselves unable to enforce orders of a foreign court

> directly and could only be able to do so through a process of mutual legal assistance. Accordingly, my delegation invites the working group to direct its attention to the diverse means by which states parties may give effect to the provisions in articles 4, 47, 48 and 58(2) ... [15]

Besides manifesting Canada's proclivity in finding compromise solutions by, in this case, directing efforts that would allow the sovereignty of a state to be transgressed without eliminating it, Canada's position on the creation of an international criminal court was also emphasized in Mr. Mawhinney's presentation before the meeting of the International Law Commission in 1993 when he stated:

> Nowhere is the need for effective law-making more urgent than in the regulation of the use of force, whether political or military. One need only to look at recent events in Eastern Europe to see the horrible suffering that results when force is used without restraint of the rule of law. It is therefore with pleasure, and with relief, that my delegation salutes the members of the ILC's working group on the draft statute for an international criminal court and its chairman, Mr. Koroma, for the work they accomplished this year. This distinguished group has succeeded in transforming into concrete terms what had been only an ambitious dream since the end of the last war: the creation of an international criminal court.[16]

More significantly perhaps, besides underlining the government's ultimate goal of the creation of an permanent international criminal court, Mr. Mawhinney's speech also spotlighted what was the essence of the shorter-term objective of the Canadian position:

> While we applauded the Security Council's quick action in creating an ad hoc tribunal for the prosecution of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia - and strongly support its work - Canada still believes that only a permanent criminal court will be able to provide the stable framework necessary to convince those willing to disregard the basic tenets of humanitarian law that the international community is unwilling to tolerate their actions.[17]

Other recommendations by the Canadian delegation which typified the tendency of the Canadian government to further institutionalize the interventionary capability of the international community included the suggestion that:

> the court should be a judicial organ of the United Nations, as is the International Court of Justice. This status would not only reflect the parallel and equal place that civil and criminal justice hold in the world's legal systems , but would signal the commitment of the international community to try and punish crimes against humanity.[18]

Explanatory Factors: Domestic and International

Domestic Factors

Before the London Conference of August 1992 during which Canada was among the first countries calling for an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, the activities of lobby groups and the weight of public opinion played an important part in bringing to the fore the growing revulsion and anger at the level of violence and atrocities taking place in Yugoslavia. As early as November of 1991 Canada's House of Commons served as an important focal point of debate not only on questions and issues of sovereignty and intervention, but also human rights concerns surrounding the conflict. Member of Parliament, Don Blenkarn (Mississauaga South), for example, in presenting two petitions to the House directly addressed the latter specifically when he referred to the petitions which "ask for justice for those responsible for these crimes [the 'slaying of innocent people of Croatian, Slovenian Hungarian, Macedonian, and Albanian backgrounds' by the Yugoslav army] against humanity."[19] Blenkarn's statements were part of a developing consensus in the House which called for those accused of committing crimes against humanity to be brought to justice. During the House debate of November 18, 1991 on the Yugoslav crisis members were highly critical of the behavior of the Yugoslav army while operating in Croatia. As already noted, members of the opposition especially had begun to draw a correlation between the rights of self-determination of nations and human rights. Most frequently it was the Croatians who were seen as victims of "war crimes" committed by the Yugoslav army frequently in collusion with Croat Serb forces. References to international law were even made to the 1954 Hague convention for the protection of cultural property - most notably with regard to the bombardment of the historic city of Dubrovnik by federal forces. Intervention by the international community was seen to be legitimate step: "... the west must now act to safeguard democracy and human rights in Croatia," opposition member, Albina Guarnieri (Mississauga East) stated in the House.[20] Beryl Gaffney's (Napean) thoughts typified the sentiments in the House when she stated: "If true justice, namely the protection of human rights, is to emerge within the international community then there has to be a more consistent and effective response to ongoing and blatant violations of human rights."[21] In his address to the House on December 4, 1991 the form of intervention by the international community was defined in more specific terms by Bill Attewell (Markham-Whitchurch-Stouffville) in his response to a special European Community report which identified the Yugoslav army as having deliberately targeted civilian populations and institutions in Croatia:

> The report recommends that the 12-nation European community intervene militarily and punish the Yugoslav federal army. I believe we should go one step further. We must announce to these self-serving Communist officers of the Yugoslav army that a war tribunal will be set up to try the officers of either army who have committed war crimes.[22]

In the summer of 1992 the voices of opposition members calling upon the government to act more decisively in the area human rights abuses continued unabated. Svend Robinson, the New Democratic Party's External Affairs critic, in an article entitled "Justice and Human Rights: Inspiring Canadian Foreign Policy" made the point that an important step in the resolution of conflicts was to strengthen the International Court of Justice(ICJ) by calling upon states to accept "the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court."[23] In addition, Robinson wrote:

> a new international tribunal - a world criminal court - should be created to adjudicate crimes against humanity. Such a body could not only rule on crimes committed, for example, in the ongoing "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but hopefully deter others from committing similar crimes in the future.[24]

Domestic Voices Join Transnational Voices

By the summer of 1992 the chorus of concern over human rights violations was directed to the broader killing fields of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. Horrific accounts of ethnic cleansing and mass rape in Bosnia drew the attention of not only Members of Parliament. The response in the House to these reported atrocities had become part of an international effort which galvanized public opinion not only against the sheer magnitude of the genocide being committed against innocents but also against the form that that genocide had incorporated - in other words, the manner in which it was applied against women. Andrew Cooper, in his article "Questions of Sovereignty: Canada and the Widening International Agenda," attested to the influence of women's groups - as "transnational societal groups" - in applying pressure on governments to "stop these assaults and to treat those responsible as war criminals."[25] Echoing the revulsion and frustration at the inhumanity of the conflict, Ian Waddell, the New Democratic Party's justice critic at the time, stated :"War crimes and atrocities are committed against humanity as a whole, and should be judged on that basis at an international level."[26] Like many others Waddell was a proponent of the belief that the time had come for the establishment of an international criminal court. Given the widespread expressions of repugnance, national and international, it was, therefore, not surprising that the Canadian government strongly supported the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 780 of October 6, 1992.

Political Leadership and the Establishment of the International Tribunal

Well before the adoption of resolutions 808 and 827 Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs had called for the establishment of an international criminal court. As already noted, at the London Conference in August of 1992 Canada was among the first countries calling for an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. Barbara McDougall was, in fact, largely responsible for having Canada initiate the movement to establish the war-crimes tribunal on Yugoslavia. The strong commitment by the Secretary of State to the establishment of an international tribunal was communicated clearly during her speech before the Forty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly on September 24, 1992 soon after the London Conference. In her speech McDougall not only challenged the UN to transgress the doctrine of non-intervention, but also led the way in ensuring that Canada play a prominent role in obtaining a consensus among delegates on a resolution that called on the International Law Commission (ILC) to give full attention to the establishment of an International Criminal Court in the following terms:

> This past year has seen the resurgence of a particularly vile form of abuse of human rights.
>
> Canada protests in the strongest terms possible the abhorrent practice of 'ethnic cleansing,' whatever its reason, wherever it is being practised. It represents the basest form of inhumanity and abuse of the individual and cannot be tolerated by this world community.
>
> In this connection, Canada calls for the drafting of a statute by the International Law Commission to establish an international criminal court. For this purpose, Canada will convene shortly an international meeting of experts to mobilize legal expertise on this matter.[27]

In pressing so strongly for the establishment of the tribunal, Canada's Secretary of State was not only acting out of frustration with international community's ineffectiveness in stemming the growing evidence of genocide and brutality, she was also, as noted by her Special Advisor, taking special interest in the plight of women victimized by the war by becoming more directly and personally involved on their behalf:

> She took up the treatment of women in Bosnia particularly and I spent a good deal of time liaising between her and womens' groups and she pressed very hard for specific programs that would help to meet the needs of these women such as through the UN High Commission for Refugees and the Red Cross, but more specifically when she visited one the camps set aside in Zagreb for refugees from Bosnia and I think she was terribly touched by that experience. That was very personal and close to her and she was really pushing the department [External] on that front and the wider question of setting up a legal mechanism and treating these people who had perpetrated these atrocities as war criminals. I think she saw that in the final instance as being only consistent in what we were saying about the preservation of human rights around the world and as a means of tempering the behavior of the actors in Yugoslavia so that they would know that they were going to be held to account.[28]

Members of the Department of External Affairs were very much aware of the unusual amount of attention the Secretary of State for External Affairs was paying to the transgressions of humanitarian laws in general and the plight women savaged by the inhumanity of the conflict, in particular. As a consequence she actively and persistently directed her department to pursue initiatives that would enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international rule of law, an important component of which, was the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.[29] The Secretary of State's initiatives, members of her department confide, were very much behind the convening of a meeting of legal experts in Vancouver in the spring of 1993 as well as efforts by legal specialists in her department to strengthen and enhance frequently intrusive international legal mechanisms of international law.

Conclusion

The creation of the war crimes tribunal for Yugoslavia was looked upon by the Canadian government as one of the first steps in laying the ground work for the establishment of an international criminal court. As noted in one editorial on the subject, the tribunal for Yugoslavia could have some advantages over its predecessor of 1945:

> Properly constituted... it would escape the taint of victor's justice that hung over the Nuremberg proceedings. More important, it could lay the ground for an undertaking that would help refute the charge of inconsistency: a permanent world criminal court, attached to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, that would prosecute terrorists and criminals wherever they were found. [30]

The Canadian government was cognizant of the fact that there were many dangers and complexities in the establishment of a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Commander Bill Fenrick was fully aware of the limitations the war crimes tribunal would face when he stated:

> I think realistically that its going to be difficult to ever get senior political or military figures before a court in the absence of a military occupation, unless under some circumstances you have a change of regime... I would be rash to suggest that [civil war generals] are quivering at the prospect of our inquiries... We simply don't have the resources for a Nuremberg 11.[31]

In short, Commander Fenrick was concurring with the view that any international tribunal would have difficulty convicting higher-level suspects unless allied military forces were to occupy Bosnia in somewhat the same manner allied forces occupied Germany at the conclusion of WWII. Nonetheless, with the adoption of resolution 827, the Security Council agreed, on May 25, 1993, to try those accused of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia by an international criminal presided over by 11 judges at The Hague, Netherlands. Judge Jules Deschenes, Canada's candidate, was among the 11 judges elected by the General Assembly in September of 1993.

Regardless of the cynicism in some quarters attached to the establishment of a war crimes tribunal, in the words of an official in the Legal Affairs Bureau of External Affairs, "its establishment is important psychologically in that it will be seen that the people of the world have not forgotten the victims brutalized by war crimes. And even if the tribunal succeeds in a small number of cases, it will provide evidence to the international community that the idea of an international criminal jurisdiction can succeed."[32] As proposed by the Canadian delegation to the ILC, from the government's perspective, the permanent institutionalization of international law was, in the final analysis, imperative for a number of critical reasons:

> ... we and many others look to the United Nations to provide an institution by which the perpetrators of crimes against humanity can be brought to justice, fairly and effectively. Tribunals such as those set up at Nurenberg and for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia are useful instruments in bringing certain individuals to justice, but their very nature suggests that the world community will react to crimes against humanity on an 'ad hoc' basis. It should be our most urgent task to make a statement, through the creation of a permanent criminal court, that no one who commits crimes against humanity, or other international crimes, will go unpunished.[33]

The preoccupation by the Secretary of State for External Affairs with human rights violations transmitted through the aforementioned initiatives undertaken with particular tenacity by the Department of External Affairs was indicative of yet another dimension of a Canadian foreign policy agenda which, in calling for a reframing of the international legal order, served to challenge the doctrine of state sovereignty. The Canadian government's legal initiatives regarding contraventions of humanitarian law in Yugoslavia had to do with not only promulgating new legal norms but also forcing states to accept human rights standards that have already been set. On this point Kathleen Mahoney has concluded:

> With the notable exception of the rights of children, the disabled, and aboriginal peoples and of women's rights, especially the right to be free from violence - areas in which norms still need to be or are being articulated in international

> law - Canada believes that enough international standards for human rights have been set. It takes the position that the time has come to move on to encourage states which have not done so to adopt the existing instruments and to press all states to implement them nationally.[34]

In describing the first of two legacies of UNCOE Commander Fenrick focused largely on the potential UNCOE's legacy has in convincing the world community "that it is possible for neutral groups to conduct criminal investigations of humanitarian law violations which apply appropriate standards of evidentiary rigour and procedural fairness even while conflict rages."[35] Commander Fenrick also went on to warn that without the support of the world community, the ICTFY and "the concept of a permanent criminal court will be laid to rest for the next fifty years."[36] The second legacy of UNCOE is related very closely to what Kathleen Mahoney has described as a "standard setting exercise" of Canadian foreign policy.[37] On the second legacy of UNCOE, Fenrick wrote:

> ... UNCOE has provided support for the view that reliance on international humanitarian law, including conducting impartial investigations of alleged humanitarian law violations, can dampen the fires of conflict and thereby contribute to a peace process. ... The basis for international humanitarian law is a belief that law does matter and that it does reduce net human suffering in some cases even in extreme circumstances. [38]

Describing UNCOE as a "unique entity without exact precedent" Fenrick concluded with the view - supported by the Canadian government and once again illustrative of a pro-interventionary foreign policy - that in the future UN peacekeeping operations should "include a small unit of military investigators and lawyers tasked with investigating alleged humanitarian law violations" even without such an explicit mandate.[39] "The establishment of UNCOE and the international tribunal for Yugoslavia," Commander Fenrick concluded during an interview, "are an impressive development in international law but constitute, at the same time, a high risk operation. Canada's role has been significant in starting this."[40] In short, the Canadian government played a prominent part in initiating the reestablishment of the role of international humanitarian law to the former Yugoslavia. Noteworthy as well was the part played by Canadian diplomatic representatives in the UN and to the ILO who directed their expertise in attempting to bridge "gaps" between matters of international jurisdiction and domestic/state jurisdiction.

Discerning the impetus behind Canada's attempt to relegitimize the rule of international humanitarian law as it applies to the Yugoslavia conflict is not a simple matter. International pressures have played a very considerable part in molding Canada's foreign policy response with regard to this matter. Those international pressures were derived from the outrage expressed by world public opinion at graphic evidence of "ethnic cleansing", genocide and the systematic raping of women during the fighting. Domestic public opinion in Canada was equally as horrified and angered by the flagrant contraventions of humanitarian law perpetrated by the belligerents. Demands for the establishment of international court to try those responsible were heard consistently in the media, in the House of Commons and by ethnic groups, civil rights organizations and NGO's - all of whom brought pressure to bear on Canada's political leadership to act. Canada's political leadership, being predisposed to see a more activist and interventionist role in revitalizing the rule of international law, was able to seize the opportunity to have its foreign policymaking bureaucracy initiate steps that could strengthen the mechanisms of international humanitarian law. Certainly, in this regard as well, evidence suggests the Secretary of State for External Affairs was particularly affected by blatant disregard for humanitarian principles, and consequently, she became unusually and personally committed to acting on behalf of those brutalized by "crimes against humanity." Evidence also suggests that the foreign policymaking bureaucracy was receptive to the opportunity to provide leadership in the reenhancement of international humanitarian law provided by Canada's involvement in Yugoslavia which had, in the final analysis, served to broaden and internationalize Canada's foreign policy agenda.

Endnotes

1. **The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia**, *Reference Paper*, 7 May 1993, p.75.

2. Ibid., p.75.

3. The other four members of the UNCOE were its Chairman, Professor Fritz Kalshoven of the Netherlands, Professor Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt, Judge Keba Mbaye of Senegal, and Professor Torkel Opsahl of Norway. By October 19, 1993 the commission had been reorganized. Professor Kalshoven, forced to retire because of medical reasons, was replaced Christine Cleirein of the Netherlands. Due to the untimely death of Professor Opsahl Ms. Hanne Sophie Greve of Norway became a member of the commission. Professor Bassiouni became UNCOE's new Chairperson.

4. Commander W.J. Fenrick, Director of Law for Operations and Training, Canadian Forces, National Defence Headquarters, personal interview, Ottawa, June 17, 1993.

5. "In the Field with UNCOE: Investigating Atrocities in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia." Commander W.J. Fenrick, Director of Law for Operations and Training, Canadian Forces and Member of the SCR 780 Commission of Experts. 1993, p.2 - given to me by Fenrick.

6. Geoffrey York, "Thousands raped in Bosnia, Canadian investigators say," *Globe and Mail*, July 17, 1993, p.A11.

7. Letter dated 24 May from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, United Nations, May 27, 1994

8. "In the Field with UNCOE: Investigating Atrocities in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia." Commander W.J. Fenrick, Director of Law for Operations and Training, Canadian Forces and Member of the SCR 780 Commission of Experts. 1993, p.2 - given to me by Fenrick.

9. Phil Needham, "War crimes prosecutions sought," *Vancouver Sun* , March 27, 1993, p.A11.

10. Ibid., p.A11.

11. Linda Hossie, "UN to create tribunal on war crimes," *Globe and Mail*, February 23, 1993, p.A8.

12. "War crime executions opposed," *Globe and Mail*, April 16, 1993, p.A17.

13. Ibid., p.A17.

14. Ibid., p.A17.

15. DEA, Speech to 6th Committee Intervention delivered by Barry Mawhinney, Assistant Deputy Minister for Legal and Consular Affairs, Department of External Affairs,(and Legal Advisor to Canadian delegation at UN)) at a meeting of the International Law Commission, October 1993.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, 34th Parliament, November 5, 1991, p.4512.

20. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Monday, November 18, 1991, p.4949.

21. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session , 34th Parliament, Monday, November 18, 1991, p.4981.

22. Commons Debates, House of Commons, Third Session, 34th Parliament, December 4, 1991, p.5761.

23. Svend Robinson, "Justice and Human Rights: Inspiring Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy*,Vol 1, No.1, (Winter 1992/93), p.19-20.

24. Ibid., p.19-20.

25. Andrew F. Cooper, "Questions of Sovereignty: Canada and the Widening International Agenda," *Behind the Headlines*, Vol. 50, No. 3, Spring 1993, p.11.

26. Ian Waddell, "Bringing the world to justice," *Globe and Mail*, October 12, 1992, p.A13.

27. "An Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Forty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly", New York, September 24,1992, *Statement*, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, p.4.

28. Gerald Wright, former Special Advisor to the Office of the Secretary of State from August 1992 to June 1993, personal interview, Ottawa, November 24, 1993.

29. Nearly all of the over eighteen high ranking members of the department which were interviewed on a number of occasions were able to confide that their minister had been extraordinarily inspired to act on behalf of women so terribly brutalized by the war.

30. "A war crimes tribunal for the Balkans?" [Editorial], *Globe and Mail*, February 23,1993, p.A8.

31. "Hope slim of snaring major war criminals, UN says," *Globe and Mail*, April 26, 1993, p.A9.

32. Sabine Nolke, Legal Operations Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, personal interview, Ottawa, November , 1993.

33. Speech to 6th Committee Intervention delivered by Barry Mawhinney, Assistant Deputy Minister for Legal and Consular Affairs, Department of External Affairs,(and Legal Advisor to Canadian delegation at UN)) at a meeting of the International Law Commission, October 1993.

34. Kathleen E. Mahoney, "Human rights and Canadian foreign policy," *International Journal*, XLV11, Summer, 1992, p.599.

35. Commander W. J. Fenrick, "In the Field with UNCOE: Investigating Atrocities in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia," p.46.

36. Ibid., p.46.

37. Kathleen E. Mahoney, "Human rights and Canadian foreign policy," *International Journal*, XLV11, summer 1992, p.558.

38. Commander W. J. Fenrick, "In the Field with UNCOE: Investigating Atrocities in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia," p.47.

39. Ibid., p.47.

40. Commander Fenrick, Director of Law Operations and Training, Canadian Forces, and member of UNCOE, personal interview, Ottawa, June 21, 1994.

Chapter 7 - Conclusion

Introduction

The seeds of change are often discovered in the most innocuous places. This thesis was launched on the premise that developments of considerable magnitude were taking place in a country that most Canadians new little about prior to its being plunged into a conflict of terrifying and brutal proportions. The Yugoslav conflict erupted as one of the more noticeable signals to the international community that a changing post-Cold war world order would be marked by violence, instability, uncertainty and complexity. Besides the scale of inhumanity produced by the civil war, Yugoslavia represents a serious regional threat to European security and a challenge to the ability of the international community and its representative institutions to cope with conflict. Yugoslavia, for most Canadians, appeared to be a land far removed from Canadian interests. Yet upon closer examination there existed a relatively long history of relations between the two federal states that frequently shared common interests and concerns. For most of that history, Canada's association with Yugoslavia took place in a global environment that was dominated by all the contingencies associated with maintaining a strategic balance of power and a strong, but gradually eroding, adherence to the doctrine of sovereignty. Under this international regime, human rights, while gradually escalating in the domestic agendas of many states, remained constrained by the dictates of Cold War state sovereignty and non-intervention. Particularly significant for Canadian foreign policy, the disintegration of the Yugoslav state took place at the dawn of the post-Cold war world order. This new global environment provided the opportunity for a substantive shift in Canadian foreign policy which saw the adoption of greater concern for human rights at the expense of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. This shift was also brought into play by domestic and governmental factors that allowed Canada's political leadership to assert itself at the forefront of foreign policy-making.

In summing up the manifestations of the shift in Canadian foreign policy, this thesis has shown that at the outset of the conflict the Mulroney government was determined that a strong and early international presence was necessary to curb the escalation in the fighting. The decision to press for international intervention and for Canada's involvement in the conflict was made by the Prime Minister with the full knowledge that the sovereignty sensitivities of certain UN member states should and could be circumscribed in order to contain the war. Emboldened by its success in advancing UN intervention in Yugoslavia, the Mulroney government continued to promote policies that advocated interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state where human rights were understood to be in peril. There was on the part of the Canadian government a new-found willingness to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. The willingness of the government to mobilize a more interventionary foreign policy was also reflected in a number of actions, including the Canadian support given for the unprecedented Security Council decision of December 1992 to intervene militarily in Somalia. Intergral to the substantive shift in Canadian foreign policy were Canadian initiatives aimed at the institutional renewal and reconstitution of multilateralism.

The institutional renewal of multilateral institutions was of foremost concern to the government as it grew more involved in the former Yugoslavia. The success of a more interventionary foreign policy was dependent on the strength and effectiveness of those institutions upon which multilateralism depended. The willingness to interfere manifested itself in governmental initiatives designed to strengthen the intrusive character of three international bodies - the UN, NATO and the CSCE - with which Canada has had a long relationship. Canadian policy-makers identified closely with the UN's **Agenda for Peace** - a document which challenges the preeminence of sovereignty. In addition, Canada played a leading role in strengthening the intrusive character of the CSCE in a manner that emasculated the use of sovereignty considerations as a deterrent for upholding human rights standards in the domestic affairs of a state. In terms of NATO's institutional renewal, Canadian policy placed considerable emphasis on developing a new mandate for NATO - one that saw NATO taking on a peacekeeping/peacemaking role in Europe. In pressing for the reform of NATO the Canadian government also espoused the development of tangible institutional links between NATO, the CSCE and the UN. Calls for the institutional renewal of multilateral institutions as well as for the strengthening of their intrusive capabilities were also followed by Canadian action. The early offer of Canadian soldiers to join an anticipated UN peacekeeping force in Yugoslavia by the Prime Minister demonstrated the depth of the government's commitment to intervene. The role of Canadian forces in re-opening Sarajevo and establishing and defending Srebrenica as the UN's first safe area, serve as prominent examples of a foreign policy willing to place humanitarian concerns above concerns with domestic sovereignty. These two operations symbolized a shift to more than just keeping the peace. Where Canada had once pioneered the peacekeeping tradition, under the Mulroney's direction and McDougall's stewardship of foreign policy, Canada was at the forefront of states fostering the use of peacemaking in support of human rights when necessary to overide the doctrine of non-intervention.

The shift in Canadian foreign policy was not an easy or smooth one. The evolution of the Canadian government's reaction to the breakup of the Yugoslav federation revealed, at the outset of the conflict, a traditional predisposition by Canada to support efforts that would see a re-negotiated Yugoslav federation remain intact. International factors rooted in the wish to protect the territorial sovereignty of European states and the belief of the EC that it could contain the conflict exercised considerable influence on Canadian foreign policy during the early months of the civil war. These factors dampened any disposition Canadian policy-makers may have had towards recognizing the breakaway republics at an earlier stage in the conflict. It was not long, however, before the transition to an interventionist view prevailed as a consequence of the Prime Minister's conclusion, supported by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, that the bloodshed and carnage could no longer be allowed to go on under the pretext of state sovereignty or inept EC management which attempted to uphold the conventional norms of state sovereignty by withholding earlier recognition - a policy that was seen to play into the hands of federalist forces in Yugoslavia. Canadian recognition of Slovenia and Croatia soon followed - even though, in the case of Croatia, the war was still in progress. In Canada the issue of Croatian independence had taken on a human rights context as members of the opposition especially called on the Conservative government to safeguard the self-determination and human rights of Croatians. Not only was domestic public opinion supportive of

Croatia's independence, but European public opinion also reflected empathy for the secessionist aspirations of the Yugoslav republics. In this way domestic and international factors combined to buttress the Prime Minister's decision to recognize Croatia. While recognition was granted, it was some time before Canada established formal diplomatic relations with Croatia - a diplomatic maneuver further indicative of the government's position that human rights considerations as they applied to the Serb minority in Croatia had to be safeguarded *before* formal diplomatic relations, recognizing the sovereignty of the new Croat state, could be granted.

Establishing a New Policy Posture

It was clear at the outset of the Yugoslav crisis that Canada was approaching an important cross-road in foreign policy. In 1989 then Secretary of State Joe Clark had warned his Yugoslav counterpart that deteriorating human rights conditions in Yugoslavia could undermine relations between the two countries. With the rapidly deteriorating political situation that was soon accompanied by serious and systematic violations of human rights on a massive scale, bonds inhibiting an interventionary and more activist Canadian foreign policy had begun to weaken. The "rhetoric gap" was beginning to narrow. Evidence of a shift in Canadian foreign policy, this study has shown, can be identified in two areas: first in the statements and speeches of the government and second, in the actions and responses of the government to the crisis in Yugoslavia.

Some of the policy ground for a change in Canadian foreign policy had been prepared by Clark during his leadership as Canada's Secretary of State. During Clark's tenure there was considerable interest by the government in redefining foreign policy, such as in initiating a review of Canadian foreign policy toward Europe. That search for redefinition, this paper shows, was also paralleled by the government's position that a new and enhanced role had to be found for multilateral institutions such as the UN and that the surrender of sovereignty, in the act of joining with other countries to achieve human rights and allowing room for outside intervention in defence of human rights, had to become a more recognizable option in resolving conflict. As early as November of 1990 the government issued some signals that a change in foreign policy direction and priorities were in the making when the PM's speech to the CSCE indicated that "the conventions of national sovereignty are becoming too narrow a base from which to resolve the broadening global and regional problems."[1] This shift in Canada's approach to humanitarian intervention was first articulated in the foreign policy statements of the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State Barbara McDougall in 1991.

Undoubtedly the most important speech which first designated a clear and formal change in the priorities of Canadian foreign policy, was Mulroney's Stanford University address of September 1991. In his speech Mulroney sparked attention by calling upon the world community to respond more forcefully to what were then the early manifestations of a crisis in Yugoslavia. Futhermore, a rethinking and a revision of conventional doctrines associated with primacy of sovereignty and non-intervention, Mulroney made it clear, would have to be initiated.[2] At about the same time Mulroney was presenting his vision of a redefined foreign policy McDougall was delivering a similar message to the UN, a message pressing for a strengthened UN which should not be impeded from effectively responding to the "wanton destruction" of human life on the basis of the sovereignty of the state. This and other speeches and policy statements by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs referred to in this study showed that the government was no longer as willing as past governments to be constrained by the sanctity of the sovereignty of the state and that the domestic affairs of other states were legitimately susceptible to humanitarian intervention. As noted in this study, throughout its involvement in the Yugoslav conflict the government's policy statements regarding the desirability and necessity of humanitarian intervention remained consistent. This thesis has supported, furthermore, the contention that Canada's continuing immersion in the Yugoslav conflict only strengthened and magnified the government's policy principles and beliefs regarding humanitarian intervention. This perception is very much attested to by McDougall's radical view of sovereignty expressed in a speech in May of 1993 in which she called for a reconsideration of the definition of state sovereignty by the UN so that it could no longer be used as a "license for international repression."[4]

McDougall's speech, like other speeches and policy statements by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs taken together, reflects a considerable degree of clarity and consistency in the articulation of a foreign policy that advocated intervention based on a response to serious breaches of human rights which should supersede pretensions of sovereignty claimed by states. More importantly, McDougall's speech captured some of the most salient features of the government's new foreign policy doctrine as it related to the right and obligation of foreign states to interfere in the domestic jurisdictions of other states. By 1991 the government had accentuated its promotion of democratic values, free-market economies and human values, in effect serving notice that it was prepared to interfere in a foreign state's domestic affairs. Some in Canada's scholarly community had recognized this change in Canadian foreign policy. In distinguishing Canada's foreign policy from other states David Cox, for example, stated in 1993 that "no other government, to my knowledge, has been more emphatic about the limitations on the principle of sovereignty than the current Government of Canada."[5] The realization of a shift in Canadian foreign policy could not be accomplished, of course, without the transformation of the government's policy statements and speeches into action. While the government's actions in responding to the Yugoslav conflict may not have reflected the same degree of consistency and purpose as found in its statements and speeches, those actions and responses exemplify a real and significant shift in Canadian foreign policy, and a narrowing of the "rhetoric gap".

As brought to light in this study one of the first governmental reactions illustrative of a shift in foreign policy was the Mulroney-directed initiative which led to Canada being the first state to request UN intervention in Yugoslavia while at the same time offering in a tangible form to send Canadian forces to support a UN peacekeeping effort. By being largely responsible for putting Yugoslavia on the Security Council agenda the government had signalled its unwillingness to be a party to Western inaction and non-involvement in the crisis. With Security Council approval on February 21, 1992 Canada contributed nearly 1,300 Canadian soldiers, deployed in the hotly disputed Krajina area, as part of an initial UNPROFOR intervention. Other less dramatic but equally noteworthy Canadian responses to the crisis followed. They included Canada's participation in the suspension of Yugoslavia from the CSCE as well as a trade ban and sanctions against Yugoslavia. Soon, however, with the situation deteriorating in Yugoslavia, symbolized by the failure of EC initiatives, Canada's foreign policy response was directed at strengthening the capability of multilateral institutions involved in Yugoslavia to ameliorate the situation there. As documented in this study this policy direction had been somewhat anticipated by, for example, the various Canadian initiatives in support of the greater intrusive capability of the CSCE such as in the case of Canada's contribution to the Moscow Document of 1991. Canada's impatience with the EC and the CSCE also extended to the United Nations.

Support for multilateral intervention had become elevated in importance as a critical component of Canadian foreign policy toward Yugoslavia. It was, therefore, the government's early assessment that multilateralism had to be revitalized and even reconstituted.[6] It is in the government's response to a perceived weakening of the role of multilateral institutions in Yugoslavia that more evidence of a shift in foreign policy was found. In political terms the government acted by calling for the reform and revitalization of these institutions. The government was also prepared to assume the political risk of challenging those institutions and their member states to act more promptly and decisively in intervening into the domestic affairs of a state consumed by the level of violence and inhumanity found in Yugoslavia. It was no longer prepared to occupy its traditional role of being "forced to work within the boundaries, or parameters, established by the leaders" of coalitions, as Nossal characterized Canada's position within "international coalitions."[7] Instead, in challenging the UN to act on Yugoslavia against considerable odds and at great political risk - the government's initiatives, extended those boundaries and directly challenged those forces opposed to the kind of institutional changes proposed by Canada. The government's efforts to advance the interventionary capabilities of the UN by identifying Canada's views of the UN with those projected in Boutros Ghali's **Agenda for Peace** was but one example of its support of the further strengthening of multilateral institutions. The attempt by the government to reconstitute multilateral institutions is clearly revealed in its initiatives designed to reform and strengthen the institutional character and presence of the UN, NATO and the CSCE. In fact, in addition to promoting good governance as one of the dominating principles of its foreign policy, it had become a goal of Canadian foreign policy to facilitate the development of institutional linkages between the multilateral players engaged in the Yugoslav conflict, the purpose of which was to strengthen and formalize the interventionary capacity of those institutions to more effectively meet the needs of post-Cold war realities. "Multilateral associations," Tom Keating has observed of the Mulroney government, "were to be employed to achieve these noble, if (in the context of traditional international politics) revolutionary objectives."[8] The government's actions represented a form of independent action, a breaking of the ranks which could precipitate a bandwagon effect to paraphrase Nossal, and as such, is strongly suggestive of a marked departure from Canada's former foreign policy practice where multilateralism was concerned. Instead of multilateral institutions modifying the interests of its members to suit the conventions of those forces and states that dominate them, the Yugoslav case study makes the argument that it is possible for a middle power to initiate the redefining of those institutions and to break ranks with convention.

The government's role in the establishment of a war crimes tribunal, designed to prosecute those responsible for violating international humanitarian law, is further suggestive of a shift in Canadian foreign policy. As noted, international law, particularly in the realm of human rights, has always had a significant place in Canadian foreign policy. For the most part international law has been concerned with relations between sovereign states. It has been understood as well that international law also has a part to play in internal disputes and has, as Rosalyn Higgins observed, "long had an interest in promoting minimum standards in the conduct of hostilities" where either internal or international wars are concerned.[9] Of some interest to this study was the application of international law pertaining to human rights abuses to the internal conflict of the former Yugoslavia. It is broadly accepted that international law, as a part of the traditional legal order, has been inadequately equipped to act as an interventionary mechanism by third parties. In fundamental terms this inadequacy stems from an absence of a central and ultimate legal authority in a decentralized world community. In the debate concerning the application of international law as an instrument of intervention in the internal affairs of a state two differing views tend to dominate. One view defines international law in rather static terms - formulated and set in the past - and therefore, largely inapplicable to the modern problems of intervention. The other, contrary view, defines international law as a flowing, continuing and evolving process that, by its very nature, seeks to redefine "an acceptable balance between the sovereign equality and independence of states on the one hand and the reality of an interdependent world and the international law commitment to human dignity on the other."[10] Canada has long understood that with the change of human rights from being simply and solely a matter of domestic concern to being a matter of international concern, the role of international law in the domestic affairs of a state has taken on special importance. It has also taken on special importance for Canada where human rights were elevated to the top of Canada's foreign policy agenda alongside collective security, national unity and economic prosperity as annunciated by Secretary of State Joe Clark in 1990.[11] Besides the elevation of human rights, we have its linkage in Canadian foreign policy with democracy and security which led the Mulroney government to assume a more forceful stance in the domestic conflicts of other states. "It justifies this intrusion on sovereignty", explains Kathleen Mahoney, " by relying on the fundamental principle that the state derives legitimacy and 'state rights' from its individual components."[12] It is, in part, on the basis of this principle that the government was compelled to assume a bolder stance in fostering a more effective application of international law in the former Yugoslavia.

Canada's role in the establishment of the tribunal was accentuated by a number of factors that included McDougall's early call for a thorough study of the human rights violations in Yugoslavia, Canada's contribution to the work of the United Nations Commission of Experts (UNCOE) and the War Crimes Investigative Team (WCIT), the hosting by McDougall of the Vancouver Conference of legal experts, efforts by Canadian diplomats and legal specialists to re-establish the legitimacy and active presence of the rule of international humanitarian law and to bridge gaps between matters of international jurisdiction and domestic jurisdiction, and ultimately, the government's call for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. In reviewing Canada's position regarding the application of humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the aforementioned evidence suggests that the Government was prepared to challenge, as had never been done before, many of those impediments to humanitarian intervention, and in so doing, has contributed to the growing body of thought that proposes to set aside the argument in international law that does not support military intervention for humanitarian purposes. There has developed, it can be argued as Pierre Hassner has, a degree of international consensus on the permissibility of intervention in cases of aggression "against an internationally recognized state," a state massacring its "own citizens" or when "a breakdown in law and order leads to anarchy and massive suffering."[13] The government's approach to strengthening the mechanisms and validity of international humanitarian law, spearheaded by Barbara McDougall, is representative of another example of its willingness to redefine multilateral institutions in opposition to those member states adhering more closely to the doctrine of non-intervention and the status quo.

This study's examination of the recognition issue as it applied to the breakup of the Yugoslav state indicated that it represented one of the first examples of a shift in Canadian foreign policy. That shift was reflected in the balance and significance accorded the recognition of the new state of Croatia as it related to Canada's human rights concerns. Canada's decision on the recognition of the break-away republics also reflected the willingness of the Canadian government to contravene the advice of the Javier Perez de Cuellar, the former Secretary-General of the United Nation, whose position was that recognition should be delayed until a UN guaranteed cease-fire could be established in the region. Mr. de Cuellar's views were, of course an extension of the UN's reticence to interfere in the domestic affairs of a state. Until the early Canadian recognition of the Baltic states, Canada's position on the recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia had retained its traditional cautious posture. By December of 1991 the Canadian position indicated greater sensitivity to the separatist aspirations of the Yugoslav republics. The responsiveness of the Canadian government was formalized on January 16, 1992 when Canada recognized the independence of the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia and thus concluded the first phase in developing formal relations with Croatia. While not at the forefront of states pressing for the earlier recognition of the republics, Canada's participation in the recognition of these breakaway republics was part of a shift in Canadian foreign policy. Canada had recognized the sovereignty of a former republic of Yugoslavia while a domestic conflict was in progress. The second and final phase of formalizing relations was poignantly illustrated in the linkage the Canadian government imposed between establishing formal diplomatic relations and human rights in Croatia. Formal diplomatic relations, eventually established in April of 1993, had been withheld as long as possible in order to persuade the Croatian government to adhere to accepted human rights standards. During this period Canadian diplomats diligently called for and supported the imposition of internationally-accepted human rights standards and norms in the domestic affairs of Croatia. In short, the Croatian case study revealed the presence of a more flexible and intrusive Canadian policy on humanitarian intervention.

The shift in Canadian foreign policy found expression not only in policy statements, speeches, and diplomatic initiatives of the government. It was also highlighted in at least two dangerous and precedent-setting operations in which Canadian peacekeepers were key players. In both cases the government actively supported the leading role played by the Canadian military in Yugoslavia. As examined in this study those were the UNPROFOR operations which re-established a UN presence in Sarajevo and the other was the establishment of the first UN "safe area" in Srebrenica.

The operation to reopen Sarajevo to a UN presence was accomplished because Canada's military leadership was prepared to interpret its mandate in broader and more intrusive terms. The Canadian convoy was prepared, as events illustrated, to push its way into Sarajevo even though it did not have a formal mandate to do so. Canadian peacekeepers were prepared to and did, take on a more aggressive posture. The UN, aware of the precariousness of the operation found or was forced into finding the political will to pass Security Council Resolution 761 which further buttressed the Canadian operation by notifying all parties - meaning the Serbs of course - that forceful action would be taken if the safety of the Canadians was in jeopardy. In the final analysis the operation was the consequence of the political will of Canada's political leadership to facilitate what had become a peace *enforcement* operation. The Srebrenica operation was even more illustrative of a shift in Canadian foreign policy.

Initially spearheaded by Lieutenant-General Morillon, the Srebrenica operation, which soon saw the establishment of the UN's first "safe area," became very much a Canadian affair. Sent to protect the Bosnian Muslim refugees of Srebrenica, undermaned and outgunned Canadian peacekeepers became a UN "trip wire" which if crossed was calculated to invite a strong military response. The UN issued orders not only for the Canadians to defend themselves but to defend the Muslim enclave as well. The Canadian government was intimately aware that these orders, which it did not contravene, represented a *de facto* enlargement of the UN mandate. Rather than calling for the removal of Canadian forces there, McDougall set the Canadian tone by suggesting that strong military action could be taken in response to an attack against the safe area as well as the need to strengthen Srebrenica's defences by calling upon a stronger international participation in defence of the town. The carnage and destruction witnessed in Srebrenica and the resolute presence of Canadian peacekeepers there symbolized for many the government's advocacy of a more robust military presence in what was becoming a UN peace enforcement operation. Preparations during this period by the Canadian air force in ground support exercises as part of the military's overall preparations and planning for possible peace *enforcement* operations served as further examples of the extent to which Canadian policy had moved and in so doing, confronted the doctrine of non-intervention in a way unprecedented in Canadian foreign policy.

Assessing the Role of Political Leadership

This dissertation has brought into focus a number of factors, domestic and international, which contributed to the shift in Canadian foreign policy that has been examined in this study. The central and most outstanding factor was the role of political leadership in initiating and directing this policy change. This was also made possible, in large part, by domestic support for a more intrusive foreign policy as well as favourable international conditions.

This paper has shown that the strengthening of the PMO and the PCO, in support of the Prime Minister's more active role in guiding foreign policy, corresponded to the discernable shift in the making of foreign policy from the Department of External Affairs to the PMO. It is important not to forget that this shift also corresponded with the period when Joe Clark was replaced by Barbara McDougall as Secretary of State for External Affairs. This change of political leadership at the helm of the Department of External Affairs served to strengthen and further accentuate the Prime Minister's prominent role in Canadian foreign policy as it responded to the Yugoslav crisis. This is not to diminish Clark's contribution towards a new foreign policy doctrine that materialized during Prime Minister Mulroney's government, but the Prime Minister emerged as the most significant player as events in the former Yugoslavia led to a more significant Canadian role.

Under the leadership of Clark the process of redefining Canadian foreign policy began within the context of the emerging international realities such as the resurgence ethnonationalism in the wake of the collapse of the Cold War world order. Clark had described his foreign policy approach in a speech of September 13, 1990 before a meeting of the C.D. Howe Institute as being "distinctly Canadian" and a reflection of Canada's assets and limitations. Clark was speaking in the belief that Canada was able to translate its domestic experience into a foreign policy approach which stressed that "institutions of governance" - domestic or international - required flexibility in order that they be successful in adapting to changing international realities and interests. A reformed NATO and an enlarged role for the CSCE in "setting new rules for the new Europe" were among the specifics of Clark's speech.[14] His tenure as Secretary of State for External Affairs came to an end as discussions and pacts between the republics and the Serb-controlled federal government on renegotiating a new federal structure and an end to the tension and violence between the Slovenian and Croatian militias and the federal army appeared to be less than promising. The Canadian government, through its Embassy in Ottawa, had been encouraging all efforts at sustaining a dialogue between the members of the federation. The federal authorities, of course, favoured retaining a strong federal system whereas the newly-elected governments of Croatia and Slovenia favoured a loose alliance of sovereign states. By March of 1991 the eight-member federal presidency was rendered ineffective by resignations. It was this rapidly deteriorating situation and the confused response to the events in the former Yugoslavia by the EC that Barbara McDougall inherited when, in April of 1991, she took over the External Affairs portfolio from Joe Clark who was seconded by the PM to assist him in the struggle for national unity.

During the early years in office the Prime Minister had relied on the Department of External Affairs and its minister, Joe Clark, to develop and guide his government's foreign policy initiatives. According to an independent observer close to the Department of External Affairs:

> It's the other side of the coin from when you had a de facto Liberal bureaucracy. Especially with [Joe] Clark leaving [External Affairs], the centre of gravity moved from External Affairs to the PMO. [15]

At the same time, in his new minister of external affairs, Barbara McDougall, the Prime Minister had found an individual less threatening to his political authority, more in tune with his views and sentiments on the conflicts that was beginning to take shape in the Balkans, and more inspired by the prospect of challenging Canadian foreign policy makers and international institutions to explore ways and means of conflict resolution that were uncharted by international experience. Joe Clark left External Affairs as a former Prime Minister and with a reputation as a well-respected and sensible minister who, after six years as one of Canada's longest-serving external affairs ministers, had some clout within cabinet and outside of cabinet. His successor, characterized by many as intrepid and capable, had little time to familiarize herself with her portfolio and the magnitude of issues with which she would have to contend. In short, she was less familiar with both Canada's assets and its limitations. Events suggest that quite possibly because of this, she was not as prepared to be bound by those limitations as her predecessor. McDougall - in conjunction with the Prime Minister - projected a more daring political will to test those limitations and where possible extend their parameters. Furthermore, there was, according to a senior member of the PCO "a greater degree of balance of power between Mr. Clark and Mr. Mulroney" that was replaced by a relationship in which the Prime Minister assumed the position of the elder and McDougall, initially with no international experience, the junior in terms of the management of Canadian foreign policy.[16] In addition, it is reported that there was little, if any, fractious debate or division within Cabinet regarding the Yugoslav crisis. Instead Cabinet tended to follow Mulroney's lead with regard to Yugoslavia and other critical foreign policy initiatives.[17]

Whatever inexperience McDougall may have had in taking on her new portfolio was soon compensated by an unwillingness to accept conventional explanations for inaction and by a tremendous drive to *do something* about resolving the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, or at the very least ameliorate the suffering of the victims of the fighting. In the words of an External Affairs officer closely involved with the Minister's office and in Canada's role in Eastern Europe: "With Mr. Clark we had a minister who was pragmatic and seasoned; with Ms. McDougall we got a minister more deeply involved in human rights and more willing to 'thump the table' when she thought necessary."[18] The "drive to do something" was also facilitated by the Minister's greater reliance on ministerial advisors who tended to be less inhibited about their advice to the Minister than departmental officials. The new Minister had captured that spirit of the times in terms of perceiving the growing interdependencies in the international system and the opportunities for change in the international system with the demise of bipolarity. She was also determined to have Canada take the lead in exploring new and unconventional approaches in the conduct of its foreign policy. Insiders confirm that McDougall was profoundly affected by what was taking place in the former Yugoslavia, and in the words of one senior bureaucrat, the Minister "drove her bureaucracy [External Affairs] nuts in persistently trying to produce new initiatives or to find new solutions."[19] Her willingness to challenge the doctrine of sovereignty was unmistakable and relentless as confirmed by the Minister's Special Advisor :

> She emphasized this point, she wanted it in her speeches; she wanted to develop the idea that sovereignty was crumbling; she wanted to keep making that point time and time again and that came out of personal conviction. At at the same time, I sensed no great opposition to this idea and it was certainly consistent with the kinds of things the Prime Minister was saying.[20]

Significant as well was the emphasis by the government on closely co-ordinating the conduct of Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia between the Prime Minister's office and the Office of the Minister of External Affairs. The close relationship in foreign policy-making between the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs was an important factor in propelling forward in tandem Canada's initiatives vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. In the words of her Special Advisor:

> The Prime Minister took an extremely close interest in the Yugoslav crisis and there was very close co-ordination between the two [the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs]; there had to be because it was imperative that both be seen as singing from the same hymn book. There was enormous emphasis put on making sure that if the Prime Minister gave a press conference [on Yugoslavia] that we had the results of that and a statement of what he had said literally within seconds so that there was not a difference of view emerging between the two people [Mulroney and McDougall]. There was no doubt that the Prime Minister was keen for Canada to play a strong, powerful role. I think if you look for distinctive aspects that the Minister contributed, they would relate to such issues as the international tribunal for example. That is one that she very much made her own. She pushed very hard for the Vancouver conference which help to design a statute under which the tribunal could operate; she was very keen on the fact that Commander Fenrick was appointed to the UN commission of Experts; she kept pushing all the time for progress on that front.[21]

Arguably, in the Minister's challenge to the principle of sovereignty there was an element of consistency with some of the policies and initiatives designed to promote human rights and democratic development that had already been put into place by the Mulroney government prior to the Minister's arrival. Where the Minister departed from conventional norms was her unequivocal disposition to seek actively the broadening and re-definition of the parameters of acceptable intervention. For example, the Secretary of State for External Affairs published her views on redefining sovereignty and intervention in scholarly journals as a means of justifying the foreign policy actions of her government. More significantly it was a means of putting forth the argument that something theoretically and practically profound was taking place in so far as Canadian foreign policy and international relations were concerned. In essence the impulse to take on theoretically and practically many of the conventional norms of inter-state relations was initiated by the political leadership of the country as attested to by a member of her advisory staff:

> There was, no doubt, a general feeling in the political leadership of the making of our foreign policy that it was necessary to give strong leadership and that was the way in which you mobilized the government bureaucracy behind you. I never heard it said that there was an 'enemy within' or that somebody was deliberately trying to slow down the process. I heard people outside who thought we were overstepping the boundaries in becoming too interventionist.[22]

Within External there was under the surface some opposition from foreign service professionals to the Prime Minister's earlier initiatives on Yugoslavia. There appeared to have been some disfavor with the Prime Minister being the first world leader to prod the UN into sending peacekeepers to Yugoslavia. Furthermore, officials of the department were neither consulted nor informed in advance about the Prime Minister's very significant Stanford speech of September 29, 1991. They were dismayed with the fact that External Affairs was kept in the background in the development of the Stanford speech and that, in general, their department's influence had been limited in the shaping of the Prime Minister's Yugoslav initiatives. The Prime Minister's Stanford speech advocated, in a number of areas, courses of action that went far beyond the conventional thinking of Western leaders. Some courses of action did not sit well with certain elements in the foreign policy-making bureaucracy in Canada or with some of Canada's allies. With reference, in particular, to the role of the international community in crises such as Yugoslavia Mulroney made it clear that he was not going to be bound by convention or by those opposed to the concept of intervention when he stated at Stanford: "We must recognize that there are certain fundamental rights that all people possess - and that sometimes, the international community must act to defend them."[23] "Things like the Stanford speech worry people," stated an unidentified government bureaucrat. " I think it does reflect a sense on the part of the Prime Minister that he is not getting what he wants out of External."[24] It also reflected, according to those working closely with Mr. Mulroney, the Prime Minister's desire that his speech be seen as a thoughtful and imaginative prescription for some of the key problems facing the new world order.[25]

In terms of his approach to the UN the Prime Minister had sent an urgent correspondence to then UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar strongly requesting that the Security Council convene an emergency session on Yugoslavia as well as committing Canadian troops to be a part of any international peacekeeping effort. Mulroney's letter to the Secretary-General was followed as noted by McDougall's speech to the General Assembly on September 25, 1991 in which, in reference to Yugoslavia, she argued there were higher principles that superceded the concept of sovereignty.[26] On December 10, 1992 Mulroney gave a speech to the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Besides providing a general prime ministerial overview of the state of international affairs, the Prime Minister's Harvard speech also returned to his familiar theme of the importance of bolstering the UN's potential to deal more effectively with humanitarian and political problems when he stated:

> This means structural changes for the institution itself; mandate reform as the world demands scope for peace-making as the higher form of peace-keeping and a new attitude to traditional definitions of sovereignty.[27]

The Prime Minister's rhetoric during his Harvard speech was not particularly bold on the subject of intervention. His message became bold, however, during a question and answer period following his speech. When asked by a Canadian student what should be done about the situation in Yugoslavia, the Prime Minister unhesitatingly suggested that the same solution to the Gulf war could be applied to *make* a peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canada would strongly support a peacemaking resolution in the United Nations he proclaimed. "We've done it before ... The events in the Gulf were under the aegis of the United Nations. Twenty-nine nations came together to put an end to aggression.... I am proposing the United Nations take those actions that we've taken elsewhere, because it's the only thing that works."[28] The Prime Minister's strong words in support of military action were also accompanied by a call for a reformed mandate for the UN in dealing with humanitarian crises and new approaches toward the concept of sovereignty as international crises demand a greater role for *peacemaking* which he likened to a higher form of peacekeeping. The explanation for the Prime Minister's strong statements on the potential use of force went beyond his well-known propensity for rhetorical flourish. They indicated, once again, his view that rare and brief historical opportunities to lead in affecting positive change and progress by the international community should not be squandered. They also indicated, as noted earlier, a deep-seated frustration with the inability of the international community and more specifically, multilateral institutions, as constituted, to find the *political will* necessary to stem the conflict and slaughter in Yugoslavia.

Like the Prime Minister, there were officials in the PMO who believed that the Department of External Affairs was slow in reacting to world developments. They were cognizant as well of the fact that Mulroney was not pleased with the quality of advice he was receiving from External.[29] The Prime Minister's role, as the initiator and principal author of more assertive foreign policy initiatives towards Yugoslavia (and other areas), had been enhanced by a small group of officials in the Department of External Affairs, the PMO and the Privy Council office who , in the words of one journalist, seemed, "to be running the high-profile foreign affairs agenda."[30] According to John Kirton, Canadian foreign policy "has been increasingly driven by a group of individuals who are professional foreign service officers, who are of a younger generation...They favour a more globally oriented, aggressive policy. That's why you could threaten to be in the vanguard of a military invasion of Haiti. That's why you can, at Stanford, say you think we should mount an aid program to the Soviet Union."[31] Confidential sources at External and close to the PMO and PCO, it should be noted, claim that these people formed a nucleus of individuals selected out as being less patient with the cautious and more conventional direction Canadian foreign policy towards Yugoslavia had been following prior to 1991 and as a consequence they were able to develop a more intimate relationship with the Prime Minister.

The use of a select group of foreign policy advisors by a Prime Minister is not a new development in Canadian foreign policy. However, what is noteworthy for this study is the degree to which the Prime Minister relied on special advisors as a counterbalance to the policy advice he was receiving from his foreign policy bureaucracy. Four officials were reportedly prominent among this inner circle of advisors. They were Paul Heinbecker, the Prime Minister's foreign policy speech writer for two years and after that assistant secretary to the cabinet for foreign and defence policy; Robert Grauer, deputy chief of staff operations in the PMO; Ried Morden, former director of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, after which he became undersecretary of state for external affairs; and Derek Burney, close to Mulroney and the Conservative government since 1984, responsible for recommending Mr. Heinbecker and Mr. Grauer to the Prime Minister and for a period of time Canada's ambassador to the United States. According to a government official who wished to remain unidentified, the inner circle of individuals who featured prominently in the development of a more assertive foreign policy started with the appointment of de Montigny Marchand in 1989 as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs. That appointment, and Mr. Marchand's recruitment of a new group of advisors reflected the Prime Minister's impatience with the Department of External Affairs which from the Prime Minister's perspective had reacted too slowly to changes particularly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. What was unique as well about this group was its willingness to project more assertively Canada's influence in a world more accustomed to a more prudent, low-profile Canadian presence. Not to be forgotten at the same time - as already pointed to in this study - was the effect that the Prime Minister's new foreign policy doctrine and accompanying shift in foreign policy had in successfully harnessing the energies of the foreign policy bureaucracy which saw within its mandate new possibilities and exciting challenges in Canadian foreign policy.

There are other explanations for the Prime Minister's interest in assuming a leading role in the direction of Canadian foreign policy toward the Yugoslav crisis. To begin with it can be partially attributed to Mulroney's frustration with the lethargic pace of constitutional reform and the absence of an anticipated improvement in the domestic economy. By turning his attention from domestic to international issues, the Prime Minister was following a precedent set by Pierre Trudeau, who late in his term of office found a foreign policy outlet for domestic unpopularity by undertaking a peace initiative which took him to all the major world capitals before he resigned. However, the greater dangers and risks, both political and military, associated with the Mulroney's initiatives towards Yugoslavia would indicate that his activism in foreign policy went well beyond a reaction to his government's domestic problems. Mulroney had gained considerable international experience and had developed a network of personal contacts on the world stage after eight years in office. Historical opportunity, and quite likely personal ambition, allowed him to employ his experience and contacts in redirecting Canadian foreign policy in a daring new direction. The Prime Minister also brought with him an established track record which was consistent with his strong interest in elevating human rights issues internationally. As discussed, the Prime Minister saw that Canada could exploit a vacuum in Europe created by US inaction and European ineffectiveness in dealing with the Yugoslav problem. According to insiders within the PMO and the PCO, Mulroney saw the Yugoslav crisis as an important test of the new world order. Moreover, from the Prime Minister's perspective, a lot of time and "hot air" had been expended by multilateral institutions doing nothing and it was time to actually *do* something about the situation in the Balkans.[32] The Prime Minister accepted the fact that there were risks involved in pursuing a more activist approach towards Yugoslavia. "I've never seen an issue that has been as internally divisive between the capitals" noted a senior official in the Prime Minister's PCO.[33] The divisiveness stemmed in good part from the differences over what the international community was prepared to do about the Yugoslav crisis and the contentious issue of humanitarian intervention.

In addition to being affected by the images of death and destruction emanating from Yugoslavia and the necessity of keeping in step with rapidly changing events and circumstances, the war had become personalized for the Prime Minister. The war in the Balkans was not only a professional matter, but also, no doubt, a personal matter - his wife being of ethnic Serbian origin and born in Sarajevo, a city which they both knew well. "He has a feel for the place," one source put it, "and so he has been pushing the [foreign policy] system to get out in front of the issue."[34] Paul Heinbecker, the Prime Minister's foreign policy speech writer and later chief foreign policy advisor in the PCO recalled: "What many people may have not realized was that the Prime Minister knew and cared a lot more about Yugoslavia than a lot of other world leaders."[35] As as been made clear here, however, it was also an issue of wider significance for the overall direction of Canadian foreign policy.

In his June 16, 1992 appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and National Defence, Alex Morrison, as Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, attested to Canada's stronger foreign policy presence as it related to various aspects of peacekeeping:

> In recent years Canada has shown an increased tendency to want to be a power player on the world stage - the Gulf, not ruling out the use of force in Haiti, calling early and loud for the use of force under the UN in Yugoslavia. The Prime Minister's speech in California last autumn and his recent speech in Montreal, called for more intervention and perhaps less concern about the internal affairs of other countries.[36]

There has been considerable controversy attendant with the governmental initiatives which called for Canada to take a more pro-active and interventionary stance in its involvement in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and elsewhere. These initiatives, this paper suggests, were very much the product of Mulroney's predisposition toward prime ministerial activism in the conduct of foreign policy late in the second, and what was to be, his final term of office. Mulroney had become the initiator and main author of governmental initiatives involving Yugoslavia. The fact that Mulroney had earlier begun to intensify, as Nossal described it, "the institutionalization of a source of prime ministerial advice on foreign policy,"[37] namely the PMO, complemented the Prime Minister's special interest in the Yugoslav problem. It was ultimately from the offices of the Prime Minister and his minister of external affairs that Canadian initiatives and challenges to the conventional doctrines of non-intervention and state sovereignty received their catalytic impetus and drive.

In the final analysis Mulroney's leadership in Canada's foreign policy reflected "the stance of a man," in the words of Roger Gibbins, "determined to shape rather than be shaped by his times. Brian Mulroney led throughout, no matter how uneasy many of us were about his destination."[38] In responding to Mulroney's announcement on February 24, 1993 to retire as Prime Minister of Canada the *Globe and Mail* in broader terms went so far as to suggest that:

> It could be said that Brian Mulroney's government has been the most radical in Canadian history, leading Canada to free trade with the United States, possibly Mexico and beyond, reshaping the contours of the state in society through privatization, deregulation and tax reform, and coming within sight of altering the very structure of our parliamentary institutions and federal system.[39]

It may well be said as well that Brian Mulroney's foreign policy - as evidenced by Canada's involvement in the former Yugoslavia - has been the most radical in history in that it sought, as no other government in Canadian history had, and, if the current Liberal government's cautiousness towards Yugoslavia is any indication, will likely seek, for some time, to reshape the contours of international relations.

Future Directions

While not entirely within the parameters of this study it can be noted that in contrast to the Mulroney government, the current Liberal government, soon after assuming power, significantly reigned in the interventionist tendencies that had evolved and showed signs of expanding and taking on new life under the Conservative government. Jean Chretien's government has maintained a much lower profile in terms of Canada's involvement in the former Yugoslavia. It has been less comfortable than its predecessors with Canada's obligation to maintain a presence in Bosnia despite the violence and the difficulties in finding a political solution to the conflict. As reported by an official in the Prime Minister's office, Chretien "wasn't comfortable with this new sort of peacemaking" because it was "really very different from classical peacekeeping that Canadians have always known."[40] More to the point Chretien's government has gone so far as to seriously question Canada's presence in the former Yugoslavia within the context of a review of Canadian foreign policy. These signs of a retrenchment in Canadian foreign policy from a more interventionist approach to the crisis in Yugoslavia to one that emphasized caution was best illustrated by the formal debate in the House of Commons on the role of Canadian peacekeeping initiated by the new Liberal government early in 1994.

In opposition both the Liberals and New Democrats expressed similar views on issues concerning sovereignty of the state and human rights issues as related to the Yugoslav conflict and other issues. Both were critical of the Conservative government for not *acting* quickly and decisively enough to head off the impending crisis in Yugoslavia. Both parties chastised the government for not acting quickly enough to recognize the separatist aspirations of the Slovenes and Croats who were being beaten up by militarily superior federal army/Serb forces. Both parties, like the Conservative government itself, were also subject to intense and sustained pressure from their domestic Croat and Slovenian constituents to have the opposition and government respond more actively to the violence and carnage that had begun to erupt in Yugoslavia. The Liberal opposition - heralding the arrival of the "new ethic of intervention" - led the charge against the Conservative government, attacking it for being indecisive, weak and slow in responding to the Yugoslav conflict. The Liberal opposition was also highly critical of the Conservative government for not allowing greater public consultation and parliamentary input in the development of Canada's foreign policy response towards the Yugoslav crisis and promoted the concept of the "democratization of foreign policy"[41] during the election campaign which brought the Liberals to power.

Having achieved power, however, the fervor with which the Liberals had attacked and criticized the indecisiveness and weakness of the Mulroney government foreign policy initiatives, was replaced by a cautious "wait and see" policy as far as Canada's future involvements in Croatia and Bosnia were concerned. The cautionary approach of the Liberal government was also felt within Canada's military and among those soldiers stationed in Croatia and Bosnia. The comment of a corporal recently stationed in Bosnia typified the perception within the military of the differing roles played by the Liberal government and its predecessor when he stated:

> I think the Mulroney government was more aggressive in the role it took in getting us there and before the present government took over. On the other hand, the big perception within the military was that Canadians would be withdrawn from Bosnia and Croatia after the Liberals came to power.[42]

The "new ethic of intervention" coined by the Liberal opposition in 1991 was replaced and dominated in 1994 by Liberal government initiatives which called for a review and a re-thinking of Canadian foreign and defence policy commitments in broader terms and the relevance of Canada's role in Croatia and Bosnia in more specific terms. The irony is that the "aggressive multilateralism" associated with the foreign policy of Mulroney's government towards the Yugoslav situation was being replaced with the traditional and more cautious multilateralism of the Chretien government anxious to return to the safer ground of traditional peacekeeping. This does not necessarily suggest that the Liberal government is any less in favour of rethinking the limits of sovereignty than when it was in opposition. The belief that the parameters of sovereignty require redefinition has gained, as illustrated in Hansard, fairly broad acceptance among all of Canada's political parties. The political will, however, actually to test the boundaries of sovereignty in the name of humanitarian intervention was, and is, another matter. The cases of Canada's involvement in UN intervention in Somalia in which Canadian forces were clearly operating in a peace enforcement operation and Prime Minister Mulroney's willingness to threaten Canada's participation in military intervention in Haiti suggests a greater willingness to assume the risks attendant with a policy more amenable to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the context especially of his government's tendency to advance Canada's place at the forefront of those states wishing to participate in and promote a more aggressive and more interventionist multilateral presence in the Yugoslav conflict, it can be argued that under Mulroney's government Canada displayed a greater inclination to test the conventional boundaries of sovereignty beyond the conventional limits of Canadian foreign policy.

Recognizing what his government perceives to be the failures, dangers and shortcomings of Conservative foreign policy towards the former Yugoslavia, Chretien, who is quite willing to leave the management of Canada's foreign policy in the hands of his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre Ouellet, has chosen a more prudent and less interventionist foreign policy approach to events in the former Yugoslavia today. From the beginning of Canada's involvement in the Yugoslav conflict the Liberals had criticized the Mulroney government for its closed-door approach to formulating foreign policy on Yugoslavia. The Liberal government was concerned that in spite of a substantial international presence in the former Yugoslavia there appeared to be no end in sight to the conflict; peace had not been achieved. Continued involvement by Canada without tangible prospects of peace was seen by the new government to be politically and militarily unsustainable. Since attempts at making a peace - with which the Conservative government had been identified - had not appeared to succeed, keeping the peace, if there was one to keep, remained the only acceptable option, short of a Canadian withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia. Where, for example, early in 1993 Canada's former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, hinted at the likelihood of unspecified but strong military action against Serb forces should Srebrenica, a safe area under the protection of Canadian forces, be attacked by them, Ouellet, in response to the recent Serb military offensive on Bihac, a UN designated safe area, expressed his regret that NATO aircraft chose to bomb a Serb airfield in the Krajina region of Croatia. Understandably Ouellet's response and low key approach to the conflict in Bosnia was inspired, first and foremost, by his government's concern for the safety and security of Canadian peacekeepers on the ground and in a broader context, the pragmatic perception, that humanitarian intervention could not be fully realized in Bosnia unless and until it was backed by the political will of the international community as well as Canadian public opinion. More importantly, Ouellet's response was reflective of a broader redirection of Liberal foreign policy which was prepared to place less emphasis on human rights and peacekeeping operations and more emphasis on trade and economic relations.[43] The Liberal's once in power found themselves arguing pragmatically, that Canada not be provoked into over-reacting to events in the former Yugoslavia and not to overstretch in terms of its financial and political capabilities.

Conclusion

While this study has shown that international and domestic factors interacted to influence the shift in Canadian foreign policy, the role of political leadership emerges as the strongest factor behind the change. It is true that the international environment - minus the constraints that had existed prior to the demise of super-power bipolarity - presented Canadian foreign policy with new opportunities and uncharted options. It is also true that on humanitarian grounds public opinion in Canada was inclined to favour interventionary policies aimed at resolving the Yugoslav conflict. However, it is also true that, left to its own devices, it is not likely that the foreign policy-making bureaucracy would have developed the kinds of initiatives that, in their sum, constituted a rejection of the doctrine of non-intervention, and, at the same time, constituted evidence of an important change in foreign policy. This policy was reconstructed largely on the premise that the time had come to call to account the principle of sovereignty as the dominant doctrine dictating relations among states. Therefore, the dangers and challenges associated with the path taken by Canadian policy towards the former Yugoslavia could only be assumed and supported by political leadership. As confirmed recently by Harald von Reikoff, "Even though he had had no personal background in international affairs, Mulroney demonstrated a more sustained interest and day-to-day direct involvement in foreign policy than any other Canadian peacetime prime minister."[44] For the past three years the unresolved Yugoslav crisis has remained the dominant issue on the diplomatic agenda of the West. Brian Mulroney's direct involvement in Canadian foreign policy has ensured Canada's place as an important contributor to the attempted resolution of the conflict and his own place as the author of a new foreign policy. Not to be forgotten is the fact that the Prime Minister's dominant role in initiating a shift in Canadian foreign policy was also made possible by Barbara McDougall who, in tandem with Mulroney, espoused a willingness to show leadership in challenging the *modus operandi* in international relations. Both repeatedly declared an anger and frustration with the shortcomings of conventional doctrines of inter-state relations in coming to grips with the Yugoslav conflict and the consequent lack of political will to interfere in the domestic affairs of a state unwilling or unable to protect the human rights of its people.

Endnotes

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17. Interview; source confidential.

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